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Abstract 
This dissertation reports on how academics in one pre-1992 university in England perceive the 
impact of quality audit processes on their teaching and draws on data from 64 interviews with 
academics and a substantial documentary analysis. The study considers the close relationship 
between quality assurance mechanisms and a culture of quality audit, and how this relationship 
is perceived to impact on the work of academics. The analysis includes consideration of the 
effects of eight internal and external quality assurance mechanisms: peer observation, student 
course evaluation, annual programme review, approval systems for new and revised 
programmes/units, institutional audit, external examining, the 2005 UK National Student Survey, 
and the degree validation activities of professional, statutory, and regulatory bodies. The arenas 
of academic work examined cover undergraduate classroom teaching practice, academics' 
workloads, the curriculum, and power relations between academics and students. 
The dissertation reveals that quality audit processes are perceived as the symbolic regulation of 
academic work, and that the English Quality Assurance Agency is believed to exercise 
hierarchical control over the case study university. Respondents held mixed views towards 
quality audit processes. One third perceived it as important in providing them with new 
paradigms to think about and improve their work through, for example, increasing awareness of 
the importance of good undergraduate teaching. This suggests that the process of quality audit 
has only resulted in bringing about a slight culture shift in relation to teaching, but the effect of 
QAA Institutional Audit upon the case study university, especially at the academic level, 
appeared to have weakened when compared with that of the QAA Subject Review period. Some 
respondents, however, showed resistance to quality audit processes and regarded it as an 
ineffective and bureaucratic practice. It was noted that there was a perceived tension between 
quality audit processes and the professional values of respondents. This tension exists due to 
some academics' negative perceptions regarding the time cost of audit, the bureaucracy it entails, 
and the distrust of academics it implies. 
xiii 
Chapter 1: Introduction to My Thesis 
Section One: Rationale for the Research 
My research explores how academics in England perceive the impact of quality audit 
processes on their work through examining a case study of a research-intensive, 
pre-1992 British university. The motivation behind my research lies in a strong 
personal interest in the quality audit movement in higher education in England. That 
movement is a main resource used by international students to judge the quality of 
teaching at a university. When I was applying for my MA courses in England in 2003, 
friends told me to choose the university according to its ranking by Times Online 
because they believed that a high ranking represented good quality and a good 
standard of teaching and learning. I followed their suggestion and chose one of the 
top ten universities ranked by Times Online. 
When it was time to choose my Ph. D. courses in 2004, I realized the importance of 
the Subject Review score because the department where I had completed my Master 
courses was proud of its high scores in that assessment. Subject Review is an official 
resource used to judge the quality of teaching at universities in the UK. Thus I began 
to pay attention to the assessment results of Subject Review and related that standing 
to my Ph. D. application. It appeared that the Graduate School of Education at the 
University of Bristol achieved full scores on the Subject Review in 2001, so I moved 
to Bristol for my Ph. D. study. At the beginning, I found that study of teaching quality 
and quality audit processes had become an international trend since the 1980s 
because many countries have established their own national quality assurance agency 
to assure the quality of undergraduate teaching. 
Considering the international trend of this quality audit, I became interested in two 
aspects, namely quality audit cultures and quality assurance mechanisms that were 
related to teaching and learning in England. I wanted to find out the relationship 
between the quality audit and quality assurance mechanisms and to reveal how 
quality audit achieved its impact through these mechanisms. The quality audit culture 
refers to the growth of cultures in the higher education sector and the widespread use 
of quality assurance mechanisms and procedures to assure and enhance the quality of 
teaching within an institution. There were eight quality assurance mechanisms 
researched for this thesis. Four were internal quality assurance mechanisms within 
the institution: Peer observation, student course evaluation, annual programme 
review, and the approval system for new and revised programes and units. The other 
four were external mechanisms: the work of the Quality Assurance Agency for 
Higher Education in England (QAA); external examining; the 2005 National Student 
Survey; and professional, statutory and regulatory bodies. The QAA took over the 
legislative responsibilities of the Higher Education Funding Councils for England 
(HEFCE) for subject-based teaching quality assessment as well as the audits that had 
previously been done by the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) (Taggart, 
2004). The QAA accomplishes this task by working with higher education 
institutions to define academic standards and quality; it carries out and publishes 
reviews in light of these standards from 1997 onwards (QAA, 2007). The QAA 
includes external examining and professional, statutory, and regulatory bodies in its 
code of practice, which provides a set of guidelines that identifies expectations 
covering matters relating to the management of academic quality and standards in 
higher education (QAA, 2006c). 
To explore the impact of the audit culture, I decided to analyze it from the perception 
of academics, to find out what academics thought of the quality audit and how that 
audit had affected their work efforts, particularly their teaching. There were several 
reasons for my interest in academic work in England; in particular my three - year 
university teaching experience in China caused me to be interested in studying the 
work of academics because academic staff are shapers of policy, or at the very least, 
interpreters of it. Academics also have an important role in maintaining and 
2 
enhancing the quality of teaching and learning. Thus, there is a need to focus on what 
academics think of the quality audit processes and determine whether they have 
become enmeshed in its audit culture. I also wanted to use the research to contribute 
to the development of higher education in China. The quality audit system in 
England is better developed than that in China, so studying quality audit and its 
quality assurance mechanisms in England could conceivably benefit academics and 
universities in China in the future. 
Section Two: Aims of the Research and the Research Questions 
The central purpose of my research is to interpret critically how academics perceive 
quality audit procedures and examine the perceived impact of quality audit on their 
work, as well as explain why there has been dissatisfaction about these quality audit 
processes among academics. Great emphasis has been placed on the close 
relationship between the growth of the notion of an audit culture in UK public 
services and its related quality assurance mechanisms (the mode and the purpose of 
these mechanisms and also the nature and extent of the mechanism activities). 
Additionally, emphasis has been placed on how quality audit achieves its impact 
through these mechanisms and the process for producing the critical analysis of how 
academics interpret their notion of professionalism in the context of such that audit. 
Three main research questions are addressed in my dissertation: 
Research Question One: What perceived impact have the external quality assurance 
mechanisms, such as the QAA Institutional Audit, the external examining system, the 
control of professional, statutory and regulatory bodies over some teaching 
programmes and the 2005 National Student Survey (NSS), had on the work of 
academics? 
Research Question Two: What perceived impact have the internal quality assurance 
mechanisms within the institution, namely, peer observation, student course 
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evaluation, annual programme review and the approval system for new and revised 
programmes and units, had on the work of academics? 
Research Question Three: Do academics perceive themselves to be professionals? Is 
there a perceived tension between quality audit processes and the academic culture 
and the perception that academic work as a profession? 
These three research questions were shaped by the literature review summarized in 
Chapters 3,4, and 5, covering the interpretation of quality audit processes and 
cultures, recent changes to academic work, the impact of quality audit processes and 
cultures on the work of academics, and the interpretation of the terms, profession and 
professionalism. There are many academic research studies that have been concerned 
with the negative impact of quality audit. For example, Morley (2003) depicts the 
negative impacts caused by quality management from the perspective of academics. 
Harvey (2005) analyses the development of external quality management in the UK 
and its of ects on higher education. Newton's (2000,2002) empirical research studies 
explore how academics have viewed, responded to, and coped with quality 
monitoring, whether externally or internally driven. During this literature review, I 
notice that studies revealing views `from the top' tend to lead to a somewhat partial 
and limited view of issues relating to changes in higher education institutions. These 
studies tend to be aimed at `correcting' or implementing changes rather than just 
giving an account of the changes that are actually occurring. My research aims to 
present the different views held by academics regarding the quality audit process and 
analyse the possible reasons for why academics hold the views that they do, as well 
as to make recommendations on the future research on quality audit. 
My theoretical framework adapts Power (1994,1997) and Shore & Wright (2000), 
who criticised the external management, particularly that of Subject Review in 
higher education institutions in the UK in the 1990s. There still remains, however, a 
considerable gap to be filled regarding the regulation of the Institutional Audit, the 
successor process to the former Subject Review, on the work of academics. The post 
4 
2000 QAA Institutional Audit adopts a lighter review method than did the Subject 
Review. This change in the audit review method can conceivably affect the total 
impact of the quality audit. An in-depth study of numerous higher education 
institutions in England is beyond the scope of my dissertation, so my project presents 
one intensive case study of a single pre-1992 university in England, to produce an 
in-depth analysis of how research-active academics do think about the quality audit 
processes and cultures and their perceived impact on their academic work. The 
literature and documents reviewed for the research and the findings of the research 
are expected to provide new empirical material that will aid the overall 
understanding of quality audit processes and quality audit cultures in the British 
higher education sector. 
Section Three: Framework for the Research 
The framework for this research refers to the five strands of thought explored in the 
literature: 
" First, there has been a changed relationship between higher education and the 
Government of the UK since World War II and especially since the late 1970s 
(See Section 1.1 Chapter 2); 
" Secondly, during the expansion of higher education in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Government higher education policies have particularly paid attention to the 
concepts of efficiency and accountability (See Section 4 Chapter 2); 
" Third, there has been an evolution in teaching and academic standards quality 
regimes, especially from HEQC's need to explain HEQC, to the QAA whose 
role is better understood. Subject Review (which examined teaching and 
assessment in individual academic departments) and a separate institution-wide 
review of academic standards was replaced by a single process of Institutional 
Audit, which adopted a lighter touch overall review for academic institutions 
without the detailed inspection of academic departments (See Section 1.4 
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Chapter 2) ; 
0 Fourth, the resistance of academics toward the quality audit processes and the 
perceived negative impact of such processes on the work of academics (See 
Chapter 5); 
" Fifth, debates on the nature of academic work and whether that can be regarded 
as a profession or not. This discussion relates to the definition of "profession". 
(See Chapter 4) 
Section Four: Organization of the Dissertation 
My dissertation has eleven chapters. The first chapter discusses the theme of the 
study, reasons for the research, aims of the study and the research questions as well 
as the theoretical framework for the research. Chapter Two provides a review of the 
contextual factors surrounding the emergence and development of quality audit 
processes within the higher education sector of England and covers the following 
aspects: The changed relationship between the university sector and the UK 
Government and the expansion of higher education and its consequences; the 
changing role of the funding bodies for higher education institutions, the reasons 
behind that change and the consequences of the change; the evolution of quality 
regimes in England; the relevant higher education policies related to the expansion of 
higher education in terms of the concepts of `efficiency' and `accountability'; and 
finally the introduction of new external quality assurance mechanisms imposed on 
educational institutions (in addition to the existing mechanisms such as external 
examining) and the development of internal quality assurance mechanisms within 
these institutions. 
The discussion running from Chapter 3 to Chapter 5 looks at the views of academic 
researchers on quality audit processes and cultures, especially on the different 
interpretations of quality and its related terms in UK higher education institutions. 
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The debate on academic work as a profession, the relationship between quality audit 
processes and the development of new managerialism is key, as is the value tensions 
that academics face during the process of quality audit and the academic debates 
about the significance of individual quality assurance mechanisms on their work. 
The design of my research is presented in Chapter 6. First, I illustrate the overall 
features of my interpretative paradigm and then identify the rationale for preferring a 
single case study. The research questions and the rationale for the case study are also 
identified. I report on the methodology for my data collection and how that process 
was perceived to have related to the research questions. The data collection methods, 
including semi-structured interviews and document analysis, and also any ethical 
issues arising in the course of the research are discussed. Finally I outline how I 
analyzed the data and the reasons behind that process. 
My results findings are presented and analyzed in four chapters, Chapter 7 through 
Chapter 10. Chapter 7 describes respondents' attitudes toward their workload and 
examines whether academics' heavy workload is related to the quality audit. Chapter 
8 presents how four individual external quality assurance mechanisms were 
perceived to have affected the work of respondents at the case study university. 
Chapter 9 examines how four internal quality assurance mechanisms were perceived 
to have affected the work of respondents at the case study university. Chapter 10 
compares these respondents' perceptions of the external quality assurance 
mechanisms with their perceptions of the internal mechanisms and assesses the 
extent to which the quality audit was perceived as affecting the work of respondents. 
The work of academics that is explored in these four chapters covers academic views 
about undergraduate classroom teaching practices, curricula, and the power relation 
between academics and students. 
The conclusion of this dissertation appears in Chapter 11 where I first draw together 
the overview of findings and then explain how the findings answer my research 
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questions. Then I compare my research with previous research to suggest in what 
way my research adds value and perception to the topic. Next, I reflect on my 
research process and present the merits and limitations of the research. Finally, areas 
for future research into quality audit processes are highlighted specifically. 
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Chapter 2: Context of Quality Audit in England 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the contextual factors underlying the emergence and 
development of quality, quality audit processes, quality assurance mechanisms, and 
audit culture within English higher education. Firstly, I draw on the literature to 
reveal the changing relationship between the university and the Government since 
World War II. Secondly, the expansion of higher education and its consequences are 
presented. Thirdly, I examine the changing role of the funding bodies for higher 
education institutions, reasons behind their change and consequences of this change. 
Fourthly, I focus on the evolution of quality agencies, especially the QAA. Fifthly, I 
analyze relevant higher education policies in the expansion of higher education, 
particularly the concepts of `efficiency' and `accountability'. Sixthly, I introduce the 
external quality assurance mechanisms imposed on the higher education institutions 
and the internal quality assurance mechanisms within the institution. The mode and 
the purpose of these mechanisms, together with the nature and extent of these 
mechanisms are described and analyzed. This chapter thus provides a conceptual 
overview of Government policies towards quality and quality audit followed by a 
focus on the political intentions that underpin various strategies used to implement 
reforms in the higher education institutions of England. 
Section one: Contextual factors in the rise of quality and quality audit 
This section examines the impact of the changed relationship between the 
Government and higher education on the funding and management of the higher 
education sector, such as the establishment of the quality regime and the requirement 
of efficiency and accountability. It reveals that the UK Government aims to increase 
returns on public investment in higher education, and that there is a strong desire for 
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universities to drive the economic development of society. The requirement for 
efficiency and accountability can be seen as an external control by the Government 
over the higher education sector, through which the universities are expected to 
become productive and to provide high quality education. 
1.1 Changed relationship between universities and Government 
There are two key concepts in this part: State and Government. The idea of `State', 
adopted from Salter& Tapper (1994), essentially means the political dimension of the 
State during a particular time period. It also conveys the interaction of political and 
bureaucratic institutions which may incorporate the input of societal interests (for 
example, the important pressure groups in higher education) at particular points in 
time. However, due to the limited scope and scale of this dissertation, it is impossible 
to review the wider literature on the changing role of the State in civil society, so this 
part focuses on the relationship between the Government and higher education. The 
concept of 'Government', which appears in this part, refers to a particular 
Government, such as 'Mrs. Thatcher's Government' (the Conservative Government 
1979-1990) and 'the Government of Blair (the New Labour Government, 
1997-2007). 
The changed relationship between the Government and higher education is explored 
according to the evolution of the funding bodies for higher education: 1919-1989 
(University Grant Committee); 1989-1993 (Universities Funding Committee); and 
1993 till now (the Higher Education Funding Council for England). The relationship 
has shifted from sponsorship-dependency relationship to Government as an investor 
in higher education. (For details see sections below) 
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1.1.1 Sponsorship-dependency relationship 
Salter & Tapper's (1994) analysis of the publications from Government, Parliament, 
and the funding bodies reveals that there has been a shift in the balance of power 
between universities and the State since 1919. One reason is that the UK Government 
realized the vital importance of the universities after the two world wars and intended 
to have a radical expansion in science and technology to meet the needs of the 
economy. Salter & Tapper (1994) call this the economic ideology of higher education 
and see it as a way for the State to exercise control over the higher education 
institutions. The universities thus became increasingly financially dependent upon 
the Government from the late 1940s. `The effect upon the proportion of universities' 
income received from the University Grants Committee (UGC) was marked, rising 
from 36 per cent in 1938-39 to 60 per cent in 1947-48' (Salter & Tapper, 1994, p. 
131). In this situation, the Government's approach to higher education shifted from 
`an exchange relationship to a sponsorship-dependency relationship' (Henkel & 
Little, 1999, p. 17). However, under the regime of the UGC, the Government allowed 
the universities to retain strong control of their own territory, such as the distribution 
of academic appointments and rewards, developing, transmitting and accrediting 
knowledge and evaluative criteria (Henkel, 2000). 
Since the 1980s, there has been a trend for the Government to exert more control 
over public expenditure on higher education. The first drastic reductions in funding 
for universities occurred in 1981. There were substantial reductions in the unit of 
resource for both universities and polytechnics during the following years. The 
university chose to reduce their intake in response to the cuts in 1981, while the 
polytechnics seized the opportunity to expand (Henkel, 2000). In the academic year 
1987-88 the UGC allocated just under 1.7 billion pounds to 44 universities (Taggart, 
2004). 
The Education Reform Act 1988 and the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 
changed irrevocably the relationship between the higher education institutions and 
the State. The Government increased its control over the funding, planning and 
management of higher education (Salter & Tapper, 1994). For example, from 1988 to 
1993, the universities were funded by the University Funding Councils (UFC). The 
government also removed polytechnics from local authority control in 1988 and 
created the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Committee (PCFC) in the Education 
Reform Act 1988. The polytechnics and colleges of higher education were funded by 
the PCFC between 1988 and 1992 (Brown, 2004). The PCFC allocated 1.1 billion for 
84 polytechnics and colleges in 1989-90 (Taggart, 2004). These changes suggest that 
the Government was no longer a provider of funds but became an investor in higher 
education, and it wanted the UFC to deliver national priorities and a mass higher 
education system, but not at an elite system price (Taggart, 2004). 
1.1.2 Government as investor of higher education 
In similar vein, Scott (1995) argues that the Government began to see themselves as 
the purchasers, on behalf of taxpaying citizens, of a range of teaching, research and 
consultancy services. For example, in order to promote efficiency through 
competition among providers, there was the development of internal markets in 
which contracts are made between purchasers - the Government or its agents, and 
providers of various teaching, research and consultancy services - universities and 
colleges. This changed relationship has had a direct impact on higher education in 
two areas: the control exercised by Governments over higher education institutions, 
and the funding of these institutions. For example, the 1992 Further and Higher 
Education Act abolished the binary line (the distinction between universities and 
polytechnics). The rationale behind this Government policy is: `The real key to 
achieve cost-effective expansion lies in greater competition for funds and students. 
That can best be achieved by breaking down the increasingly artificial and unhelpful 
barriers between the universities, and the polytechnics and colleges. ' (HMSO, 1991, 
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p. 12) In the same year, the UFC and the PCFC were replaced by the unified Higher 
Education Funding Councils for England (HEFCE) under the 1992 Act. The HEFCE 
is a funding body of higher education as well as a regulatory body. This is achieved 
through its power to attach conditions of grant to funding, and through its power of 
accountability (Kogan & Hanney, 2000). 
The Government does not have the power to allocate funds to any particular 
institution or subject area, because the funding is allocated by the HEFCE, which 
receives all its funding from the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), but the 
Government does have power over the HEFCE in two aspects (Taggart, 2004). One 
is that the DfES sets the overall funding levels for higher education. The other is the 
DfES sets the HEFCE running costs which affect its ability to grow as an 
organization to set and deliver on its own agenda. This suggests that the Government 
acts as an investor of higher education, and that it does have the power to set the 
overall funding levels and an overarching framework for policy development in 
higher education. The power relationship is translated by HEFCE into the higher 
education sector (Taggart, 2004). 
1.2 Expansion of higher education 
Together with this changed relationship, the expansion of higher education took place 
in the UK. The expansion of the number of students and higher education institutions, 
and the consequence of this expansion will be analyzed in this section. 
The first wave of expansion happened between 1963 and 1975. In 1945, the UK had 
a small university population, catering for three per cent of the school-leaver age 
group, but from 1945 to the early 1970s, expansion resulted in a five-fold expansion 
to 15 per cent. The number of universities increased from 24 to 43 between 1945 and 
1967 (Kogan & Hanney, 2000). In this phase of expansion, the material standards of 
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what the universities provided were rising. For example, an increasing number of 
students were being accommodated away from home and staff ratios improved from 
1: 10.2 in 1939 to 1: 8.6 in 1952, and then to 1: 7.2 in 1957. However, the resulting 
increases in the cost led to more control over resources by the Government (UGC, 
1958). 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a dynamic growth of a second wave of expansion of higher 
education. The number of universities in the UK increased to 105 in 1997. The 
number of school leavers entering higher education rose to 32 per cent in 1995 
(Kogan & Hanney, 2000). The expansion has carried on since the 1990s. According 
to a DfES (2003) report, The Future of Higher Education, 43% of 18-30 year olds 
would participate in higher education in 2003. The Government aims to increase 
participation towards 50 per cent of those aged 18-30 by 2010 (Kogan & Hanney, 
2000). This suggests that widening participation has become a key element of 
Government policy for higher education. There are two main reasons for the 
Government's interest in this expansion. One is the strong demand for graduates. 
Research shows that 80 per cent of the 1.7 million new jobs needed by the end of the 
decade will recruit those with higher education qualifications. The other reason is 
because the UK participation rate of 43 per cent of 18-30 year olds is lower, 
according to OECD comparisons, than in many other developed countries (DIES, 
2003). 
1.2.1 Consequences of expansion 
However, some researches critique that the expansion has not produced the culture 
change which is normally associated with a mass system (Scott, 1995). Despite the 
quantitative indicators which suggest that British higher education is now a mass 
system, in qualitative terms it still feels like an elite system because many practices 
in British universities remain rooted in an elite past, such as an enduring commitment 
14 
to a research culture, selective entry, specialized academic disciplines, high student 
retention, and high academic standards (ibid). Although there is a lack of culture 
change, according to Scott (1995), the expansion has caused changes in the following 
ways. 
The first change is the view of the Government towards higher education. During the 
first wave of the expansion, there was a predominant view that higher education was 
an investment good because individual rates of return were high. Higher education 
was thus acknowledged to be a public responsibility because everyone would benefit 
from investment in higher education in the long run, not only those who participated 
directly. However, during and after the second expansion, higher education began to 
be regarded as consumption good. The view for regarding it as a public responsibility 
weakened. This expansion was accompanied by a decline of distinctively graduate 
careers (Scott, 1995). 
The second change is that the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 marked a 
major reshaping of UK higher education (Scott, 1995). The polytechnics grew bigger 
and politically stronger in both the local and national contexts (Henkel, 2000), 
because they become universities. Meanwhile, the end of the binary system made the 
previously autonomous universities respond to forms of central regulation which had 
applied to the polytechnics and other non-university institutions but not to them 
(Kogan & Hanney, 2000). 
The third change is the standard of provision (Scott, 1995). The ratio of full-time 
students to full-time university staff rose from `8.1 to 11.2 between 1971/72 and 
1989/90' (Halsey 1992, p. 99). In the pre-1992 universities this ratio rose from 9.5 in 
1981/82 to 14.0 in 1993/94, whilst in all universities in the unified sector, this ratio 
reached 17 in 1994/95 (Kogan & Hanney, 2000). 
The fourth change is that institution grants plus fees for full-time equivalent students 
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in the UK fell between 1995/96 and 1998/99 from 4904 pounds to 4305 pounds per 
student, a drop of 12.2 per cent (Taggart, 2004). This drop was higher in England (at 
12.8%) than in Scotland (10.3%) or Wales (8.1%) (AUT, 1996). Meanwhile, the 
expenditure on higher education rose by around 45% in real terms between 1976 and 
1996-97, but fell by about 40% for each student over the same period (Dearing 
Report, 1997). 
The fifth change is that academic salaries suffered considerable attrition when 
compared with those of comparable groups (Taggart, 2004). The Association of 
University Teachers (AUT) pointed out that whilst university salaries remained 
unchanged in real terms from 1981, comparable groups had seen increases from 
between 18 and 50 per cent. The Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals 
(CVCP), using different bases of comparison, observed that while university 
teachers' pay grew by 8.6 per cent in real terms between 1961 and 1993, non-manual 
male workers in general saw their pay increase by 37 per cent (Dearing Report 1997, 
p. 32). 
To summarize, the expansion of higher education has so far resulted in the fall in the 
unit of resource, the worsening of staff-student rations, and reduced pay in real terms 
for academics. The changed relationship between universities and Government has 
made the higher education institutions become far more vulnerable to political 
interventions. The responsibility for managing and regulating higher education has 
thus been placed on the funding bodies for the higher education institutions. 
1.3 The changing role of the funding bodies 
In this section, a description and analysis of the funding bodies for higher education 
institutions will focus on those in England, such as the University Grant Committee 
(UGC), the University Funding Council (UFC), and the Higher Education Funding 
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Councils for England (HEFCE). A simple chronological history of these funding 
bodies is listed in Appendix 8. 
1.3.1 University Grant Committee (UGC) 
The UGC was created by the Government in 1919 and lasted seventy years. It was 
perceived as a `buffer' organization between the Government and the universities, 
characterized as a partnership based on mutual dependence, and it tried to keep 
politics out of the funding allocations to individual higher education institutions 
(Brown, 2004; Salter & Tapper, 1994; Scott, 1995; Shattock, 1994; Taggart, 2004). 
The UGC is seen as a rational planner in its approach to the management of the 
university sector, particularly in the early 1980s, and its development is divided into 
four periods: 1919-1945,1945-1963,1963-1979, and 1979-1989. (Taggart, 2004) 
1.3.1.1 UGC 1919-1945 
In the period of 1919-1945, the UGC was seen as a funding body to distribute grant 
income to institutions. Its members were drawn primarily from the higher education 
sector (Taggart, 2004). The role of the UGC in this period was essentially `reactive' 
to the demands from higher education institutions, and it did not have a role in 
defining the activities of the institutions supported through its funding (Shattock, 
1994). Instead the UGC reacted to the pressure either from the Government or the 
University. There was a partnership of convenience between the UGC and the 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP). Both of them worked in 
partnership to persuade the Government that the HE sector needed more funding to 
maintain the quality of research, and to support the growth in student numbers 
(Shattock, 1994). 
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1.3.1.2 UGC 1945-1963 
In the period 1945-1963, the UGC did not play the role of mediator between the 
Government and the University (Taggart, 2004) because the Government was willing 
to provide ever increasing funding to the universities (Shattock, 1994). The UGC 
operated as an intermediary between the Government and the universities. It 
explained the needs of the sector to the Government while keeping the institutions 
content with their annual allocation of grant funding (Taggart, 2004). 
1.3.1.3 UGC 1963-1979 
According to Salter & Tapper (1994, p. 198), `from the 1960s onwards the UGC 
appeared to be subjected to more explicit political direction, and more amenable 
pressure from the State'. The effective cut of the unit of funding per student gave the 
UGC no alternative but to allocate the funds it received and to accept the grievance 
of university staff (Taggart, 2004). By the mid-1970s, the system of planning 
university funding some five years in advance collapsed. As a result, the university 
system became vulnerable to changes in the political climate (Shattock, 1994), and 
the UGC was no longer seen as in tune with the needs of the times (Shattock, 1994) 
because when the UGC tried to maintain elite traditions and parallel funding levels, 
this created a tension between the Government's aim to reduce public expenditure 
and unit costs. The Conservative Government thus felt that the UGC could not 
manage the higher education system and moved it swiftly towards the mass higher 
education model (Taggart, 2004). 
1.3.1.4 UGC 1979-1989 
The period 1919 to 1979 was a period of growth in higher education with the 
expansion fully funded (Taggart, 2004). However, the arrival of the 1979 
Conservative Government reversed that trend. It was committed to reducing 
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Government expenditure on education, increasing efficiency, and redirecting the 
educational system further towards the needs of industry (Scott, 1995). In the period 
1980-81 to 1983-84, the cumulative effect of the cut of grant for home students plus 
the withdrawal of subsidy for overseas students led to an 11% reduction in 
universities' general income. Meanwhile, there was substantive reduction in income 
from the UGC to some institutions (Taggart, 2004). These changes together with 
hyper inflation during the 1970s made it hard for the UGC to provide appropriate 
management for the expansion of higher education from the 1980s onwards. As a 
result the UGC moved from its position as a broker to an all-powerful arbitrator of 
funds to the university sector (Taggart, 2004). However, after the massive 
Government funding cut was enacted in 1981, the Government still saw the 
universities as inefficient, wasteful and unresponsive. One measure by the 
Government was to commission an examination of the role, structure and staffing of 
the UGC (Scott, 1995). 
The Jarratt Committee was established by the Committee of Vice Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP) in 1984 to give guidance and advice to universities on strategic 
planning in the context of Government cuts in the funding for the higher education 
sector (Taggart, 2004). This committee was seen as a safety valve put in place by the 
CVCP as the representative body for the universities (Scott, 1995). The Jarratt Report 
(CVCP, 1985) pointed out that the UGC needed to be proactive in the new policy 
environment, and that the higher education system needed a new focus on leadership 
and vision to cope with the management of change in higher education. It meant that 
the universities needed to bring the functions of planning, resource allocation and 
accountability together with a corporate planning process. However, the report cast 
doubt on whether the UGC would carry out its roles in promoting and encouraging 
good management practice. 
Following the Jarratt recommendation there was a review of the UGC, mainly on its 
constitutional position and role in relation to the Government and the universities, on 
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its internal structures and working methods, and its secretariat. This review was 
undertaken by the Croham Committee appointed by the Government and was 
established in July 1985, with its result published in 1987 (Taggart, 2004). The 
Croham Committee supported the UGC as an intermediary body on the grounds that 
the Government required independent policy advice from a professional expert 
organization. However, the committee was worried that the UGC was unable to take 
action in respect of the financial performance of an institution. One concern of the 
committee was the failure of the UGC to spot the financial crisis at University 
College Cardiff, which led to its collapse (Shattock, 1994). This was an important 
factor in the downfall of the UGC. The committee recommended that the UGC 
should be reconstituted as a University Funding Committee and that it should have a 
substantial proportion of non-academic members on its governing council, in order to 
let it represent the wider national interest (Croham, 1987). The Government accepted 
the recommendation from the Croham Committee and announced in the 1987 White 
Paper `Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge' that it would establish the 
Universities Funding Council (UFC) as a new funding body for higher education 
(DES, 1987). 
1.3.2 University Funding Council (UFC) 
There were two funding structures for higher education in the period 1989-1993: the 
UFC for the university, and the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Committee 
(PCFC) for polytechnics. Both the UFC and the PCFC were created by the Education 
Reform Act 1988 and dissolved in 1993 under the provisions of the Further and 
Higher Education Act 1992 (Scott, 1995). 
The UFC provided funding for the university sector in the UK from 1988 to 1992, 
with its independence enshrined in legislation, but it was more accountable to the 
Government than the UGC (Taggart, 2004). There is a perception that the UFC was 
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established by the Government to manage and control the higher education sector 
and to exercise control over public investment in highcr education (Scott, 1995). 
Similarly, Taggart (2004) regards the UFC as a regulator of the Government 
investment in the higher education system, as well as a purchaser of teaching and 
research from the university on behalf of the Government. 
According to Taggart (2004), the establishment of the UFC was an important step in 
transforming the funding body from a provider of grants (UGC) to a regulator and 
manager of the higher education system (UFC and HEFCE). Taggart (2004) argues 
that although the life of the UFC was short, lasting just five years, the UFC is 
significant in some aspects: first, it established the tradition that the funding council 
became an agent of the Government and that the Council should operate within the 
overarching framework of Government funding and strategy for higher education; 
second, it established a new type of relationship between the Government and the 
higher education in that the Government became an investor in higher education; and 
third, it attempted to introduce market forces into the funding for teaching (Taggart, 
2004). 
However, Scott (1995) points out that the UFC embodied subordination and a loss of 
autonomy, because in its early beginning, the UFC was guided by, and operated 
within, the context of the 1987 White Paper `Higher Education: Meeting the 
Challenge', which aimed to develop a higher education system that would effectively 
meet the needs of the economy. The Government proposed an increase and widening 
of participation in higher education, more selectively funded research, greater links 
between higher education institutions and industry, and an emphasis on measuring 
quality and efficiency in teaching and research (HMSO, 1987). This suggested that 
funding was no longer unconditional, but provided for specific activities and 
deliverables, and that the Government had moved from being a provider of funding 
to higher education institutions to being an investor in higher education. 
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The UFC chairman, Lord Chilver, encouraged institutions to bid against each other in 
order to drive down unit costs. The allocation of the additional student place was 
based on a bidding competition. This meant that if an institution bid below the offer 
price and was able to persuade the UFC that this would not lead to a decrease in 
quality then the UFC would allocate the institution a greater share of the available 
student places. Lord Chilver's remarks about making students contribute to the cost 
of their tuition increased the universities' sense of alienation, and the UFC was thus 
seen as an arm of the Government (Scott, 1995). However, the higher education 
sector did not co-operate with this bidding process. In 1991, the UFC abandoned its 
strategy of seeking competitive bidding for all student numbers and restricted the 
bidding competition to the margin of growth in numbers. Meanwhile, the universities 
were encouraged to attract fees-only students (Taggart, 2004). 
1.3.3 HEFCE 
The 1991 White Paper `Higher Education: A New Framework' proposed a single 
funding structure for higher education institutions, and the creation of separate 
funding councils for higher education in England, Scotland and Wales (HMSO 1991). 
In 1992, the Higher Education Funding Councils for England (HEFCE), the Scottish 
Higher Education Funding Council (SHEFC) and Funding Council for Wales (FCW) 
were established. The HEFCE replaced both the UFC and the PCFC by the 1992 
Further and Higher Education Act which enshrined the legal independence of the 
HEFCE from the Government (Salter & Tapper, 1994). The basic theory underlining 
the creation of HEFCE was that the higher education institutions in the UK had to 
become both more efficient in their use of resources and more responsive to the 
needs of the economy (Brown, 2004). 
There are different interpretations to the role of the HEFCE. The HEFCE sees itself 
as a mediator and buffer organization between the Government and the higher 
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education sector (Taggart, 2004). However, there are different views from the higher 
education sector. Brown (2004) argues that the structural changes of the funding 
councils have marked a subtle dilution of institutional autonomy, with the HEFCE 
losing its buffer role and acting more or less directly as an agent of the Government. 
Taggart (2004) holds a different view that the HEFCE works as a mediator between 
the DfES and the higher education institutions, because the HEFCE is more 
accountable to the DfES than its predecessors, the UGC and the UFC. Taggart 
describes HEFCE as `a guide dog for the Government and the higher education 
sector' (p. 79), which absorbed the demands of the Government over the past decade 
and used the power of financial regulation to exercise control and influence over the 
higher education sector. For example, the DfES sets the levels of funding for 
activities within the overall funding for teaching and research. The HEFCE seldom 
opposes the wishes of the Government, except for its lack of attention to the wishes 
of the Government to link funding for teaching to teaching quality assessment (TQA). 
The reason why the Council adopted TQA is because the Rt. Hon John Patten MP, 
the secretary of State for Education, suggested that the HEFCE could use the former 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI), which was used for the polytechnics sector before 
the abolition of the binary line between polytechnics and universities, to assess 
teaching in the universities. This proposed method was refused by the HEFCE 
(Kogan & Hanney, 2000). Instead, the Council adopted Teaching Quality Assessment 
and had the power to withdraw funding from any higher education institution where 
quality had been demonstrated as unsatisfactory (HEFCE 1993). 
Based on an analysis of the HEFCE annual reports, Taggart (2004) argues that the 
HEFCE has actually become a regulator and manager of higher education through its 
financial power because if an institution seeks to disregard the conditions of the 
HEFCE grant, then it stands to lose funding. Kogan & Hanney (2000) share a similar 
view that on most occasions, the HEFCE can be perceived as a policy development 
and policy implementation body for Government strategy in support of national areas 
of priority. However, Taggart (2004) argues further that although the HEFCE 
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regulates the higher education sector, it cannot be seen as a planner of higher 
education for two reasons. One is because the HEFCE does not have the legislative 
power to direct funding to specific regions of the country to address a shortage in the 
provision of higher education. Its funding method was based on historical allocations 
plus a competitive bidding process whether for teaching or research. The other 
reason is that the HEFCE does not have the power to plan the activities of the higher 
education institutions. All the institutions are partly funded by the HEFCE, except 
the University of Buckingham, the UKs only private university, which receives no 
funding from the HEFCE. Therefore, the council uses its policies and funding to 
regulate and influence the activities of the higher education institutions. 
The literature indicates that there are some further differences between the HEFCE 
and the UGC. According to Taggart (2004), one difference is that the HEFCE is an 
agent of Government, not a buffer body like the UGC, so the role of the HEFCE is to 
regulate and to fund institutions against their own strategic plans rather than to 
impose any system-wide pattern of development, but the HEFCE needs to approve 
institutional development plans (ibid). Another difference is that the HEFCE can 
anticipate the financial crisis of the universities more quickly than the UGC. For 
example, the HEFCE annual reports for 1995-96 revealed that the higher education 
sector was in serious financial difficulty. Brandon Gough, the Chairman of the 
HEFCE, noticed this looming crisis and warned that if urgent offsetting action was 
not taken, the higher education sector as a whole would `move from a wafer-thin 
surplus into deficit in 1996-97' (HEFCE, 1996, p. 1). In contrast, the UGC failed to 
see the crisis coming when the University College Cardiff was in financial difficulty 
in the 1980s (Shattock, 1994). This suggests that the HEFCE recognizes these 
financial crises more quickly because the HEFCE has strong finance and audit 
departments in place to monitor the financial health of institutions, while the UGC 
did not (Taggart, 2004). 
Graeme Davies, the Chief Executive of the HEFCE in 1994, felt that because the 
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higher education institutions had received large amounts of public money, the 
independent higher education institutions were becoming increasingly accountable 
for their actions (HEFCE, 1995). According to Taggart (2004), there are two 
explanations for this view. One is that Davies was irritated by the way the Council 
felt it had been treated over the introduction of the Teaching Quality Assessment 
exercise. The other is that Davies wanted to make the HEFCE offective. Later on, the 
TQA was moved out of the HEFCE to an independent body - the Quality Assurance 
Agency for Higher Education (QAA). This was seen as a tactical move by the 
HEFCE, because there was no sympathy for the TQA system in the HE sector and 
the close association between TQA and the HEFCE would sour the relationship 
between the Council and the higher education institutions (Taggart, 2004). 
1.4 Development of the quality regime 
The QAA as a quality regime was established in 1997. Its development can be dated 
back to the time when the university system was under pressure to address the 
quality of teaching, but the CVCP was determined to retain as much autonomy as 
possible and established an Academic Standards Group, chaired successively by 
senior vice-chancellors, first by Philip Reynolds and then by Stewart Sutherland 
(Kogan & Hanney, 2000). Following the Reynolds Report (1986), the CVCP set up 
codes of practice on the maintenance and monitoring of standards, including external 
examining and arrangements for postgraduate training and research (Reynolds 
Report, 1986). The pressures for teaching quality to be assessed included not only 
ministers' and officials' concerns but some in the academic community who feared 
that if research was assessed, but teaching was not, even greater emphasis would be 
given to research (Cave, et a!., 1991). 
As a result, in the 1987 White Paper the Government stipulated that the quality of 
teaching in higher education institutions should be evaluated. There should be: `... 
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systematic arrangements for ... staff appraisal; evaluation of the results achieved, 
including analysis of external examiners' reports and students' employment 
patterns; ... and a feedback from students themselves (DES 1987, para. 3.12). The 
White Paper went on to suggest that the quality of teaching needed to be judged by 
reference mainly to students' achievements. The 1991 White Paper was more 
assertive about quality assessment of teaching: 
While recognizing that the precise arrangements will be a matter for the Funding 
Councils themselves, the Government considers it important that assessment of 
quality should continue to inform the funding decisions of the new Funding 
Councils. This is already the case with the PCFC and the UFC... the role of the 
assessment units will be for the Funding Councils to determine in consultation 
with institutions and subject to guidance from the Secretaries of State (DES 1991, 
para 79 and 83). 
In the view of Brown (2004), the 1991 White Paper included proposals for a new 
quality assurance regime which for the first time brought the regulation of all 
institutions' teaching and learning activities within an overall statutory framework. 
The proposed dual quality assurance regime consisted of an assessment by the 
HEFCE of the quality of teaching and learning in institutions; and second, audit by 
the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC), the Committee of Directors of 
Polytechnics (CDP) and the Standing Conference of Principals (SCOP) of 
institutions' quality control mechanisms. The HEQC was responsible for undertaking 
academic quality audits of higher education institutions in the UK, and the academic 
audit referred to external scrutiny aimed at providing guarantees that institutions 
have suitable quality control mechanisms in place (HEQC, 1994). According to 
Brown, the creation of the quality audit, the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA), 
and the associated machinery in the HEFCE and the HEQC, were part of the 
fundamental shift in the relationship between the Government and higher education. 
The Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA) started in 1993, and was carried out by the 
Quality Assessment Division (QAD), part of the HEFCE (Taggart, 2004). The TQA 
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was an external review of and judgments about the quality of teaching and learning 
in institutions. It was conducted by subject peer reviewers, with departments of the 
higher education institutions graded as excellent, satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
(Taggart, 2004). However, there was increasing criticism of the cost and the 
bureaucracy of the TQA, as well as growing resentment in the university system 
towards the TQA, quality audits, and increased accreditation activities by other 
professional and statutory bodies (Kogan & Hanney, 2000). This, together with 
debate between the HEFCE and the CVCP, government pressure and threats that the 
schools inspectorate, OFSTED might have its role extended into higher education, 
finally led to the establishment of the QAA in 1997 (Taggart, 2004). The replacement 
of the HEQC by the QAA suggests that there is a lack of stability in the various 
quality regimes since 1992. Brown (2004) argues that it is mainly because of 
continuing disagreements between the Government, the funding council and the 
institutions about the purposes, coverage, form and ownership of quality assurance, 
especially the issue of what is the best means of protecting the quality of student 
learning. 
There are different arguments used as to how an institution's arrangements for 
maintaining academic standards are best protected. One is that quality is best 
protected by institutions competing against one another for students and income. The 
main drivers of this view are efficiency in the use of resources and the need to match 
provision to requirements. The external assurance through assessment is thus focused 
on teaching and learning at subject/programme level. Another is that quality is best 
protected by an institution's own quality arrangements. The third is that external 
quality assurance is needed to benchmark standards at a national level/across the 
sector. Correspondingly, there is an emphasis on the collection and publication of 
information about quality and standards. 
27 
Section 2: External quality assurance mechanisms 
Except for the Institutional Audit by the QAA, there are several other external 
quality assurance mechanisms for monitoring quality, of which the external 
examining system, accreditation of programmes by professional and statutory bodies, 
and, since 2005, the National Student Survey are covered in this research study. This 
section includes a description and analysis of these mechanisms, mainly on their 
mode, purpose, and the extent of their activities. The mode refers to whether these 
mechanisms are carried out by the academic community collectively, by the 
Government or by an agency under its control, or by a combination of these means. 
The purpose means whether the mechanism aims primarily at improving institutional 
effectiveness in teaching and learning, or at improving the efficiency of the resources 
used for teaching and learning. The activities of these mechanisms mainly deal with 
academic standards, academic quality, and academic quality assurance. 
2.1 QAA 
This section looks at the work of the Quality Assurance Agency for higher education 
(QAA), mainly its Institutional Audit and its Academic Infrastructure. From the view 
of the UK Government, the QAA serves as an instrument in national higher 
education policy making and provides information on the quality of education 
(Taggart, 2004). It took over the legislative responsibilities of the HEFCE for 
subject-based teaching quality assessment as well as the audits that had previously 
been done by the HEQC (ibid). The QAA aims to safeguard the public interest in 
respect to sound standards of higher education qualifications and to inform and 
encourage continuous improvement in the management of the quality of higher 
education. The QAA does this by working with higher education institutions to 
define academic standards and quality, and it carries out and publishes reviews 
against these standards. The Agency publishes reports on most of its review activities 
(QAA, 2007). 
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2.1.1 Institutional Audit 
In England, the current review method by the QAA is Institutional Audit which was 
introduced in 2002-03 for a transitional period of three years, during which all higher 
education institutions in England were to host an Institutional Audit. In 2002-03 and 
2004-05,70 institutions participated in audits. In England, the first full programme of 
Institutional Audits was completed in 2005. Thereafter a six-year cycle became the 
norm (QAA, 2005). 
2.1.1.1 Objectives of Institutional Audit 
An objective of institutional Audit is to contribute to the promotion of high - quality 
in teaching and learning' (QAA, 2005). The audit process has five main phases: 
preparation, briefing visit, audit visit, audit report, and mid-cycle follow up. The 
audit assesses the quality and standards of teaching and learning at subject level and 
ensures that the higher education institutions are providing higher education, awards 
and qualifications of an acceptable quality and an appropriate academic standard, and 
are exercising their legal powers to award degrees in a proper manner. The audit 
focuses on ensuring that the quality assurance systems of the institution are in place 
and are working effectively to maintain academic standards and quality and on 
validating the information published by the institution (QAA, 2006a). 
The QAA puts a great emphasis on academic standards and academic quality. 
Academic standard is a way of describing the level of achievement that a student has 
to reach to gain an academic award which is at a similar level across the UK (QAA, 
2006a). While, academic quality is explained by QAA (2006a) as a way of describing 
how well the learning opportunities available to students help them to achieve their 
awards. It aims to ensure that appropriate and effective teaching, support, assessment 
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basic notion of its emphasis on academic standard and academic quality is that the 
institutional quality assurance would be judged against academic infrastructure 
which has evolved from recommendations about quality and standards made in the 
Dearing and Garrick reports in 1997 (Taggart, 2004). 
2.1.1.2 Academic Infrastructure 
The Academic Infrastructure provides a means of describing academic standards in 
UK higher education, of which practice for the assurance of academic quality and 
standards in higher education are included in my research and analyzed below. 
2.1.1.2.1 Subject benchmark Statements (SBSs) 
According to QAA (2006b), the benchmarks, together with the Framework for 
Higher Education Qualifications, programme specifications, and a code of practice, 
are a means of making explicit the nature and level of academic standards in higher 
education. The development of SBSs was one of a set of linked recommendations of 
the Dearing Report of 1997. All the SBSs were written by a group of academics and 
other specialists from the subject area. The Statements suggest what a first degree 
means to different subjects, and sets out expectations about standards of degrees in a 
range of subject areas. They are seen as providing academic staff and institutions 
with a point of reference in the design and development of degree programmes and a 
framework for specifying intended learning outcomes. 
2.1.1.2.2 Programme Specifications (PS) 
Another important part of the code of practice produced by the QAA is the 
programme specification (PS) which is a concise description of the intended 
outcomes of learning from a higher education programme, and the means by which 
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these outcomes are achieved and demonstrated. In the view of QAA (2006b), the PS 
is intended as public information to students and parents as well as is directed 
primarily to the academic audience: teaching staff, those involved in quality 
assurance, external examiners, professional bodies and statutory regulatory bodies. 
The QAA believes that the PS can help higher education make sure that designers of 
programmes are clear about the intended learning outcomes, in terms of knowledge 
and understanding, skills and other attributes. In designing first degree programmes 
and creating the PS institutons will be expected to use the information produced by 
SBSs. It is intended that the benchmarking information acts as a general check point 
against which the institution's outcomes and processes can be referenced. 
2.1.1.2.3 Code of practice 
The Code of practice provides a set of guidelines which identifies expectations 
covering matters relating to the management of academic quality and standards in 
higher education (QAA, 2006c). This Code is seen as central to the overall quality 
framework promoted by the QAA (McGhee 2003). Administratively, it links the 
Framework for Higher Education Qualification, subject benchmark statements and 
Institutional Audit. Politically, it reflects the authority of the agency to lay down an 
agenda for quality assurance, but acknowledges the autonomy of institutions to 
address the agenda according to their own mission and local circumstances (Harvey, 
2005). The code of practice covers ten sections, including external examining, which 
has historically been seen as independent of quality assurance. 
2.2 External examining 
The external examining system is a major feature of higher education in the UK and 
a key mechanism for ensuring that standards are maintained and comparable across 
higher education. There is an expectation that external examiners can act as 
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independent and impartial advisers providing institutions with informed comments 
on the standards set and student achievement in relation to those standards (Silver, 
1995). 
2.2.1 Development of external examining 
The introduction of external examining in this section is based on Silver (1995). 
According to Silver, the origin of external examining can be traced back to 1832 
when the University of Durham was established. The external examiners were 
additional examiners to help with the setting and marking of examinations. The 
purpose of the University of Durham using Oxford examiners was to confirm to the 
outside world that their degrees were of a comparable standard, so from the 
beginning of external examining one implication has been a statement about 
standards. By the 1880s a further expansion in the number of universities was 
accompanied by a requirement that examinations should be conducted by internal 
and external examiners. External examiners were then used as part of judgments 
about the standards of courses. 
According to Silver (1995), external examining developed slowly in British 
universities in the nineteenth century and was firmly established by the end of the 
twentieth century. It was associated with the discipline-based honours degrees and 
adopted by institutions newly entering higher education, with an intention of 
demonstrating their credibility and standards. In the 1950s the system became part of 
the operation of Colleges of Advanced Technology associated with the award of the 
Diploma in Technology by the National Council for Technological Awards (NCTA), 
and from 1965 those which came under the umbrella of the Council for National 
Academic Awards (CNAA) for their degrees and other awards. The CNAA regulated 
the procedures for the appointment, involvement and reporting of external examiners 
in its polytechnics and colleges of higher education. 
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Both the CNAA and the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) (now 
Universities UK (UUK)) had in the 1980s issued guidelines for the appointment and 
involvement of external examiners. The CVCP in 1984 described the appointment of 
external examiners as persons of sufficient seniority and experience to be able to 
command authority, but this qualification was dropped later. After the CNAA 
disappeared following the 1992 Education Act, the HEQC in 1994 set out the 
procedures and priorities by which institutions might ensure that they operate an 
effective system for external examiners. This suggests that the role of the external 
examiners becomes more complex with the changes in the traditional structure of 
higher education (HEQC, 1994). 
2.2.2 The role of external examiner 
Although the traditional role of the external examiner is as an additional marker, 
increasing student numbers have moved the external examiner towards the role of 
`moderator', in which capacity they scrutinize assessment procedures, sample 
student work, and become involved at the final stage only in relation to the most 
difficult and controversial individual cases. In some institutions, the role of the 
external examiner has been extended towards an advisory or consultancy and review 
role, advising on the creation of new units and programmes (Silver, 1995). 
In the view of Brown (2004), the external examining system is turned into a national 
system, because of the strong and continuing interest from the HEFCE. One example, 
Brown quoted is that the funding council asked the Cooke Committee in 2002 to 
look at ways of promoting better training and development for external examiners, 
particularly through some form of accreditation to promote higher standards and to 
develop over time a form of college or academy of accredited external examiners. 
The Committee produced the Cooke report which recommended that the external 
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examiner can hold a public assurance role by providing public information about 
standards through a summary report publicly available (Cooke Report, 2002). 
Furthermore, the QAA (2006d) regards external examining as an integral and 
essential part of institutional quality assurance, and specifies that there are three main 
purposes of external examining: to verify that academic standards are appropriate for 
the award or part thereof which the external examiner has been appointed to examine; 
to help institutions assure and maintain academic standards across higher education 
awards; and to help institutions ensure that their assessment processes are sound, 
fairly operated and in line with the institution's policies and regulations. This 
suggests that external examining has become part of the quality assurance system, 
and that the core role of the external examiner has become that of assuring the 
quality of assessment processes and maintaining academic standards. According to 
the QAA (2006d), institutions may ask external examiners to undertake other 
activities, such as, making comments on assessment practices at modules; advising 
on the comparability of the examining process across a range of programmes, the 
procedures for the classification of degrees; and being responsible, to some extent, 
for modules spanning different programmes. 
In the code of practice produced by the QAA, external examining is linked to subject 
benchmarking, the national qualifications frameworks and institutional programme 
specifications, all of which are part of the publicly available information that 
supports judgments on academic standards and quality assurance procedures (QAA, 
2006d). This reveals that the external examining system has been internalized within 
the institutions. 
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2.2.3 Terms of comparability and standard 
There are two key words in the purposes of external examining: standards and 
comparability. The notion of comparability carries with it an assumption about 
identifiable standards. According to Silver (1995), the principal support for external 
examining as a means of comparing standards remains at the level of the subject. 
Silver regards comprehensive and cross-subject comparison as impossible because 
only comparison with similar courses across institutions is possible. 
The belief in a common standard of award has provided the justification for the UK 
external examining system (Barnett, 1992). However, the idea of a common gold 
standard is argued to be a fiction because standards are subjective and elusive (Silver, 
1995). Silver's (1995) project examines the effectiveness and future of the external 
examining system, and reveals that most respondents believe that standards are 
actually the outcome of a collaborative activity, a consensus in which the various 
perceptions of internal and external examiners, within a regulatory framework, result 
in the implementation of a standard appropriate to the course and to the institution. 
This reveals that there is a link between institutional aims and expectations and the 
role of the external examiner, and that the external examiners play a variety of roles 
in establishing and maintaining standards by helping the individual institution to be 
aware of what others do and to enforce its explicit standards. 
To summarize, the external examining system helps the institutions to ensure that the 
academic standard of each award and its component parts is set and maintained by 
the awarding institution at the appropriate level, and that the standards of student 
performance are properly judged against this. But how about programme validation 
and curriculum accreditation? Who is responsible for those? The following section 
will answer these questions. 
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2.3 Professional, Statutory and Regulatory Bodies (PSRB) 
According to QAA (2006), the curriculum of higher education has never been part of 
the Government's concern or under central control, except in certain areas of 
professional preparation where the professional bodies validate the curriculum. 
Where a higher education institution offers vocationally orientated degrees it is likely 
to engage with a wide range of Professional, Statutory and Regulatory Bodies. In the 
case study university analysed in this thesis there are a number of vocationally 
oriented awards which are accredited by a range of PSRBs, for example, the British 
Computer Society (BCS). These are introduced in the section below. 
2.3.1 The British Computer Society (BCS) 
The British Computer Society is the qualifying body for Chartered Information 
Technology (IT) professionals. Established in 1957, and incorporated by Royal 
Charter in 1984, the BCS is licensed by the Engineering Council to award Chartered 
Engineer status (CEng) and Incorporated Engineer status (IEng); and more recently 
by the Science Council to award Chartered Scientist status (CSci). Its objects are to 
promote the study and practice of computing and to advance knowledge of and 
education in IT for the benefit of the public (BCS, 2006). 
2.3.2 Importance of PSRBs accreditation 
What is the purpose of PSRBs? According to the QAA (2006e), the PSRBs offer the 
only means of obtaining a license to practice a particular profession. In other words, 
admission to membership of a PSRB is taken to demonstrate the attainment of a 
particular range of occupational and professional skills. Hence, accreditation of a 
higher education programme by a PSRB may exempt graduates of the programme 
from further examination or assessment for membership, and give access to a licence 
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to practise. QAA Institutional Audit relates closely to the PSRB by taking into 
account its report, 
2.3.3 Institutional oversight of reports from PSRBs 
According to the QAA (2006e), the information from the 70 Institutional Audit 
reports published by November 2004 demonstrated that institutions engage 
constructively with PSRBs relevant to their provision, particularly at subject level. 
One positive view is that the process of accreditation by PSRBs can lead to valuable 
feedback on a range of issues of interest to the institution as a whole as well as those 
particular to the specific subject area. A number of audit reports noted that PSRBs 
reports were integrated with the institution's quality processes. For example, the 
PSRBs report informed the annual monitoring process, and a progress report on the 
actions following from PSRB comments formed a part of the annual monitoring 
report. However, many audit reports indicated that the primary responsibility for 
engaging with the PSRB was given to departments, schools or faculties with, in a 
few cases, a degree of central oversight. Several audit reports expressed concerns 
that there was little evidence of institutions using PSRB reports in their quality 
assurance processes. It was recommended that institutions should review the way in 
which they engaged with the PSRB accreditation process in order to ensure 
institutional oversight and consider any strategic implications in PSRB reports (QAA, 
2006e). 
To summarize, the PSRBs, like external examining and Institutional Audit can be 
seen as important processes of the external quality audit. Except for these external 
quality assurance mechanisms, the National Student Survey (NSS) has become 
another important process of the external quality audit. 
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2.4 National Student Survey (NSS) 
What is the NSS? The NSS is a national initiative across all publicly-funded higher 
education institutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The HEFCE is 
responsible for this survey. According to the HEFCE (2006a), the NSS aims to gather 
the feedback on the quality of students' courses, helps inform the choices of future 
applicants to higher education, and contributes to public accountability. Results from 
the NSS are regarded as an essential element of the revised quality assurance 
framework for higher education. The HEFCE commissions Ipsos UK to undertake 
the survey which was piloted and tested during 2003 and 2004 at 23 higher education 
institutions. The first full-scale survey, across more than 140 higher education 
institutions, took place in 2005. Results of the NSS are published on the Teaching 
Quality Information (TQI) web-site. 
2.4.1 Background of NSS 
Why was the survey conducted? According to the HEFCE (2006a), a revised quality 
assurance framework for higher education was developed following the completion 
of Subject Review by the QAA. A Task Group was set up to recommend what 
information the new framework should generate. The group consulted on proposals 
(HEFCE 01/66), and concluded (as set out in HEFCE 02/15) that an essential 
element would be consistently gathered and student feedback published through a 
new national survey. As part of a new framework for assessing the quality of higher 
education and providing information to the public, a national survey of students took 
place across all higher education institutions in UK during 2005. 
2.4.2 NSS methods 
What are the methods of the NSS? According to the HEFCE (2006b), the 2005 NSS 
covers all publicly-funded higher education institutions in England, Wales and 
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Northern Ireland and nearly all full-time and part-time undergraduate students 
registered at these higher education institutions during their final year of study. The 
survey uses a range of electronic, postal and telephone methods, including email 
questionnaires and the use of mobile phones. The 2005 NSS questionnaire focuses on 
six dimensions of teaching quality by using 21 individual questionnaire items. In 
addition, a measure of overall satisfaction with the course of study is also included, 
making a total of 22 questions responses to which are quantitatively analysed. 
" Teaching and Learning (Questions 1-4). 
" Assessment and Feedback (Questions 5-9). 
" Academic Support (Questions 10-12). 
" Organisation and Management (Questions 13-15). 
" Learning Resources (Questions 16-18). 
" Personal Development (Questions 19-21). 
" Overall satisfaction (Question 22). 
In the view of the HEFCE, the survey is expected to help students choose where to 
study. How the survey has influenced the actual teaching of academics will be 
presented in the findings chapter. 
Section 3: Internal quality assurance mechanisms 
Together with the external quality assurance mechanisms, there are internal quality 
assurance mechanisms used by the higher education institutions to assure and 
enhance quality and standards. These mechanisms vary, depending on the individual 
institution mission, size, curriculum structures and other factors. My case study 
university uses a series of quality assurance mechanisms to maintain quality of 
teaching and learning. In my case study university, the primary responsibility for 
quality and standards mainly resides in academic departments, although there is a 
balance between `central control' and `departmental autonomy'. In other words, the 
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learning and teaching committee within my case university oversees quality 
assurance, while the devolved responsibility for areas such as programme approval, 
monitoring and review, student course evaluation, and peer observation are carried 
out within the departments/schools. 
3.1 Annual Programme Review (APR) 
Annual Programme Review was formally introduced in 2001 in the case study 
university and is carried out within the individual department/school. It aims to 
improve the quality of the programmes offered by my case university. It requires that 
each year a department gathers feedback on all of its programmes, from external 
examiners, students, departmental staff and external organisations. Reflections or 
reports on individual units are taken into account, together with statistical 
information such as student progression rates and the proportion of degrees awarded 
in the different classes. All these elements are then discussed in a departmental 
meeting, and a brief summary report will outline the positive features of the 
programme and any action to be taken. 
3.2 Approval of New and Revised Programmes and Units (ANRPU) 
In order to ensure that any changes made to units or programmes, or any new units or 
programmes, are academically appropriate and sound, and that sufficient resource 
can and will be made available to ensure their successful delivery, my case university 
requires that all changes to units or programmes must be approved by a formal 
process at department and faculty level. The ANRPU was formally introduced in 
1994. New programmes, major programme changes, new and changed mandatory 
units are also approved by the University's Validation Group which reports to the 
University Learning and Teaching Committee. 
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3.3 Peer Observation 
According to my case university, peer observation is a formative process and a 
learning experience for both those observed and observing. Peer observation was 
formally approved by the university in 2005. One main purpose of peer observation 
is to create the space and opportunity for those being observed and those observing 
to reflect on their teaching. There are guidelines on peer observation, requiring that 
all departments / schools should operate a system of peer observation of teaching, 
with at least one formative observation of each core member of teaching staf, as 
identified by the Head of Department / School, during any two year period. 
3.4 Student course evaluation 
My case university is aware of the significance of feedback arrangements to the 
experience of students as learners, and uses it as a key component of its quality 
assurance mechanism to make sure that the voices of students are heard in its quality 
management and academic standards arrangements. There is a system for gathering, 
analysing, responding and acting upon feedback from students. Guidelines for 
feedback from Students were formally introduced by the university in 1994. Students 
are invited to complete a questionnaire for each unit they take in the case university. 
The evaluation forms are mainly electronic and paper ones. The format and contents 
of the evaluation varies within the departments and schools. 
Section four: Accountability and efficiency in higher education sector 
The above quality assurance mechanisms, together with the funding councils and the 
quality regimes, aim to effect public accountability and efficiency within higher 
education institutions. Meanwhile, accountability is articulated and regulated through 
the work of these statutory bodies, and funding was used to achieve Government 
policy aims through a series of special initiatives. 
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4.1 Accountability 
The 1991 White Paper wanted the institutions to make more effective responses to 
the increasing demand for higher education benefits for individuals as well as for the 
economy and society as a whole, so the Paper emphasized that the main 
responsibility for maintaining and enhancing the quality of teaching and learning 
should rest with each individual institution. The paper also claims that `there is a 
need for proper accountability for the substantial public funds invested in higher 
education' (DES, 1991, p. 24). It believed that the publication of the HEFCE 
assessments of the quality of teaching in institutions would stimulate competitive 
behaviour in and between institutions, and that the institutions would become 
sensitive to market demands and needs. 
4.2 Efficiency 
Together with the requirement for accountability, there is a demand for higher 
education institutions to become efficient. The requirement for efficiency in UK 
higher education has undergone three phases: efficiency as bureaucratic-rationality, 
efficiency as more for less, and efficiency as economy (Johnson, 2000a) 
4.2.1 Efficiency as bureaucratic-rationality 
In 1984, the UGC asked the CVCP to make arrangements to reduce inefficiencies of 
traditional modes of work and organization in the university. In response, the 
Committee reported that universities could improve their efficiency and effectiveness 
in planning and the use of resources. For example, the efficiency would be improved 
through a rational frame of management and by empowering administrators in 
decision-making, planning and resource allocation (Jarratt, 1985). 
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4.2.2 Efficiency as more for less 
Later on, the 1987 White Paper extends the definition of efficiency to more for less, 
because the Government felt that it was no longer sufficient to improve efficiency 
through reducing waste, and that it was necessary to produce more out of the system: 
The pursuit of efficiency is not just about saving money. It is about helping 
institutions and individuals to achieve more of what they should achieve with the 
money that is available.... The Government has a role in seeking to ensure that 
suitable arrangements to promote and monitor efficiency are in place for 
institutions and for different parts of the whole system (DES 1987: 3.23). 
The Paper advocated market derived financial incentives such as contracts and 
encouraged entrepreneurial income generating activity. It assumed that marketisation 
would provide more stimuli to institutions to innovate and to find a particular niche 
in a more competitive HE market (Henkel & Little, 1999). Marketisation can be 
interpreted at two levels. At the system level, it refers to Government policies to 
build up a market-like culture and resource allocation systems, whereas at the 
institutional level it refers to competitive behaviour that has been stimulated between 
and within institutions (Bargh et al, 1996). 
The higher education institutions were thus under pressure to do more for less. They 
began to incorporate the values and mechanism of the market into their organizations 
and to reduce their financial dependence upon the State. The universities were 
encouraged to compete for industrial partnerships in research and teaching, for 
commercial funding, for consultancies, and for new students' (Henkel, 2000, p. 46). 
As a result, `the image of an effective organization became that of a university with 
the capacity to achieve and prove competitive powers, and to demonstrate financial 
and corporate viability. ' (Johnson, 2000a, p. 191) 
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4.2.3 Efficiency as economy 
The 1987 White Paper also gave another extension of the definition of 'efficiency'- 
efficiency as economy. It assumed that there was a link between educational, 
industrial and national economic success. It implied that the students' role and 
interest in studying is instrumental: focused on maximizing potential career and 
incomes levels and that research should no longer be about exploratory work towards 
unpredictable discoveries but directly instrumental to economic needs. Efficiency has 
thus become defined as about cost reduction and competitive production within 
institutional units, and is defined as the extent to which higher education products 
match the ends of industry and commerce (Johnson, 2000a). 
Conclusion 
This chapter discusses and analyzes three important contextual factors in the rise of 
quality and quality audit in UK higher education: the changed relationship between 
universities and the Government, the expansion of the higher education system, and 
the development of university funding mechanisms and quality regimes, which are 
closely related to each other. The changed relationship and the expansion can be 
perceived as the key reasons for the change of UK Government policy with respect 
to university funding mechanisms and quality regimes through which the 
requirement of accountability is articulated and regulated. Meanwhile, universities 
are encouraged to compete for efficiency as on the basis of bureaucratic-rationality, 
efficiency as more for less, and efficiency as economy. Under the pressure of external 
quality assurance mechanisms, the universities set up their own internal mechanisms 
to meet the requirement of the external mechanisms, and to assure and enhance the 
quality of their education. 
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Chapter 3: Debates on Quality and Quality Related Terms in Higher Education 
Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyzes the interpretations of quality and its related 
terms in the higher education sector in England. There is a focus on the different 
interpretations of quality from section one to section three. Most of these 
interpretations are related to the quality audit movement, rather than addressing the 
meaning of quality in higher education. Sections four and section five include an 
analysis of the understanding of various quality related terms, such as quality audit, 
quality assurance, and quality assessment. 
Section one: Conceptualizing quality in the context of higher education 
Quality as a concept has migrated from the industrial and commercial settings of the 
1980s into the domain of higher education (Newton, 2002). During the 1990s, quality 
became `a central term in the lexicon of contemporary higher education and a major 
point of interest to various interest groups' in the UK (Newton, 2002, p. 44). However, 
quality is a contested concept (Barnett, 1994). It means different things to different 
people in different circumstances. One explanation for these different views on 
quality is that we are living in a time of `stakeholders'. According to Srikanthan and 
Dalrymple (2003), the stakeholders refers to individuals or groups who are regarded 
as having a legitimate interest in the quality of higher education, such as, funding 
bodies, students, staff and employers of graduates. These stakeholders have an 
interest in the quality of higher education but not everyone has the same idea about 
what constitutes quality (Brennan & Shah, 2000). 
Another reason why quality is a contested concept is because conceptions of quality 
are based on personal and social constructs (Harvey & Newton, 2004). Each 
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stakeholder constructs a view of quality based on selected attributes, but criteria for 
selection of the attributes are formed through their personal values and judgements, 
so these attributes vary from stakeholder to stakeholder. In this sense, quality has 
become a relative concept, relative to stakeholders in the higher education sector 
(Harvey & Green, 1993). 
Section two: Harvey and Green's definition of quality 
The concepts of quality identified by Harvey and Green (1993) have greatly 
influenced people's perception about the meaning of academic quality since the early 
1990s. Lomas (2002) suggests that Harvey's five categories of quality - quality as 
exception, as perfection, as fitness for purpose, as value for money and as 
transformation - should be viewed as a matrix for defining quality, because they have 
the potential to form the basis of an analytical framework to consider quality in 
higher education. This echoes Watty's (2003) view that an understanding of these 
conceptions of quality would assist in an analysis of the priorities that various 
stakeholders bring to evaluating quality in higher education. 
2.1 Quality as exception 
According to Harvey, the concept of quality as exception is related to high standards 
of performance or achievement. It means quality is something special. Harvey & 
Green (1993) identify three variations of exception: distinctive, embodied in 
excellence, and passing a minimum set of standards. The notion of excellence 
corresponds to the student's view of quality, because students want to ensure a 
relative advantage in career prospects (Lagrosen, et, al. 2004; Srikanthan & 
Dalrymple, 2003). 
The definition of quality as exception emphasizes standards. However, fulfilling 
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certain, minimum standard does not necessarily mean that quality is achieved, 
because standards can be independent of quality. Barnett (1992, p. 57) gives an 
example in that `we could find institutional performance of low quality against high 
standards, and of high quality when measured against comparatively low standards'. 
This suggests that passing a minimum set of standards can be regarded as one 
criterion to quality, but it will make quality become a relative concept. 
2.2 Quality as perfection 
According to Harvey & Green (1993), quality as perfection means everything is 
correct and there is no fault. This approach is perceived as inappropriate in the higher 
education setting, because the institution does not intend to produce standardized 
graduates, free from defects. Therefore Watty (2003) suggests that quality as 
perfection should be removed from the quality categories. However, Srikanthan & 
Dalrymple (2003) hold a slightly different view. They argue that quality as perfection 
can be applied to academics and administrators in higher education, because 
perfection means they can achieve job satisfaction by meeting behavioural norms and 
upholding the core ethos of the organisation. 
2.3 Fitness for purpose 
Harvey & Green (1993) regard `fitness for purpose' as a functional definition of 
quality because it means that quality is judged in terms of the extent to which the 
product or service fits its purpose. Harvey & Green associate this definition of 
quality with two notions. One is to meet the needs, requirement or desire of the 
customers. The other is the institution fulfilling its own stated objectives, which has 
become the mostly often seen definition of quality in the higher education sector. For 
example, CHEA (2006) adopts the interpretation of quality as fitness for purpose and 
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accrediting or quality assurance body. 
However, there are different views on the interpretation of quality as fitness for 
purpose. Barnett (1992) sees it used by the funding council in England as a criterion 
of resource allocation, a means of legitimizing a differential funding base because it 
protects the general hierarchical ordering of higher education institutions from great 
threat from the state. Therefore the unequal distribution of resources that 
accompanies the hierarchical ordering will remain largely intact. In contrast, Lomas 
(2002) and Ottewill & Macfarlane (2004) argue that fitness for purpose is the basis 
of the QAA review methodology because the goals of the institution are articulated 
through the mission statement of the institution and at a precise academic level 
through a particular programme's aims and learning outcomes. 
2.4 Value for money 
According to Green & Harvey (1993), the notion of value for money is a popular 
view of quality, because public services are expected to be accountable to the funders 
and to the 'customers'. This notion is first presented by the 1984 Audit Commission 
and implies paying less for the best product (Watty, 2003). Salter & Tapper contend 
that the idea of value for money is closely related to the `economic ideology' of 
higher education, which means that `education is an economic resource which should 
be organized in a way that maximizes its contribution to Britain's industrial 
development' (Salter & Tapper, 1994, p. 12). What Salter & Tapper imply is that as a 
paymaster, the government wants to ensure that institutions are accountable for 
carrying out their economic role, so it uses the funding councils to audit the 
performances of the institutions, in order to assure that money allocated to the 
universities is properly and effectively used. In this sense, `value for money' is on 
behalf of the government to look for a good return on investment, and the notion of 
accountability is central to this definition of quality. 
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2.5 Transformation 
The concept of quality as transformation emphasizes the enhancement and 
empowerment of students. According to Harvey & Green (1993), this concept 
implies critical thinking which encourages students to challenge preconceptions of 
their own, their peers and their teachers. This notion also involves cognitive 
transcendence with the provider `doing something to the customer rather than just 
doing something for the customer' (Harvey & Green, 1993, p. 24). The concept of 
transformation is popular among many students who speak of their time as a student 
at university as a transformational experience both in developing as a learner and as a 
person (Barnett, 2007). This suggests that transformation is becoming an overriding 
objective of learners. 
Srikanthan & Dalrymple (2003) hold that the notion of quality as transformation is 
potentially capable of addressing the concerns of all the stakeholders' group. 
Lomas's (2002) empirical research with 108 senior managers in HEIs in the UK 
reveals that transformation is one of the most appropriate definitions of quality, but 
problems of measuring quality as transformation have led to difficulties in its 
practical application. The difficulty could be explained as the notion of quality as 
transformation does not lend itself to the atomisation of clearly stated purposes 
(Harvey & Knight, 1996). Therefore there is an argument that the notion of quality as 
transformation has been singularly missing from all the approaches to quality in 
higher education so far (Harvey, 1998). 
2.6 Critical analysis of Harvey's interpretations of quality 
Of the five interpretations of quality provided by Harvey, the notions of quality as 
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fitness for purpose and quality as value for money are utilitarian responses to 
economic needs. For example, value for money is a value-based definition and sees 
quality as providing good value for costs. Fitness for purpose measures quality from 
the operation of the market in higher education. In contrast, exception and 
transformation are an idealist view of quality and focus on learning for learning's 
sake. To make it specific, the notion of exception is closely related to the elitism of 
higher education, but the notion of transformation is mainly concerned with students' 
learning experience. The notions of exception and perfection suggest that quality is 
related to a particular standard or specification. 
There is a perception among some academic researchers, such as Barnett (1992, 
2003), Lomas (2004), and Ottewill & Macfarlane (2004), that the notions of `fitness 
for purpose' and `value for money' have become the most widely accepted concepts 
adopted by the HEFCE and the QAA, in spite of the fact that if quality is defined 
largely as excellence, massification might be considered as reducing quality with 
more meaning worse/ different (Lomas, 2004). The wide use of quality as fitness for 
purpose suggests that quality has become a management concept for the government, 
the funding councils, and an organizing concept for the institutions. (Power, 1997) 
Except for the differences between different notions of quality, these various notions 
have the potential to overlap at the margin and are not mutually exclusive (Harvey & 
Green, 1993). Take the concepts of `exception' and `fitness for purpose' for example. 
One variation of `exception' is excellence, a kind of conformance to standards. This 
is similar to a requirement of `fitness for purpose' that the institution sets its goals 
and then meets these by conforming to the standards it has set itself. When the 
institution meets the standard, it will be recognised as `excellent' by the QAA. In this 
sense, both perfection and fitness for purpose are judged by standards. They are 
actually conforming to requirements and specifications, so they are 
manufacturing-based definitions. 
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Not only the HEFCE and the QAA but some academic managers hold the view that 
quality can be seen as fitness for purpose and value for money. For example, 
Lomas's (2002) research with 108 senior managers in a wide range of higher 
education institutions reveals that the definition of quality as fitness for purpose is 
the most popular one in universities, closely followed by transformation. Excellence 
and value for money received far lower ratings with the latter as the least popular 
definition. This finding is related to the fact that the QAA uses `fitness for purpose' 
to assess the quality of university performance, which might have influenced the 
managers' perception of quality. The prevalence of the notions of quality as fitness 
for purpose and quality as value for money suggests that although the most important 
stakeholders of higher education are academics and students, their voice has been 
less prominent than that of the Government. The government uses quality as an 
ideological symbol to legitimate its regulation of the higher education sector while 
proportionately reducing resources for it (see context chapter). This echoes the 
argument of Barnett (1994) that the debate over quality is actually `a power struggle 
where the use of terms reflects a jockeying for position in an attempt to impose their 
own definitions of higher education' (p. 6). 
Section three: Other interpretations to quality 
Except for Harvey & Green's (1993) interpretations of quality, there are some other 
ways to understand quality in the higher education sector, such as, quality as meeting 
the expectations of customers (DfES, 2003), quality as power (Morley, 2003), and 
quality as bureaucratisation, impression management, and conformity (Newton, 
2002). The following sections will analyse these other interpretations of quality. 
3.1 Meeting expectations of customers 
As analyzed in section 2.3, quality as fitness for purpose emphasizes the importance 
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of customers (Harvey & Green, 1993). This notion of quality has been extended to 
meeting the expectations of customers in the 2003 White Paper, The Future of 
Higher Education (DfES, 2003). Meeting the expectation of customers means that 
the quality of teaching and learning in higher education is expected to meet the 
perceived needs of students and employers. Meeting the expectations of customers is 
a user-based definition because it makes quality become a means for customer 
satisfaction. However, this definition makes quality individual and partly subjective 
as the expectations of customers can vary. 
3.2 Quality as power 
Except for the definition of quality as meeting expectations of customers, Morley 
(2003) uncovers some ways in which quality is experienced by academics and 
managers in the higher education sector. Morley argues that quality is a political 
technology functioning as a regime and as a relay of power. This argument is mainly 
based on two theories. One is that quality audit establishes relationships of power 
between observers and observed because audit creates and maintains certain norms. 
According to Shore & Wright (1999), norms can constitute an invisible web of power 
because the norms become internalized and more difficult to recognize and contest. 
The other theory Morley uses is that the insertion of quality discourse into the higher 
education sector is an example of the changing relations between universities and the 
state. The state has shifted from a promoter of intellectual activity to a controller of it 
(Dominelli & Hoogvelt, 1996). Quality audit is thus the state asserting its 
responsibility, as it perceives it, to monitor and control the activities of academics. 
Morley's reveals that academics fear quality audit as a means of controlling their 
activities, and that academics were concerned of the compliance culture associated 
with the quality audit movement. Morley's interpretation of quality helps to explain 
academics' perception of, and response to, audit. 
52 
3.3 Other interpretations of quality 
Together with seeing quality as power, there is an indication that academics' 
definition of quality has become equated with bureaucratisation, educational 
orthodoxy, and conformity (Henkel, 2000). Harvey (2005) suggests that the term 
`quality' is used `as shorthand for the bureaucratic procedures than to refer to the 
concept of quality itself (p. 272). 
Similarly, Newton's empirical research on how academics have made sense of the 
quality revolution in UK higher education suggests that quality had become 
associated by most in the UK academic community with `bureaucracy' and `burden' 
by the mid-1990s (Newton, 2002, p. 45). The followings are nine views on quality 
from Newton: 
1. Quality as 'ritualism' and 'tokenism' (Newton, 2002, p. 46). It means academics 
use procedures primarily to satisfy external requirements and that quality 
enhancement becomes a residual feature of quality systems. 
2. Quality as 'impression management' (Newton, 2002, p. 46), because preparations 
for external assessment are carefully scripted and stage-managed. 
3. Quality as a 'burden' and part of an inspectorial compliance culture. (Newton, 
2002, p. 46) 
4. Quality as 'failure to close the loop' (Newton, 2002, p. 46), in the sense that key 
service areas are usually excluded from the formal system for managing academic 
quality. 
5. Quality as 'suspicion of management motives' (Newton, 2002, p. 46). In other 
words, academics view quality monitoring, externally or internally driven, as an 
essentially managerial tool that threatens academic or professional autonomy. 
6. Quality as 'discipline' and 'technology' (Newton, 2002, p. 46). He suggests that 
quality audit emphasizes 'better systems' or 'improvements in quality assurance', but 
academics perceive that these are distinct from improvements in quality. 
7. Quality as 'front-line staff resistance' (Newton, 2002, p. 46). It means that 
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academics respond to quality audit in different ways with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm and support because audit implementation lacks academic ownership. 
8. Quality as 'lack of mutual trust' (Newton, 2002, p. 46). The requirement of 
accountability is perceived as distrust of front-line academics. 
9. Quality as a culture of 'getting by' (Newton, 2002, p. 46): academics feel 
constrained by lack of time and associate the shift from 'resource-led' to 
'improvement-led' with confusing demands. 
When compared with Harvey & Green's (1993) interpretations of quality, Newton's 
findings construct an alternative understanding of quality. It provides valuable 
insights into how academics cope with quality and think of quality. However, both 
Newton's and Harvey & Green's interpretations of quality have stakeholder-specific 
meaning. Their views are value related and judgemental. Harvey & Green's 
interpretations look at the perspectives of various stakeholder groups, whilst 
Newton's focuses on one stakeholder, the academic who is responsible for the 
performance of the university (Watty, 2003). 
Later in his writing, Newton summarizes the ten themes into two: quality as 
`intrusion, inspection and bureaucracy'; and quality as `conformist behaviour' 
(Newton, 2002, p. 56). These two themes suggest that academics as one stakeholder 
even hold different views of quality in higher education. These views suggest that 
academics use quality as a pejorative term, which can be perceived as academics' 
protest against audit, instead of really explaining what quality is in the higher 
education sector. 
However, the above interpretation of quality can be useful in the following ways. 
First, it suggests that many academics have grown increasingly sceptical of and 
resistant to quality audit. This might be due to worsening working conditions for 
academics as a result of the expansion of UK higher education (See Chapter 2). 
Second, academics' pejorative use of the term quality reveals that it is important for 
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academics to have their own shared definition of quality in higher education, or to 
reach a consensus between other stakeholder groups with regard to what is meant by 
`quality' in higher education, instead of simply protesting against the notion of 
quality imposed from outside the sector. If `academics do not agree that quality 
assurance systems currently measure what they regard as `quality in higher 
education', then there is a need to first recognise that differences exist and then 
identify these differences in conceptions', in order to establish a quality model which 
would be accepted widely within their community (Watty, 2003, p. 213). 
In summary, the literature reveals that the government, the funding bodies and 
academics have different understanding of quality in higher education. This suggests 
that quality is an elusive concept. However, quality as intrusion, inspection and 
bureaucracy, and as conformist behaviour is a negative conception and does not 
indicate more positively what are the key components of quality in higher education, 
so it is better to regard these concepts as the academics' perception of and responses 
to the quality audit movement in England. As for the notions of quality as fitness for 
purpose, as value for money, and as meeting expectations of customers, 
comparatively speaking, the notion of quality as exception corresponds with the 
traditional view of elite education, but these standards of excellence must be defined 
by the academics and their institution. Moreover, this concept does not fit easily 
within the context of the massification of higher education. 
From my perspective, quality as transformation is the most appropriate definition, 
because it emphasizes the development of student, and because it empowers students 
by letting them develop to their full potential, which is the ultimate goal of higher 
education according to Barnett (1990). Empowering students does not contradict but 
helps the development of subjects and disciplines where the academics' authority 
rests in. However, there is currently less attention paid to the notion of quality as 
transformation in the higher education sector in England, partly because the sector is 
undergoing a transition period due to massification and quality audit which diverts 
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academics' attention from quality as transformation, and because of the difficulty in 
applying or being able to audit quality as transformation. Therefore it might be a long 
time before the higher education sector has quality as transformation as its model. 
Section four: Quality audit 
Together with quality, another world-wide phenomenon, quality audit in higher 
education began in the 1980s. According to Power (1994,1997), audit has become 
central to ways of talking about administrative control in the UK since the late 1980s. 
By the early 1990s, audit has been used as a main way to ensure that institutions are 
providing higher education awards and qualifications of an acceptable quality and an 
appropriate academic standard, and that institutions are exercising their legal powers 
to award degrees in a proper manner (QAA, 2006). From the social science 
researchers' perspective, for example, Shore & Wright (2000), audit refers to not 
only a specific inspection regime but also a culture and a concept which is developed 
in the process of evaluating the public sector. Therefore there are different 
interpretations to audit. The sections below analyze audit first from the social science 
perspective, then as an inspection regime for quality assurance. 
4.1 Audit as a culture 
Both Power (1994,1997) and Shore & Wright (2000) analyze audit from the social 
science perspective, but they analyze audit in a slightly different way. According to 
Power (1994,1997), audit is a concept and can be perceived as an idea, control of 
control, and a form of impression management. Audit is an idea because it is based 
on the assumption that when the economic resources of one party are entrusted to 
another, human nature is weak, untrustworthy, so there is a need for some kind of 
check. The reason for the use of audit is because `quality must be made measurable' 
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to a wider audience, whether this is the customer, the regulator, or even the customer 
as a regulator (Power, 1997, p. 60). Audit thus functions as a vehicle for change in 
the name of ideals such as `cost effectiveness', 'efficiency', 'quality' and so on 
(Power, 1997, p. 60). 
Power (1997) reveals that the technical practices of audit shift from `checking the 
arithmetical accuracy of every transaction, document or entry, to evaluating `the 
strength of internal control'(p. 20), because of the belief that effective regulation is 
possible and capable of `reaching into the inner motives of target organizations' (p. 
54). Organizations subject to audit develop their own internal system of control. The 
external audit process concentrates on these controls in the organization under 
scrutiny, so audit becomes `control of control' (ibid). 
The control aspect of audit raised by Power is shared by Shore & Wright (2000). 
However, instead of seeing audit simply as an innocuously neutral, legal-rational 
practice, Shore & Wright regard audit as a culture and argue that this culture is an 
instrument for new forms of governance and power, embodying a new rationality and 
morality, and designed to engender new norms of conduct and professional 
behaviour among academic stafff. 
It is obvious that both Power and Shore & Wright perceive audit as a kind of control. 
The control view of audit helps explain academics' resistance, but Power and Shore 
& Wright give little consideration to how quality audit operates in practice and what 
its intended purposes are, which are concerned with the methods of the audit 
inspection. The definition of quality audit by the Council for Higher Education 
Accreditation (CHEA) which is a national agency in the USA can help to provide an 
explanation. 
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4.2 Quality audit as an inspection system 
According to CHEA (2006), quality audit is a test of an institution's quality assurance 
and control system through a self-evaluation and external review of its programs, 
staff, and infrastructure. It is designed to provide an assessment of an institution's 
system of accountability, internal review mechanisms, and effectiveness with an 
external body confirming that the institution's quality assurance process complies 
with accepted standards. 
CHEA explains the function of audit and how audit assessment processes work. 
Similarly, Pearce (1995) regards quality audit as a means of checking relevant 
systems and structures within an institution to support its key teaching mission, and 
to ensure that provision is at or beyond a satisfactory level of quality. A quality audit 
can be conducted either internally or externally. Audit checks that the university 
system does what it says it is going to do, and has written documented evidence to 
prove it. 
Both CHEA and Pearce conceive quality audit as a test of whether an institution's 
quality assurance process complies with the external review requirement or not. 
However, Pearce divides quality audit into two levels: internal and external. The 
internal refers to the quality process within the institution. The external is the quality 
review imposed upon the institution. This is identical to Power's (1994,1997) 
argument that audit is control of control, because the quality assurance mechanisms 
imposed upon the institution, such as external examining and Institutional Audit 
would control and check the performance of the quality assurance mechanisms inside 
the institution. 
The above interpretations of quality audit and the characteristics of Institutional 
Audit enacted by the QAA (see context chapter) reveal that quality audit in England 
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has the following four characteristics: external assurance, easy access information, a 
finance system connecting with quality, and academic standard based audit. The 
external assurance can be understood as Institutional Audit, external examining, the 
review of professional, statutory and regulatory bodies, and the National Student 
Survey required at the national level and imposed upon the institution to examine the 
institution's internal quality management process. The opening up of information 
systems means that the information relating to quality and standards is now available 
to the public. The finance system connects with the way that HEFCE uses funding to 
regulate the activities of higher education institutions. The QAA also references 
academic quality and standards in higher education in its code of practice. 
Section five: Other terms related to quality 
The literature reveals there are some other terms related to quality, such as quality 
control, quality assessment, quality assurance, and quality enhancement. Like quality 
audit, these terms are concerned with maintaining and improving the quality of 
higher education, but involve different management processes. This section is going 
to discuss and analyse these terms, reveal their differences and similarities, and 
explore the characteristics of management issues associated with these terms. Most 
interpretations of these terms are quoted from CHEA and QAA which are national 
agencies for quality assurance. 
5.1 Quality control 
CHEA (2006) explains quality control as mechanisms within institutions for 
maintaining and enhancing the quality of their provision. Frazer (1992) defines 
quality control as a system to check whether the products produced or services 
provided have reached pre-defined standards. In the quality control process, quality 
is usually inspected at the end of the production process and is undertaken by 
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someone external to the workforce. Compared with Frazer's interpretation which is 
adopted from and applies to industry production, the definition of CHEA is higher 
education focused. It suggests that quality control is a quality mechanism within the 
institution, with the aim of assuring and enhancing quality. This reveals that quality 
control is a general format of management, including both quality assurance and 
quality enhancement. 
5.2 Quality assessment 
Because my research only concerns teaching quality, not research quality, so the first 
stage in the introduction of quality assessment by the UK Government can be seen 
from the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act which required the funding 
councils to establish a Quality Assessment Committee, with the function of assessing 
the quality of education provided in institutions. 
According to the DES (1991: 13 and 24), quality assessment is `external review of, 
and `judgements about', the quality of teaching and learning in institutions. The DES 
implies that the assessment is from outside the higher education institutions. In 
contrast, the CHEA (2006) puts less emphasis on regarding quality assessment as 
external, but defines quality assessment as a diagnostic review and evaluation of 
teaching, learning, and outcomes based assessment through a detailed examination of 
curricula, structure, and effectiveness of the institution or program. It is designed to 
determine if the institution or program meets generally accepted standards of 
excellence. 
Both DES and CHEA suggest that quality assessment is a means of assessing the 
quality of what is actually provided by institutions, but DES puts emphasis on 
teaching and learning without mentioning the criterion or standard of the external 
review. In contrast, the CHEA considers not only teaching and learning but the 
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outcome. However, Pearce (1995) shows his concern that when quality assessment 
intends to be mission sensitive and examines the quality of education provision 
against the expressed aspirations of the individual institutions, there are some 
potential problems with quality assessment, because these aspirations could be either 
high or low. For example, if a university has high aspirations, quality is to be 
measured against this high yardstick. This would make it more difficult for the 
university to succeed than another university which sets lower aspirations. 
5.3 Quality assurance 
Quality assurance is another important concept in the quality debate. The QAA and 
the CHEA interpret quality assurance in a slightly different way. In the opinion of the 
QAA (2003), quality assurance is a way of describing all the systems, resources and 
information that universities and higher education colleges use to maintain and 
improve standards and quality, which includes teaching and student learning, 
scholarship and research, but my research is only concerned with the teaching aspect. 
In contrast, the CHEA (2006) glossary suggests that quality assurance is a planned 
and systematic review process of an institution or program to determine that 
acceptable standards of education, scholarship, and infrastructure are being 
maintained and enhanced. Usually this includes expectations that mechanisms of 
quality control are in place and effective. Also, in the U. K., institutions must confirm 
that the conditions are in place for students to achieve the standards set by the 
institution or other awarding body. 
There are overlaps and differences between these two definitions. Both emphasize 
that standard needs ought to be maintained and enhanced or improved, and both 
suggest that quality assurance is invisible, but you can assess it, because it is a 
process open to evaluation. However, there are some differences between these 
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definitions. On the one hand, CHEA holds that quality assurance is a review process, 
while QAA regards it as a way to describe the processes of quality maintenance and 
improvement. On the other hand, CHEA suggests that quality assurance expects that 
mechanisms of quality control are in place and effective. This reveals that quality 
assurance is a form of compulsory control. In contrast, the QAA describes quality 
assurance as a system, resource and source of information used to maintain and 
improve quality in the higher education institutions. The definition of the QAA does 
not mention the control nature of quality assurance and nor does it make clear 
whether the system the universities use is compulsory or voluntary. The QAA might 
have assumed that quality assurance is a system based on the premise that everyone 
in the university has a responsibility for maintaining and enhancing the quality of 
higher education. The QAA definition suggests that quality assurance in the UK is a 
light touch regime (Harvey, 2005). One reason might be that this definition was dates 
from 2003, a time shortly after the QAA had completed a full cycle of departmental 
inspections in 2002, and then it moved towards Institutional Audit dropping subject 
based inspections. This has become known as a light touch approach which means 
the institution is responsible for its own quality standards, and that the Institutional 
Audit makes sure that the institution has the appropriate procedures to achieve this. 
Whatever the differences lying in behind these interpretations, it is noticeable that 
quality assurance is linked to three main underlying rationales: accountability, 
compliance and improvement (Harvey, 1999). Compared with quality control and 
quality assessment, quality assurance is the most comprehensive approach to assess 
and to monitor quality in higher education. Its main purpose is to make judgements 
against defined criteria, require not just the detection of defects as in quality control 
but also the prevention of defects. People in the institution are expected to be 
committed to an organizational culture that prizes quality, relentlessly improving in 
search of perfection. However, these aims and purposes are very difficult to achieve. 
It might often remain as a goal or philosophy that universities aspire to achieve or get 
closer to rather than a reality (Tam, 2001). 
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5.4 Quality enhancement 
With the implementation of Institutional Audit enacted by the QAA, the quality 
agenda in UK higher education has shifted from quality assurance to quality 
enhancement. The quality enhancement strategy was first adopted by the HEQC, and 
then rediscovered by the HEFCE (Harvey, 2005). The QAA is supplementing 
existing quality assurance frameworks through a more active strategy for quality 
enhancement (ibid). Meanwhile a new national body, the Higher Education Academy, 
was established in 2004 from an amalgamation of the Institute for Learning and 
Teaching in higher education and other related bodies. Its primary purpose is to 
improve the student experience, by addressing it as quality enhancement. As a result, 
quality enhancement is becoming a widely used term and a contemporary concern in 
the quality management in UK higher education. This term also appears in the case 
study university. 
According to CHEA (2006), quality enhancement is a deliberate process of change 
that leads to improvement. It is an inclusive concept and a collective enterprise. It 
involves everyone who teaches, supports and guides students and the managers and 
administrators of HE institutions. It includes significant strategic initiatives and the 
many small things that people do to try to make things better. 
The definition of CHEA emphasizes improvement, and things contributing to 
improvement, such as strategy, academics and other professional support staff within 
the HEIs. In the view of QAA (2003), continuous improvement should be the 
ongoing concern of any enhancement strategy. It means that no matter where one is 
starting from, it is always possible to seek improvement. In operational terms, the 
process cannot literally be continuous, but will involve a cycle of planned phases 
63 
including reflection, planning, implementation and evaluation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented different interpretations of quality and quality related 
terms in the higher education sector, and analyzed the differences and similarities 
among interpretations of these terms. The concept of quality as: exception, perfection, 
fitness for purpose, value for money, and transformation, identified by Harvey and 
Green (1993), have greatly influenced people's perception about the meaning of 
academic quality since the early 1990s. However, nowadays there are some other 
ways to understand quality, such as, quality as meeting the expectations of customers 
(DfES, 2003), quality as power (Morley, 2003), and quality as bureaucratisation, 
impression management, and conformity (Newton, 2002). These interpretations 
suggest that academics associated quality with `bureaucracy' and `burden', and 
perceived quality as power control over their work. 
The elusive concept of quality suggests that academics, the UK government and 
different stakeholders of higher education have different views of quality. Therefore 
it is time for different stakeholders to reach a widely accepted understanding of 
quality in the higher education sector in order to improve quality as intended. 
Because my research is concerned with teaching quality only, it focuses on the 
teaching assessment, especially on quality assurance and quality enhancement. The 
interpretations and the comparison of these terms related with quality help to 
understand the quality management process of teaching in the higher education 
sector in England. 
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Chapter 4: The Changing Academic Profession in England 
Introduction 
The British higher education sector has been undergoing a process of rapid change 
since World War II . Key elements to this change are: 
" Reforms of the higher education sector during Thatcherism; 
" Structural systematic change of the polytechnics into the university; 
" Changes in resource allocation to universities, especially the transformation of 
the funding regime; 
" Evaluation of teaching by quality audit; and 
" Substantial and rapid growth in student numbers together with a substantial 
decline in per capita student funding. 
As a result, the British higher education system has transformed from an elite to a 
mass system, with the management of the institutions moving from a collegial 
towards a more managerial model. The ways that this move has influenced the work 
of academics is discussed in this chapter. Section one presents the debate on whether 
academic work is a profession or not. Section two describes the shift from 
collegiality to managerialism, revealing that quality audit is closely related with the 
development of `new' managerialism. Section three highlights the value tensions 
academics face in the process of quality audit. 
Section one: Academic work, a profession? 
There are different views on the nature of academic work. One view is that academic 
work is a profession (Halsey, 1992; Henkel, 2000; Millet, 1967; Wilson, 1979). 
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Another view is that academic work is a vocation (Weber, 1918). There is also a 
intermediate view from Hogan (2003) that academic work is halfway between a job 
and a vocation. Hogan describes teaching as a way of life. These different views on 
academic work spread over different time spans, so an understanding of their specific 
historical context needs to be taken into consideration in any analysis. Before 
discussing these views, the distinction between a profession and an occupation will 
be introduced below. 
1.1 Distinguishing a profession from an occupation 
According to Kultgen (1988), the word `profession' is derived from "profiteri", 
which comes from `pro' plus `fassfateri', to confess, and to own. In English, `to 
confess' is first to take the vows of a religious order, to declare them openly, to lay 
claim to some quality or feeling and finally to declare oneself proficient or expert 
(Kultgen, 1988). A profession is normally conceived of as a particular occupation, 
with features of a monopoly, with control over who practices, moral integrity, 
adherence to code of practice, special expertise, and expert service (Freidson, 2001; 
Johnson, 1972; Larson, 1977). 
Johnson (1972) regards a profession as a kind of occupation, and defines it as a 
method of controlling work - one in which an occupation exercises control over its 
work. This suggests that a profession is special in its power in establishing and 
maintaining its control over work. Johnson interprets professionalism as `a successful 
ideology that has entered the political vocabulary of a wide range of occupational 
groups in their claims and competition for status and income' (p, 32). This 
interpretation reveals that professionalisation is about market closure and control, 
and that due to this market closure, professionals have gained a monopoly to promote 
their own occupational self interests in terms of salary, power and status returns. 
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Similarly, Larson (1977) perceives a profession as a particular occupation, and terms 
the process in which occupations seeks to improve their economic position and their 
social prestige as professionalisation. However, Larson differs from Johnson in 
perceiving a profession as part of an official occupational classification scheme in 
England. Larson argues that gaining recognition as a profession is important to 
occupations because the special expertise and moral probity emphasized by the 
traditional concept of the profession have provided a basis for legitimating protection 
for the profession from the forces of occupational competition. Using an historical 
analysis of the development of the medical profession, Larson points out that the 
development of the profession is a collective mobility project which has control over 
who practices. The aim of the project is individualistic, although the project and its 
means are collective: it is through the upgrading of an occupation - with the attempt 
to control the individual members which this involves - that prestige is attached to 
the professional roles, and by extension, to their occupants. 
Unlike Johnson who does not treat trust as an essential aspect of professionalism, 
Larson argues that trust has become an ideological control mechanism of the 
powerful occupational groups. However, Freidson (2001) holds a different view that 
there is a link between the notion of trust and the notion of professionalism, and that 
trust is one value of professionalism. Freidson perceives a profession as generically 
an occupation, with specialized knowledge and skills required to perform different 
tasks in a division of labour. He regards professionalism as the ideology of expertise 
and service and as a special set of institutions which serves not only as a unique form 
of occupational control of work but as a discourse to promote and to facilitate 
occupational change. 
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Both Larson and Freidson regard a profession as an occupation, but Freidson differs 
from Larson in considering the logics of three different ways of organizing work and 
workers in contemporary societies: the market, organization and profession. This 
provides a holistic picture of how the profession relates with society, and reveals that 
it is specialized knowledge and skill that make the profession differ from the 
occupation. Comparatively speaking, Larson provides a more convincing argument 
that the specialized forms of knowledge and skills enable the profession to gain 
economic position and social prestige which in turn, gain control over who practices. 
As a result, this would benefit development and upgrading of the profession. 
Larson's view helps to explain the role of control in the nature of a profession, and 
the social and economic factors related to it. While it is obvious that Larson and 
Freidson have different focuses in their argument, and because both interpretations 
are essential dimensions of the profession, it is better to combine the views of Larson 
and Freidson in order to better understand what a profession is. 
1.2 Academic work as a profession 
It is noticeable that Freidson (2001), Johnson (1972), and Larson (1977) are all 
mainly concerned with law and medicine as professions. Far less attention has been 
paid to academic work. Can academic work be regarded as a profession? According 
to Wilson (1979), academic work is a profession. Wilson based his argument on the 
following three main reasons: universities are the seedbed of the traditional 
professions; the professional ethos for academics has deep roots; academic work has 
the attributes of a profession, such as special expertise, moral integrity, and control 
over who practices. These attributes have been raised and discussed by Freidson 
(2001), Johnson (1972), and Larson (1977). 
What Wilson (1979) implies is that academic work possesses some attributes of the 
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profession. One example Wilson gave is that academic work has a knowledge base 
that requires a lengthy period of education and which is central to academic practice. 
The other example is that academic work has a kind of authority within organizations, 
not only in that academics manage their own teaching and research and 
manager-academics deal with academic work, but also with recognition of a standard 
of conduct to govern the exercise of this knowledge and skill. 
However, when compared with the features of a traditional profession, academic 
work is different from the traditional professions in three ways. One difference is that 
there is no absolute requirement of specific prior qualifications for entry to the 
academic profession in the UK (Fulton & Holland, 2001). Although there is control 
over who practices as an academic, in the sense that doctorates particularly control 
access to research (Fulton & Holland, 2001), academic teaching is not recognized for 
general certification, whilst the traditional professions normally do - for example 
medicine and law. Moreover, the 1997 Dearing Report recommended that all 
academic staff should demonstrate that they were fully trained and qualified to teach. 
Subsequently, the CVCP set up the Institute for Learning and Teaching (ILT) in 
Higher Education to manage the national framework for training and certification. 
Although the ILT was university owned and controlled, it was perceived as a kind of 
government intervention (Fulton & Holland, 2001). However, the national training 
for all academic teaching in university has not become compulsory, because the 
qualification of the academics is independent on the institutions' rules and 
regulations, in spite of the fact that many UK universities now require that academics 
with less than 3 years experience take a postgraduate certificate course in learning 
and teaching (HEA, 2008). 
The second difference between academic work and the traditional profession is that 
academics are loyal to their subjects/disciplines (Becher & Trowler, 2001). However, 
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these different subjects/disciplines, such as law, medicine, and architecture, have 
formed the traditional professions, so in this sense, it is hard to perceive academic 
work as a single profession. Academics are often drawn from a multitude of other 
professions such as law, nursing and medicine. They are both an academic and a 
continuing member of this other profession. 
The third difference between academic work and the traditional profession can be 
seen by the consideration of 'expert service' (Freidson, 2001; Johnson, 1972; Larson, 
1977). While professional work always involves `expert service', meaning applying 
complex, theoretical and specialized knowledge to the problems of clients, 
employers, or customers, it is hard to consider the work of academics as the 
application of `expert service'. One reason is because of the difficulty in defining 
academics' students as clients and customers. Another reason is that the term 
`profession' is usually related to the traditional professions, such as, law and 
medicine, so it only connotes the prominent features of these traditional professions, 
such as, involving an intimate relationship with individual clients, and providing 
services/consultancy to the clients. These features do not happen in the process of 
academics teaching to students. 
However, considering that academic work has some characteristics of the traditional 
profession, can we extend the term profession to academic work? According to 
Kultgen (1988, p. 5), the answer to this question is yes as professions can be `taken 
broadly to embrace the literally hundreds of occupations that so label themselves and 
fret over their professionalism'. Based on the analysis of the effect of 
professionalism on the moral life of society, Kultgen argues that the term profession 
includes not only members of the learned professions, but teachers. Similarly, 
Freidson (2001) relates the term profession to the higher education sector, and argues 
that the professional ideology of service goes beyond serving others' choices. Rather, 
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it claims devotion to a transcendent value which infuses its specialization with a 
larger and putatively higher goal which may reach beyond that of those they are 
supposed to serve. Each body of professional knowledge and skill is attached to 
such a value'. (Freidson, 2001, p. 122) 
What Freidson suggests is that because academic work has its specialization, it can 
be perceived as a profession. There are some other academic researchers who regard 
academic work as a profession. For example, based on both policy analysis and 
interviews in eleven UK universities, Henkel (2000) argues that British academics 
are engaged in reprofessionalization in spite of their changing environment, and that 
big changes are taking place in the areas of academic disciplinary practice. For 
example, academics felt their autonomy was being reduced and some areas of their 
work were under scrutiny and subjected to intervention not only by academic 
management but by audit. However, the traditional academic values like the balance 
of teaching and research and views about institutional management, whilst 
differentiated by disciplines and departmental loyalties, appear constant across 
disciplines - leading. What Henkel implies is that as long as academics can balance 
their teaching and research effectively, they are professionals. 
In contrast, in the view of Halsey (1992), academics are deprofessionalised as 
proletarianization in the UK has occurred. The proletarianization takes the form of a 
`threefold reduction of power and advantage in the work and market position of a 
class or occupational group: in autonomy of working activity, security of 
employment, and chance of promotion' (Halsey, 1992, p. 125). 
Halsey's argument relies on three surveys of British academic staff conducted in 
1964/5,1967, and 1989, in order to revisit the British academic profession and to 
analyze its changing structures and functions since the 1960s. One example Halsey 
uses to argue against the proletarianization of academic work is that the prestige, 
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salaries, autonomy and resources of academics have been much reduced compared 
with the period before the 1960s. This is due to the expansion of the higher education 
sector, lack of resources, and external control over the institutions. Halsey shows his 
concern that these changes led to not only discontent within the profession but also 
lowered attributions of prestige both by the public and by the British political elite. 
However, Trowler (1998) argues that Halsey's analysis overstates both the nature of 
changes in academics' working conditions and the sense of loss of prestige that these 
changes have created, Similarly, Fulton & Holland (2001) point out that there is no 
reliable data other than salary information that would enable people to judge the 
validity of Halsey's observation. Except for the above disagreement with Halsey 
(1992), there is an indication that Halsey (1992) put too much emphasis in regarding 
professionalisation as a process in which the occupation seeks to improve both their 
economic position and their social prestige. One example he uses is that university 
teachers used to have comparatively better incomes and enjoyed greater autonomy 
and higher social respect under the patronage of government in the immediate 
post-war period. However, since the 1970s, the academic's working conditions have 
declined, especially in that their incomes have not kept pace when compared with 
other relevant occupations. One reason is because the government pressed 
universities to weaken the strength of tenure for those appointed after 1988. 
Academics' promotion opportunities also deteriorated. According to Halsey (1992), 
`the proportion who held professorial rank fell from 12 per cent in 1964 through 10 
per cent in 1976 to 9 per cent in 1989' (pp. 135). These examples suggest that Halsey 
links the deprofessionalisation mainly with loss of status and the deterioration of 
academics' working conditions, but he does not discuss other characteristics of the 
academic profession such as their expert knowledge and their control over their 
subject knowledge. However, expert knowledge and control over the subjects is one 
sign of academics' professionalism (Henkel, 2000), because the knowledge and skills 
of the subjects would enable academics to claim social recognition and economic 
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rewards (Larson, 1977). In other words, professionalisation is an attempt to translate 
one order of scarce resources into another (Larson, 1977), so academics' possession 
of scarce knowledge and skill is the principal basis on which they claim social 
recognition and economic rewards. 
If academic work is a profession, its professionalization would involve market 
closure and control, expert knowledge, and expert service, like the traditional 
profession experiences. Therefore, the structure of the academic professional market 
would thus be 
'determined by the larger social structure within which it is situated. The stage of 
economic development, the volume and distribution of national income, the class 
structure and ethnic composition, the average standard of living, the nature of the 
state and its policies, and ideology - including a variety of cultural traditions - 
define the potential, the characteristics, and the dynamics of a profession's market. ' 
(Larson, 1977, pp. 50) 
It happens in history that although the traditional professions can sometimes initiate 
projects and influence governments, professions often have to respond to external 
demands for change, which may be political, economic, cultural and social (Evetts, 
2006). Assuming academic work is a profession, a similar trend appears to have 
occurred in the higher education sector in England, particularly as the government 
has become its main funder. It is hard for the higher education institutions to survive 
and to develop without the resource and support from society and the government. 
Therefore, it is inevitable that the government has tended to challenge the higher 
education institutions to make them meet its designated needs in the audit context. In 
this sense, Halsey's arguments that the loss of academic status and the deterioration 
of academics' working conditions are a bit weak in proving that the academic 
profession is deprofessionalized. 
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Except for the perceived decline in working conditions, massification was regarded 
by Halsey (1992) as another cause of academic deprofessionalization. According to 
him, this massification helps to break the market closure which enables academics to 
achieve a monopoly of control to promote and to further their own occupational self 
interests in terms of salary, power and status returns, so in the long run, the 
attractiveness and the general social prestige of being an academic would be 
adversely affected. It is obvious that Halsey's argument of massification is again 
connected to the ability of academics to gain economic benefits and social status, 
which it has been argued is weak evidence in proving that the academic profession is 
deprofessionalized when compared with other traditional professions. 
Another flaw in Halsey's argument is that his critique calls people back to a previous 
age of the elite university rather than facing and addressing the problems of 
contemporary mass higher education in England. This corresponds with Scott's 
(1995) worry that in the British case, it is possible to create a mass system while 
retaining an elitist mentality in thinking about it. Therefore, I prefer Henkel's (2000) 
analysis to Hasley (1992), because Henkel analyzes professionalism not only as an 
ideology of expertise and service, a unique form of occupational control of work, but 
also as a discourse to promote and facilitate occupational change (Freidson, 2001). 
Henkel not only presents the negative impacts of quality audit on the work of 
academics but also points out that academics have adapted to these changes and 
become reprofessionalizcd through the audit process. The perceived 
reprofessionalisation suggests that academics as `professional workers are accepting, 
incorporating and accommodating to the concepts of `profession' and particularly 
`professionalism' in their work' (Evetts, 2006, p. 523). 
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1.3 Academic work as a vocation 
Except for the view that academic work is a profession, Weber in his classic lecture 
`Science as a Vocation' points out that science is a vocation organized into special 
disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. The 
science Weber refers to includes both natural science and historical science taught by 
teachers in the university. There are two main reasons for Weber treating academic 
science as a vocation. One is its specialization. The other is its presupposition. 
According to Weber, science has entered a phase of specialization and will forever 
remain the case. Weber also argues that science is not free from presuppositions, 
because scientific work presupposes that their rules of logic and method are valid, 
and that what is yielded by scientific work is important and worth knowing. These 
presuppositions are perceived by Weber as problematic, because they cannot be 
proved by scientific means, but only be interpreted by reference to its ultimate 
meaning, which people reject or accept according to their understanding of life. 
Considering the free of presumption nature of science, Weber argues that the primary 
task of the teacher is to serve the students with his knowledge and scientific 
experience instead of imprinting upon them his personal value judgements in order to 
enable students to have a fuller and more independent understanding of the facts. 
It is obvious that Weber's view has been influenced by his emphasis on the spiritual 
factors with regards to knowing the world. This can be detected from his use of the 
term `vocation', because vocation originally means `first a call or summons to the 
religious life; then the work to which one is called; finally, regular employment' 
(Kultgen, 1988, p. 82). It means that when making demands upon a person, a 
profession is a vocation, a calling by God or by nature as voiced in the native 
endowments that equip one to serve others (Kultgen, 1988). 
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Moreover, Weber's argument on vocation is mainly based in the background of an 
elite education in Germany. The science Weber conceives of is quite different from 
the academic work nowadays. Although there is a sense of rationality in Weber's 
work, in that he does not deny the usage and the importance of science, Weber's view 
is confined by the German social context in the 19`h century. At that time there was 
specialization of science in universities, which were very research oriented and 
where science might have been taught by academics only. This context might have 
enabled a larger degree of freedom for academics in their work. 
However, in the current social context, there is a change to the generalization of 
science. This change has been raised and explained by Hackett (1990) who 
theoretically and empirically examines the changes in the structure and values of 
science subjects in universities in the 1990s in the USA. He argues against treating 
science and the academy as equivalent. Hackett (1990) points out that although there 
is a high degree of interdependence and interpenetration between science and the 
academy, their goals, values, and norms are not equivalent. The marriage of research 
and teaching within the university has limited and compromised the purposes of both 
endeavors. Considering the characteristics of academic science, Hackett holds that it 
is not operating independently of society as Weber suggests. Instead, it is undertaken 
within organizations which have their unique properties, dynamics, and goals which 
endure across sectors, communities, cultures, and societies. The academic science is 
thus shaped by general organizational forces, particularly the quest for resources and 
legitimacy. Hackett's finding suggests that science and academe are different, so 
Weber's view on academic science as a vocation needs to be reconsidered. 
1.4 Teaching as a way of life 
Except for Hackett who disagreed with academic work as a profession, Hogan (2003) 
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also argues against regarding academic work as a vocation, because the `vocation' 
concept is associated with the prominence of church influence in the history of 
\'Vestern education. The vocation concept `carries strong connotations of service 
given for a loftier purpose than monetary reward and it is also linked with 
ecclesiastical requirements of obedience to higher authority' (Hogan, 2003, p. 208). 
Hogan holds that academic work is halfway between a profession and a vocation and 
that teaching is a specific way of life with its own integrity because teaching makes 
`an occupational commitment to a form of action that has an authority of its own and 
responsibilities of its own' (Hogan, 2003, p. 209). 
In general Hogan perceives teaching and learning as involving not only a repertoire 
of competencies to be mastered and shared, but as something qualitatively different, 
because everyone has different lifestyles, value orientations and careers. This 
suggests that Hogan regards education as a human practice, a form of purposeful 
action with goods and virtues internal to itself that it seeks to sustain and develop. 
The best example of teaching, according to Hogan, is Socrates of Athens who treated 
teaching as inspiration. When Socrates raised a question, he did not give out answers, 
but was keen to venture afresh with others, in order to get some new insights (Hogan, 
2003). It is evident that Socrates' model of teaching has the characteristics of being 
reflective and showing respect for learners. These characteristics of teaching have 
been passed on, but are developed with more emphasis on the students and have been 
addressed with different terms in higher education sector nowadays. One example is 
in the ambition to help students become independent and critical learners both in 
regards to their own discipline and the world around them (Barnett, 1990). The other 
example is protecting student academic freedom as one of the professional values to 
be possessed by teachers, which means allowing the students to freely pursue 
learning, so the students can become critical about knowledge claims (Macfarlane, 
2004b). However, Macfarlane suggests that it would be inappropriate for teachers to 
hide their convictions from their students because of teachers' intellectual honesty 
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and emotional leakage, and that the teacher should strike a balance in protecting 
students' voice and in identifying their own perspectives on the issues under 
discussion. 
However, expansion of higher education in the UK has made teaching become a 
transmission of knowledge and skills, instead of making it an inspiration and a 
one-to-one activity between a student and a teacher, so it is hard to adopt the Socratic 
teaching model in this situation. The argument of Hogan, that teaching is a way life, 
is mainly based on the historical time when academics lived in their Oxbridge 
colleges imbued with a collegiate culture, but nowadays, there is a trend away from 
collegiality toward managerialism in the UK higher education sector, of which 
quality audit has made academics perceive their teaching as being under scrutiny and 
as a compliance activity (sec chapter 5). Moreover, different institutional missions, 
either research focused or teaching focused, could have influenced the position of 
teaching in the institution, which correspondingly could affect the academics' 
attitude to teaching. In light of this, whether the view `teaching as a way of life' 
could be applied to a non Oxbridge university, especially in the context of 
massification and quality audit, is to be questioned. 
In summary, this section discusses and analyzes three different views on the nature of 
academic work. These views cover different time spans. Of these views, academic 
work as a profession is commonly accepted. However, there is a shift from 
collegiality to managerialism which is perceived to be eating into academics' 
professionalism and into the rights of academics to manage themselves in the UK 
higher education sector (Halsey, 1992). The section below thus explores the ideas of 
collegiality and managerialism and analyses the shift from collegiality to 
managerialism in higher education institutions in England. 
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Section two: Shift from collegiality to managerialism 
Collegiality has its origins in the organisation of Oxbridge colleges, but over time, 
this collegiate tradition has seeped out of Oxbridge to influence other universities. 
According to Tapper, the idea of collegiality has expressed itself in three institutional 
arenas (Tapper, 1998; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2002): the college itself, for example, 
the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge (or `Oxbridge'); the collegiate university, for 
example, the ancient collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge; and all the 
higher education institutions that have incorporated aspects of the collegiate tradition 
as identified within the colleges and the collegiate universities. Therefore, 
collegiality is interpreted differently according to the institutional context within 
which it is located. Its manifestation is confined to a small number of universities and 
continues to exist only at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge (Tapper, 1998). 
According to Tapper (1998), the model of collegiality has both physical and 
functional dimensions. The physical dimension refers to the colleges where the 
university performs its duties. The functional dimension of collegiality embodies 
university governance and the relationship between academic colleagues of which 
collegiality is treated as an idea and the values it relates are the focus of this section. 
Collegiality is associated with significant academic autonomy and freedom, and 
defines the university as a self-governing community of scholars. Collegiality 
enables academics to hold an authority relating to their professional status, training 
and experience, and to have a right to be involved in the decision-making process of 
the institution in which they work (Brundrett, 1998; Dearlove, 1995,1997). 
According to Bush (1995), collegiality assumes that 
`organizations determine policy and make decisions through a process of 
discussion leading to consensus. Power is shared among some or all members of 
the organization who are thought to have a mutual understanding about the 
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objectives of the institution. '(Bush, 1995, p. 52) 
Similarly, in the view of Dearlove (1995,1997), collegiality embraces a number of 
concepts, such as that universities should be autonomous institutions with sufficient 
free funds to enjoy independence from financial pressures; participatory democracy, 
not representative government; consensus emerging from debate; the equal worth of 
all academics, with no room for hierarchy and managers; that students, support staff, 
administrators, lay persons, and the other non-academic staff should be excluded 
from university governance. However, Dearlove is also aware that these notions are 
so ideal that they differ from organisational reality. Firstly, in mass higher education, 
universities are no longer as well resourced as before. Secondly, outside of Oxbridge, 
lay persons have long been involved in university governance. Thirdly, the 
presumption of shared values does not entertain the possibility of unresolved 
conflicts when there are hard choices to be made. This means there is a need for 
some form of organizational leadership (Dearlove, 1997). These points suggest that 
collegial management is an ideal and that some of the benefits it offers are difficult to 
attain (Brundrett, 1998). 
There are other critiques of the collegial models in higher education. One is that 
collegial governance is slow and conservative, so it will inevitably elongate the 
decision making process (Bush, 1995; Dearlove, 1995,1997). Another critique is that 
collegiality is indifferent to institution-wide concerns, so it can easily degenerate into 
the single-minded and selfish pursuit of individual and departmental interests 
(Dearlove, 1995,1997). These critiques suggest that collegiality has become a 
problematic mode of governance for delivering change in mass higher education. 
Dearlove (1997) shows a concern that due to this collegiate culture, academics 
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believe that they should be free to manage themselves as self-employed, and that 
they still regard their teaching and research as craft work which establishes their 
work as a professional in the mass higher education. Craft work means practical 
skillful work `by an individual or a small team, where constant corrections are made 
on the basis of the exercise of judgements that derive from experience learned on the 
job through apprenticeships. ' (Dearlove, 1997, p. 57) As a result, academics tend to 
defy external control and become hostile to it. (Dearlove, 1995) 
However, the university has been undergoing a series of changes: a shift from elite to 
a mass higher education, the greater size and complexity of universities, a move of 
the university towards an economic ideology, acute funding pressures, the strategies 
of the 1979 Thatcher government towards university marketisation, the growth of an 
audit culture for teaching and research, and increased accountability for the 
university (See context chapter). These changes have brought about a shift from 
collegiality to managerialism. 
What is managerialism? Generally speaking, managerialism is a new mode of 
governance, not a term confined to higher education. According to Pollitt (1993), 
managerialism is a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which there is 
assumption that `better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range 
of economic and social ills' (p. 1). On examining how the British and the Americans 
run their public services including education by managerialism, Pollitt argues that 
managerialism suggests a belief that the application of private sector management 
would improve the public and nonprofit sector and reduce the burden of public 
expenditure. 
In the higher education sector, managerialism is perceived as not just a concern for, 
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but a belief in, the effective management of specific institutions in specific situations, 
because `the `ism' points to an ideology, to a faith or belief in the truth of a set of 
ideas which are independent of specific situations' (Trow, 1993, p. 2). This view is 
based on Trow's analysis of the effectiveness of the policy of managerialism and the 
consequences of British higher education sector following this policy. According to 
Trow (1993), managerialism is critical of some norms and attitudes that marked out 
British universities and academics in the past, such as complacency and conservatism, 
administrative inefficiency, indifference to establishing links with industry and 
commerce or to broadening access to larger sectors of the population. 
Both Pollitt and Trow perceive managerialism as a belief and as a technical activity. 
This reveals a concern with the importance of management for management's sake 
(Deem & Brehony, 2005). However, Deem & Brehony (2005) hold a perception that 
the move of the higher education sector towards the devolved management of public 
services and their marketisation is not only a technical but also a political activity, 
because this move is accompanied by both greater state regulation and is associated 
with imposed external accountability. 
According to Dearlove (1997), Tapper (1998), and Tapper & Palfreyman (2002), the 
political connotation of managerialism can be retrieved from the publication of the 
Jarratt Report (1985) which explicitly expressed its opposition to collegial 
self-government, and the possibility that academic participation in governance would 
block necessary changes. In recommending that laymen should be more involved in 
governance, the Jarratt Report can be perceived as a sign of how the higher education 
sector was encouraged to move away from collegiality towards managerialism. 
Similarly, Deem (2004) argues that state policies and funding regimes have 
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contributed to the new managerial permeation of universities, associated with change, 
for example, the high emphasis on the explicit management of core and support 
activities. Deem & Brehony (2005) interpret new managerialism as an ideological 
construction derived from practices once used by the private sector, and an 
ideological model of governmental and institutional order. In other words, new 
managerialism is `a set of values, ideas and practices including marketisation, 
performance management, league tables, devolved budgets and targets, aimed at 
reforming the management of public service organizations' (Brehony & Deem, 2005, 
p. 396). It is apparent that the notion of `new managerialism' invokes not only 
relations of power and domination, associated with new kinds of imposed external 
accountability, but also language and discourse in that new managerialist language 
asserts that the solution to all public service problems is management (Deem & 
Brehony, 2005). 
Deem's ESRC-funded project on `new Managcrialism and the management of UK 
Universities' reveals that the evident features of a `new managerialism' in UK higher 
education are: 
Changes to the finding environment, academic work and workloads (more 
students, a smaller unit of resource per student and pressure to do both teaching 
and research to a high standard); more emphasis on team work in both leaching 
and research, partly in response to external audit; the introduction of cost-centres 
to university departments or faculties; greater internal and external surveillance 
of the performance of academics and an increase in the proportion of managers, 
both career administrators and manager-academics, in universities (Deem & 
Brehony, 2005, p. 225). 
This project reveals that new managerialism has brought about significant changes to 
the higher education sector. First, increasing the importance of management and 
management roles has caused organizational and cultural change, including changes 
to the perception of how management is done and why. For example, some 
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manager-academics see the academic community as a source of resistance, 
obstruction and frustration and many managers attempt to achieve change by 
`wielding greater influence over new appointments and stressing new and tighter 
conditions of performance for existing staff' (Deem, 2000, p. 5). Second, grass-root 
academics complained about being excluded from `decisions affecting their work and 
the absence of transparency in the way things were done' (Deem, 2003, p. 116). 
Third, there are different views about the use of technologies. Government ministers 
and officials see the wide use of technologies of devolved resources and workload 
allocation systems as easing workload, while academics see these technologies as 
adding to their workload (Brehony & Deem, 2005). 
In sum, the rise and development of managerialism and new managerialism draws 
power away from the academic community to the managerial bodies both inside and 
outside the universities. New managerialism is intimately connected to the audit 
culture (Shore & Wright, 2000). Quality audits further legitimate the right of 
university managers to manage. 
Section three: Academics facing value tensions 
However, academics are professionals believing in their authority that derives from a 
discipline-based professionalism (Dearlove, 1997). When quality audit makes some 
challenges to academic assumptions and values, academics resist or show hostility to 
this managerial control. This section analyzes the value tensions between managerial 
control and academics' professionalism in the process of quality audit in England: 
compliance versus diversity, distrust versus professionalism, accountability versus 
professionalism, and bureaucracy versus professionalism. 
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3.1 Compliance versus diversity 
The literature reveals that quality management has caused a compliance culture 
amongst academics, which contradicts their need for a diversity of approaches to 
teaching. One argument is that quality in higher education is associated with various 
manifestations of conforming behaviour (Newton, 2002), and that the quality 
movement in higher education demands compliance and performativity and the 
endless reproduction of norms (Morley, 2003). This rewards conformity and prevents 
academics from making changes to their teaching practice because the meaning of 
teaching quality has been transformed by the audit process. In order to be audited, 
the learning experience must be quantified and standardized so that it can be 
measured (Shore & Wright, 2000). As a result, the `energy and ingenuity' of 
academic staff in UK higher education remain focused on `how to get a good `result' 
from whatever quality assurance process they face' (Brennan, 2001, p. 1). There is a 
fear among academics that this institutional compliance culture created by the 
requirements of the external assessment exercises in the UK would dampen creativity 
and slow down the responsiveness of the system to a rapidly changing environment 
(Harvey, 1995; Henkel, 2000; Kogan et al., 2000). 
3.2 Distrust versus professionalism 
Views on the link between trust and professionalism have varied over time. The 
general picture is that professionalism and trust were perceived to be related in the 
1950s. Later on they were perceived to be disconnected in the critical analyses of 
professionalization processes. However, since the 1990s, there is an argument that 
trust is associated with professionalism. For example, both Parsons (1951) and 
Hughes (1958) relate trust to professionalism, emphasizing that professionals should 
be trusted because they are competent to think about and solve problems that fall in 
their domain. Parsons and Hughes perceive professionalism as occupational 
85 
cooperation, collegial employment and relations of trust based on competences. The 
origin of this notion of trust is in the l9`h century when professionals, such as doctors, 
lawyers and clergymen, were trusted to provide altruistic advice within a community 
of mutually dependent middle class and upper-class clients (Evetts, 2006). 
In contrast, Johnson (1972) does not relate trust to professionalism. He defines a 
profession as a method of controlling work and interprets professionalism as `a 
successful ideology that has entered the political vocabulary of a wide range of 
occupational groups in their claims and competition for status and income' (Johnson, 
1972, p, 32). Similarly, Larson (1977) does not see trust as an essential aspect of 
professionalism, but as an ideological control mechanism of the powerful 
occupational groups. This disregarding of trust in the professions can be explained by 
some medical and legal negligence and malpractice scandals. One example is the Dr 
Harold Shipman case, a medical doctor who was convicted of the mass murder of his 
patients. This case has resulted in renewed questioning of the association between 
trust and professionalism (Evetts, 2006). People have begun to treat some professions 
with suspicion. 
However, since the 1990s, professionalism is again associated with trust. Evetts 
(2006) and Freidson (2001) argue that trust should be related to the professionals and 
that the trust of professionalism has been decreasing in the UK. Freidson (2001) 
refers to professionalism as the ideology of expertise and service and a special set of 
institutions. Freidson argues that professionalism is not only a unique form of 
occupational control of work but also a discourse to promote and to facilitate 
occupational change, and that trust is one value of professionalism. This suggests that 
trust in professionals matches the collegial value of high-trust and ethical 
commitment within the profession. The reason people consider collegiality as an 
ideal model of the profession is because of a widespread belief that collegiality can 
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result in mutual support, management and client trust (Hughes, 1958; Parsons, 1951, 
Freidson, 2001). (The characteristics of collegiality and its influence on the work of 
academics have been discussed in section two of this chapter. ) 
However, the adoption of quality audit in the higher education sector produces an 
argument that the work of academics is distrusted, and that the origin of quality audit 
is the distrust of government in the higher education sector (Morley, 2003; Trow, 
1993). Martin Trow is amongst the first to associate the development of the external 
quality assessment with a withdrawal of the trust to the academic community. Trow 
(1993) argues that the 1991 White Paper (DES, 1991) represents massive distrust in 
the traditional professional ethic of continual enhancement of expertise and 
establishing practices in consultation with both peers and service-users. Eraut (1994) 
remarks, in a sarcastic way, that professional bodies used to exist to protect the 
public from unqualified non-professionals, but now they function to protect the 
public from the professionals themselves. As a result, issues of trust, authority and 
expertise had been disaggregated and routines have been subjected to scrutiny. 
Academics have lost some of their authoritative power but a new defensiveness is 
emerging (Eraut, 1994). 
3.3 Accountability versus professionalism 
In England, with the demand for higher education institutions to become accountable 
in the use of publicly generated resources (Walden, 1996), the quest for greater 
accountability to the public has penetrated the lives of academics. In theory, the 
culture of accountability can make academics and institutions more accountable to 
the public, but O'Neill (2000a, 2000b) argues that the real requirements of 
accountability are accountability to regulators, to government departments, to 
funders and to legal standards. Similarly, among academics there is a perception that 
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the concept of accountability has been used within government policy to justify, 
legitimate and to implement the structures and technologies that seek external 
leverage and control over academic institutions and professionals (Johnson, 2000a). 
This perception accounts for the academics' resistance to the concept of 
accountability. 
On one hand, the demand for accountability reflects the greatly increased scale and 
cost of higher education and increasing customer awareness (Gosling & D'Andrea, 
2001). The UK Government holds that taxpayers have the right to know their money 
is being spent economically, efficiently, and effectively, so the public investment in 
higher education is required to `justify closer scrutiny of the outcomes achieved by 
publicly funded institutions and from students who expect to receive good quality 
teaching and sufficient learning resources to meet their needs' (Gosling & D'Andrea, 
2001, p. 6). However, there is a worry that this might result in performance 
assessments acting only as proxy for consumer satisfaction (Johnson, 2000b). 
On the other hand, the demand for accountability has made universities 
`accommodate themselves to public policies as determined by the Government' 
(Salter & Tapper, 1994, p. 202), not only `in terms of their conformity to legally 
acceptable process but also in terms of performance' (Power, 1999, p. 44). In theory 
the culture of accountability aims to make professionals and institutions more 
accountable for good performance, but quality audit focuses on things that are easily 
measurable, and the performance indicators that the audit chooses are for ease of 
measurement and control rather than measuring accurately what the quality of 
performance is (O'Neill, 2000a, 2000b). For example, universities attach significance 
to annual reports, prospectuses and web-sites in order to demonstrate their 
organizational efficiency, but academics perceive these symbols as superficial, 
because they give little indication of the internal values, cultures and practices of 
88 
teaching and research. The academics thus perceive this quality management as a 
burden on time, financial and administrative resources (Johnson, 2000a). 
It is obvious that accountability has been related to customer culture and with the 
requirement for academic performance. However, the requirement for performance 
might have influenced academics' ability to judge and to control their work, because 
academics as professionals prefer to manage and control their own work. This 
reveals a tension between accountability and academics' professionalism. Another 
tension is that accountability makes it difficult for academics to engage with 
colleagues in serious interdisciplinary debate about the quality of provision, because 
of the standardization required by audit. This contradicts the characteristics of 
professions in that the creation of a sense of community and a willingness to examine 
values openly are the necessary conditions within which questions relating to quality 
can be taken seriously (Nixon, 1996). Nixon's argument is based on his interviews 
with academics in England on how they understand what makes for good practice 
and what institutional conditions are necessary for such practice to flourish. Similar 
criticism is voiced by O'Neill (2000a, 2000b), arguing that the emphasis upon 
accountability has in fact undermined trust by constraining and weakening 
professional practices, and damaged professional pride and integrity. These views 
suggest that the accountability movement does not square with the intrinsic goals and 
targets of the institution, so when required to conform to it, academics use their 
collegial values to protect the interests of their own profession. 
3.4 Bureaucracy versus professionalism 
This section aims to describe the characteristics of bureaucracy, and analyze the 
tension between bureaucracy and academic professionalism. According to Max 
Weber, bureaucracy is `the means of transforming social actions into rationally 
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organized action' (Roth, G. & Wittich, C., 1968, p. 987). Watson (2003) explains 
further that bureaucracy is `the control and co-ordination of work tasks through a 
hierarchy of appropriately qualified office holders, whose authority derives from 
their expertise and who rationally devise a system of rules and procedures that are 
calculated to provide the most appropriate means of achieving specified ends' (p. 86). 
Weber compares earlier forms of administration with bureaucracy and holds that 
bureaucracy is efficient, because of its impersonality, concentration of the means of 
administration, a leveling effect on social and economic differences and 
implementation of a system of authority that is practically indestructible. Weber 
summarizes the main characteristics of bureaucracy as: 
" `There is the principle of official jurisdictional areas, which are generally 
ordered by rules' (p. 956). 
0 `The principles of office hierarchy and of channels of appeal stipulate a clearly 
established system of super- and sub-ordination in which there is a supervision 
of the lower offices by the higher ones (p. 957). 
" `The management of the modem office is based upon written documents' (p. 
957). 
" Office management usually presupposes thorough training in a field of 
specialization. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the 
full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact the length of his 
obligatory working hours in the bureau may be limited. 
" The management of the office follows general rules. It involves jurisprudence, 
administrative or business management (Roth, and Wittich, 1968). 
Watson (2003) presents the appeal of bureaucracy as two-fold: 
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" `Fairness in the distribution of posts and rewards, particularly in the sphere of 
public administration.... By the following of procedural neutrality and 
impartiality, the old evils of favoritism, nepotism and capriciousness would be 
removed. 
" Efficiency both in state administration and in industrial enterprises. Great 
promise was seen in terms of output and quality if large organisations could be 
administered on the basis of clear procedures, expertise and co-ordinated human 
efforts. ' (p. 86) 
It is evident that both Weber and Watson perceived the bureaucratic model as the 
most accurate approximation of how the administrative organization of an institution 
functions. They see the bureaucracy originally has a technical and neutral meaning, 
with the characteristics of hierarchy of authority and the presence of rules. However, 
there is an indication that academics are opposed to bureaucracy. For example, the 
increased bureaucracy due to quality audit has become a concern in the higher 
education sector (Harvey, 2005; Kogan, et al., 2000). 
3.4.1 Tension between bureaucracy and academic professionalism 
Kogan, et al. (2000) compare the change processes in higher education in the UK, 
Sweden and Norway during the 1990s and reveal that external quality management 
has become an important contributor to increased `bureaucratisation'. Similarly, 
Harvey (2005) points out that these external pressures have required institutions to 
develop elaborate and comprehensive internal procedures to audit the practice of 
academic and central departments, and that both external and internal quality 
assurance mechanisms are so complicated that they have contributed to the increase 
of bureaucracy in some degree. The General Secretary of the Association of 
University Teachers (2002) reminds people that the burden of bureaucracy has 
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reached unmanageable proportions, and that staff are increasingly prevented from 
getting on with their jobs because of the amount of `red tape' they have to deal with. 
('Red tape' is a derisive term for excessive regulations or rigid conformity to formal 
rules that are considered redundant/ bureaucratic and hinders/ prevents action or 
decision-making. ) 
These researches suggest that academics are anti-bureaucratic and that academics 
perceive bureaucracy differently from Weber. The meaning of bureaucracy has gone 
beyond being neutral in the context of the higher education sector in England. 
Bureaucracy has become a term associated with the defects of large organizations 
applying rules to cases (Kogan, et at., 2000). As a result, some occupational changes 
promoted and facilitated by professionalism, such as more paper work and additional 
responsibilities would be interpreted by academics as increased bureaucratization 
caused by quality audit. 
One implication of these findings is that academics show strong resistance to quality 
audit. They might have regarded professionalism as an ideology which helps their 
occupation to gain `monopoly of competence legitimized by officially sanctioned 
`expertise', and `a monopoly of credibility with the public' (Larson, p. 38). When 
quality audit is perceived as an instrument of control, academics will use the 
ideology of professionalism to fight against the audit to maintain and regain the 
monopoly of their expertise (their subjcctldiscipline knowledge) and their social 
status. In this case, it is likely that academics would blame quality audit for increased 
bureaucratization in their institutions. This also suggests that academics possess an 
idealized notion of a profession linked to collegiality which is supposed to boost their 
professionalism and differs from bureaucracy advocated by managerialism. Another 
implication is that bureaucracy questions professional discretion, one value of 
collegiality, because bureaucracy puts an emphasis on hierarchy and requires people 
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to follows generalised rules. However, in the view of academics, bureaucracy would 
reduce their freedom to make judgements or decide what to do, and would prevent 
them exercising independent judgement. 
In contrast, Larson (1977) holds a different view that the bureaucratic phenomenon 
does not conflict with the model of professions, because bureaucracy and 
professionalism are complementary models of work organization and two subtypes 
of rational administration. In Larson's words, bureaucracy helps to develop 
professionalism and creates the structural context of successful professionalisation. 
For example, large-scale bureaucratic organizations can transform the social matrix 
of professionalisation, providing the climate of ideological legitimation for both old 
and new professions, and providing models, sponsorship, equipment, and resources 
(Larson, 1977). 
It is inevitable that professionalism would produce some organizational change, 
which includes bureaucracy (Kogan, 1999). After analyzing the changes in the 
infrastructure of higher education institutions, Kogan points out that the higher 
education sector is not bureaucracy free, because in all the institutions there are 
mixtures of collegial, academic-based decision making, and bureaucratic/hierarchical 
working, `therefore collegial working is not simply a coming together of peers, but is 
itself structured into hierarchical and bureaucratic formats' (Kogan, 1999, p. 270).... 
`A lot of decision making process will inevitably become bureaucratized. For 
example, curricula, assessment procedures and the like are monitored by 
administrators to ensure that they fall within existing policies and are consistent 
with practices being developed in the rest of the university (Kogan, 1999, p. 271). 
In the view of Larson (1977), the alleged conflict between profession and 
bureaucracy is actually a contrast between the structure of bureaucratic organizations 
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and an ideology promoted by some of the members of the profession. In the higher 
education context, Larson's theory implies that some academics still hold an 
ideological conception that their profession should be a community with democratic 
mutual supervision over internalized common standards, without considering the fact 
that the shift from collegiality to managerialism has led higher education institutions 
into more bureaucratic structures. These structures transfer the power or authority 
from the organization to the individual. The impersonal organizational power 
becomes that of a person as long as he or she occupies that role, but the power is not 
a property of the person, because it is not separable from the organization (Larson, 
1977). In contrast, the academic profession would like to maintain indeterminate 
cognitive areas in order to assert the uniqueness of individual capacities, but 
collectively, they solicit trust in individual professionals and individual freedom from 
external controls. The knowledge and internalized ethical norms the academics offer 
to the public in exchange for its trust emphasizes the academics' individuality and 
illustrates the essential individualism of the professional ideology. Therefore, this 
individualism is one of the powerful factors that make academic professions appear 
to be anti-bureaucracy (Larson, 1977). 
These perceived value tensions have made the notion of academic work as a single 
profession problematic. Maybe it is time for academics to re-define their 
professionalism in terms of their underlying commitments and purposes (Nixon & 
Marks, 2001). Based on analyses of the influence of changed working conditions on 
the roles of the academics, Nixon & Ranson (1997) and Nixon & Marks (2001) argue 
that academia should become a learning profession and that academics' 
professionalism should not be defined in terms of status and self-regulation, but 
rather in terms of values and practices. What they meant is that academic 
professionalism should be based on shared understandings and open dialogue 
because of the changed context of the higher education sector, such as, greater degree 
of institutional specification, a more diversified academic workforce, significantly 
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increased student numbers, marketisation, quality and the quality audit movement. 
According to Nixon & Ranson (1997), this changed context has made the institutions 
`associated with "the learning society": television, the new technology, the printed 
word, new social movements, etc' (p. 207), so if academics want to exert their 
professional influence, they would have to `look to their own institutional boundaries 
and to how they might mediate their own professional interests beyond those 
boundaries' (p. 207). In other words, academic professionalism should be based `not 
only on academics' ability to 'profess' their own professional values, but also on their 
capacity to receive and work with the values of others' (p. 207), such as parents, 
students, and the local and national community. 
Nixon & Ranson (1997) and Nixon & Marks (2001) explain this new 
professionalism further as a capacity of academics to be extroverted, generous and 
knowledgeable in their relations with professional colleagues, other professional 
groups and the public. They describe characteristics of this new professionalism as 
new forms of agreement-making that seek to reinforce the primacy of the relation 
between professionals and their publics, and the need to ground that relation in an 
ongoing dialogue regarding the ends and purposes of learning. This suggests that 
Nixon & Ranson (1997) and Nixon & Marks (2001) regard the expert service of the 
academic profession as a service to the public, with the potential aim also of meeting 
the accountability requirement of higher education institutions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the phenomenon of professionalism as it appears in 
contemporary society, analyzed its characteristics and distinguished it from an 
occupation. Three different views on the nature of academic work have been 
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presented and discussed: academic work as a profession, academic work as a 
vocation, and teaching as a way of life. Of these views academic work as a 
profession has been commonly accepted, instead of the fact that there are some 
differences between academic work and the traditional profession. However, the shift 
from collegiality to managerialism has contributed to value tensions in the work of 
academics particularly in relation to quality audit in England. Four value tensions 
have been discussed and analyzed: the compliance culture produced by the audit 
culture constrains variety in teaching practice, a perceived decreased trust from the 
government conflicts with the professionalism of academics, the requirement of 
accountability undermines academic professional practice and finally the academics' 
ideal conception of their profession produces an anti-bureaucracy sentiment. This 
chapter ends with an assumption that it is time for academics to become a learning 
profession, in order to meet the needs of the communities they serve (Nixon & Marks, 
2001). 
96 
Chapter 5: Reviewing the Impact of Quality Audit on the Work of Academics 
Introduction 
After an overview of academic work as a profession in England in the previous 
chapter, this chapter then reviews the various ways in which different forms of 
quality assurance mechanisms for teaching might have affected the work of 
academics. One reason for analyzing the perceived impact of quality assurance 
mechanisms is because of the close relationship between audit and quality assurance 
mechanisms. Because audit works as a control of control (Power, 1994,1997), 
quality assurance mechanisms imposed upon the institution form an external control 
and check the performance of the quality assurance mechanisms within the 
institution. The internal mechanisms, in turn, regulate the work of academics. 
Therefore this chapter first highlights and reviews academic debates about the 
individual quality assurance mechanisms, then looks at the general perceived impact 
of quality audit as a whole on the work of academics. 
Section one: Debates on quality assurance mechanisms 
As the context chapter suggests, there are a variety of quality assurance mechanisms 
imposed upon institutions by external agencies and separately created within the 
institutions themselves, of which student course evaluation, peer observation, and 
external examining are most frequently discussed in the literature. The following 
section is going to present and analyze debates on these individual mechanisms. 
1.1 Student course evaluation 
Student course evaluation is known by a variety of terms including, for example, 
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student feedback. Student evaluation constitutes information which can be used by 
lecturers, students, and other stakeholders of higher education when examining or 
selecting programmes or course units (Richardson, 2005). It has become a common 
practice to evaluate the quality of teaching in English higher education institutions. 
Academics often use this evaluation to support their applications for appointment or 
promotion. 
However, academics hold mixed views with regard to the impact of student course 
evaluation on teaching. A range of researchers draw attention to the significance and 
importance of evaluation for improving teaching. Their arguments are: that 
evaluation is an important mechanism in teaching (Lecky & Neville, 2001; Wilson et 
al, 1997), and evaluation appears to have improved teaching performance (Moore & 
Kuol, 2005; Nasser & Fresko, 2002; Timpson & Andrew, 1997; Wilson et al, 1997). 
However, some other researchers have little faith in evaluation for several reasons: 
flawed evaluation methods (Douglas & Douglas, 2006; King et a!, 1999), students' 
incompetence in completing evaluation forms (Rowley, 2003), and alleged lack of 
contribution of the evaluation towards academics' professional development (Fisher 
et al., 1998; Johnson, 2000b; Pratt, 1997; Saroyan & Mundsen, 2001). There is also 
an argument that the evaluation is not always treated seriously by the institution 
(Harvey, et al, 1997; Richardson, 2005). These different views will be analysed 
below. 
1.1.1 Importance of evaluation to teaching 
Wilson et al (1997) suggests that student course evaluation is a valid, reliable and 
useful indicator of teaching quality, because it can provide crucial information about 
course quality for funding agencies, universities, prospective students and employers 
of graduates. The importance of evaluation is confirmed by Lecky & Neville (2001) 
who analyse student course evaluation approaches adopted by British universities. 
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Lecky & Neville argue that the evaluation information is important to teaching in the 
following ways: assisting academic staff to enhance the quality of their teaching 
performance, measuring teaching effectiveness for use in administrative 
decision-making, informing students and assisting their decision-making when 
selecting a course of study, and informing research on teaching. 
There is widespread belief as well as evidence that student course evaluation can be 
used to improve academics' teaching practice. Timpson & Andrew (1997) reveal that 
student evaluation has promoted continuous instructional improvements, and that it 
permits more analysis and discussion among students, teachers and administrators. 
There is evidence that academics take the evaluation seriously and have been making 
changes according to the results of student course evaluation (Moore & Kuol, 2005, 
Nasser & Fresko, 2002), such as changing course assignments, organization of the 
course, and use of instructional strategies, but the usefulness of the evaluation to 
improve lecturing varies by instructional area and by reported evaluation results 
(Nasser & Fresko, 2002). 
1.1.2 Debates on validity of evaluation 
In spite of the argument that student course evaluation is important and has improved 
teaching practice, it has not been well received by some other researchers. One 
debate is on the validity of student course evaluation to teaching. Douglas & 
Douglas' (2006) interviews with staff within a business school of a post - 1992 UK 
university indicate that staff have very little faith in the validity of student feedback 
questionnaires due to three main reasons. First, many of the questions were so 
subjective that responses would be influenced by personal prejudice. Second, the 
questionnaire aimed to measure student's satisfaction with a given module, but many 
questions were irrelevant to the delivery of that module. Third, the questionnaires 
were open to abuse by students because they were completed after their assignments 
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had been graded and returned to them. This meant that students might deliberately 
give low ratings as an act of `revenge' for low assignment marks. 
The competence of the students to evaluate teaching is also raised and discussed by 
Rowley (2003). Rowley theoretically analyses a range of issues in relation to the 
collection of student feedback on modules and courses, and points out that when 
students evaluate teaching, they are influenced by different variables, such as their 
ethnic background, gender and age, the size of the class, the centrality of the course 
(compulsory or optional), and instructor characteristics, (rank, experience, reputation, 
research skills, gender, minority status, and physical appearance). 
Similarly, King et al's (1999) survey of student feedback systems at Loughborough 
University Business School in the UK suggest that academics perceive the feedback 
method as flawed, and that academics perceived students as not competent to give 
reliable feedback. The examples academics quoted are: significant numbers of 
questionnaires are not correctly completed; some student representatives cannot 
represent the student body because they do not have the ability and opportunity to 
find out their cohort's views before meetings and then pass feedback to their cohort 
afterwards; there is a disinclination among students to feed back sensible responses, 
because they either have little knowledge of or little interest in the purposes of this 
evaluation, and because students have little confidence that their comments would 
make a difference to their units, especially if they see the same problems recurring 
year on year. 
The above examples suggest that there are some flaws in relying too heavily on 
student feedback. In examining how student evaluation was practised at the 
University of Central England, Harvey, et al (1997) argues that one reason why some 
students become sceptical of and are unwilling to participate in the evaluation is 
because the institution does not deal with the evaluation seriously. The examples are: 
the evaluation may not be properly analysed; the evaluation may be analysed but is 
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lost in reports with statistics and tables that give little guidance for action and has 
limited circulation in the university; the students may not be informed about any 
actions resulting from their input. Harvey's view is shared by Richardson (2005) who 
reviews the research literature concerning the use of student feedback and points out 
that students' lack of attention to the evaluation result is due to four main reasons: 
the lack of guidance to teachers, managers and administrators on how the evaluation 
result should be interpreted; the lack of external incentives to reward good feedback 
or punish poor feedback; the fact that the results of the evaluation are not published 
to assure the students that action is to be or being taken; and ambiguity about the 
ownership of feedback data. These factors have caused academics to be less willing 
to act on the results of feedback, and have made students critical of the value of the 
evaluation. 
Another explanation for the lack of attention to student course evaluation is because 
academics and students have different views of good teaching. For example, 
academics may focus on challenging students and developing independent learners, 
while students may focus on instrumental concerns about passing exams (Fisher et 
al., 1998). Moreover, the evaluation emphasizes a process of receiving and reacting 
to summative measures. Its outcomes are assumed meaningful and informative at 
face value, but academics do not perceive the outcomes as helpful to their 
professional development (Saroyan & Mundsen, 2001). 
1.1.3 Impact of evaluation on power relations between academics and students 
Except for the debates on the validity of student course evaluation, there is a 
perception among academics that student course evaluation is a source of authority 
and a device to curb the power of academics over students (Johnson, 2000a). Not 
only Johnson but also Macfarlane (2004a) holds the view that academics possess 
power over student lives. According to Macfarlane, the assessment of student work 
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places academics in a unique position to influence the class of degree a student 
receives, which in consequence will influence their future career prospects, but 
student course evaluation intervenes in the power relations between academics and 
students by putting power in student hands. Macfarlane (2004a) shows his concern 
that student course evaluation could prevent academics from being open about their 
own sense of incompleteness, mistakes and confusion, and can make academics feel 
alienated and threatened by the results of such evaluation, leading to them adopting a 
dismissive attitude to evaluation. 
Similar views appear in Johnson (2000a) who investigates the use of student course 
evaluation for the professional development of lecturers in the UK. Johnson finds 
that student course evaluation used internally for management appraisal can damage 
relationships between students and lecturers because it does not encourage individual 
academics to actively progress their own professional development. Instead the 
lecturers evaluated were likely to perceive the evaluation as surveillance, as a 
`consumer `complaints' form that induces cruel banalities from students and 
generates a level of bad-faith tinged with nervous anxiety on the part of the lecturer. ' 
(Johnson, 2000a, p. 430) 
1.2 Peer observation 
Together with student course evaluation, peer observation of teaching is regarded as 
another opportunity for academics to reflect on their teaching practice. Peer 
observation generally involves peers observing each other's teaching, in order to help 
academics examine their teaching for self-improvement and to establish good 
practice to enhance student learning (Lomas & Kinchin, 2006). 
There are different ways to interpret the origin of peer observation. One view is that 
peer observation is a political and cultural drive to raise teaching quality via the 
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development and sharing of good practice (Lomas & Nicholls, 2005; Lomas & 
Kinchin, 2006; Shortland, 2004). The other view is that the adoption of peer 
observation reveals a worry that relying on student evaluation only is not sufficient to 
enhance the quality of teaching and learning across departments (Douglas & Douglas, 
2006), because teaching is `a complex, cognitive ability that is not innate but can be 
both learned and improved upon' (Saroyan & Amundsen, 2001, p. 344). 
A study of the literature suggests that whether peer observation improves teaching 
practice is a debate. On the one hand, there is an indication that academics are 
reluctant to engage with the peer observation process (Bell, 2001; Cockburn, 2005; 
Shortland, 2004), because they do not find it useful in improving their teaching 
practice, (Douglas & Douglas, 2006; Peel, 2005). On the other hand, some other 
researchers suggest that peer observation has improved teaching, such as, Allen 
(2002), Bell (2001), Cockburn (2005), and Fletcher & Orsmond (2004). 
1.2.1 Academics' resistance to peer observation 
There are four main factors contributing to academics' resistance to peer observation: 
academics' perceived value of peer observation, flawed methods of peer observation, 
the usage of observation, and an academic's length of service in higher education. 
These four factors are analyzed below. 
First of all, how academics perceive the values of peer observation has significantly 
influenced academics' acceptance of peer observation. If academics perceive peer 
observation as a tool to meet the demand of external quality assurance bodies, 
academics would regard it as either a coercive quality assurance instrument to hold 
them to account (Cockburn 2005), or a managerial control to drive them to complete 
forms and records in order to provide evidence of participation in the observation 
scheme (Shortland, 2004). However, if academics perceive the evaluation as an 
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opportunity to improve their own teaching practice and the educational experience of 
learners, academics are likely to become supportive of peer observation (Douglas & 
Douglas, 2006; Cockburn 2005). 
The second factor that explains academics' resistance to peer observation is the 
perception that the method of observation is flawed. Cockburn (2005) reveals that his 
respondents were critical of the credibility of the observer and the way the act of peer 
observation changes the `on-stage' behaviour of teachers and students. Cockburn's 
respondents pointed out that the classroom competence and personality of observer 
can influence the result of the observation, and that the observation might reduce the 
complexity of teaching to a set of technical skills, which are deployed in a way 
absent of expressive interpretation. 
Other factors contributing to academics' resistance of peer observation are the use of 
observation and the length of service of academics in higher education. Bell (2001) 
reveals that when peer observation is used as a form of appraisal to judge the 
observee's level of competence, academics would show resistance to it because 
academics feel that the observation does not reflect the full, complex reality of their 
teaching. Similarly, Douglas & Douglas' (2006) case study, exploring how 
academics in a UK business school think of peer observation, suggests that 
academics' resistance is connected with their length of service in the higher 
education. Douglas found that most academics who have been working in higher 
education for over 3 years would negatively endure the process of peer observation, 
and that the staff who have been academics for less than 3 years would regard peer 
observation as an opportunity to reflect on their own teaching. This might be because 
the latter group feel that they are still on a `learning curve' and still need to develop 
their own teaching approach. 
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1.2.2 Impact of peer observation on teaching 
Allen's (2002) survey of three post-1992 universities and a university college in the 
UK reveals that there are mixed views about how peer observation has affected 
teaching. One argument is that peer observation has improved teaching practice (Bell, 
2001; Cockburn, 2005; Fletcher & Orsmond, 2004). In contrast, there is suspicion 
about the positive impact of teaching observation (Douglas & Douglas, 2006; Peel, 
2005). 
Bell (2001) suggests that peer observation helps develop and implement new ideas 
about teaching, improve teaching practice and makes academics feel a sense of 
accomplishment at the end of the process. According to Bell, three kinds of changes 
can occur among academics after their peer observation: technical, pedagogical, and 
critical changes, which are analyzed below. The technical changes mean improving 
either the use of visual aids or the structuring of information. The pedagogical 
changes refer to the implementation of interactive learning strategies. The critical 
changes mean academics' adoption of reflective practices which are normally made 
by those who want to develop strategies for ongoing professional improvement. Bell 
finds that technical changes often happen to relatively inexperienced teachers and to 
those who are trying to improve their transmission of ideas to students. This finding 
is confirmed by Fletcher & Orsmond (2004) who demonstrate that the observation 
may be perceived as a useful learning tool, especially when less experienced staff act 
as observers of more experienced staff because they can gain from seeing good 
practice in operation, although there is a possibility that the less experienced staff 
may learn the bad habits of some more experienced staff. 
Except for improving teaching practice, Cockburn (2005) finds that peer observation 
can be useful in boosting academics' self-esteem and confidence, because it provides 
support and help for academics who are struggling with their teaching and who have 
lost direction in their teaching, therefore it gives academics a fresh perspective on 
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teaching, and enhances teaching skills by improving academics' delivery and 
organisational skills. Cockburn reveals that the observer in general benefits more 
from observing others than from being observed. Because the observer is free of the 
classroom responsibilities experienced by the teacher, the observer can devote all 
their attention to reflecting on different methods and techniques. 
While some claim that peer observation leads to improvements in teaching 
techniques, others are suspicious about its true intentions. One argument is that peer 
observation is not sufficient to enhance teaching performance in the classroom, 
because improved teaching is more likely to occur when academics are actively 
engaging with the pedagogical theory of their disciplines, critical reflection on 
classroom practice, and a challenging of assumptions through shared critical 
reflection with colleagues, rather than simply meeting external demands (Douglas & 
Douglas, 2006). This argument suggests that peer observation is perceived as 
meeting external demands, although peer observation is intended to be a 
developmental tool for academics. Another argument against peer observation is that 
academics generally do not like to provide negative criticism to undermine their 
colleagues' confidence, so peer observation is not useful in improving academics' 
teaching practice (Peel, 2005). However, Peel's account is based on his personal 
experience of peer observation, so whether his view is typical or not needs to be 
explored. 
1.3 The external examining system 
The external examining system has become another crucial and frequently discussed 
mechanism of quality assurance in UK higher education (Gaunt, 1999). However, 
from a historical perspective, external examining has been independent of quality 
assurance bodies (Harvey, 2005) because the main traditional roles of external 
examiners have been to ensure that degrees awarded in similar subjects are 
106 
comparable in standard across higher education institutions, and to ensure that 
students are dealt with fairly in the system of assessment and classification (Silver et 
al, 1995). 
However, the expansion of higher education, the increasing diversity of the sector 
and of institutional missions, and the increasing demand for public accountability has 
led to the external examiner system coming under scrutiny in the UK (Gaunt, 1999). 
In the early 1990s, the Higher Education Quality Council commissioned the Quality 
Support Centre (QSC) of the Open University to undertake a project to examine the 
effectiveness and future of the external examining system. This project revealed that 
the external examining system was expected to become an integral and essential part 
of institutional quality assessment. Both the UFC and the HEQC relied strongly on 
external examining in forming their judgements. They scrutinized external 
examiners' reports provided by the institution, and then recommended that external 
examining should be strengthened, and that issues of the purpose, scale and nature of 
an institution's internal assessment should be addressed (Silver et al, 1995). Given 
concerns about variations in academic standards, the 1997 Dearing Report, 
commissioned by the UK government, proposed an enhanced role for external 
examiners in relation to outcomes, promulgated guidelines on external examining, 
and recommended a national register and training of external examiners and 
publication of their reports. Later on, the Quality Assurance Agency included the 
external examining as a code of practice in their Academic Infrastructure, which 
serves to provide public information on academic standards, and to help assure 
quality of assessment processes and to maintain academic standards at the level of 
the subjects (QAA, 2007). All the above evidence suggests that the external 
examining system has become a formalized quality assurance mechanism in the 
context of quality audit. 
However, Hannan & Silver (2006) reveal that academics generally resist attempts to 
make the external examining system more formal in function by opposing attempts 
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to impose a national system of training of the external examiners because of two 
reasons. One is because the external examiner needs to understand the course needs 
and the culture of the institution. The other is because externals are subjected to 
increased pressures on their time as academics, which can affect their availability and 
desire to act as external examiners. 
In spite of academics' resistance to making external examining more formal, many 
academics are still interested in becoming external examiners. According to Hannan 
& Silver (2006), academics regard the external examining system as part of their 
professional or career development, so they are committed to what the system 
represents and are motivated to become external examiners. One motivation for 
academics choosing to become an examiner is because of their preference of the 
culture of collegiality and of being a critical friend, which enables them to get `a 
sense of involvement in a higher education system or culture and the concomitant 
need to give and receive service' (Hannan & Silver, 2006, p. 62). Another motivation 
for being an external examiner is academics' subject loyalty which enables them to 
make a comparison of standards within subjects/disciplines and across institutions 
(Silver et al, 1995). According to Silver, being an examiner also provides academics 
with a chance to relate to other academics in the same subject area, and to build up a 
personal profile in the field as well as enhancing the reputation of their own 
institution. Other motivation for being external examiners includes the chance to 
improve one's curriculum vitae (Hannan & Silver, 2006) because being an external 
examiner implies that the person is an expert of their designated subject/discipline 
and has `sufficient experience and seniority to be able to make judgements about 
standards in an evolving system' (Silver et a!, 1995, p. 12). 
Academics' strong interest in becoming external examiners and comparison of 
standards at the subject level could be perceived as the strengths of external 
examining. However, there are four main weaknesses of external examining, which 
are discussed and analyzed by Silver et a! (1995) below: 
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Firstly, although there is a hope that external examining can contribute to the 
comparability of standards for students across courses and disciplines, and to 
bench-marking national standards, there is lack of consistency in assessment and its 
criteria, and disparities in degree results across subjects, institutions and time, so the 
comparison of external examining across institutions is possible only with subjects or 
disciplines. 
Secondly, the expanded role of external examiners has produced a greater burden of 
work for them. For example, external examiners are expected to take on a 
consultative role, such as assistance in internal institutional reviews, which aims to 
contribute to course development and quality control and assurance. However, the 
expanded role of external examiners, together with modularization, semesterisation, 
increased student numbers, and changes in the assessments of students, has increased 
the workload of examiners. Silver et al (1995) also showed their concern that the 
expanded role of external examiners might result in a closer relationship between the 
institution and the examiners, which might reduce the objectivity and independence 
of the examiner. 
Thirdly, remuneration of external examiners is low, which could cause obstacles to 
academics' effective participation in external examining and to the place of external 
examining in the role of academics in general. 
Fourthly, different institutional traditions affect the examiner appointment process, 
examiner reports and the perception of the role of examiners. Thus, how the 
examiner carries out their role varies between programmes and institutions. 
In spite of the above weaknesses, external examining remains an essential feature of 
the British higher education system, but it is not regarded as the only source of 
comparability of standards. For example, course validation and review, as well as 
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accreditation, also play a part (Silver et al, 1995). Therefore, Silver perceives 
external examining as an additional pillar of the quality assessment process. 
Section two: Impact of quality audit on the work of academics 
The above debates on the individual quality assurance mechanisms reveal that 
quality audit in the higher education sector has become a source of controversy. One 
explanation is that underlying the operation of audit are issues of power and values 
(Brennan & Shah, 2000). Another explanation is that quality audit is a kind of power 
control over academics (Morley, 2003), and that quality audit embodies a new 
rationality and morality and is designed to engender among academic staff new 
norms of conduct and professional behaviour (Shore & Wright, 2000). With 
consideration of the various view of quality audit, this section is going to report and 
analyze the literature on how quality audit has affected the work of academics, 
especially with regard to undergraduate classroom teaching practice, curricula, power 
relations between academics and students, and academics' general workload. 
2.1 Impact of audit on teaching 
There are two opposite opinions on how quality audit has affected undergraduate 
classroom teaching practice. One is that audit is a pointless process because it 
focuses on measurement, external accountability and regulatory control. Academics 
do not have a sense of ownership of the audit process, and academics do not feel 
responsible for audit (Gosling & D'Andrea, 2001; Harvey, 2005). Some academics 
even perceive audit as having delivered a better deal for students than staff, such as 
highlighting the technology aspects of teaching due to student questionnaires, and 
increased opportunities for students to participate in committee meetings (Newton, 
2000). As a result, academics adopt a compliant attitude to audit rather than attempt 
to bring about a change in the learner or in the institution (Srikanthan & Dalrymple, 
110 
2003). Moreover, audit is argued to have diverted academic staff time towards 
administrative jobs, so it may have actually undermined the quality of teaching and 
learning (Gosling & D'Andrea, 2001; Harvey, 2005; Morley, 2003; Newton, 2000; 
Srikanthan and Dalrymple, 2003). 
The other view is that quality audit has a produced positive impact on teaching in the 
UK, such as, more awareness of the importance and practice of good teaching 
(Brennan et al., 1997; Dill, 2001). Brennan et al. (1997) find that increased 
institutional attention has been paid towards teaching and learning, especially the 
quality of teaching. There are more active discussions and co-operation within 
academic units, and a better clarified responsibility for improving teaching and 
student learning and provision of better information on best practice (Dill, 2001). 
The mixed views expressed above on the impact of quality audit on teaching accord 
well with the findings about how individual quality assurance mechanisms have 
affected teaching (section 1.1.1& section. 2.2.1). Because teaching is closely related to 
the curriculum, the following section presents literature on how quality audit has 
affected the curriculum. 
2.2 Impact on curriculum 
Barnett and his colleagues conducted research on changing patterns of undergraduate 
curriculum in the UK. He conceptualized key patterns of change in the undergraduate 
curriculum, proposed models for configuring the main components of curriculum, 
and revealed that the control of curriculum was closely related to quality audit 
(Barnett, 2000; Barnett, et al., 2001; Barnett & Coate, 2005). 
The view of Barnett is that the curriculum has become market oriented, customerized, 
and outcome-based, due to the increasing influence of outside interests. One 
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perceived influence is the massification of UK higher education, where students have 
been recast as consumers of their education. Courses are designed to offer skills and 
knowledge that attract students who want to compete in the labour market, so 
contemporary curricula have become guided by consumer demand (Barnett, et al., 
2001). 
Another perceived influence on curriculum is the QAA. Barnett argues that the QAA 
has put the curriculum under scrutiny and has led the curriculum to move from a 
subject-based to an outcome-based model (Barnett, et al., 2001; Barnett & Coate, 
2005). One example is that the QAA uses subject benchmarking statements to 
provide a means for the academic community to describe the nature and 
characteristics of programmes in a specified subject (see context chapter). The 
benchmarking statements are not intended to represent a national curriculum in a 
subject area, but set out expectations about standards of degrees in a range of subject 
areas, describing what gives a discipline coherence and identity. In this way, the 
benchmarking statements define what can be expected of a graduate in terms of the 
abilities and skills needed to develop understanding in the subject (QAA, 2007a). 
Therefore, subject benchmarks have encouraged transparency and accountability in 
curriculum design and delivery (Barnett, et al., 2001). 
Together with the benchmark statement, the programme specification, a concise 
description of the intended outcomes of learning from a higher education programme 
(QAA, 2007b), has been used by the QAA to `require all course designers to indicate 
how their curriculum can be referenced and measured against these benchmarks' 
(Barnett & Coate, 2005, p. 28). 
However, Barnett & Coate (2005) perceive both the subject benchmarking 
statements and programme specification as an `attempt to impose an external agenda 
and order on an expanding curriculum that had become difficult to measure in terms 
of its value' (p. 29). This control has made the curriculum become performativity - 
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oriented: `an increasing emphasis in higher education on use-value, rather than 
knowledge for its own sake' (Barnett, et al, 2001, p. 445). In other words, the 
concept of curriculum becomes `hinged significantly around learning outcomes, and 
these understood in terms of students' skills, especially those oriented towards 
employability' (Barnett & Coate, 2005, p. 23). 
Barnett shows a concern that this outcome approach of curriculum has become a 
recent development for some subject areas, and that many of the professional subject 
areas are more accustomed to developing curricula in relation to external 
requirements. Curricula are therefore pulled in different directions. One is the desire 
to maintain the depth of a university education, to preserve the disciplines, and to 
produce disciplinary specialists. The other is to meet external demands for a useful, 
functional curriculum product (Barnett & Coate, 2005). As a result, the academic 
hegemony in shaping the curricula in their separate knowledge field is dissolving in 
the UK (Barnett, 2000). Skills, such as knowledge and understanding skills, generic 
intellectual skills and personal transferable skills, have become a dominant element 
in the curriculum (Barnett and Coate, 2005). 
To summarize, Barnett's research reveal a shift from a traditional curriculum which 
focuses on the discipline to an emerging curriculum which focuses on a need for 
transferable skills with intrinsic and marketable value. Although the QAA is 
perceived to have controlled the curriculum, the QAA is only part of quality audit. 
Some other factors could also have influence on curriculum, so it is hard to tell the 
extent to which quality audit has changed the curriculum. 
2.3 Impact on power relation between academics and students 
Except for the control of the curriculum, quality audit is generally perceived by 
researchers to have influenced power relations between academics and students, 
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especially with the adoption of student course evaluation which puts power in the 
hands of the students (section 1.1.4. this chapter). This potentially changed power 
relation suggests a trend to treat students as customers in the UK. 
2.3.1 Student as customers 
The expansion of higher education, the adoption of the undergraduate `top - up' 
tuition fees in England from September 2006 (students paying towards the cost of 
their education and most students arc paying £3000 per year), as well as the 
widespread use of quality audit in the higher education sector have provided a 
context for the debates on students as customers in the UK. There is evidence that the 
UK government tends to perceive students as customers, and encourages universities 
to adopt systems, structures and organisational cultures present in most commercial 
service organisations to embrace the customer-orientation (Lomas, 2007). 
First, the Dearing Committee in 1997 made reference to the development of a 
customer consciousness: 
There is now greater emphasis on recognition of the individual as customer or 
consumer. People's expectations of publicly funded services have arisen and they 
no longer accept unquestioningly what is offered. (Dearing, 1997: 64,4.59) 
Second, the UK government has been taking measures to ensure that universities 
provide as much information as possible to current students, potential students, their 
parents, government agencies and employers (see context chapter). One example of 
information provision is that the QAA sets up a variety of quality assurance 
mechanisms to help existing students measure the quality of provision that they are 
receiving and to assist prospective students to make informed choices about which 
universities to attend. Another example is that HEFCE (2002) recommends that 
universities publish information about quality and standards of learning and teaching, 
which includes summaries of external examiners' reports, outcomes of student 
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satisfaction surveys, summaries of learning and teaching strategies, and the results of 
major programme reviews. This recommendation emphasizes providing information 
for the students and perceives the students as one stakeholder of the higher education 
system. These measures enable students to express their views on the education and 
services they receive and influence university decision-making, encouraging a 
culture of students as customers in the higher education sector (Lomas, 2007). 
Third, the case for treating the students as customers is further supported by a 
statement in the HEFCE Strategic Plan 2003-2008 that, 
... students increasingly see themselves as consumers, entitled to agreed standards 
of provision and to full information about the quality of what is provided (HEFCE, 
2003, para. 3). 
Fourth, the National Student Survey (NSS) introduced by the HEFCE is perceived by 
Douglas & Douglas (2006) to have given further credence to the concept of student 
as customer (See Chapter 2 for details). 
2.3.2 Academics' doubts on students as customers 
The subject benchmark statement and programme specifications suggest that the UK 
government has been using public service management strategies to direct and to 
control the work of universities (Henkel, 2000) in order to make universities become 
a service provider (Lomas, 2007). However, quite a few academic researchers cast 
doubts on the notion of university as service provider because students are not 
customers (Harvey & Green, 1993; Harvey, 1999; Harvey, 2002; Lomas, 2007; 
Macfarlane, 2004a; Morley, 2003; Sharrock, 2000, etc). A popular view among them 
is that students are different from the conventional customers who can choose and 
decide what they like because students do not usually have full freedom of choice 
with specialist knowledge, and because students do not know what they want and are 
not clear of what they do not know. Therefore the notion of students as customers is 
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contrary to the traditional view that education is a developmental process instead of 
being a product or service to be sold to students (Sharrock, 2000). According to 
Morley (2003), seeing students as customers in contemporary higher education is 
symptomatic of a de-skilling process, because it would construct students as 
purchasers of an expensive product, and would make academics become accountable 
to students. As a consequence, it might cause a climate of anxiety among academics, 
and would make the higher education sector become a mass production industry. 
Another argument against the notion of students as customers is that higher education 
differs from the service industry (Harvey & Green, 1993; Harvey, 2002; Macfarlane, 
2004a; Sharrock, 2000). One difference is that the professional service of higher 
education cannot be fully evaluated until after it has been experienced by students 
because they are not able to reflect fully upon the benefits of the knowledge and 
skills acquired and the attitudes they have developed until a number of years later 
when students have had sufficient opportunities to realize what they have learnt 
(Macfarlane, 2004a). Another difference is that the transformation process in higher 
education often involves cognitive transcendence, because the provider of education 
is `doing something to the customer rather than just doing something for the 
customer' (Harvey, 1993, p. 24). The third difference between universities and other 
service industries is that universities regulate students and set standards for them. For 
example, going to university is different from going to McDonald's where there is 
no-one at the door to assess whether you are qualified to eat the food, and when you 
leave, no-one assesses whether you are qualified to leave (Sharrock, 2000). 
The differences between universities and other service industries accounts for 
academics' resistance to the notion `students as customers'. However, academics in 
general acknowledge the influence of students in the university. Lomas' (2007) 
empirical research examines how academics in three pre-1992 and three post-1992 
universities in the UK perceive the student as a customer. Lomas suggests that the 
type of university is not as influential as academics' discipline and their position on 
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their attitudes to students as customers. For example, academics in business and 
management, dentistry and nursing, and other vocational subject areas, are more 
likely to be customer-oriented. Senior managers and governors are much more 
supportive of the view that students should be regarded as customers. 
2.3.3 Decreased academic privileges 
Quality audit, as well as the widespread notion of students as customers has 
produced a fear that the power relation between academics and students would be 
changed, because the notion of students as customers would decrease academics' 
privileges. In the analysis of the impact of consumerism on learning and teaching in 
higher education, Naidoo & Jamieson (2003,2005) argue that rather than 
empowering students, consumerism may entrench academic privilege in the 
following respects: 
" Consumerism is likely to lead to the commodification of higher education and 
the pedagogic relationship will be transformed into a commercial transaction. 
" The pressures of greater student numbers as well as the fear of student 
complaints and litigation has led to a shift from individually tailored feedback 
relying on professional judgement to minimal and standardized feedback that 
meets official criteria and protects academics against student complaints. 
" In order to comply with the external monitoring procedures required by a 
consumerist framework, such as performance indicators and league tables, the 
university will manage data, or even in extreme cases falsify it. For example, the 
university might award more first class degrees and lower the failure rate (ibid). 
Naidoo and Jamieson's argument helps to explain the potentially changed power 
relation between academics and students as a result of consumerism. However, their 
work is mainly theoretically based. Some of their arguments lack empirical evidence. 
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There is little other evidence that the power relation between academics and students 
has changed so far. 
2.4 Impact on workload of academics 
This section analyzes how quality audit has affected the workload of academics. 
Concern around the workload of academics in the UK has generated a voluminous 
collection of both theoretical and empirical findings. Some of them are large-scale 
national surveys, such as Association of University Teachers survey in 1994 and 
2003 (Court, 1996, Kinman & Jones, 2003, Kinman, et al., 2006, and Tytherleigh, et 
al. 2005). These surveys all report that academics' workload is heavy and is 
becoming heavier, and that this has caused an overload in academics' teaching, 
research, and administration roles. Based on this research, this section first compares 
the working hours of academics in the UK from 1994 to 2004, then analyzes whether 
there is a connection between these long working hours and attitudes to quality audit. 
2.4.1 Academics' long working hours 
There is evidence that academics in the UK normally work more than 40 hours a 
week, in spite of the differences of university and subject. Court (1996) reveals that 
in pre-1992 universities there is an average working week of almost 55 hours during 
term time. This is similar to the Association of University Teachers (AUT) (1994) 
finding that the average length of the working week in British universities was 53.5 
hours (Court, 1996). These findings suggest that there was a long working hours' 
culture among academics in the period of Teaching Quality Assessment (1993-1995) 
which was operated by the Higher Education Funding Council for England. Has 
there been any change in this long working hour culture after this Quality 
Assessment process? 
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Kinman & Jones' (2003) survey in 1998 explores the working conditions of 
academics in the UK, and reveals that most respondents work long hours. For 
example, 66% of full-time academics work more than 45 hours in a typical week, 
and 23% regularly work in excess of 55 hours. This finding is identical to that of 
Court and the AUT. One way to explain this finding is that Kinman's survey was 
conducted in the period of QAA Subject Review (1995-2001), shortly after the 
Quality Assessment. The Subject Review was well known for its tight management 
of the UK university sector (see context chapter), so the academics' workload would 
remain heavy in this period. However, the QAA has been using Institutional Audit to 
evaluate the teaching of the HEIs since 2002. This Audit adopts a supposedly lighter 
touch quality mechanism and management. Will this lightened management reduce 
the work hours of the academics since 2002? 
Tytherlcigh, et al's (2005) survey was completed in 2002. It explores occupational 
stress among academic staff based on a survey of 3808 academics in fourteen UK 
HEIs. It reports that academics in general are stressed by work overload. 38% of 
respondents work between 41 and 50 hours in a typical week, and 40% work at least 
51 hours. Similar findings appear in Kinman's survey in 2004, which covers 844 
academics in 99 universities in the UK, and compares the stability over time of 
working hours, specific work stressors and levels of psychological distress 
experienced by academics in the period between 1998 and 2004. The survey reports 
that the average weekly working time for academics has reduced since 1998. For 
example, in the 1998 survey 73% respondents reported working 45 hours or more in 
a typical week, but in 2004 only 67% respondents working 45 hours or more. The 
proportion of the respondents regularly working over 55 hours has decreased from 
23% in 1998 to 22% in 2004 (Kinman, et al., 2006). The period 1998-2004, in which 
Kinman's two surveys were conducted, is also in the period of the QAA quality 
audit. 
However, it is hard to tell the connection between this reduced workload and the 
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QAA audit, because there appears to be only minor changes of the working hours, 
and because some other factors could also contribute to the work overload of 
academics in the UK, such as the expansion of higher education, reduced funding to 
the university, and the growing demands of the Research Assessment Exercise. There 
is an indication that the work overload can be caused by short-term contracts and an 
increasing threat of redundancies within universities (Kinman & Jones, 2003; 
Kinman, et al., 2006; Tytherleigh, et a!., 2005), the variety of students, increased 
need for support from the students, increased emphasis on coursework, and more use 
of student feedback (Fowler, 2005). Therefore, it is hard to tell whether the quality 
audit has increased or has reduced the academics' workload. 
2.4.2 Influence of academic work overload 
There is an argument that the work overload has caused some negative impact on the 
life of academics. For example, it has caused academics to have an imbalance in their 
teaching, research and administration roles. 53% of respondents in Kinman & 
Jones's (2003) survey said that their workloads were unmanageable and that 74% 
feel the pace of their work is too rushed. As a result, some respondents choose to 
constantly neglect an important job in favour of other tasks. 
Another argument is that academics find it hard to maintain their work-life balance 
when facing heavy workload. The work of academics has encroached into other life 
domains of some academics. Many academics, surveyed by the AUT (2003), 
Kinman (2001), Kinman, et al. (2006), and Morley (2003), find their home has 
become an extension of the workplace. For example, 56% respondents find little 
spare time to pursue personal interests or hobbies, and 72% respondents believe that 
their families suffer as a direct result of the demands of their jobs (Kinman, et al, 
2006). 
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The imbalance between work and life has made some academics in the UK regret 
choosing an academic career. For example, Boyer, et al's (1994) international survey 
of the academic profession in 14 countries reports that 47 per cent UK respondents 
found their job a source of considerable personal strain, and 63 per cent said if they 
had it to do over again, they would not become academics. Similar findings appeared 
in Kinman et al. 's survey (2006) that 52% respondents experienced less job 
satisfaction, and had seriously considered leaving the university sector. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed research on the workings and perceived impact of a range 
of quality audit mechanisms on the work of academics. This chapter offers some 
illustrations of the debates about how quality audit has affected the work of 
academics in England, particularly in four main respects: undergraduate classroom 
teaching practice, the curriculum, power relations between academics and students, 
and academics' general workload. The mixed views on the impact of quality audit on 
teaching suggest that audit has become a source of controversy. Although there is a 
perception that quality audit has made the curriculum performance oriented, there is 
not much empirical evidence to support this argument. There is little evidence that 
the power relations between academics and students have been changed substantially, 
in spite of the indication that this might change in the future. There is evidence of 
long working hours among academics in England, but it is difficult to tell the extent 
to which quality audit has contributed to this culture. 
After the literature review in Chapter 3-5, I am going to mainly use the theories of 
quality audit culture from Shore & Wright (2000) and Power (1994,1997), as well as 
the debates on the impact of individual quality assurance mechanism on the work of 
academics to refer to the data led chapters (Chapter 7- Chapter 10). There are three 
purposes in using the concept of quality audit, and the debates of quality audit 
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process, cultures, and its related quality assurance mechanisms. One is to illustrate 
how quality audit processes, audit culture, and its related quality assurance 
mechanisms have affected the work of respondents. Another is to testify whether my 
respondents held mixed views on the impact of quality audit on their teaching as 
Chapter 5 reveals. The third to find out the reasons behind my respondents' 
perception of quality audit processes, cultures, and its related quality assurance 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter describes, justifies and analyzes the design of my case study. I first 
illustrate the overall features of the interpretative paradigm, then identify the reasons 
why I prefer a single case study and explain the aims and purposes of my study. Next 
I translate these purposes into my three research questions and present the procedures 
of how I set up my data collection and how that related to my research questions. My 
data collection methods, such as semi-structured interviews and document analysis, 
and the ethical issues arising in my research are discussed. Finally, I outline the ways 
I chose to analyze my data and the reasons behind it. Together with the description 
and analysis, there is also a reflection on my research process, addressing the 
strength and limitation of my research. The validity and reliability of my research are 
also taken into consideration and are addressed in terms of the transcription, 
interpretation, and gencralisability. 
Section one: The interpretive research paradigm 
My research investigates how quality audit is perceived to have affected the work of 
academics in a pre-1992 research-intensive university in England. I considered that 
an interpretive research paradigm could build gradual pictures through interpretations 
that represent the complex reality of the particular social life (Holliday, 2002) in 
academe, and that I could gain the insights of academics on the process and 
mechanisms of quality audit through the use of interviews, backed up where 
appropriate by document analysis. I decided to adopt an interpretive research 
paradigm to explore how respondents had perceived quality audit and its impact on 
their work. 
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Meanwhile, I was aware of the limitation of the interpretative paradigm as a personal 
and subjective approach, especially when employing a case study as a method 
(Denscombe, 2003). Therefore, I explored respondents' perceptions of quality audit, 
which could be perceived as socially constructed, by mutual negotiation and through 
an analysis of the specific situation being investigated. The impact of quality audit on 
the work of academics might vary according to different universities and different 
academics and reality is not `out there', rather quality audit is a social construct as 
well as a process which people understand in different ways (Morrison, 2002, p. 18). 
This suggests that there is no objective reality of the impact of quality audit. My way 
of finding out the impact of quality audit on the work of academics is to capture my 
interviewees' perceptions through their description and interpretation of their 
experiences with quality audit, compare the mechanisms mentioned with official 
documents, and then analyse and further interpret the data, remaining sensitive to the 
context, and finally provide an experiential account for readers to reflect on. 
Section two: My case study research 
In the interpretive paradigm, I strived to understand how respondents perceived the 
impact of quality audit through a case study approach. According to Yin (2003, p. 23), 
a case study is: `an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used'. 
Yin's definition of a case study contains the following important points. First, there 
is an emphasis on the empirical, in the sense of relying on the collection of evidence 
about what is going on. Second, it focuses on a phenomenon in context, especially in 
situations where the boundary between the phenomenon and its context is not clear. 
Third, it advocates use of multiple methods of evidence or data collection, because 
they can provide multiple sources of evidence that can be used to explain the 
phenomenon under investigation. Therefore, Yin's definition covers both the scope 
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of a case study, in other words, the contextual conditions which are pertinent to the 
study, and research strategies, such as data collection and data analysis methods. In 
this case, a case study is seen as a comprehensive research strategy with its focus on 
a case which is an entity with a unique life. 
Similarly, my research focuses on a research - intensive pre - 1992 university in the 
UK, which can be seen as a case. I attempt to preserve the wholeness, unity and 
integrity of my case through conducting 64 interviews and a large amount of 
document analysis to explore in depth how the academics in this university perceive 
the impact of quality audit on their work. The interviews and documentary analysis 
can be seen as my multiple sources of data and multiple data collection methods. My 
research thus possesses the features of a case study: a case, research strategies, and 
an aim for in depth study. 
2.1 Types of case study 
The literature on the use of case studies suggests that there are different types. The 
section below gives examples on these different types and reveals how my case study 
might be classified. Firstly, according to Yin (1994), a case study can be seen as 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. An exploratory case study aims at defining 
the questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study. In other words, it functions to 
resolve uncertainty, for example through a pilot study. A descriptive case study 
provides a description of a phenomenon within its context. The narrative accounts 
can be achieved through the perceptions of participants and through observation. An 
explanatory case study presents data bearing on cause-effect relationships and 
explains which causes produce which effects. 
Secondly, a case study can be classified as a single case study where the focus is 
within the case, and or multiple case studies, where the focus is both within and 
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across cases (Yin, 2003). There are two versions of the single case study, classified 
on the basis of the level of the unit of analysis: holistic case studies and embedded 
case studies. Holistic case studies examine the global nature of an organization or 
programme. An embedded case study concerns multiple units of analysis within a 
case (Yin, 1994). Both single and multiple case studies can be `based on any mix of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence' and they need not necessarily include 
observations as a source of evidence (Yin, 2003, p. 15). 
Thirdly, Stake (1995,2005) identifies three categories of case study: intrinsic, 
instrumental, and collective. An intrinsic case study is undertaken primarily because 
the case itself is of interest. The case is pre-selected. It does not aim to understand an 
abstract construct or generic phenomenon or build theories, but the researcher does 
not avoid generalisation. Intrinsic case studies are designed to understand the case in 
its complexity and entirety, as well as in its context. In instrumental case studies, a 
particular case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a 
generalization. This case may be seen as typical of other cases or not and it plays a 
supportive role, but it is still looked at in depth, because this helps the researcher to 
pursue an external interest. A collective case study is an instrumental one extended to 
several cases. Researchers study these similar or dissimilar cases to investigate a 
phenomenon, population, or general condition. 
Based on the above classifications, my study is therefore: 
"A single case study (Yin, 2003), involving only one research-intensive pre-1992 
university in the UK. 
0 Descriptive (Yin, 1994) in that it provides narrative accounts of the impact of 
quality audit on the work of academics through the perception of academics and 
through documentary analysis. 
" Explanatory (Yin, 1994) in that my study aims to test current theories on quality 
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audit in higher education in order to determine whether two well-formulated 
theories of quality audit in higher education by Power (1994,1997) and Shore & 
Wright (2000) are supported or whether some alternative sets of explanation 
might be more relevant. Hence, my study is explanatory in that it can raise issues 
which might contribute to theory - building and theory development of quality 
audit in UK higher education institutions. 
" Instrumental (Stake, 1995,2005) in that my research intends to provide insight 
into the issue of quality audit in higher education by exploring the perceptions of 
academics through interviews. My case university is a research - intensive as 
well as an excellent teaching pre-1992 university in the UK based on its ranking 
in the top 50 of the 2004 Sunday Times University League table. Its average 
result for the QAA Subject Review from 1997 to 2001(on a subject by subject 
basis), is 22 marks out of a possible 24. The first round of QAA Institutional 
Audit in 2004 gave a judgment of broad confidence in the soundness of the 
university's management of the quality of its academic programmes and the 
academic standards of its awards. Therefore, this case study university can 
provide a supportive role in understanding other pre-1992 universities. I 
interviewed 64 academics from 7 different disciplines to enable me to achieve an 
in-depth study to find out how individual academics perceived quality audit. I 
aim to describe the themes arising from my case study in sufficient descriptive 
depth with interpretation, so that readers can experience these happenings 
vicariously and draw their own conclusions. 
I believe that my case study has the following advantages. First of all, it offers an 
opportunity to research quality audit in higher education. Second, it provides a rich, 
contextualized account of how academics perceived quality audit and its impact on 
their work. Third, it helps to understand the impact of quality audit on the work of 
academics in depth and in its natural setting, recognizing its complexity and its 
context. Therefore my case study is an in depth study for full understanding of the 
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perceived impact of quality audit on the work of academics in a university in 
England. 
2.2 My case study university 
As explained in the previous section my research focuses on a research - intensive 
pre-1992 university in England. There are three main reasons why I chose this 
particular university as my case. First, I am interested in studying the impacts of 
quality audit on undergraduate teaching. This university is well known for its 
teaching excellence in undergraduate teaching, although it is primarily research-led. 
Second, this university ranked in the top 50 in the 2004 Sunday Times University 
League table, which can be seen as a product of quality audit and also an effective 
way to attract students, especially those from overseas. 2004 is relevant as that is the 
year in which the case was selected. Third, the factor of `expense, time and 
accessibility' (Cohen, et, 2000, p. 92) plays an important role in my choice of the 
case university. It was conveniently located and I was permitted full access to it as a 
researcher. 
It is important to make it clear that I do not intend to use my case study university to 
generalize about the wider population of higher education institutions in the UK. 
Qualitative researchers often seek to generalize (Kvale, 1996), but such a practice 
should not necessarily be the objective of all research projects, whether case studies 
or not (Denzin, 2006). However, considering that there is potential generalizability of 
knowledge built from case study (Punch, 2005), and that my case study aims to 
develop theories of quality audit in higher education, I argue that my findings should 
allow the development of generalisable theoretical propositions. My way of 
producing generalizable outcomes is by developing the concept of quality audit 
based on my case study. The rationale for my theoretical generalization is that I 
chose my case for its power to explain rather than for its typicality because `the 
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features present in a case study will be related in a wide population not because the 
case is representative but because our analysis is unassailable' (Mitchell, 1983, 
p. 109). 
When conducting my research, I bear in mind that every institution is unique and has 
its own traditions and cultures. The way academics in a university perceive quality 
audit and the way they deal with quality audit might be different from the academics 
in other universities because each phenomenon has its own intrinsic structure and 
logic (Kvale, 1996). My research thus may not be able to produce laws of human 
behaviour that could be generalized universally, but it aims first for in depth 
understanding of my case university, and to produce concrete, practical 
(context-dependent) knowledge because the sample of 64 interviews of academics in 
seven disciplines in one university is big enough to enable me to explore in depth the 
perceived impacts of quality audit on the work of academics. Then I will develop 
propositions of quality audit from my case for further study. Some of the 
propositions might be used to help understand other institutions in the context of 
quality audit. In this sense, my research can be seen as a descriptive, interpretative 
and analytical study based upon changes of and quality audit reforms in UK higher 
education. 
2.3 My research questions 
After the above description of the features of my single case study, this section is 
going to discuss my three main research questions around which my case study is 
developed: 
Research Question One: What perceived impact have the external quality assurance 
mechanisms, such as the QAA Institutional Audit, the external examining system, the 
control of professional, statutory and regulatory bodies over some teaching 
programmes and the 2005 National Student Survey (NSS), had on the work of 
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academics? 
Research Question Two: What perceived impact have the internal quality assurance 
mechanisms within the institution, namely, peer observation, student course 
evaluation, annual programme review and the approval system for new and revised 
programmes and units, had on the work of academics? 
Research Question Three: Do academics perceive themselves to be professionals? Is 
there a perceived tension between quality audit processes and the academic culture 
and the perception that academic work as a profession? 
I adopted interviews and relevant documentary analysis to address these research 
questions. Take the first two questions for example. I first looked at the development 
of internal quality assurance mechanisms within my case university, current changes 
of these mechanisms and causes of these changes. Secondly, I tested academics' 
knowledge of both external and internal quality assurance mechanisms by asking 
them questions like: `have you ever heard of ....? ' and `can you tell me something 
of .... ' Thirdly, I explored academics' perception of the implementation of these 
mechanisms within their department and institution, such as whether the mechanism 
is compulsory or voluntary and whether the department/institution has adopted a 
serious attitude to the implications of quality mechanisms. Fourthly, I showed a 
particular interest in academics' attitudes towards these mechanisms and asked them 
what they liked or disliked about each mechanism. Fifthly, I asked academics how 
these mechanisms had affected their undergraduate classroom teaching practice, their 
overall workload, and their relationship with students and the design/development of 
the curriculum. Taking the external examining system for example, I first asked 
academics' view of the pros and cons of the external examining system and then 
asked academics whether they thought it could affect their undergraduate classroom 
teaching practice or not, and if so, how this occurs. Next I questioned whether 
academics felt their workload and their relationship with students had been affected 
by the external examining system or not. Finally, I asked them what the impact of 
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this system was on the curriculum. In order to encourage academics to speak more 
about the external examining system, I asked them to reflect on their experience of 
being external examiners themselves and how they had made use of their experiences 
and whether these experiences had been useful to them. 
Section three: Data collection for the case study 
In order to refine my data collection plans with respect to both the content of the data 
and the procedures to be followed, I conducted my pilot case study in November 
2005. It helped me to develop my interview questions and provided some conceptual 
clarification for my research design. In my pilot study, I interviewed four academics 
in my case university institution, three lecturers and one professor from four 
departments (not the one used in the main study) and one senior manager from the 
QAA. The length of my interviews ranged from thirty minutes to one hour and fifty 
minutes. 
3.1 My pilot case study 
Before my pilot study interviews, I was worried that English as my second language 
would prevent academics from understanding my questions well, and that my 
international student status would create a power relation imbalance between my 
respondents and me. However, to my great surprise, this problem was not apparent in 
my interviews. My respondents were very friendly and helpful. One reason might be 
that some respondents were recommended by my supervisor. Some respondents tried 
to speak as clearly as they could, and paused and explained what they said when they 
noticed that I looked puzzled. Some respondents even kindly gave me suggestions on 
my research, such as how to avoid big questions, how to give eye contact in the 
interviews and whom else might be interviewed. One of them recommended me a 
senior QAA manager, her previous student, with whom I had a one hour fifty minutes 
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interview later on. 
This pilot study thus formed the exploratory phase, resolving my uncertainty 
concerning about how quality audit had affected the work of academics and 
increased my confidence in the main phase of my case study research. According to 
my respondents' suggestion and my reflection on pilot interviews, I did a draft of my 
interview questions for my case study. 
3.2 Interviews as my case study method 
In my empirical case study data collection, I used two main methods: interviews and 
documentary analysis. There are two reasons for my adopting interviews as my main 
research method. One is that knowledge is situated and contextual, so the interview 
can elucidate relevant contexts to highlight the situated knowledge during the 
process of interviewing the research participant (Mason, 2002). The other reason is 
because I assume that understanding, views and perceptions of academics are 
meaningful and important properties to study the phenomenon of quality audit in UK 
higher education institutions. Although the subjective perception of academics is 
hard to observe, it could be achieved through interviews because the interview 
process is a form of dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee with the 
aim of constructing the meaning inherent in the experiential accounts of the research 
subjects (Kvale, 1996). 
My case study thus used interviews to provide an in-depth insight into quality audit 
in higher education in England to get valuable information and ideas from 
respondents. The respondents engaged in discussions about quality audit and 
expressed their experience, feeling and attitudes with regard to quality audit, so 
interviews became the medium through which knowledge was constructed from the 
interviewee's personal experiences. This confirms the view of Kvale (1996, p. 105) 
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that interviews are 'particularly suited for studying people's understanding of the 
meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self-understanding, 
and clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived world'. 
During the interview process, I was aware that there were limitations to using 
interviews in data collection, such as, the bias of interviewer, and the snap shot 
nature of the views they revealed. Although I was responsive to the situation during 
the interview and attempted to produce a valid and reliable transcript and findings, 
there is a danger that I might have unintentionally made mistakes by allowing my 
bias to affect the study. Bias in qualitative research is inevitable due to the fact that 
the researcher is the primary instrument of research and the data he or she gathers 
will be biased regardless of the research method employed (Janesick, 2000). Another 
reason for this potential bias is because a semi-structured interview is a highly 
subjective technique, the interviewer's manner might have an effect on the 
respondents (Bell, 1993). One example is that the response of an interviewee might 
be based on the emotional impact or the perceived purpose of an interviewer (Keats, 
2000). In order to reduce and minimize this potential bias, I was careful not to let my 
emotions show when asking about respondents' perception towards quality audit, as 
well as using semi-structured interviews which allowed me as a researcher to adapt 
the main questions to suit the interviewees complementary roles in order to explore 
his or her different perspectives in depth (Denscombe, 2003). 1 asked a lot of open 
questions instead of closed ones. This gave my respondents more space to elaborate 
their views, meanwhile encouraging them to speak about their opinions in depth 
telling me what they thought and what they knew. As a result, I could consider issues 
in terms of what they truly thought (Walker, 1989) to avoid a subjective account 
initiated by me. The other limitation of my use of interviews was that it only allowed 
for a snap shot of views (Kvale, 1996) because what respondents talked about was 
their views of quality audit at that specific time when interviewed. If some of them 
had changed workload or changed position now, they might have views of audit 
different from what they had before. In order to reduce this potential superficiality of 
133 
my interview data, I made it clear in my thesis that the perception of my respondents 
was explored in the time shortly after they experienced QAA Institutional Audit. 
3.2.1 Semi-structured and one-to-one interviews 
In general my interviews were carried out in two different phases. The first phase 
was from January 2006 to April 2006, including 64 semi-structured one-to-one 
interviews. The interview questions were developed from my first two research 
questions. I explored academics' view of, attitudes to, and value of quality assurance 
mechanisms, which was used to reflect on the perceived impact of quality audit on 
their work. In the 64 interviews, I asked open-ended questions, listened to and 
recorded the answers, and then followed up with additional relevant questions. 
One advantage of using semi-structured interviews is that it enables the interviewee 
to elaborate their points of interest because it is a flexible approach and helps them 
speak more widely and develop their own thoughts to reach more depth of analysis 
(Denscombe, 2003). As a result of using semi-structured interviews I understood 
better my interviewee's perspective of quality audit. My interviews were not only 
semi-structured but one-to-one for three main reasons. The first reason is because my 
research topic is a sensitive one. Some of my interviewees did not want their 
departments and their colleagues to know that they were interviewed. I am obliged to 
keep the identity of the interviewees anonymous, so it was inappropriate for me to 
arrange group interviews. The second reason is because a group interview can omit 
certain views, especially those who are quiet. Some members of the group will 
dominate the talk, while others might loose the chance to let their views known.... 
The opinions that are expressed are ones that are perceived to be 'acceptable' 
within the group. Where group members regard their opinions as contrary to 
prevailing opinion within the group, they might be inclined to keep quiet, or 
moderate their views somewhat (Denscombe, 2003, p. 168). 
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The third reason is as a student, I find it easier to arrange one-to-one interview with 
academics because this enables me to `locate specific ideas with specific people' 
(Denscombe, 2003, p. 167). I also found it relatively easy for me to maintain control 
of the one - to - one interview process because I only had one person's views to 
grasp and interrogate and one person to guide through the interview. Therefore, I had 
a clear idea of what I wanted to find out. I asked the right questions to get the 
information I needed, and I gave appropriate verbal and nonverbal feedback 
whenever needed. For example, I listened carefully to make sure that the responses 
received provided me with answers to the questions asked. If the responses were not 
relevant to my question, I would remind the interviewee, after he or she finished 
talking of my interest by saying: ' that is really interesting, but can you tell me 
something about....? ' In this situation, if my interviewee still refused to give me a 
direct answer, I would not ask him/her again, because I did not want to discomfort or 
offend them. Instead, I would wait until he or she finished talking and then moved on 
to my next question. 
3.2.2 Interviews via emails 
The second phase of my interviews took place in October 2006, after transcription of 
my first phase 64 interviews. It took the form of email interviewing, and was carried 
out around research question three (See Section 2.3 this chapter). I identified some 
frequently used words and phrases by academics from the transcription, such as, 
bureaucracy and professionalism, and found these two were being counterposed, so I 
developed three questions around them. These questions enabled me to reveal and 
explain in depth academics' perception of quality audit. (See appendix 7) 
I emailed these questions after securing permission from my respondents who were 
interviewed in the first phase interviews. 30 out of 64 responded. Some of them 
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responded more than once to explain their opinions. There are two main reasons I 
used email interviewing. One reason was that I had developed rapport with my 
respondents in the first phase interview. They knew my purposes and expectations, 
and they all had easy access to the internet. The other reason was my consideration of 
time saving, convenience and feasibility. It was hard for me to arrange a second 
face-to-face interview with my respondents because they were busy, especially at the 
end of the academic term, so I used email interviewing which was quick, efficient, 
time-saving, and low cost. (Meho, 2006; Wellington, 2000) 1 interviewed more than 
one respondent at a time. Many respondents replied on the same day I emailed them, 
so I could easily and quickly probe their views and perspectives through their 
response. 
Meanwhile I was aware that there was a weakness in email interviewing. For 
example, I could not pick up my respondents' visual cues (Hamilton & Bowers, 
2006). These included facial expressions such as smiles and frowns, and other aural 
and visual cues such as tones of voice, and pauses in speech, which would have been 
valuable for adding depth to my understanding. I sought to minimize this weakness 
by asking for clarification if there was any question over the meaning of a response 
that might have been lost because of the lack of nonverbal cues. When some reply 
was abrupt and short, I went back to ask again in other ways to clarify what my 
respondents implied. In my experience, I found email interviewing had some other 
advantages. One was that it helped to avoid embarrassment on some sensitive topics 
and allowed the interviewees time for reflection on and consideration of the problem 
(Wellington. 2000). The second advantage was that I had time between receiving 
answers and sending the next set of questions to reflect on how best to follow up on 
the information received. This enabled me to check hunches within the same 
interviews as well as across interviews (Hamilton, & Bowers, 2006), then design 
follow up questions. The third advantage of using email interviewing was that there 
was no need for any transcription to occur in my email interviewing, which saved my 
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time in data collection. 
3.3 Documentation 
Interviews did not comprise the only form of my data gathering. Documents relevant 
to my research topic were used as a second important source of my case study. A 
document is `an artifact which has as its central feature an inscribed text' (Scott, 
1990, p. 5). In other words, the text is the central and most obvious feature of a 
document because the script is the written expression of a spoken language and 
therefore contains a text. Documents are important to my research because they 
provide public information and they helped me to understand and construct the social 
context of the case study university. They formed an important way to represent and 
to perpetuate the case study university from which they originate and give meaning 
to the university (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004; Mason, 2002). The documents I used in 
my research were of various kinds: 
" library - based, aimed at producing a critical synopsis of quality audit in higher 
education in UK; 
" internet-based, consisting of open-published official documents, derived from 
the website of QAA, HEFCE, and Teaching Quality Information (TQI), such as 
university Institutional Audit reports, Subject Benchmarking Statements (SBSs) 
and results from the 2005 National Student Survey (NSS). I asked my 
interviewees how much they know about SBSs and what they thought of the 
impact of the NSS on their teaching practice and the development of their 
curriculums. I compared the content of Institutional Audit reports with the 
effects of Institutional Audit from the perception of my interviewees. 
" institution-based, that is documents obtained from my case university. This 
covers Annual Programme Review Report (APRR), department self-evaluation 
reports and minutes from departmental meetings (2005-2006) on undergraduate 
teaching, quality and quality assurance. I explored how academics perceived the 
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impacts of the internal quality assurance mechanisms on their work and whether 
these mechanisms have achieved their objective or not. Self-evaluation reports 
and departmental meetings were used to find out the attitude to and strategies for 
quality audit at the department level. 
The first step in my documentary analysis was to test whether the documents had the 
three following characteristics or not: authenticity - whether it is actually what it 
purports to be; credibility - the extent to which the evidence is undistorted and free 
from error; and representativeness - whether it is representative of the totality of 
similar documents (Scott, 1990). In order to test the soundness of a document, I 
ensured that it was a copy of the original. In appraisal of credibility, I undertook a 
critical scrutiny of why the author chose to write the document and whether the 
author believed what she or he actually recorded. When reading the documents, I 
ensured that my documents represented the totality of similar documents of quality 
audit. 
After testing the quality of my documents, I analyzed the meaning and significance 
of what my documents contain at two levels: literally and interpretatively. I not only 
described the content of the document(s) but also engaged in an analysis of meanings, 
themes, ideas, and use of language. In order to produce interpretations of a text, I 
attempted to understand the wider public context in which a text was circulated 
because the same text might have different meaning in different contexts. According 
to McKee (2001), context is other texts that surround a text which provide useful 
information for making sense of it, and which teach people how to interpret these 
texts. 
The main text analysis method I adopted was content analysis which originates in 
mass communication approaches to the media. It uses quantitative techniques to 
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assess the significance of particular items within a text, for example, the frequency of 
times a particular idea appeared in the document is taken as measures of the 
importance of the idea to the author (McKee, 2001). Many words of the text are 
classified into content categories. Each category may consist of one, several, or many 
words (Weber, 1990). 
As Weber (1990) suggests there might be problems of reliability and validity in the 
text classification because they can be caused by ambiguity of the word meanings 
and category definitions. In my case study, I was careful with the meaning of words 
and category definitions. In order to find out the frequency of key concepts, ideas, 
words, and respondents' perceptions of quality audit, I created and tested my coding 
schemes. After reading the document, the first step I took was to find out themes 
related to quality audit and defined them as my recording units of the text. 
Sometimes long, complex sentences were broken down into shorter thematic units. 
This form of coding helped me to develop detailed comparisons of the effect of 
quality audit on the work of academics. After creating my coding schemes, I defined 
the category which included my recording units. My categories were mutually 
exclusive because I did not want the same recording units belonging to different 
categories. During the coding, I examined the highest - frequency words that had 
been classified into categories because these words reflected the greatest concern of 
the document (Weber, 1990). In order to test the clarity of my category definitions, I 
first coded a small sample of the text, and then coded the whole text to reveal its 
meaning. During the analysis, I related text to the intentions of the author whilst 
bearing in mind that the objective meaning of a document might go beyond these 
intentions. I sought to be systematic in my data analysis, and related the documentary 
data to my research questions, as well as compared the official views of quality audit 
from the public documents with that from my respondents because the information 
from these documents might be different from the perception of my respondents. 
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In general, the documents served as an important supplementary form of my data, 
corroborating and augmenting evidence from different sources (Yin, 2003), to 
illustrate how the quality audit had affected the work of respondents in my case study 
university. They provide 
'a valuable source of data for the analysis of official definitions of what is 
defined as problematic, what is viewed as answers, and what is regarded as 
proper solution' (Jupp, 1996, p. 302). 
3.4 Ethical concerns in the case study 
Before and during the process of conducting my case study, I have needed to bear in 
mind that I am obliged to act in accordance with the principles of ethical research 
practice in the educational research field. Ethics is defined as: 
a matter of principled sensitivity to the rights of others. Being ethical limits the 
choices we can make in the pursuit of truth. Ethics say that while truth is good, 
respect for human dignity is better, even if, in the extreme case, the respect of 
human nature leaves one ignorant of human nature' (Caven, 1977, p. 810, from 
Cohen, et, 2000). 
The question of ethics in research is a highly complex subject because each stage in 
the research sequence may be a potential source of ethical problems (Cohen & 
Manion, 1994; Cohen, et al, 2000). The ethical problems may arise from the nature 
of the research project itself, the context for the research, the procedures adopted, 
methods of data collection, the nature of the participants, the types of data collected 
and what is to be done with the data. 
There is evidence that the complexity of ethics stems from some people's moral 
attitudes as well as regulatory tensions. One is the tension between two sets of related 
values held by society: `a belief in the free scientific inquiry in pursuit of truth and 
knowledge, and a belief in the dignity of individuals and their right to those 
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considerations that follow from it' (Cohen, et, 2000, p. 58). This tension can put the 
researcher in moral predicaments because which proposition he favors, or how to 
strike a balance between the two will depend on the background, experience, and 
personal values of the individual researcher (Cohen & Manion, 1994). However, 
there is an emphasis that the welfare of subjects should be kept in mind, even if it 
involves compromising the impact of the research (Cohen, et, 2000). 
3.4.1 Informed consent 
The literature reveals that there are some fundamental concepts contributing to the 
principles of ethical procedures to protect the welfare of human subjects: informed 
consent, confidentiality and anonymity. According to Ryen (2004), informed consent 
means 'research subjects have the right to know that they are being researched, the 
right to be informed about the nature of the research and the right to withdraw at any 
time' (p. 231). The need for informed consent normally appears at the initial stage of 
the research project - that of access to the institution or organization where the 
research is to be conducted, and acceptance by the participants (Cohen, et, 2000). In 
my case study, there were two stages of getting informed consent. 
In the first stage, I identified the `gate keeper'. This phrase refers to the official and 
significant figures whose permission must be sought to do my research in the case 
university. They were persons who were responsible for undergraduate teaching in 
the faculty. I contacted them and got their permission to do research in their faculties. 
At a later point, I chose two departments/schools from each faculty which I 
researched. Most of these departments/schools got top marks in Subject Review and 
the latest Departmental Review in their faculty. The rest of them had experienced a 
recent Institutional Audit Trail. Next, I sent letters to Heads of School/ Department to 
introduce the overall purposes of my research and the main features of my design. I 
expressed my interest in doing interviews in their departments and asked for their 
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consent. I promised confidentiality and anonymization of all the data to be collected. 
Only one head of departments/schools declined my request, for the reason that he 
had to protect his staff's time for research and teaching. Another department did not 
respond to my application until I finished all my data collection, so I had to decline 
its offer. In the end, I got access to seven departments/schools in my first data 
collection phase. 
The second stage of obtaining informed consent was to contact academics in the 
seven departments/schools researched. I first read through these departments/schools 
websites for information about academics and selected individuals according to three 
criteria: undergraduate teaching, rank of position, and gender. In other words, I only 
chose academics who undertook undergraduate teaching. I chose academics 
according to their rank of position. Here, I wanted to ensure that I had a good balance 
of professors, lecturers and teaching fellows, as well as academic managers, such as 
the Head of School/ Department, and the programme director for undergraduate 
teaching. A similar profile was chosen from each department/school researched. 
Meanwhile I took the gender difference into consideration because Morley (2003) 
and others have noted that women academics may respond differently to audit 
processes. Therefore I aimed to get an equal number of female and male respondents 
in each department/school. However it turned out to be not feasible due to subject 
differences. Two of the departments/schools researched had very few female 
academics, so, instead, I had to ensure that my interviewees were representative of 
the gender balance within the department when choosing my respondents. In this way, 
I got access to 22 female and 42 male interviewees in the case study university. 
3.4.2 Protection of respondents 
During data collection, I was fully aware of the importance of protecting my 
respondents. One way I did this was to make their participation in my research 
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voluntary. I emailed chosen academics individually to show my interest in 
interviewing them, together with an introductory letter about my research explaining 
to them what my research was about, why it was being undertaken, and how the data 
was going to be used. In order to present myself as trustworthy and accommodating, 
I promised to protect the rights, interests, privacy and sensitivities of these 
respondents, informing them of their right to withdraw or refuse to participate 
whenever they wanted. On the day of interviews, I produced a copy of my research 
statement and asked respondents to sign it. During the interviews, I asked for 
respondents' permission to tape our conversations. 
Except for asking respondents' to take part in my research voluntarily, confidentiality 
was another way I used to protect my respondents' rights. The essence of 
confidentiality is the extent to which investigators keep faith with those who have 
helped them (Cohen, et al, 2000). This means that as a researcher I should know who 
has provided the information, and that I am able to identify participants from the 
information given, but not make the connection known publicly. What I did was to 
keep all personal data of my respondents concealed and made it public only behind a 
shield of anonymity (Christians, 2005). The essence of anonymity, according to 
Cohen, et al (2000, p. 61), 'is that information provided by participants should in no 
way reveal their identity. ' My main way to ensure anonymity was not using the 
names of my respondents or any other personal means of identification. 
3.5 Reflections on my interviews 
During the interviews, I found that while being ethically considerate of my 
respondents was important, so was achieving their goodwill and co-operation. My 
field research extended over ten months. Some academics were interviewed twice. If 
there had been no support from my respondents, my interviews could not have 
carried on smoothly. 
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3.5.1 Building trust and rapport 
During my interviews and document collection, I presented myself as competent and 
honest. I was confident talking about quality audit and its related quality assurance 
mechanisms. The respondents could tell from my speech that I knew about the 
politics and process of quality audit. When they mentioned something new about the 
audit, I reminded them in a polite way that it would be nice if they spoke a little more 
about that. In this way, I built up trust between me and most of my respondents. 
However, only building up trust is not enough in the process of interviews, I found 
establishing rapport from the respondents as vitally important. In order to achieve 
this purpose, at the beginning of each interview, I asked simple open-ended interview 
questions about the interviewee's jobs and responsibilities within their department or 
institution, which was used to provide contexts for later discussion of quality audit. 
The questions asked were sequentially organized and started with the form of "what", 
"how", and "why" questions. They were first concerned with internal quality 
assurance mechanisms within their institution and then concerned with the external 
quality assurance mechanisms imposed on the institutional level. The aim of the 
questioning was to obtain respondents' descriptions of their experiences, as well as to 
elicit their explanations of their perception of quality audit. I was active and 
reflective during the entire interview process and raised some new questions arising 
from the respondents' description and account of quality audit, such as their general 
perception of quality audit, which quality assurance mechanism they liked or disliked, 
and what they thought of the current quality of undergraduate teaching in higher 
education. In this way, the majority of my interviews went well and I managed to 
establish good rapport between myself and my respondents. 
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3.5.2 Power relations in the interviews 
During the interview, I explored how my international student status had affected my 
interviews in order to find out whether it had produced any imbalance of power 
relations between my respondents and me. The followings are reflections from my 
interviews: 
" On most occasions, my international student status affected my interviews in a 
positive way. In my pilot study, some of my respondents tried to speak as clearly 
as they could because they knew that English was not my first language. 
Similarly, in my empirical research, a lot of my respondents were sympathetic, 
expressing that it would be very hard for an international student to do research 
in England. Some of them told me that I was welcome to come back to them 
again whenever I needed help in my research. 
" As to the assumed power relations between respondents and me, it was difficult 
to detect it in my pilot interviews, but I did feel it in a couple of interviews in my 
empirical data collection. Three respondents were suspicious of the purpose of 
my research and joked that I was a spy for the QAA. I had to reassure them that 
the interviews were only for my PhD thesis. Two respondents felt relieved at my 
explanation and cooperated very well in the interviews, but one respondent was 
still reluctant to talk much. This suggests that although I am a student, my 
interviewer status had made some respondents feel threatened by the nature of 
my project. 
I felt that four academics imposed their power over me because of my student 
status. For example, one female academic agreed to be interviewed, but she 
arranged our two meetings only at the time she was supposed to see her students 
in her open office hour. In the first meeting, my interview only lasted about 
fifteen minutes when she stopped me by saying that a student was waiting for her 
outside her office. I reminded her that she could withdraw our interview if she 
was very busy, but she suggested another time for our second meeting. It was 
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again the time she was seeing her students. I arrived on time, but had to wait 
outside her office for about half an hour until she finished her meeting with her 
students. At the beginning of our second meeting, she told me that she would stop 
me whenever there was a student looking for help. As a result she stopped our 
meeting after ten minutes. Interviews with her were so tense that I could not help 
feeling nervous, almost like I was back in school facing a strict teacher. 
Section four: Theoretical samplings 
During my interviews, I not only considered the ethical issues and the relationship 
between me and my respondents, but also the importance of sampling within my case 
study as a means of collecting satisfactory data. I adopted theoretical sampling in 
choosing my interviewees. Theoretical sampling is 
a process of data collection for generating theory, whereby the analyst jointly 
collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and 
where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. The process of 
data collection is controlled by theoretical sampling according to the emerging 
theory. (Glaser, 1992, p. 101, in Punch, 2005) 
It is obvious that theoretical sampling puts emphasis on `sampling on the basis of 
concepts that have proven theoretical relevance to the evolving theory' (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p. 176). The relevance refers to concepts that are 
deemed to be significant because they are repeatedly representative or notably 
absent when comparing incident after incident, and are of sufcient importance to 
be given the status of categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 176). 
There were two considerations for my adopting theoretical sampling. One was that it 
was not feasible for me to interview every academic in the department/school I was 
interested in, and that I wanted to avoid falling into a representational logic trap. 
Specifically, I did not want to assume that because I selected one category of a 
particular type, this could somehow represent all categories of this type. The 
categories of academic respondents and manager-academic respondents I chose were 
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intended to allow me to generate data to explore similarities and differences in their 
perception of the impact of quality audit on their work, in order to test and to develop 
theories of quality audit in the context of England, rather than to make statistical 
comparisons between academics and manager-academics in England, and to infer 
causality on that basis. Another consideration for my adopting theoretical sampling 
was that my interviewee samples should be related to some theoretical propositions. 
The main criteria for my choosing academic interviewees were their status, position, 
rank, gender, years of working, and types of contract because Newton (2002) reveals 
that different academics hold different views on quality audit. 
My theoretical sampling went well. A lot of academics showed great interest in my 
research and their response rate was very high. In the end, I managed to get 64 
respondents in 7 different disciplines in 5 faculties. These 64 respondents included 
16 manager-academic respondents, 48 academic respondents. These respondents 
include those in early/late career, and those with permanent/temporary contracts. The 
manager-academic respondents were those responsible for quality assurance in the 
department/school, such as programme directors and directors of undergraduate 
studies within the school/department, heads of school/department, people responsible 
for faculty undergraduate studies, and faculty staff in charge of quality assurance or 
directing staff development. The academic respondents included professors, readers, 
senior lecturers, lecturers, and teaching assistants (Table 1). 
Table 1: Number of academic interviewees in the departments (N=48) (Names of 
departments are anonymized) 
A B C D E F G 
Professor 1 2 1 1 
Lecturer 2 3 3 3 1 3 7 
Teaching fellow 2 2 1 2 
QA staff 2 1 2 5 2 2 
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Of the 64 respondents, 22 were female and 42 were male (Table 2). 




Dean HoD QA 
staff 
Prof Lecturer Teaching 
fellow 
Female 1 2 1 1 3 1 9 4 
Male 2 4 6 11 4 13 2 
The figures shows that the proportion of women in the academic interviewed as a 
whole in the case study university reached 34.37 per cent. This proportion is similar 
to that of the proportion of women academics in the university as a whole. The 
amount of imbalance between female staff and male staff is explained by the fact that 
there are fewer female academics than male ones in science and engineering subjects 
than in arts and social sciences. This is partly because a natural scientist may spend 
much of their research and teaching time in a laboratory, while a humanities scholar 
will make much more use of libraries and archives because `the latter is a more 
flexible environment than the former for anyone juggling complex home 
responsibilities with a job' (Deem, 2003, p. 244). The figure 34.37 per cent is similar 
to the finding of HESA (2008) that the proportion of full time women in the 
academic profession as a whole in the UK was 36.1 per cent in their 2004/05 survey. 
Section five: Transcription 
After the 64 interviews were completed I began data transcription. All my 64 
transcripts were based mainly on audio data, so I tagged my voice record with details 
of when, where the interview took place and which interviewee was recorded. Flick 
(1998) provides a good example of a document sheet on information about the 
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interview and the interviewee (appendix 9), which I have adopted. Where 
identification was possible in the transcripts, the name of the interviewee was 
replaced by reference letters, and the data was anonymised, both to comply with data 
protection regulations and to protect participants' identity on ethical grounds. After 
reference coding, I duplicated my data and used the back-up copies for analysis and 
stored the original one. 
The data from all my interviews were transcribed in full and verbatim because I 
wanted to ensure that these transcripts are faithful reproductions of the oral record. 
The verbatim accounts when transcribed tend to look remarkably disjointed, 
inarticulate, and even incoherent when committed to the printed page (Patton 1990). 
Therefore it is important that in the transcripts all pauses, broken sentences, 
interruptions, and other aspects of the messiness of casual conversation are faithfully 
reproduced (Poland, 2001). 
5.1 Quality of my transcripts 
I personally found transcription an extremely time-consuming process. For half an 
hour on tape, it normally took me three to six hours to transcribe. When doing the 
transcription, I bore in mind that there would be some potential challenges to 
transcription quality. First, the transcribers' problems with sentence structure, the use 
of quotation marks, omissions, and mistaking words or phrases for others. Second, a 
failure of transcripts is that they do not tend to indicate when people are paraphrasing 
or mimicking others, or when respondents quote things others told them. Third, 
omissions can occur when transcribers go forward and backward in the tape when 
they listen to a passage more than once, with the danger that they do not pick up 
exactly where they left off and pieces are lost. Fourth, transcribers mistake words for 
other similar words that may or may not make sense in the context of what is being 
said (Poland, 2001). 
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I minimized the above challenges by improving accuracy of my transcription. I 
transcribed everything I could hear on the tapes, even aspects of emotional context 
are expressed with an oral component, such as pauses, sighs, laughter, coughing and 
phone ringing and I presented them in the way as Poland (2001, p. 641) suggested: 
" Pauses: short pauses (... ); two - to three - second breaks (pause); four or more 
seconds (long pause) 
" Laughing, coughing, etc: indicate in parentheses (cough), (sigh). Using 
(laughing) to denote one person, (laughter) to denote several laughing 
" Interruptions: indicate when someone's speech is broken off midsentcnce by 
including a hyphen (-) at the point where the interruption occurs (e. g. "what do 
you -") 
" Use x's to denote passages that cannot be deciphered at all (number of x's should 
denote approximate number of words that cannot be deciphered). 
" Emphasis: use caps to denote strong emphasis; for example, "He did WHAT? " 
Except for transcribing everything I could hear on the tapes, I used my interview 
notes to achieve accuracy of my transcripts because the notes revealed the interview 
contexts, which helped me to conduct in-depth analysis of how my respondents 
perceived the impact of quality audit on their work. Moreover in order to use the 
right punctuations, before I decided where to begin and end sentences, I listened to 
the tape a couple of times carefully, sometimes several times, to make sure I 
understood what the interviewee meant, then I inserted the punctuations 
corresponding to an oral statement, though it is still a guess as the spoken word does 
not involve punctuation. 
5.2 Tension between accuracy and readability 
In the whole process of my transcription, I was fully aware of the tension between 
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accuracy and readability, and initially transcribed the interviews verbatim, so when 
the interviews were conversational rather than following a structured question and 
answer approach, my data had the features of conversations, i. e. repetitions, 
hesitations, pauses, `um' and `err'. However, due to the fact that all my respondents 
are academics, it was possible to derive verbatim quotes from them, on most 
occasions, which does not make difficult reading. 
I encountered some other difficulties in my transcription. For example, I found two 
interviews difficult to transcribe and they took me much a longer time than expected. 
Furthermore, in these two interviews there was excessive background noise, such as 
the traffic sound on the street, the persistent ringing of a telephone in my 
interviewee's office and, several times, colleagues knocking at the door. What I did 
was to describe and present this contextual interference in my transcription. In one 
interview, because of weak batteries in my voice recorder, I lost one third of the 
conversation, so I had to rely on my field notes to finish my transcription. 
Section six: Data analysis 
After the interview transcription, it was time for my data analysis. According to Yin 
(2003), case study data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, and 
testing evidence to address the initial propositions of a study. This means that data 
analysis should focus on defining priorities for what to analyze and why. In my data 
analysis, I adopted the strategy of theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003), which means 
that data analysis will be shaped by the theoretical framework within which my study 
is conducted (Patton, 1990). The first step I undertook was to read my data on three 
levels: literally, interpretively and reflexively, which I found very helpful (Mason, 
2002). 
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6.1 Reading the data literally, interpretively and reflexively 
What is literal reading? Mason explains that it is to read data literally and to `show 
interest in their literal form, content, structure, style layout, and so on' (2002, p. 149). 
However, it turns out that `pure literal reading is not possible, just as a purely 
objective description is not possible because the social world is always already 
interpreted and because what we see is shaped by how we see it' (Mason, 2002, 
p. 149). As a result, there is a need for interpretive reading which helps researchers 
construct or document a version of what they think the data mean or represent, or 
what they think they can refer from the data. Furthermore, in order to make the data 
analysis complete and persuasive, Mason argues for the importance of reflexive 
reading, as a means to `locate you as part of the data you have generated, and will 
seek to explore your role and perspective in the process of generation and 
interpretation of data' (p. 149). 
As Mason (2002) suggests, I read my data literally, interpretively and reflexively. I 
added comments and reflections in the margins alongside the data, which acted as a 
reminder about my new thinking on facets of the investigation because as my 
analysis progresses, new things might emerge as relevant, or new interpretations 
might be given to the same extract of data which needed to be recorded on my data. 
After that I came back to my research questions, thinking about how well the data 
addressed them, as well as how well the data would address my theoretical 
propositions. 
6.2 Coding and creating data categories 
After three levels of reading on my data, the next step I took was to code my data and 
relate the codes to my research questions and my theories. I used NVIVO software 
for my data analysis by putting my research design into the project on computer and 
coding it, meanwhile analyzing the nodes as they were indicated in the design. It is 
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worth mentioning that in NVIVO software, nodes equal categories which I will talk 
about shortly, and that I can ask of any node what its relationship is to other nodes, 
either in the catalogue or in the coding it holds. 
During my coding process, in order to achieve a holistic understanding of my data, I 
bore in mind the importance of linking codes, data categories and my theories 
together because according to Coffey & Atkinson (1996), codes, data categories, and 
concepts are related closely to one another, in that some fragments of data relate to 
some particular topic or theme. Coding helps to link all those data fragments to a 
particular idea or concept and these concepts are in turn related to one another, so the 
important analytic work lies in establishing and thinking about such linkages. My 
data analysis considered these linkages and adopted three coding methods: 
`descriptive', `topic' and `analytical' coding (Richards, 2005, p. 87). 
Descriptive coding involves storing information about characteristics or attributes of 
the case being studied (Richards, 2005). My research design indicates the 
background and characteristics of my respondents. I kept this information 
systematically in table forms and stored it in my computer, which helped to remind 
me of the patterns and characteristics of my respondents. Appendix 10 attached in 
this thesis can provide an example of that. Except for descriptive coding, I used 
`topic' and `analytical' codings, both of which are `interpretative processes' to gather 
all the text about a category (Richards, 2005, p. 88). 
Topic coding labels text according to its subject, but it usually involves little 
interpretation. When reading the text, I always asked `what is this about? ' If the 
answer was a topic for my project, I selected the text. If I had that topic already as a 
category, I selected it and coded it. If the topic had not been recorded as a category, I 
created the category, and then coded it. As a new topic appeared, I considered 
whether it deserved a place in my project. Together with descriptive coding and topic 
coding, analytical coding is used because it is central to qualitative enquiry, in that it 
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leads to theory emergence and theory affirmation (Richards, 2005). Analytical coding 
refers to coding that comes from interpretation and reflection on meaning. It means 
that if 'you are considering the meanings in context, and creating categories that 
express new ideas about the data, coding to gather and reflect on all the data related 
to them' (Richards, 2005, p. 94). For examples of descriptive and analytical coding, 
please see Appendix 11 and Appendix 12 of this dissertation. 
In my data analysis, when I found a passage interesting, I selected it and asked the 
question: `why am I interested in that? ' If the answer was a category, where I wanted 
to code data, I made a category and carefully named it, then coded the selected text at 
the category. When I did the codings, I was fully aware of the importance of keeping 
the balance between topic and analytical coding by asking not just `where does this 
text go' but `why am I interested in that? ' because topic coding will dominate when 
you are uncertain about what is to be done, or prevented from progressing (Richards, 
2005). Apart from the codings, I found it a good practice to browse categories 
frequently, to explore the variety or similarities of the material being gathered, and to 
reflect on the idea or concept the category represents, and then write about it. The 
categories made could be seen as a continually changing representation of what I was 
finding in my material. In order to achieve speed, efficiency and reliability in my 
data analysis, I created a 'catalogue of category' (Richards, 2005, p. 108). This 
catalogue was useful in reviewing, clarifying, and strengthening ideas I was 
producing and it helped inform the growing structure of my research, such as the 
relations of categories and major dimensions of my research. 
6.3 Addressing my theoretical concerns 
After finishing the structures of my node/category system in the data, I began to 
reflect on my data and explored how the data had addressed my theoretical 
framework about quality audit. According to Yin (2003), a good case study is the one 
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in which the explanations have reflected some theoretically significant propositions. 
This suggests that it is important to address the theoretical concerns in the data 
analysis. 
I personally found the suggestion of Richards (2005) on addressing the theoretical 
concerns very useful in my data analysis. By following his suggestion, I revisited the 
goals and the design of my research, and asked myself the following questions: 
" What am I seeking? 
" What have I realistically achieved? 
" How will I know if it is good enough? 
The last question is a major area of debate in qualitative research because it raises 
philosophical issues of the nature of realities and their perception. It is a way for me 
to rethink my research outcome, what kind of outcome it is and whether it is 
satisfactory or not according to certain criteria. 
6.3.1 What I am seeking 
Following coding, it was time for me to reflect on my data to make it clear what I 
was seeking. I kept in mind the importance of answering my three research questions 
about how quality audit has affected the work of academics from their perspectives. 
In order to address my research questions, I not only described but also analyzed my 
data because rich description can make my writing interesting, and `to stop at 
describing the data is rather like describing the scene of a crime without trying to 
solve the crime' (Richards, 2005, p. 127). In any case, interpretation begins in the 
interview - every probe is an attempt at interpretation. Therefore analysis is 'the 
process of bringing order to the data, organizing what is there into patterns, 
categories, and basic descriptive units' (Patton, 1987, p. 144). The analysis of my data 
can explain my findings and attach significance to particular results. 
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To move on to the stage of analysis, I started to ask `why' questions. For example, on 
the perceived impact of quality audit on undergraduate classroom teaching practice, I 
asked why quality audit had affected the teaching. This `why' question was extended 
by the following questions: How has quality audit affected the teaching, positively or 
negatively? Why positive and why negative? Where does the positive/negative 
evidence come from? Is it a common view among academics? If, no, why not? Who 
is the main holder of this view? Why does she or he have this point of view? 
6.3.2 What I have achieved 
After making clear what I was seeking, I began to reflect on what I have achieved, 
aiming to find out whether I could challenge and extend theories on quality audit in 
higher education because from Richards' (2005) point of view, it is important to 
make a theory from the study. There were two methods I used to find out what I had 
achieved in my research. One way was to read reports from similar studies to find 
out whether some were convincing, and meanwhile was critical of the studies I found 
boring, trivial or skewed by the position of the researcher and asked myself whether 
and how I could do better. The other way I did this was to reflect on the possible 
outcomes for my study, by analyzing and interpreting my data first, and then 
constructing my own theory from the data, next comparing it with the ones I adopted 
in my research, and finally illustrating the differences and similarities between these 
theories and the reasons behind the differences. In this way I could check whether the 
outcome of my data was satisfactory, and meanwhile challenge and extend the 
theories on quality audit in higher education in England. 
My outcome was a kind of difference outcome which is a kind of analytical outcome, 
aiming to construct the difference (Richards, 2005). My research explored and 
extended existing theories on quality audit processes and cultures and showed the 
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need for more subtle explanations and understandings of quality audit because there 
were mixed views towards the audit. My research constructed these different 
perceptions on quality audit and then contrasted the patterns of these perceptions, 
aiming to provide a richer picture of quality audit in higher education. 
6.3.3 Maintaining the quality of my research 
After reflecting on what I had realistically achieved, it is important to consider 
whether my outcome was valid enough. This could be interpreted as whether the 
outcome was satisfactory or not according to certain criteria. According to Patton 
(1990), it is important for the researcher to explain in clear terms, and convincingly, 
the methods of his data collection and analyses and his philosophical belief. This will 
enable the researcher to achieve accuracy in their findings because the credibility of 
the research finding depends on three distinct but related inquiry elements: 
1. `Rigorous techniques and methods for gathering high-quality data that is 
carefully analyzed, with attention to issues of validity, reliability, and 
triangulation; 
2. The credibility of the researcher, which is dependent on training, experience, 
track record, status, and presentation of self, and 
3. Philosophical belief in the phenomenological paradigm, that is, a fundamental 
appreciation of naturalistic inquiry, qualitative methods, inductive analysis, and 
holistic thinking' (Patton, 1990, p. 461) 
As a PhD student, and a novice researcher, I am fully aware that the credibility of the 
researcher can affect the way findings are received. My principle was to report my 
research process as clearly as possible because it could reveal my understanding of 
how to do research (see section three). Meanwhile, I considered and followed 
suggestions from experienced researchers. For example, Cohen, et al (2000) suggests 
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that in a case study it is important to use semi-structured and open interviews, 
observation, narrative accounts and documents, and diaries, rather than surveys and 
experiments. After having considered the characteristics and the needs of my own 
research, I decided to use semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. In 
the process of conducting my interviews, I paid attention to the strategies of 
interviewing different people and found interviewing senior people later (Cohen, et al, 
2000) very effective. What I did was to interview academic respondents first and 
then manager- academic respondents, in order to get a holistic picture of the impact 
of quality audit on a department/school and on the respondents. This meant that at 
the time of seeing the manager-academic respondents, I was well informed about the 
department/school/faculty in question, and I thus made the most effective use of our 
discussion time. As to my philosophical belief, I have made use of the interpretative 
research paradigm because it could build gradual pictures through interpretations that 
represent complex reality of the particular social life (Holliday, 2002). Therefore, I 
could interpret the different views of academics towards quality audit, so I managed 
to present rich data on how quality audit had affected the work of academics. 
6.3.3.1 Validity 
I paid attention to other key criteria concerned with the quality of research, such as, 
validity and reliability, which are considered relevant in judging the quality of case 
study research (Yin, 2003). In general validity is viewed as the extent to which an 
account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers whereas 
reliability is the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same 
category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions 
(Silverman, 2001). 
It is obvious that Silverman's view emphasizes the extent of accurate accounts of 
social phenomena. This accords well with the view of Cohen et al (2000) that 
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validity is 'the honesty, depth, richness and scope of the data achieved, the 
participants approached, the extent of triangulation and the disinterestedness or 
objectivity of the researcher' (p. 105). However, the fact is that it is hard for research 
to be 100 per cent valid because the subjectivity of respondents, together with their 
opinions, attitudes and perspectives contribute to a degree of bias. This suggests that 
validity is not only concerned with accuracy of the account, it can also be seen as an 
issue of qualitative research in general (Richards, 2005). Therefore it is better to 
perceive validity as a matter of degree rather than an absolute state (Cohen et al, 
2000) because it is judged by the extent to which an account accurately represents 
the data collected, the extent to which all relevant views are represented, the 
adequate use of the original data and the impact of the research design/ approach on 
the result. 
My research has considered the above interpretations of validity. Each stage of my 
research, such as concepts development, research questions, data collection and 
analyses, and research findings, has exhibited validity through detailed description, 
analysis and interpretation of the information gathered and the research methods I 
used. For example, in my data analysis, I interpreted my data in meaningful and 
sensitive ways, rather than imposing my interpretation inappropriately or without 
justification. Although it is undeniable that the interpretation of my data is 
value-laden because it is based on my knowledge, experience, and my international 
student status, I managed to maintain the validity of my finding because of two main 
reasons. 
One reason is that I do not over generalise my finding is because the issue of 
generalization in qualitative research is contentious and because opinion differs on 
whether it is possible to generalize and if it is, on the extent to which the researcher 
can ensure generalisability (Stake, 1995). My research is a single-case study. I would 
like my case study to make a contribution to theoretical generalization on the 
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perceived impact of quality audit on the work of academics in England because my 
goal is to expand theories of quality audit and to generalise my findings to theoretical 
propositions of quality audit, on the basis that a case study should strive to extend or 
generalise theoretical propositions (Yin, 1993). Therefore I did not intend to either 
undertake statistical generalisation or generalise my findings to all the universities in 
England. Instead, I provided readers with a detailed description of my case study's 
context, and with interpretations and descriptions of my case, which serves to specify 
everything that a reader may need to know in order to understand my findings, so 
they could make their own generalisations from my study (Stake, 1995). 
The other reason why I could maintain the validity of my finding is that I recognized 
the limitation of my research by openly declaring the factors which could impact 
upon the perspective that I attempted to address (See section eight). I come from 
China and I am studying the UK HE system. This international experience could be 
positive because it enables me not to take anything for granted. Considering that my 
perceptions of quality audit might be different from that of the academics, I presented 
all my data in detail and organised academics' views into different patterns and 
compared these patterns in order to present readers with the complex impact of 
quality audit on the work of academics. The way of reflecting on my limitation thus 
helped me maintain the validity of my research. 
6.3.3.2 Reliability 
Reliability, like validity, is another important measure of quality of qualitative 
research. According to Silverman (2001), reliability is the degree of consistency with 
which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the 
same observer on different occasions. What Silverman suggests is that reliability 
concerns with the consistency over time. In order to achieve this consistency, Mason 
(2002) argues that it is important to put emphasis on the accuracy of the research 
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strategies because reliability involves the extent to which the research methods and 
techniques are accurate. In similar vein, Richards (2005) suggests that reliability is 
the aim for a result the audience can rely on, and that the best way to assure 
reliability is to have well-validated procedures in all that the researcher does. 
LeCompte, et al. (1993) classifies reliability into internal reliability and external 
reliability. Internal reliability concerns the degree to which other researchers 
applying similar constructs would match these to data in the same way as original 
researchers. Demonstration of internal reliability is believed to increase confidence in 
the logical consistency with which data analysis has been done. External reliability 
concerns the reproducibility of entire studies, in the sense that other researchers 
studying the same or similar settings would generate the same findings. LeCompte , 
et al. (1993) offers five suggestion to improve reliability of research. First, a research 
report should identify the status position taken by the researcher in the field, such as 
the gender or age. Secondly, the researcher should tell who offered data. Thirdly, the 
researcher should tell the social situations of the research. Fourthly, a full account 
should be given of the theories and ideas that informed the research. Fifthly, it is 
necessary to have a detailed account of all aspects of methods used. 
In order to achieve reliability of my research findings, I first identified my 
international student status, my working experience in China, and the neutral position 
taken in my research. I interpreted my role as providing a clear, detailed and in-depth 
description and sufficient depth of analysis so that readers are able consider the 
extent to which the findings resonate with their own experience of quality audit in 
their own institutions. Then I identified who my respondents were and what my case 
study university was like and the context in which my research was carried out. Next 
I presented the theories of quality audit I was going to test in my case study. Finally, I 
described clearly the approach to and procedures for my data collection and analysis. 
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I also provided justification for why these procedures were appropriate within the 
context of my study. The processes I used to generate themes, concepts or theories 
from the data were clearly documented. Moreover, the reference to external evidence 
including previous qualitative studies to test the conclusions from my analysis as 
appropriate are adopted. In this way, my research maintains its reliability. As a result, 
the quality of my research is assured. My research also fulfils its purpose of 
providing readers detailed and rich information on the perceived impact of quality 
audit in a university in England. 
Section seven: Limitation of my research 
In spite of all the above endeavours I took to assure the quality of my research, there 
are some limitations in my research. For example, I did not use focus group 
interviews, where respondents are offered some topic or stimulus material and then 
encouraged to discuss it amongst themselves (Kvale, 1996). Group interview has the 
advantage of yielding a wide range of responses. This kind of interview is 
useful 'where a group of people have been working together for some time or for 
common purpose, or where it is seen as important that everyone concerned is aware 
of what others in the group are saying' (Cohen & Manion, 1994, p. 287). 
Although I intended to undertake group interviews, this did not happen for two main 
reasons. One is because my research topic is a sensitive one. Some of my 
interviewees did not want their departments and their colleagues to know that they 
were interviewed. I am obliged to keep the identity of the interviewees anonymous, 
so it might be inappropriate for me to arrange group interviews. The other is the 
disadvantage of group interviews. One disadvantage is that group interview is time 
consuming to arrange, and is 'of little use in allowing personal matters to emerge, or 
in circumstances where the researcher has to aim a series of follow-up questions at 
one specific number of the group' (Cohen & Manion, 1994, p. 287). Instead group 
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interviews could `drown out certain views', (Denscombe, 2003, p. 168).... Because 
`the opinions expressed are ones that are perceived to be `acceptable' within the 
group. Where group members regard their opinions as contrary to prevailing opinion 
within the group, they might be inclined to keep quiet, or moderate their views 
somewhat' (Denscombe, 2003, p. 168). 
Another limitation of my research is that there was a lack of cooperation from the 
academics in one or two of my interviews. One reason is that my research topic is 
sensitive. Another reason is that my assurance of confidentiality might be weak, or it 
was perceived to be more likely to be breached by the academics in these interviews 
because I am a young looking student. Therefore, I might have given the impression 
of a lack of credibility or ability to keep my promise of confidentiality to these two 
academics. 
The third limitation of my research is that although on most occasions I could choose 
my respondent sample freely in the seven departments/schools researched, in one 
science-related department, the Head gave me a list of academics to interview. This 
Head might have wanted me to do me a favour by recommending his colleagues, but 
this unfortunately had limited my access to the other academics who might show 
interest in my research. It is likely that this Head might have chosen the people he 
knew well and he thought would give a favourable impression of the department. 
Therefore my respondent samples were not firmly based on my theoretical sampling 
as they were for other departments. 
The fourth limitation of my research is that it is a single case study, although it could 
provide readers with a detailed and rich description of how quality audit had affected 
the work of respondents in my case study university, and it could make a theoretical 
generalization, it has little connection with the post-1992 universities in England. It 
is not feasible for me to compare the finding of my case study with that of the post 
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-1992 universities to reveal the similarities and differences because these universities 
have different contexts. This means that the study cannot provide a holistic picture of 
quality audit in England. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has set out my research design, providing a rationale for the 
single-case study approach and detailing the development of the case study. The 
procedures used in data collection and analysis have been described and analyzed. 
Both the limitations and the strengths of my research have been identified and issues 
relating to ethical considerations have been discussed. 
My dissertation was based on an interpretive approach to exploring and developing an 
in-depth understanding of how academics in a research-intensive pre-1992 university 
in England perceived the impact of quality audit on their work. The interpretive 
approach not only enabled me to understand the complex perceptions of respondents 
on quality audit but also gradually revealed the mixed impact of quality audit on the 
work of academics, so I could categorise these different impacts based on the various 
views and perceptions 
I employed a single case study as my research approach because I could focus on one 
university in England which was selected according to their top ranking in teaching 
excellence. In the case study I used theoretical sampling and finally chose 64 
academics, according to their level of seniority and gender, from seven different 
departments/schools. In order to develop gradual understanding of respondents' 
views on quality audit and to provide `rich' data on respondents' perception of 
quality audit, I used semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis to explore 
respondents' views in two continuous phases from January 2007 to October 2007. All 
these 64 respondents signed an informed consent form following appropriate 
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research ethics practices. During the interviews, I established trust and rapport with 
the majority of my respondents which enhanced the research process and data 
collection as they became confident to express their views and feelings concerning 
quality audit, its related quality assurance mechanisms and its impact on their work. 
All my interviews were taped recorded and transcribed with care. During my data 
analysis, I first did three levels of reading on my data, literally, interpretively and 
reflexively, in order to gain full understanding of it. I then analyzed my data using 
NVIVO software and categorized my data according to different themes which were 
developed according to my theories of quality audit. After the data analysis, I 
reflected on my research, to find out what I wanted to achieve, what I had achieved 
and whether what I achieved was satisfactory or not. These reflections increased my 
confidence in the quality of my research. 
Meanwhile I am fully aware that there are limitations of my research, such as, my 
student status, the use of semi-structured interviews, no absence of group interviews, 
and a biased sample in one selected department. It is obvious that my findings do not 
aim to be generalisable but, rather, offer a detailed study of how quality audit has 
affected the work of academics in one research-intensive pre-1992 university in 
England. I prefer to treat my research as a starting point for further research on 
exploring how academics perceived the impact of quality audit on their work. 
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Chapter 7: Working Conditions of Academic Respondents in my Case Study 
University 
Introduction 
In this chapter I take a close look inside a research-intensive pre-1992 university to 
find out how 64 academic staff interviewed perceived their working conditions in the 
context of quality audit processes, cultures, and mechanisms. I aim to explore the 
attitudes of respondents towards their workload and find out how they have balanced 
their research, teaching, and administration. Differences between respondents on the 
basis of their subject and level of seniority are taken into consideration in the 
analysis of their workload. This chapter examines whether there is a connection 
between the perceived heavy workload of academics and quality audit processes etc, 
revealing whether the audit was perceived as the main cause of this problem. 
This chapter will begin with a holistic picture of respondents' workload in the 
context of quality audit, then analyze the main drivers to respondent's work overload, 
revealing whether these drivers are related to quality audit processes etc or not. 
Finally, this chapter will illustrate why respondents in general held negative attitudes 
towards administrative jobs which include quality audit related tasks, and to find out 
the reasons why the majority of respondents have been taking on administrative roles 
in the case study university. 
Section one: Workload of academics 
An analysis of the interview data suggests that the majority of respondents feel 
burdened with a heavy workload. Only seven out of sixty-four respondents asserted 
that they were satisfied with their workload. All these seven respondents were in a 
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junior position and had worked for less than fifteen years in the case study university. 
Five of them were lecturers and two were teaching fellows. There were various 
reasons why these respondents found their workload acceptable, such as, research 
leave, reduced administrative responsibilities, and getting used to their workload. For 
example, one male lecturer said that he was happy with his workload because of his 
research leave: 
Reasonably happy, because I do a lot of teaching and I am on research leave, so 
you have 50% extra teaching when you have research leave... in the second 
semester..., but I really can't complain at the moment, especially when I have 
fairly low administrative load... (Respondent 32) 
Except for research leave, reduced administrative jobs have become another 
important reason for respondents feeling satisfied with their workload. For example, 
a male lecturer in a social science school asserted that he felt relieved without 
administrative jobs: 
Err, ... at the moment, yes. it is 
better that ... I give up the administration 
(Respondent 40) 
The other five respondents revealed that they did not want to make a fuss about their 
workload because they had got used to it. A female lecturer in an arts related 
department for example, made it clear that she had become so used to her workload 
that she did not want to complain about it: 
I am happy to spend a bit more time on ... research, 
but perhaps I get more used 
to .... This is my second ... 
full year teaching and 1 get more ... used to 
it, so I will 
be able to ... prepare that and spend more time on research ... 
in term. 
(Respondent 17) 
1.1 Respondents with a heavy workload 
Except for the 7 respondents who were happy with their workload, the other 57 
respondents in the case study university all perceived their workload as heavy, which 
is based on their perceptions not their actual workload. This is similar to the finding 
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of Kinman, et al. (2006) and Tytherleigh, et al. (2005) that academics' workload is 
heavy in the UK. The interview data reveals that many respondents in this case study 
described their workload as a major problem and articulated that their workload was 
beyond what they regarded as a reasonable expectation. For example, a male lecturer 
in a medical related course asserted that his workload was unreasonable: 
It (workload) is not what I expect.... It is excessive. (Respondent 33) 
A male respondent with quality assurance responsibilities in a social science school 
shared a similar view and described his workload as a `nightmare': 
Am I happy with it (workload) ?... Generally, NO, it is nightmare! It is nightmare! 
I have got far too much to do. (laughter) (Respondent 64) 
There is evidence that in order to deal with a heavy workload, most respondents 
chose to extend their work out of office hours. For example, a female lecturer in a 
social science school found she had no choice but to work on weekends. 
I work every weekend. (Respondent 20) 
Some other respondents expressed a similar view. For example, a male lecturer in a 
medical related school articulated that he just worked over the weekend: 
For example, 1 am at work this Saturday, to finish work ready for next weeks work. 
(Respondent 26) 
The above examples suggest that academics have been working out of office hours 
when facing a heavy workload. This is identical with the finding of Kinman, et al. 
(2006) and Tytherleigh, et al (2005) that there was a long working hours' culture 
among academics in the UK. A further analysis of the interview data reveals that 
academic respondents who had worked over ten years in the case study university 
were more likely to claim that they were overworked due to accumulation of their 
responsibilities. For example, a male professor in charge of undergraduate studies in 
an Arts faculty explained that it was because academics in early career would take 
their workload for granted, while academics in later career used to have lighter 
workload, so they would find their current workload heavy: 
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... You know, when I first arrived here, I was very inexperienced and I took it 
(administrative job) for granted. ... but some old academics said that it was 
ridiculous to have all these administrative burdens. (Respondent 5) 
A male head of school of an art related course shared the view of respondent 5 and 
explained that it was because the pressure on all the academics increased, but 
comparatively speaking, the academics in their early academic career were less likely 
to notice the difference: 
Yes. ... The pressure on teaching, research and administration 
has increased in the 
past 25 years, so it means that older academics find the current ways of doing 
things are quite alien to them, while younger staff will not notice much difference. 
(Respondent 11) 
What respondent 11 suggested was that academic respondents in their late career 
liked to complain about their heavy administration load. One explanation was that 
these senior academic respondents had worked such a long time in the 
department/school that they would be expected to become administrators, leaders, or 
to take some other jobs, so they might have got more jobs to do than the respondents 
who had worked a shorter time in the university. 
However, six other academic respondents who had worked in academe less than five 
years held a different view and argued that it was the junior staff who did most 
administrative jobs in their departments/schools. For example, a male lecturer in a 
science related school pointed out that his department always gave administrative 
jobs to young staff: 
I think, ... it is a 
bit... the tradition of this department that ... if 
1 can put it 
politely ... to preserve the time of professors, and give more 
heavy workload... to 
junior member of staff. I think that is changing ... at the present administration, 
I 
don't say that it is ... purely self serving and 
I mean it supplies more ... to the 
junior staff. (Respondent 60) 
Respondent 60 implied that his department allocated administrative jobs unfairly and 
that administrative jobs had become the least popular task among respondents, 
resulting in disputes over their administration load. There is an indication that 
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respondents' length of years working in the case study university had influenced their 
administration workload and their perception of administration workload. For 
example, academic respondents in early career, including teaching fellows, found 
their workload more bearable than the senior staff. Take teaching fellow for example, 
most of them found their workload satisfactory. This confirms the previous finding 
that academics in early career were less likely to complain about their workload than 
academics in later career. A further analysis of the interview data suggests that it was 
because most teaching fellows were the people who just received their PhD and they 
had temporary jobs and nothing to compare their load with in the past, so in order to 
get permanent jobs, most of them would choose to work hard and to make less 
complaint about the work pressure. In contrast, most senior staff had got permanent 
contracts, so it would be easier for them to refuse administrative jobs than the young 
staff. 
1.2 Reasons for respondents' perceived heavy workload 
Except for the years of working experience, there were some other factors which 
were perceived to have contributed to the workload of the respondents, such as, a lot 
of pressure to carry out research, a heavy teaching load, and large amounts of 
administrative tasks. The interview data demonstrates that pressure in research had 
become perceived as the most important factor to half of the respondents' in 
explaining their excessive workload. For example, a female director of quality 
assurance for a faculty of science emphasized that it was the RAE that had 
significantly increased the workload of academics: 
Of the workload, the huge impact is the RAE. There is a tangible fear that we must 
get a good result next time. That stresses the academics. (Respondent 7) 
There is evidence that due to the RAE, some academics had to reduce their input in 
teaching and administration. For example, a male lecturer in an engineering 
department found his teaching and administrative jobs suffered: 
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(Laughter) There is a lot of pressure in research, ... particularly within ... getting 
research funding, and actually getting on ... with the research... is 
difficult, which 
in turn has impact ... on ... 
how much effort ... you can put in teaching, and 
similarly ... with administration. 
(Respondent 27) 
Except for the research pressure, a high teaching load was regarded as another 
important cause for one third of respondents' heavy workload. For example, a female 
lecturer in a social science department was worried about her heavy teaching load 
and explained that she had to apply for research grants in order to reduce her 
teaching loads: 
I mean I am not happy with the teaching loads. I ... mean comparison with other 
friends I had within other universities I had, it is the highest load. ... 
And the only 
way I can do research is because ... research grants 
brought me out of teaching, 
for half of the year. (Respondent 18) 
A female lecturer in the same department of respondent 18 expressed a similar 
concern about a heavy teaching load and argued that she had became frustrated when 
nearly all her teaching load was arranged in one teaching block: 
With the teaching, I am not happy, because I have too many units, which means 
that ... my teaching is the main task. There are five syllabus. You 
know, it is very 
time consuming. And most of my teaching... was in teaching block one, which I 
liked, but it also meant ... 10 hours a week. (Respondent 22) 
It is obvious that respondent 22 considered 10 hours a week as a heavy teaching load. 
However, a respondent in charge of learning and teaching in a social science 
department questioned the arguments about a heavy teaching load and contended that 
respondents in the case study university was much lower when compared with that of 
a post 1992 university. The different perceptions of teaching load among respondents 
can be explained by the fact that the case study university is so research focused that 
academics in general preferred research to teaching. Therefore respondents regarded 
10 hours teaching a week as heavy. 
Except for the above perceived research and teaching pressure, the third reason why 
nearly one third of respondents were dissatisfied with their workload was because of 
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their heavy administrative burdens. For example, a male lecturer in a science related 
department asserted that he had too many administrative jobs: 
Oh, that's a good question. Err, ... 
I am happy with my teaching loads. l feel that I 
do too much admin. ... 
(Respondent 37) 
When asked about his current administrative jobs, this respondent gave out a full list: 
I have to do some administration ... associated with teaching ... and 
administrating the course. Each of our unit ... of the assessment 
have conveyors, 
so course of lecture, maybe a unit or part of a unit. ... 
Unit has some 
administrative role. ... 
I convene for three units... and a year one course.... That 
means that you are responsible ... 
for administration for that unit, and any people 
teaching on that. There might be more than one person teaching on that.... You are 
also responsible for ... compiling a unit 
folder which contains ... 
handouts for the 
course. And it contains exam questions and you have to compile the exam paper, 
so you are responsible for compiling ... a 
folder for that unit, that is seen by the 
external examiners actually, so that we can show that we provide with the students 
and we can show that ... what we telling students about 
the course is actually 
affected. We can see that the exam questions don't ... overlap with the course work 
and you can check that there is no overlap in the different form of assessment, for 
instance, so I administer the three courses. (Respondent 37) 
It is noticeable that this respondent' administrative jobs were related to his teaching. 
According to the majority of manager-academic respondents, relating administrative 
jobs with teaching had become a popular trend in the case study university. However, 
in the view of academic respondents, not all their administrative jobs were connected 
with their teaching and research. For example, a male teaching fellow in an art 
related department found himself burdened with an administrative job which was 
perceived as little related to his teaching: 
I am in the ethics ... committee. 
That means that in the third year, there are a lot of 
joint single degrees and ... people 
do take the final essay which accounts as their 
final degree. My responsibility is ... to advise ... people what regulations are.... 
And then sign the mark for, the double blind mark.... Then there is faculty marking 
dissertation. 
... 1 sit on the graduate committee and 
discuss all issues for ... 
students and anything for admissions. ... 
I also sit on the staff student committee. 
That is where we discuss problems and ... if there is any problem, we take them to 
the departmental meeting and .... 
(Respondent 51) 
Although respondent 51 perceived his administrative job as not related to teaching, 
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this job was actually related to teaching because it was concerned with marking for 
students. This confirms that respondents in general tended to treat administrative 
work as the job they least want to do. An analysis of the interview data reveals that 
an important reason why respondents showed little interest in administrative jobs was 
because their teaching and research loads were not reduced even when they were 
given extra administrative jobs. For example, a male professor in a medicine related 
course gave an example to illustrate how the administration workload was imposed 
upon academic staff in his department: 
I think there is a problem here that ... we ask people to 
do administration, but we 
don't say ... we are going to 
free some time for you ... to 
do the administration, 
so ... 
for example, when I became ... 
head of the ... programme, and 
head of 
division, it wasn't the case of ... you 
had this workload, and we were going to 
take ... the 
50% workload offyou... and make you head of division, we expect you 
to use that 50% time ... to 
be head of division. ... 
It is the case that you have this 
workload and... you are going to take this ... programme as well, and the 
division 
as well, so you get extra administrative burden. ... 
That is the problem. That is not 
just the problem for me. That's the problem for most people ... who 
do 
administration in the university and ... they 
do it as well as they doing their 
ordinary work. (Respondent 40) 
What respondent 40 suggested was that the practice that departments did not free 
some time for academics to do administration had made respondents in general show 
resistance to administrative jobs. Fifteen other respondents expressed their 
resentment about administrative jobs and asserted that these jobs cost them a lot of 
time and were not specified in their contracts, though the contract was very vague 
anyway. A female senior lecturer in a social science school gave the following 
examples: 
Quite a lot of the ... tasks that expected ... in terms of quality assurance and 
admin ... are ... not really specified ... in terms of... the job 
description that I get 
when I signed ... the contract when I go to the university. It is all 
hidden day to day 
today. ... Actually, there is a major demand... on senior academic time, so 
(pause) 
two find balanced time ... between the ... three major roles, which is teaching, 
admin, ... and research as a senior lecturer, ... is very 
difficult. (Respondent 19) 
It is obvious that respondent 19 felt pressurized by administration, especially by the 
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quality assurance related jobs because they were beyond what she felt were a 
reasonable expectation. Respondent 19 was not unique in her dislike of quality 
assurance jobs because respondents in general regarded quality audit related work as 
an administrative task and did not consider this to be part of the work of an academic. 
A further analysis of the interview data suggests that quality audit was perceived as 
one factor causing the heavy workload of academics, especially those who were 
responsible for quality assurance in the department/school. For example, a male 
lecturer in a science related school found that his quality assurance work was a 
nightmare: 
Well, I confess that I find it (quality assurance work) a nightmare. It wouldn't be 
my choice to do ... and one of the 
issues you probably ... understand 
here 
... is ... 
before coming to the university, I taught ... in the 




so ... to me, the idea of academics ... 
having major administrative roles ... and we 
are doing this and it is not very common. Most of it is done ... 
by professional 
administrators, so in that respect, that is not what I am ... trying to 
do and I am 
interested in doing academics. I find it, ... 
frankly, just a lot of paper work and it is 
boring 
... and it is to 
fulfilling certain objectives ... and 
1 am not sure ... there 
is a 
role for it, to ensure the quality to produce document to 
say 'quality'.... (Respondent 60) 
Respondent 60 showed an anger and resentment against quality assurance work. The 
main reason was because he felt that quality assurance jobs were not part of 
academic work, especially when it involved large amounts of paper work, which as a 
result had made respondents cast doubt on the purpose and the effect of quality audit. 
However, in spite of the time consuming nature of quality assurance jobs, there is 
little evidence that quality audit are perceived as the main cause of academics' heavy 
workload. Instead, six senior manager-academic respondents argued that the main 
reason for academics' heavy work was because of the complicated and reformed 
higher education system in England. For example, a respondent in charge of 
undergraduate studies in the faculty of arts made this view explicit: 
... 
Over the ten years, the burden (of administration) is getting greater and greater. 
It is not just quality assurance. It is everything, you know, involves. You know the 
whole system is more complicated and like the education survey and all these kind 
of things to do with staff development and progression and everything associated 
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with admission. The range of task just becomes multiplied. The point is a lot of 
these things do not need have to be done by academics, but they have been done by 
academics. That's the problem. (Respondent 5) 
What respondent 5 implied was that the case study university took in more students 
due to the massif ication of higher education, so it produced more administrative jobs 
as well as teaching for the academics. Except for the complicated higher education 
system, the lack of administrators at the departmental level was perceived as another 
reason why academics had to take on more administrative jobs. For example, a 
respondent in charge of quality assurance in the faculty of science showed his 
concern that there were not enough administrators in the department: 
The administration. ... There are not enough highly qualified administrators and 
there are not enough administrators. Full stop. (Long pause) ... The lack of 
administrators put work on academics. (Respondent 7) 
In general, the interview data reveals that teaching, research, and administrative jobs 
were perceived as the main factors causing a heavy workload for academic 
respondents, and that quality audit was not the main cause of most respondents' work 
overload, in spite of the fact that many respondents treated audit related jobs as 
bureaucratic and time consuming. As is revealed in the previous section, the majority 
of respondents complained about their heavy workload, but in the view of four 
manager-academic respondents, not all the complaints about heavy workload should 
be taken seriously because some academics had been using this complaint as a self 
defense strategy. For example, a director of learning and teaching in a social science 
department argued that some academics complaining about their workload were 
unjustified in doing so and pointed out that it was time for academics to learn to 
increase their work efficiency: 
My personal view ... is ... not all claims to being overworked should be taken 
seriously.... Well, some people felt overworked by having to get here early in this 
morning. You know, ... at one thing, it is very clear that they were overworked is 
very objective, so some people don't feel overworked by working as twice as much 
as somebody, clearly, so ... some people felt overworked, when they are not 
actually doing it. What I mean is that once you treat the fact they feel that it is 
taken seriously, it is absolutely. You might want to explore why that was the case. 
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Some case is because they get too much to wait to do. In some cases, maybe 
that ... is not so clear. 
And they make you think about how you deal with 
that. ... From my point of view, most people complained about how heavy their 
work load are ... are actually not the people ... 
doing the most work, but it is a 
good defense strategy. If you made a good noise of how terrible your workload is, 
and how you couldn't possibly cope with anything else.... Then of course people 
don't ask you to do anything else. (Respondent 64) 
Respondent 64 was very critical of academics finding excuses not to do 
administrative jobs or to do less work, which suggests that this respondent did not 
think the workload of academics was as heavy as they perceived it to be. Later on in 
the interview, this respondent gave examples to illustrate that the general workload of 
academics was actually lower when compared with that of people who worked 
outside the university: 
Some of my colleagues may see me being harsh.... Generally speaking,... people 
outside the university centre ... tends to 
be better organized ... and 
have a better 
appreciation ... of what' a 
lot of work is or different appreciation , so there are 
people who worked elsewhere and some of them worked in new university ... their 
workloads are a lot higher.... A lot higher, if they work in the public sector or they 
probably did the management and something like that. (Respondent 64) 
Respondent 64 was unique in implying that the workload of respondents in the case 
study university was lighter when compared with that in a pre-1992 university. This 
different view implied that the position of academics would influence their 
perception of workload. Respondent 64 was a director for learning and teaching, he 
dealt with the workload allocation of academics in his school, and he had other 
part-time jobs. Therefore he had a good knowledge of the general workload of 
academics, especially when he compared these demands with that of people who 
worked outside the university. Another implication of respondent 64's remarks is that 
the case study university was research - focused, so most academics would like to 
treat research and teaching as their priority, and that in order to have more time for 
either teaching or research, academics would like to let others know that their 
workload is heavy, so that they could make an argument to have less or be removed 
from some administrative jobs. The view that the case study university was research - 
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led was shared by the majority of respondents, which will be analyzed in the section 
below. 
1.3 Imbalance of teaching, research and administration 
The interview data indicates that because the case study university was research 
focused, most respondents tended to focus on their research. For example, a female 
lecturer in an art related department said that she was research - focused because of 
the research - centered culture in her department: 
The department as a whole is quite ... keen on research ... and research excellence 
that kind of things, so I was lucky at the beginning ... on a research leave very 
soon after my arriving, the second year and my last year. The whole ... of the year 
I was on research leave writing, but ... the first year I was here and this year ... I 
do full teaching load as well, so it is a mixture of both. (Respondent 17) 
A male lecturer in an engineering department expressed a similar view and 
confirmed that it had become a common practice for academics to put research as 
their first priority in the case study university: 
I feel that all academics could put a lot more time in their teaching ... if they 
weren 't doing their research. That cannot be true, so (pause) you have to draw the 
line someway.... I do think ... the pressure on research ... at the moment, 
particularly when you get funding, actually... does have impact on teaching, 
because 
... it means that we 
have to spend more time ... on these 
business to get 
funding and ... on the whole, I wouldn't say there is so much issue 
doing the ... 
research. It is more ... trying to get 
funding and ... so on to 
keep your research 
going. (Pause) And if you are going to ... carry on 
doing the research, then the 
only place ... you can make space, is to give up your teaching and your admin. See 
what I mean? (Respondent 27) 
What respondent 27 implied was that respondents in the case study university had 
little choice but to focus on research, which as a result had affected respondents' 
input into teaching and administration. This confirms the fact that research was the 
priority of most academic respondents in the case study university. However, the 
interview data suggests that although most respondents treated research as their 
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priority, 62 out of 64 respondents had been undertaking a mixture of teaching, 
research and administration work in the past academic year. 50 respondents 
expressed their concern at the difficulty in balancing their teaching, research, and 
administration roles. This finding corresponds with that of three national surveys that 
the work overload of academics in the UK has caused an imbalance of teaching, 
research, and administration (Kinman & Jones, 2003; Kinman, et al., 2006; and 
Tytherleigh, et al., 2005). 
In the case study university when respondents were facing difficulty in balancing 
their teaching, research, and administration, it had become a common practice for 
them to limit their time to either research or teaching. Fifteen out of sixty-four 
respondents, mainly the lecturer respondents, indicated that they had to sacrifice their 
research time due to the the imbalance of teaching, research, and administration. One 
example is that a male lecturer in a science department argued that his research 
suffered because he had prioritised his teaching 
Well, most of the teaching is essential. It has to ... 
be done, but I tried in contrast 
previous years, to do an adequate job ... with teaching, without putting extra 
time 
in, ... the admin 
has to be done. And the research gets pushed in time ... to slip 
over. (Respondent 29) 
The reduced input in research can be explained by the fact that research has a longer 
time scale, so it is easier to put aside for things that make more immediate, urgent 
demands on time, such as teaching or administration. However, the majority of 
respondents asserted that they still found time for their research. Instead, these 
respondents chose to either arrange their teaching, research, and administration in 
different proportions, or work out of office hours, such as early mornings, late nights 
and weekends. A couple of respondents felt that they had become workaholics under 
the pressure of a heavy workload. For example, a female lecturer in a social science 
department made this view explicit: 
I am workaholic, which means I work 40 hours a week, 10 hours a day which 
means that ... in weekend, I am in ofce. 
(pause) and I really like it. (Respondent 
22) 
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What respondent 22 implied was that she not only worked 10 hours in the weekdays, 
but also worked long hours at the weekends. Respondent 22 showed great passion in 
her work in spite of the heavy workload. An analysis of the interview data suggests 
that except for working out of office hours, a couple of respondents preferred to work 
faster and more efficiently in their office hours. For example, a male senior lecturer 
in an engineering department decided to stop working at home after having done it 
for years: 
It was dijfIcult. I have a particular way of doing things. ... For myself, the main 
way I work is ... to work, basically solid from 9 to 5. I tend not to take tea break, 
lunch break, so just ... work all the way through, but then go home and just 
stop. ... This year I decide to stop ... more 
less ... at 5 o'clock, and do other things 
in the evening. (Respondent 31) 
What respondent 31 suggested was that he increased his work pace to reduce his 
work pressure. In similar vein, a female lecturer in an art department chose to 
increase her work efficiency: 
Well, by working veryfast.... I always work veryfast, because I don't want to be 
tied ... and I try to fix too many things in a short time. 
(Respondent 43) 
The above data suggests that a research - centered culture in the case study 
university had greatly influenced respondents' attitude towards teaching and research, 
in that respondents in general showed preference to do research. However, in spite of 
this preference, the majority of respondents have a mixture of teaching, research and 
administration, which made them feel over-worked. There is evidence that 
respondents had been using various strategies to balance their work, such as reducing 
their input in research/teaching, working extra hours, and increasing work efficiency. 
The different strategies suggest that respondents held different attitudes towards their 
work. Reducing input in teaching/research suggests that respondents were reacting in 
a passive way when facing a heavy workload. However, a number reacted by 
increasing work efficiency suggesting that some respondents had been actively 
coping with their changed workload. 
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1,4 Respondents' resistance to administration jobs 
As is revealed in the previous sections, academic respondents in general showed 
preference for research, and showed least interest in administrative jobs. This section 
is going to analyze the reasons behind this resistance to administration. 
In the case study university although the majority of respondents had been doing 
administrative jobs, academic and manager-academic respondents in general held 
different views towards administrative jobs. For example, the majority of academic 
respondents treated administrative jobs as a burden upon them. In contrast, nearly 
one third of manager-academics argued that a lot of administrative jobs were 
important because they were teaching and research related, and that as the academics 
did not trust non-academics to do administrative jobs this meant that the academics 
should take on these tasks. This difference in view between academics and 
manager-academics suggests that administrative jobs have become a contentious 
issue between these groups. For example, a head of school of a medical related 
course argued that academics had to take on administrative jobs which were 
teaching/research related. He gave an example to illustrate how academics kept 
control of admission jobs: 
Most admin and most colleagues do is related to, probably related to teaching or 
research, not many people say not related to that. Particularly, teaching related 
admin, academics stay control. There is element of entirely not trusting of non- 
academics to take that workload all over.... If you say, err, (long pause) that 
academics don't have to get involved in admission at all, which is one thing we 
brought up 6 months ago at Senate. There are some people would be very worried 
about that because they would like to be able to retain control of that process, so 
they can decide who get admitted.... (Respondent 10) 
What respondent 10 argued was that it had become a common practice for academics 
to do administrative jobs which were teaching or research related, and that academics 
chose to do these jobs because they did not trust administrators to do them. A director 
of teaching and learning in a social science department shared the views of 
respondent 10 and asserted that although academics complained about administrative 
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jobs, it did not necessarily mean that these academics wanted the jobs to be taken on 
by someone else: 
I think the thing is ... they 
(academics) need moan about the work they do. And if 
you said: 'ok then I will take it of you and give it to somebody else ; he might be 
quite unhappy. Why they are unhappy? Because they have got to find something 
else to do. ... 
(Respondent 64) 
Compared with the above manager-academic respondents, many academics were 
very critical of administrative tasks and articulated that these jobs were the thing they 
least wanted to do. For example, a male professor in a medical related course argued 
that most academics would not choose to do administrative jobs: 
Well, they think that ... staff choose to 
do administration?! Err, ... it will 
be 
interesting to say how you find ... asking people there. 
There are some people 
who ... like administration, but some people get real kick of it. ... You 
know, they 
like the power ..., and they 
like being able to do something ... and 
being able to 
change there. And there are some people who are really good at ... and they 
love 
teaching and research and whatever, and they don't really ... want to 
do 
administration, but they feel obliged to do it. I think there is quite a few people 
here 
... and I am sure, in other parts of the university who are 
doing 
administration and ... they 
don 1 really ... want to. 
(Respondent 40) 
It is obvious that respondent 40 showed strong resentment toward administrative jobs 
and perceived quality audit related roles as part of the administration to exert burden 
upon academics. In spite of respondents' resistance to administrative jobs, 62 out of 
64 respondents had been doing administrative jobs in the past academic year. The 
section below is going to analyze why these respondents had been taking on 
administrative jobs. 
1.5 Reasons for taking on administrative jobs 
The interview data reveals that there are a few reasons why respondents had to do 
administrative jobs. These reasons are listed below according to their perceived 
importance by the academic respondents. Firstly, academic respondents were 
expected to do different jobs as part of their normal workload. Secondly, doing 
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administrative jobs would benefit academics' promotion chances. Thirdly, some 
academic respondents did administrative jobs because it was associated with the 
responsibilities of seniority. Fourthly, administrative jobs were stated in some 
academics' formal contract. These respondents were mainly teaching fellows, and 
people responsible for teaching at department and faculty level. 
According to most respondents, the reason why they had to take on administrative 
jobs was because they were asked to do them as part of their workload. There were 
plenty of examples in the interviews where respondents felt that they had no choice 
but to accept an administrative job passively. For example, a male professor in an art 
department argued that it was because academics were expected to do different jobs, 
so they had to do administrative jobs in their department: 
I think it is to ensure that everyone does it a bit ... and that people don't just do 
research and teaching. (Respondent 41) 
What respondent 41 suggests is that it has become a common practice to require 
academics to do administrative jobs, but the majority of respondents in the case study 
university preferred to spend more time on their research, so it is inevitable that 
academic respondents in general would treat administrative jobs as unimportant and 
as an extra burden and therefore show resistance to these jobs. 
Except for the expectation from the department/school for academics to do 
administrative jobs, there is a perception that respondents did administrative jobs in 
order to help with their promotion. This view was widely accepted by academic 
respondents in their early career and manager-academic respondents. For example, a 
male lecturer in a medical related course stated that administrative jobs had benefited 
his promotion: 
I was asked to do it and I knew it would be necessary for promotion i. e. more 
salary. (Respondent 26) 
What respondent 26 implied was that although academics in general showed 
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resistance to administrative jobs, university/department policy on promotion could 
encourage academics to take on administrative roles. However, there was a worry 
among three manager-academic respondents that linking administration with 
promotion would make academics show less interest in administrative jobs after their 
promotion. For example, a head of a medical related school made this view explicit: 
The other ... 
driver has been the promotion procedure, so I can say this year, in 
order to get promoted, from lecturer to senior lecturer, from senior lecturer to 
reader and then to professor, you have to show excellence in two or three areas of 
activities, the teaching, research and administration, so quite a lot of people in 
order to get promoted, maybe their research wasn't quite so good, so they have 
taken on administrative tasks and in order to be able to get tick in that box, and 
get promoted, so I think that is the huge constraint... on people keeping admin task. 
It has got to change, because the new career pathway system comes in place in 
August which means people just progress to senior lecturer, so we won't have to 
artificially, if you like, take on administrative tasks just to get 
promoted. (Respondent 10) 
What respondent 10 suggested was that administrative jobs were box-ticking 
exercises and a superficial activity for academics to conduct in order to jump through 
the promotion hoop, so when academics got promoted, they would lose their interest 
in carrying on with administrative responsibilities. Except for the purpose of 
promotion, another reason for academics to take on administrative jobs was because 
of their seniority. This view was mainly shared by respondents who had worked for 
over ten years in the case study institution and who were professors or senior 
lecturers. For example, a professor in a medical related course indicated that he had 
to do administrative jobs because of his position as a professor: 
So you are right, you are a professor, why you take on the administrative job? ... 
I 
guess it is because... it is expected of you and it expected you to show leadership. 
(Respondent 40) 
A similar view was expressed by respondent 41 who was a professor in a social 
science related department. Respondent 41 expressed his reluctance to take on 
administrative jobs: 
Seniority. It is the responsibility that you have to take on, ... 
but if you are lucky, 
you can choose which one to do. Before I was at the school, I was director for 
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research, ... so it was natural progression to be head of school.... at the moment, I 
think it is the university contract. You have to do some teaching, ... some research 
and some administration. (Respondent 41) 
What respondent 41 implied was that he had to take on administrative jobs, but there 
is little indication that he was happy about this. Further analysis of the interview data 
reveals that not only professors but senior lecturers had been doing administrative 
jobs because of their senior position. For example, a male senior lecturer in an 
engineering department argued that it had become a common practice for senior 
lecturers to do administrative jobs in his department: 
I guess the main reason is that my head of department asked me to do it. I think 
academic in the department, ... we should take ... on admin roles, especially at 
senior lecturer level. (Respondent 27) 
A senior lecturer in a social science department confirmed the view of respondent 27 
and asserted that being a member of senior staff had given him little choice but to 
take on quality assurance jobs: 
Well, partly they are part of my ... role. 
As a programme director, quality 
assurance for the degree ... is my role. ... then as a senior member of the staff 
in 
the department, ... it is expected of me that 
I take part,... at the departmental 
level, ... like management roles, and that sort ofstt 
ff (Respondent 19) 
It is noticeable that neither professors nor senior lecturers had expressed their 
willingness to do administrative jobs, but treated these jobs as another chore to 
complete. This suggests that academics still held a traditional conception of academic 
work with their focus on either teaching or research. The interview data indicates that 
the fourth main reason for some teaching fellows, and people responsible for 
teaching at department/school and faculty to do administrative jobs was because it 
was specified in their contract. There is evidence that administrative jobs were 
specified in the contract of five academic respondents. For example, a male professor 
in a medical related course confirmed that administrative jobs by academics were 
stated by the university contract: 
Yes, I think that is part of it (university contract). If you look at the criteria ... for 
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admission, it includes ... administration, so I think people take on administration 
when they feel they need to do so... for their promotion. (Respondent 40) 
All the above examples confirm that academic respondents in general were reluctant 
to do administrative jobs, although they normally found it hard to escape these jobs. 
Some faculty/departments had noticed academics' being over-burdened with 
administration, and that they began to take various measures to reduce this workload, 
such as employing more administrative staff to remove such responsibilities from 
academics, and reducing the teaching load of academics as compensation. One 
respondent interviewed even indicated that his/her Faculty planned to carry out a 
reform named `schoolification': 
... There is a discussion last year, at the 
faculty board meeting, ... whether or not, 
we should divide ... the 
Arts Faculty into different schools... in order to get ... rid 
of the administrative burden from ... the academics to more a centralized 
structure ... schoolification. 
(Respondent 51) 
However, it is too soon to tell whether the `schoolification' has reduced academics' 
administrative burdens or not. One reason is because the expansion of higher 
education has increased student numbers. The other reason, according to a senior 
administrator in academic staff development at the university, was because of 
university policy which adopted a much more managerial approach to administration 
more than ten years ago. As a result, this had made some administrators change their 
attitudes towards academics, and increased the administration loads of academics. 
This respondent argued that simply employing more administrative staff could not 
remove the administration load from academics: 
... It 
depends on employing the right people to be administrator, who is 
sympathetic to academic concerns and have enough knowledge and intelligence to 
do jobs that were done by academic staff before.... (Respondent 53) 
What respondent 53 implied was that the current management of the case study 
university has adopted a managerial style which places an emphasis on efficiency 
and had increased academics' administration load, but academics in general still 
preferred collegiality, so these differences in outlook had made academics resentful 
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of administrative jobs, in spite of the fact that they were expected to treat them as 
part of their normal work. 
Conclusion 
To summarize, this chapter has analyzed and described the respondents' working 
conditions in the case study university, revealing that most respondents found their 
workload heavy, and that it was difficult for them to balance teaching, research and 
administration. Three main reasons help explain this perception: there is too much 
teaching, too much research, and too much administration. Meanwhile, there is an 
indication that the managerial approach which is prevalent in the case study 
university may had changed the relationship between administrators and academics 
which in turn had adversely affected the workload of academics because academics 
would do more administrative jobs although they did not want to. 
The interview data suggests that because this case university is research intensive, 
the majority of respondents tended to become research-focused and preferred to 
spend most of their time either researching or teaching. Therefore, it had become a 
common practice for most respondents to treat administrative jobs as the least 
popular element of their work because it had brought them little benefit for their 
academic career development, except for a few individuals who had gained 
promotion as a result. However, the majority of respondents had to take on these jobs 
expected by their department and because these jobs were specified in their 
employment contract. 
In spite of the fact that most academic respondents had been treating quality 
assurance roles as administrative jobs which were perceived to have increased their 
workload, there was little indication that quality assurance tasks had become the 
main reason for the respondents' heavy workload, except those who had specific 
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quality assurance jobs in the department/school. Moreover, the case study indicates 
that academic respondents and manager-academic respondents held different view 
towards administrative jobs because academic respondents tended to perceive them 
as a burden, whilst one third of manager-academics felt that most administrative jobs 
were teaching or research related, and so academics should take on these tasks. 
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Chapter 8: Perceived Impact of Individual External Quality Assurance 
Mechanisms on the Work of Academics 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how four external quality assurance mechanisms (EQAMs) 
are perceived to have affected the work of respondents in the case study university. 
These mechanisms are the Quality Assurance Agency for higher education in 
England (QAA), external examining, 2005 National Student Survey (NSS), and 
professional, statutory, and regulatory bodies (PSRBs). The work of academics 
explored covers views about undergraduate classroom teaching practice, curriculum, 
and power relations between academic and students. This chapter first looks at how 
respondents perceived the QAA and what perceived impact the QAA has had on the 
work of academics, then explores accounts of the effect of the external examining 
system on respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching and the curriculum, 
revealing what respondents liked and disliked about the external examining system. 
Next, the chapter analyzes whether the NSS has affected the work of respondents. 
Finally, the chapter describes and analyzes the PSRBs, exploring their impact on 
undergraduate classroom teaching practice, curriculum, and power relations between 
academics and students. The chapter concludes with a comparison of respondents' 
attitudes towards these four external quality assurance mechanisms, revealing which 
mechanisms were most and least accepted by respondents and reasons for their 
acceptability. 
Section one: Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education in England 
(QAA) 
An analysis of the interview data demonstrates that 56 out of 64 respondents had 
some knowledge of the QAA, but the rest did not know about nor had heard of the 
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QAA. These 8 respondents came from different subject fields, 3 from the faculty of 
social science, 2 from a medical related course, and 3 from other faculties. This 
indicates that subject differences had little influence on respondents' knowledge of 
the QAA. However, there is evidence that academic respondents in their early 
academic career tended to know less about the QAA than respondents in late career. 
This is illustrated by the fact that 5 out of the 8 respondents who had no knowledge 
of the QAA had worked in the case study university less than 5 years. One 
explanation for these early career respondents' ignorance of the QAA was that they 
had been in the case study university for too short a time to have the chance to know 
about the QAA. As for the respondent who worked over 10 years in the case study 
university, their lack of knowledge of the QAA suggests that since the QAA stopped 
doing Subject Review, it becomes less invisible to academics, and that these 
respondents showed no/little interest in the activities of this body. 
Among the 56 respondents who had some knowledge of the QAA, 
manager-academic respondents in general knew more about the QAA than academic 
respondents, which suggests that respondents' rank of position might have influenced 
respondents' knowledge of the QAA to some degree. One reason for academic 
respondents' possessing less interest in the QAA is that their priority was either 
teaching or research, so they had less of a stake in quality assurance jobs and work 
related to the QAA. 
1.1 QAA as a double-edged sword 
Most respondents in my case study university perceived the QAA as a double - edged 
sword because it was important but with limitations. On the one hand, respondents 
articulated that the motives of the QAA were a good idea, particularly in that it made 
the university build up developmental structures which aimed to not only make 
academics understand and reflect about what they had done, but also ensure that 
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academics were performing well, so students could be assured of receiving a good 
education, especially when they began to pay top up fees in 2006. The interview data 
suggests that the QAA was perceived as important in four aspects: increasing 
awareness of good teaching among academics; providing an external opinion to 
ensure that universities and academics were performing well; comparing standards 
between universities; and helping future students choose universities. These views 
were not exclusive. Some respondents mentioned more than one aspect. 
1.1.1 Perceived importance of the QAA 
Nearly one third of respondents asserted that the QAA was important in increasing 
awareness of good teaching because it would force them to think hard about their 
practice. It thus helped respondents find faults in their teaching, especially when the 
respondents were research-focused. A male lecturer in an engineering department 
described the importance of the QAA as keeping academics on their toes to provide 
good teaching: 
I think it has made people ... think about their teaching.... 
And it would be naive 
to say that ... everything was perfect, 
because I don't think it was. ... 
1 think it 
keeps you on your toe, if you like. ... 
And I don't see anything wrong with that..., 
and 1 think it is a good idea. ... 
I don't think we are in the business of teaching 
our students, we are in the business of asking the students to learn from us,... 
and that is quite important distinction, but at the same time, ... we should make 
sure ... that the 
lecture we give all the way ... and we present the material as 
good as it can be. (Respondent 27) 
What respondent 27 suggested was that the QAA had made academics become more 
careful about what they taught. Similarly, fifteen other respondents asserted that the 
QAA was important in providing an outside view on programmes and honest 
suggestions to academics as a whole. For example, a female lecturer strongly argued 
for the importance of the QAA in providing academics with external views: 
Err, ... I think, we need it easy ... for university ... and people and perhaps, ... 
for people in the department, looking inwards ... somebody coming 
from 
outside ... look at the programme, and may see things we can't see ... 
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ourselves. ... I think it is essential. (Respondent 23) 
A female teaching fellow in a social science school shared a similar view and 
perceived the QAA as important in providing suggestions to academics as a whole: 
Yes, because they (QAA) are independent body... that can give you some ... 
honest 
... opinion, and advice and information... about your work. It doesn 1 
intend to do it ... 
for individual. It tends to do it, the teaching group, as a whole. 
(Respondent 48) 
Together with the perceived importance of the QAA in providing external views to 
academics as a whole, 9 respondents argued that the QAA was important because it 
enabled comparison of standards between universities. For example, a male lecturer's 
response illustrated this view: 
Well, it is important and we are all subject to ... peer review... from outside, 
rather than being internally regulated, so it gives... some sort of ... 
standardization between different universities, so you can compare to ... similar 
faculties and departments ... in different universities. (Respondent 36) 
Except for the perceived comparison of standards by the QAA, the fourth reason why 
respondents regarded the QAA as important was that its audit results could help 
future students to choose their university because good audit results would make the 
audited university well known to the public, including the students. 
1.1.2 Perceived limitation of the QAA 
In spite of the argument above that the QAA was important, the majority of 
respondents viewed the ability of the QAA to improve the quality of teaching within 
the case study university as limited. One perception among a quarter of respondents 
was that the QAA set such big agendas that it had become unrealistic about what it 
could achieve. One example is that the QAA requested universities to meet the 
requirement of its Code of Practice, but it ignored the fact that every university was 
different, so that the extent to which the university conformed to the Code was also 
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different. 
Another reason for the respondents' suspicion of the ability of the QAA in improving 
the quality of teaching was that its Institutional Audit was normally perceived as a 
fault finding exercise among academics, so audited academics, departments/schools, 
and universities were likely to conceal their mistakes and problems when audit 
occurred, which, as a result, limited the ability of the QAA to improve the quality of 
teaching. This perception, in the view of Power (1994; 1997), is that audit is a form 
of impression management because it focuses on files and checklists, therefore the 
institutionalized pressures exist for audit and inspection systems produce comfort 
and reassurance, rather than critique. Ten respondents in my case study university 
adopted defensive attitudes towards the QAA audit and perceived it as an event to get 
through. For example, a head of school of a science related course described the 
QAA audit process as jumping through a hoop: 
... If you will, it is a hoop to jump through the war to get over. It is not 
something that you would say that fantastic, and they come and nun, ... so the 
school is forced into a defensive position when they come to the quality 
assurance. (Respondent 15) 
What respondent 15 suggested was that it was hard for the QAA Institutional Audit 
to achieve satisfactory results because academics saw the process as about 
impression management. A female respondent with responsibility for quality 
assurance jobs shared a similar view and showed her concern that the inability of the 
audit to capture the normal working practice of academics might cause big problems 
in the end: 
The audit process itself, generally itself with QAA, or any other audit process, is 
very negative and it doesn't work. It makes differences and put it off the idea of 
quality assurance, because it makes them difficult. To be compliant to an audit, 
we have to do this and I have to do that. I don't see it is relevant.... If it wasn't 
quite such an aggressive approach, audit always work. I know the reasons 
behind it, but I think more people actually respond to it and be more willing to 
say: 'I have to shut it up under the carpet. We have got some problem and we 
don't tell you about it because it is something internal'. That sort of thing 
doesn't get done and when someone picks it up, by the time it will be a huge 
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problem. (Respondent 7) 
Aside from the concern that the QAA audit was really about impression management, 
the third reason for respondents' suspicion of the ability of the QAA to improve the 
quality of teaching was because a lot of respondents did not perceive the QAA 
assessors as peers. A manager-academic respondent explained that academics 
normally associated peer assessors of the QAA with those who could not do well in 
their academic career: 
Actually, why would someone choose to be a QAA assessor? In some cases, it 
would seem to be that they would really not be going somewhere with their 
academic career, so this is sort of a side line. They won't go to the top researcher, 
so they become a QAA assessor instead. It may be unfair but it was the 
perception. It was the sense that we were not been judged by ... people ... we 
would think of our peers, but judged either of the research centered university 
or people from another research-insensitive university, who would appreciate 
the particular issues to the particular programmes. We could be judged by 
people from sort of less research led universities. ... 
You know, it is one of the 
reasons many of my whole colleagues are unhappy with the whole process. You 
know, people are judging. It is supposed to be. There are peers and we can feel 
safe with their judgements. And actually was the opposite. Anyhow there are 
plenty of anecdotes of unprofessional behaviour.... (Respondent 5) 
It is obvious that respondent 5 had a strong prejudice against QAA assessors and 
regarded them as unprofessional. This prejudice helps to explain why respondents in 
general tended to treat the QAA as related to `paper work' rather than as assuring real 
quality. Except for the perception that the QAA assessors were not professional, 
about one third of respondents in the case study institution argued against the large 
amount of time and money spent in preparing for the QAA audit, because the audit 
had not produced much of a positive result but caused heavy burdens for academics. 
For example, a respondent with responsibilities for quality assurance work in a social 
science department was very critical of the administrative burden caused by the 
QAA: 
I am not opposed to QAA, I think how it functions ... can 
be extremely 
burdensome 
... and actually ironically, 
I think it can ... 
be anti- quality 
assurance, because if we have spent the amount of time ... we could also 
be 
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sitting around, we could spend this time preparing for our classes instead. And 
we do it more ... and more ... through the 
STUPID paper forms ... that nobody 
is going to look at. ... You 
know, it is just the admin, rather than sharing best 
practice, very hard get ... sharing 
best practice.... (Respondent 45) 
What respondent 45 argued for was that academics' time spent in preparing for the 
QAA could be used for improving teaching, which suggests that respondents 
perceived the QAA audit as unrelated to bringing about real benefits for the 
improvement of practice. This lends further support to the view that the QAA 
Institutional Audit is perceived as a kind of impression management among a quarter 
of respondents. 
1.2 Lack of perceived impact of Institutional Audit on the work of academics 
Together with the argument that the QAA Institutional Audit was impression 
management of the work of respondents, there is evidence that the majority of 
respondents did not perceive the impact of the audit on their undergraduate 
classroom teaching practice and curriculum as significant. One perception was that 
the `light touch' approach of Institutional Audit did not check teaching and the 
curriculum, so the audit had achieved little impact on these areas of actual practice. 
However, Subject Review, which happened before Institutional Audit was introduced, 
was perceived to have achieved great impact on the work of academics. One reason 
is that the respondents perceived Subject Review as a tight control over the work of 
academics as well as the higher education sector to look at a variety of issues, such as 
whether curriculum, resources, the pastoral care system, student teaching and 
learning, and the quality assurance mechanisms were in place. The tight control of 
Subject Review made respondents feel that it looked at their work and made them get 
involved in the assessment process, so respondents found Subject Review had 
achieved some impact on their work. 
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In contrast, respondents, in general, felt more relaxed about Institutional Audit when 
compared with Subject Review because they did not worry about being chosen to be 
assessed in this newer methodology. Although the Discipline Audit Trails (DATs) in 
the Institutional Audit in early 2000s were intended to look at the work of individual 
departments/schools, the use of trails had now been discontinued. Academics no 
longer needed to worry about being chosen and getting involved with the process of 
Institutional Audit. The end of DATs had resulted in respondents feeling less concern 
for or interest in Institutional Audit. However, Institutional Audit did mean that 
academics would be monitored and necessitated a degree of mental preparation. 
Even so, academics found it easier to ignore Institutional Audit. As a result, 
Institutional Audit did not actually reveal very much about how things were working 
in the case study university. Therefore there was a perception that the light touch of 
Institutional Audit produced minimal impact on the work of academics, in spite of 
the fact that most respondents preferred Institutional Audit to Subject Review 
because Institutional Audit had reduced their workload. 
Another reason for the perceived lack of impact of Institutional Audit on the work of 
respondents was because most respondents regarded Subject Review and 
Institutional Audit as a continuous long term process. The perceived impact of 
Subject Review was, by comparison, much greater although respondents found it 
hard to tell whether changes that had occurred were produced by Subject Review or 
by Institutional Audit. 
The interview data indicates that the third reason why Institutional Audit was 
perceived to have had limited impact on the work of academics was because about 
one fifth of respondents confused Institutional Audit with the internal review carried 
out by the case study university. There is an indication that respondents found it hard 
to distinguish the impact of Institutional Audit from that of the university internal 
review. For example, a deputy head of school in a social science department 
expressed his difficulty in distinguishing Departmental review from Institutional 
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Audit: 
Err, (long pause), I think it is really hard to reach a judgment on that, 
because 
... we 
had Subject Review in 2000, Departmental Review in 2005. You 
know, in a sense, it is a whole long going process and I think the most important 
of this is the Departmental Review and Institutional Audit came early and I 
can't distinguish these two in my mind. (Respondent 14) 
The above examples suggest that Institutional Audit of the QAA was perceived to 
have achieved little effect on the work of respondents. In order to explore the reasons 
for this lack of impact, I studied the code of practice of the QAA, which informs the 
Institutional Audit process, and relates closely to programme specification and 
subject benchmarking statements. The impact of these codes of practice on the work 
of academics is analyzed below. 
1.3 Impact of programme specification on the work of academics 
According to the QAA (2006b), programme specification is a description of the 
intended outcomes of learning from a higher education programme, and the means 
by which these outcomes are achieved and demonstrated. The QAA believes that the 
specification can help to make sure that designers of programmes are clear about the 
intended learning outcomes. However, the case study reveals that the majority of 
respondents perceived writing programme specifications as an artificial exercise and 
felt that this document was not a completely true reflection of what the programme 
was actually about. There was little evidence that the specification had had a great 
effect on respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching practice and curriculum 
because the specification only described what respondents already did in a slightly 
different form. 
Eleven respondents argued against the transferable skills required by the 
specification because they felt confused about what transferable skills were. For 
example, a respondent in charge of undergraduate studies in the faculty of arts was 
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critical of the transferable skills requirement and cast doubts on the appropriateness 
of these skills: 
The programme specification designed the form and emphasized the 
transferable skills. There is quite a debate within arts and humanities about how 
far we should be focusing on transferable skill, how far is our real job to teach. 
They developed a lot of extra skills. ... They do that but the argument is it is not 
our job to teach those skills, but it is still in the programme specification 
because what we do is to talk about the transferable skills and going to details. 
In some cases, it is slightly artificial.... (Respondent 5) 
What respondent 5 implied was that he and his colleagues did not consider teaching 
transferable skills as part of their jobs. Aside from the confusion about what 
transferable skills were, respondents were also sceptical of whom the specification 
was for. According to the QAA, the specification was expected to be useful to 
academics and students because it would make academics become clearer about their 
teaching aims and it would help students to choose their courses. However, the view 
of most respondents in the case study university was that programme specification 
was neither useful to academics nor to prospective students. A senior administrator in 
academic staff development articulated that the real effect of programme 
specification was to enable the university to bring together information that was 
previously dispersed: 
Originally programme specification was intended to be useful to students. And 1 
don i think they really fulfilled that role. They are useful in programme approval 
and validation, but I don't think they are particularly helpful for students, just 
departments give students much more detail about their programme. They are 
potentially useful to perspective students, parents and teachers, and we have to 
publish them on our website.... (Respondent 53) 
Respondent 53 suggests that progamme specifications did not fulfil their purpose in 
being useful to students. A further analysis of the interview data indicates that 
although the specification was intended to be useful to academics, it turned out that 
respondents who were not programme directors knew little about the specification 
because they were not required to write them. Moreover, there is little indication that 
most programme directors took the specification seriously, for example, five of them 
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considered writing the specification as an administrative burden. This suggests that 
programme specifications fail to fulfil their original intended purposes, and that 
respondents in general were not interested in the specification. According to a head 
of school of an engineering department, academics' lack of interest in programme 
specification was because the specification involved a lot of paper work: 
The programme specification required by the university is played at the bottom 
because they generally generating enormous amount of paper work and nobody 
read it. (Respondent 12) 
Although programme specifications were not popular among most respondents, four 
manager-academic respondents emphasized the importance of the specification. One 
of their arguments was that the specification forced academics to think about the 
content of programmes, and it highlighted areas which were important and 
interesting. For example, a respondent in charge of undergraduate studies in the 
faculty of social science argued for the importance of the specification: 
I think it is a useful exercise.... You look at the programme as a whole and say 
does this fit for this? Is it logical? And now the whole things thinking about the 
learning outcomes for most people have become what you now do, but five or 
six years ago it was completely impossible. It is useful in making people start 
from what we want students knowing. (Respondent 1) 
What respondent I implied was that programme specifications could make 
academics think more about students' learning outcomes. The interview data 
suggests that another perceived usefulness of the specification was that it made the 
curriculum coherent because when academics wrote the specification, they would 
think about how things came through the specification and how they should teach 
students. This view was shared by a couple of other respondents. In contrast, from 
most respondents' perspective, programme specification had no impact on the 
curriculum because it was built on curriculum. For example, a female programme 
director in a medical related course explained the relationship between the 
specification and the curriculum in the following terms: 
(Long pause) 1 think the way it worked in practice is people delivered the 
curriculum they want. And the programme specification is written ... to ... fit. 
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Sorry, I don't think it would really affect ... the curriculum. (Respondent 44) 
Respondent 44 implied that the curriculum came before the specification, so the 
specification could not affect the curriculum. This view was shared by the majority 
of respondents. After analysis of the programme specification, the section below 
looks at how subject benchmarking statements (SBSs) have affected the work of 
respondents because the SBSs together with the Framework for Higher Education 
Qualifications, programme specifications, and the QAA code of practice are a means 
of making explicit the nature and level of academic standards in English higher 
education (QAA, 2006b). 
1.4 Impact of subject benchmarking statements (SBSs) 
According to the QAA, all the national SBSs were written by groups of academics 
and other specialists from the relevant subject area. Although the QAA expected the 
individual academics to know about the SBSs, very few academic respondents in the 
case study university showed interest in knowing about the SBSs. Instead the 
majority of academic respondents perceived the SBSs as useful mainly to external 
examiners and to people who developed new programmes, and useful in programme 
validation and approval. 
However, manager-academics tended to show more interest in the SBSs and to have 
more knowledge of them than the academic respondents. This suggests that 
respondents' interest in the SBSs could be influenced by their level of seniority or 
position. For example, a senior administrator in academic staff development 
explained that it was because the manager-academic respondents would engage more 
with the SBSs than their academic colleagues: 
I think, if you become a programme director, or if you have a faculty role, then 
sometimes you might need to look at them, but 1 would think, not necessarily. 
Although I work with the Academic Infrastructure all the time, I don't expect 
academics to engage with it. (Respondent 53) 
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What respondent 53 implied was that the SBSs were not perceived as closely related 
to the work of academic respondents, so these respondents would ignore it easily. 
Respondents' lack of knowledge of and interest in the SBSs helps to explain why the 
impact of the SBSs on the work of academics was very limited. 
To conclude, section two reveals that respondents in general held mixed attitudes 
towards the QAA; and Institutional Audit, programme specification and subject 
benchmarking statements were perceived to have produced little impact on their 
work. However, the code of practice of the QAA suggests there are some other 
quality assurance mechanisms to assure the quality of teaching in the universities, for 
example, external examining, so section three is going to explore how respondents 
perceived the impact of external examining on their work. 
Section two: The external examining system 
According to Silver (1995), the external examining system is a major feature of 
higher education in the UK and a key mechanism to ensure that standards are 
maintained and comparable across higher education. Similarly, most respondents in 
the case study university perceived external examining as important in being part of 
their peer review system. These respondents held a perception that external 
examining was different from the QAA because of two main reasons. One is that the 
external examining system has a longer history than the QAA. The origin of external 
examining can be traced back to 1832, while the QAA was only set up in 1997. The 
longer history distinguished external examining from the QAA, so the majority of 
respondents perceived external examining as separate entities, instead of as part of 
the QAA, although the QAA includes external examining system as part of its code 
of practice. The other reason is that the external examining system is about review by 
peers while Institutional Audit was felt to involve academics for whom respondents 
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had less respect and regarded as less relevant or credible in evaluating their teaching 
practice. 
2.1 Respondents' preference for external examining 
Except for the perceived difference between external examining and the QAA, the 
majority of respondents in the case study university preferred external examining to 
the QAA. The main reason for this is that they perceived external examiners as 
subject specialists in the subject examined, so the respondents felt very confident 
with the suggestion of examiners for the further development and improvement of 
practice. In contrast, although the QAA used some subject specialists in its 
Institutional Audit, there were also people on the audit team who were not subject 
specialists, so there was a worry among respondents that non-specialists were 
examining specialist teaching. The second reason for respondents' preference for 
external examining was that the examiners were fellow academics, so respondents 
knew more about these examiners because they worked in the same subject fields. As 
a result, respondents felt more comfortable with the examiners' suggestion. For 
example, a female manager-academic respondent in a science department explained 
that there was an intimate relationship between external examiners and academics: 
We tend to know ... the external examiners.... they 
know us and ... they 
know the 
discipline, so it is kind of genuine intellectual engagement, rather than 
engagement that is more about ... the 
bureaucratic requirement of one sort or 
another.... (Respondent 46) 
Respondent 40 implied that external examiners had a great value to academics 
because the examiners were directly dealing with what academics did. In contrast, 
respondents perceived the QAA as slightly distant from them, partly because the 
QAA liked to pronounce on how academics should do things, which had made 
respondents become a bit defensive toward the QAA. For example, a quarter of 
respondents expressed the perception that the QAA process was a `snapshot'. A 
201 
female teaching fellow in a science department made this view explicit: 
1 think I would generally prefer the external examining... because external 
examiner gets closer ... to ... that particular 
department, and what ... they 
delivering. 
... They see over a 
long period of time. ... and there is a continuity 
for three years or four years ... while, 
QAA just come in as a snapshot.... 
(Respondent 47) 
Respondent 47 showed a preference for external examining and perceived the 
process of external examining as about a continuing relationship with an individual 
but treated the QAA process as an event to be tolerated. This confirms that 
respondents regarded the QAA as more distant than external examiners. Except for 
the perceived snapshot process of the QAA, it was felt that there were less time 
demands in preparing for external examining. This was the third reason for 
respondents' preference of external examining. For example, a male professor in an 
engineering department implied that dealing with the QAA was comparatively more 
time consuming than external examining: 
Because it (external examining) is a very low ... impact activity. It 
happens 
... 
once or twice a year. It is valuable ... and it takes zero amount of my time ... to 
prepare for them, additional time... Of course, I have external exam preparation, 
but there is no additional time.... The examiner is not going to expect me to pay 
a whole documentation preparation to ... read over above what 
I am already 
doing, so specifically very low impact, compared to that ... very 
high impact ... 
on physical time that QAA requires. (Respondent 39) 
The above comment indicates that the majority of respondents found external 
examining more important than the QAA. This confirms that respondents accepted 
external examining as a legitimate element of self-regulation as well as a traditional 
way to maintain and to compare the academic standards of undergraduate degrees 
and the quality of teaching, in spite of the fact that the external examining system has 
both benefits and problems which will be analyzed below. 
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2.2 Perceived benefits of external examining 
The interview data suggests that the most widely accepted view among respondents 
was that external examiners came from outside the university, so they provided an 
external view of what was going on, and they could spot faults in the work of 
academics more easily than academics working in the reviewed department. About 
one fifth of respondents, particularly the respondents in their early career, regarded 
external examining as a way to legitimize what they did because it could assure them 
that what they did was fair. This was also perceived as confidence inspiring because 
when external examiners were happy with what they were doing it meant a kind of 
approval of their work, which as a result would give respondents confidence in their 
teaching. 
Except for the confidence inspiring function, respondents perceived external 
examining as useful in the following three ways: providing insight into teaching and 
assessment; making suggestions which enabled departments to reflect; and keeping 
respondents in contact with academics in different universities. For example, a 
female lecturer in an art department argued for the importance of external examining, 
particularly in its role assuring the quality of programmes: 
I think it is very useful system ... particularly 
for 
... professional programme. 
It 
is an important external view of... what is happening.... It is the most important 
quality assurance aspect ... of the programme. 
And their comment is taken ... 
very seriously. They identify the problems which is not clear ... to the inside. 
They identify the weakness of student understanding ... etc. 
Their comments 
tend to be taken very seriously ... 
by the department, so they are more likely to 
have a ... 
big impact. (Respondent 32) 
A female lecturer in a medical related course shared a similar view and regarded 
external examining as a useful method: 
Pros: good method of ensuring fairness of marking, examinations etc. Good 
for academics to have feedback from someone outside the University, reassuring 
for students to know that the system is in place to ensure fairness, appropriate 
standards, etc. (Respondent 25) 
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What respondent 32 and respondent 25 implied was that external examining was 
perceived as an important element of peer review and as a way of benchmarking 
their standards against other institutions. Together with the perceived benefits of 
external examining, an analysis of the interview data indicates that there were also 
problems with the system. 
2.3 Perceived problems with external examining 
The main perceived problems with external examining among respondents were: 
examiners received too low a payment but a heavy workload; some examiners knew 
little of the reviewed department, so their comments were lacking in objectivity; the 
quality of external examiners varied; and it was difficult for external examiners to 
compare standards across the institutions. It is important to point out that although a 
lot of respondents were critical of the external examining system, none of these 
respondents denied the fact that external examining was important and useful to their 
work. 
2.3.1 Low payment and heavy workload of examiners 
The most frequently raised concern among respondents was that external examiners 
were paid little but their workload was heavy. This finding was similar with the 
argument of Hannan & Silver (2006) that external examiners had little pay and often 
received little or no support from their own institution for taking on examining 
activities. Nearly one third of respondents in the case study university showed a 
concern about the difficulties of getting good examiners if the university was 
unwilling to spend more time and money in supporting the external examining 
system. For example, respondent 59 was unique among those I interviewed in the 
extent of his criticism of the low payment of external examiners. He regarded this as 
an insult to academics: 
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Well, ok, as an external examiner, ... you are not paid enough. In fact, the 
payment is such insult ... that you 
don't spend time doing it.... (Respondent 59) 
Respondent 59's criticism of the external examining system was based on his 
personal experience. On a couple of occasions, this respondent refused to take on 
external examiner jobs because he felt that his work was not recognized by the low 
pay. The view that the pay for external examining was too low was shared by nearly 
half of the other respondents. For example, a manager-academic argued against 
paying external examiners so little. He was concerned that this would prevent good 
academics from becoming external examiners: 
I dislike the fact that we cannot pay the examiners more and I dislike the fact 
that people university wants are the most distinguished academics, but 
sometimes they are very busy, so you end up with people you perhaps are less 
happy with. (Respondent 4) 
Respondent 4 was worried that it might be difficult to obtain good examiners in the 
future. Together with the issue of low payment, the heavy workload of external 
examining was a concern of ten respondents. For example, a manager-academic 
confirmed that the workload of external examiners was heavy. He showed sympathy 
for this situation: 
The major problem is there is so much work. The integrity of the system rests on 
a small number of people doing an enormous amount of work. And they are 
being asked to do more and we can see why the university has introduced the 
reporting forms to try to get the external to give more comment and to give the 
right sorts of comments, but it is an extra burden on external examiners. And we 
get comments from a number of our different departments and they really resent 
this. Why do they have to do the extra stuff? Why do they have to try to fill in the 
form which isn't always helpful for them? (Respondent 5) 
Respondent 5 found that the job of external examining had become bureaucratically 
driven and blamed the case study university for the increased paper work. However, 
an analysis of the QAA documents reveals that paper work related to external 
examining might be due to the fact that external examining was included in the Code 
of Practice by the QAA, which has made external examining become a quality 
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assurance mechanism, so the university has to make sure that these requirements are 
adhered to. As a result, it produces more form filling, which made respondents 
perceive the workload of being an examiner as heavier. This finding is similar to that 
of Hannan & Silver (2006) that the increased bureaucratisation or formalisation of 
external examining was not accepted by academics and that it could reduce 
academics' motivation for undertaking the role of an examiner. 
2.3.2 Examiners' lack of knowledge of reviewed department 
Except for the perceived low payment and heavy workload of external examiners, the 
second frequently raised concern among respondents was that external examiners did 
not spend much time looking at the work of the reviewed department/school because 
they only stayed in the reviewed department/school a short time of period, often one 
day per year. For example, eighteen respondents cast doubts on external examiners' 
knowledge of the reviewed department/school. A male respondent doing a quality 
assurance job in a science department expressed his suspicion of the quality of the 
work of his examiners because they spent so little time examining students' work in 
his department/school: 
The other thing is ... external examiners... are 
just here ... 
for a couple of days or 
so.... They read sample of scripts ... and they see small group of students.... 
At 
the moment, it is very difficult for them, there is a small set of information 
and ... very small window ... on the 
department 
... they visit ... to make ... 
dramatic changes ... over 
how we should be ... 
doing things. It is very 
difficult 
... to read a 
few scripts to say: 'your marking system is completely 
wrong. You are being far too generous, or far too severe... for students and you 
need to be adding... 10% mark... and 20% mark ... to everybody to ... get up 
to ... acceptable standards. 
'That is a dramatic, very difficult thing for external 
examiner to do..., even if he or she may feel ... that the 
department is 
absolutely... a bit generous ... a 
little bit severe... over marking, (pause) so they 
are making ... 
fairly minor recommendations. (Respondent 63) 
It is evident that respondent 63 did not consider the comments made by the external 
examiners as convincing because they did not spend much time learning about the 
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department/school. Similarly, six other respondents expressed their doubts about the 
objectivity of examiners' comments about the reviewed department/school because 
they found a lot of departments in the case study university liked to choose their 
academic friends to be external examiners. One respondent described it as sort of 
human instinct to ask people whom they knew well and who they felt were 
sympathetic to their perspective. These six respondents expressed their worry that the 
departments might make the wrong choice because the people the department knew 
well might not be necessarily an appropriate or professional choice. For example, a 
male respondent doing quality assurance in a science department showed his concern 
that using an examiner lacking in the right qualifications would increase the 
workload of the reviewed department: 
If you picked up someone ... who is not very good ... and you can 
decide with 
them ... and some of them 
do have idiot criticism .... 
They want you to do 
things.... You have to ... 
formally respond to ... and you wish ... they 
keep their 
mouth ... shut about .... It is not that you 
hide something, just that ... you think 
that they are wrong. (Respondent 60) 
What respondent 60 implied that some external examiners might not be necessarily 
that well qualified to undertake the role. This suggests that the quality of external 
examiners in the case study university was perceived as varied. 
2.3.3 Variable quality of external examiners 
An analysis of the interview data reveals that about one sixth of respondents found 
the quality of their examiners varied. One example is that these examiners did not 
think broadly when they made suggestions to the reviewed department/school. For 
example, a head of school of a medical related course revealed that some external 
examiners did not understand what they were supposed to do: 
The cons are that, err... the external examiners do not always understand what 
it is they are supposed to do, so they come up with spare suggestions. The 
problem is that the area they haven't read it brief, so they get a balcony of 
information from the university, never looked at it, and the feedback they give 
through the form is sometimes inappropriate. (Respondent 13) 
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Respondent 13 questioned the ability of the external examiners in general, and 
perceived the quality of external examiners as poor. Twelve other respondents shared 
a similar view and expressed their concern that since the quality of external 
examiners varied, it was important to make the external examining process more 
valid. Otherwise, it would become little more than a box ticking exercise. However, 
Hannan & Silver (2006) reveal that academics are generally resistant to attempts to 
make external examining more formal in function and they oppose attempts to 
impose a national system of training. This suggests that how to make the external 
examining process satisfactory is a debate as well as a long standing process among 
academics. 
2.3.4 Difficulty in comparing standards across institutions 
Except for the suspicion of respondents about the quality of external examiners, ten 
respondents cast doubts on the feasibility of external examining comparing standards 
across institutions. For example, a respondent in charge of undergraduate studies in 
the faculty of arts argued that it was not possible for external examiners to compare 
standards across institutions: 
The system (external examining) is supposed to mean every degree in each 
institution is the same. Everybody knows that it is not true.... (Respondent 5) 
Among the ten respondents who doubted the comparability, there was a perception 
that although external examining was expected to compare standards at the subject 
level, it was actually used to provide assurance for students, funding councils and 
higher education institutions. For example, a male respondent doing a quality 
assurance job in a science department made this view explicit: 
Err, (long pause) I think, you have to have, some sort of... comparison... 
between 
... those at the subject level .... Provide reassurance, ... 
for students... 
and for those to ... 
fund them and for their families as well... that ... standards 
are similar..., but there are two ... obvious ... weaknesses. That is ... that 
universities ... tend to 
draw 
... their external examiner ... 
from other 
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universities that they know... are fairly ... similar to themselves, so... there isn't 
great ability ... for the external examiner ... to say: 'you need to change ... what 
you are doing... because they come and start with ... very similar sorts of 
institutions. (Respondent 63) 
What respondent 63 implied was that he and his colleagues doubted the ability of 
external examiners to be able to perform their traditional role in comparing standards 
across institutions. Instead they were beginning to perceive external examining as a 
quality assurance mechanism used to assure the public that the university was 
providing good quality teaching to students. 
2.4 Effect of external examining on the work of academics 
In spite of the above arguments that the external examining had disadvantages, there 
is evidence that the examining system was perceived as useful in a variety of ways, 
such as checking and giving suggestions on exam papers, giving academics feedback 
to develop programmes, making recommendations for the way teaching practices or 
courses could be modified, pointing out things about procedures, rules, and the 
content of the course, and providing suggestions on degree assessment. It is evident 
that the perceived usefulness is related to checking examination papers and 
examination procedures. However, there was little evidence that external examining 
was perceived to have improved respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching 
practice and curriculum partly because of the fact that external examiners in general 
liked to assure academics that they already doing a satisfactory job, instead of 
making criticisms of their work. For example, a head of school in an arts department 
confirmed this view and revealed that the effect of external examining mainly fell on 
examinations: 
... It 
(external examining) affected the individual exam outcome and so forth. As 
to the work of academics and curriculum, it has little bit, but it could do more, 
because mainly it is satisfactory with what we are doing. There is something 
potential of being affective for changing what we do. (Respondent 11) 
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In spite of the limited impact of external examining in making recommendations on 
examinations and assessments, most respondents showed support for this system 
because they perceived external examining as providing them with an external 
perspective. A couple of respondents described external examining as keeping 
academics `on their toes'. A male professor in an engineering department for 
example, strongly argued in favour of the value of external examining: 
I think the external examiner do play a valuable role, just ... to keep people on 
their toes ... to make sure that we do expect that. The external examiner board 
meetings will... give an overview of the course, and say: ' in this course field, 
this is and ... 'I look at the marking and say this course 
didn't do well and... the 
last year hasn't do well, what are you doing to increase that?. (pause) So they 
can keep people on their toes about things. (Respondent 39) 
It is worth pointing out that in the analysis of the external examining system, 
respondents' experience as external examiners were taken into consideration. 10 out 
of 64 respondents had got external examiner experience, but there is little evidence 
that their experience had greatly influenced their perception of the external 
examining system. Only 5 of these 10 respondents asserted that they learned 
something useful from being external examiners, such as, bringing back examples of 
good practice in another institution, getting good teaching ideas and assessment ideas. 
The other 5 respondents expressed that they did not gain a great deal from being an 
external examiner. However, a lot of respondents showed strong interest in being 
external examiners because it was perceived as a mark of esteem and it would 
contribute to their career development. This is similar to the finding of Hannan & 
Silver (2006) that academics are motivated to be external examiners because taking 
on this role is perceived as part of professional or career development. 
To conclude, section 3 reveals that external examining was perceived as a useful 
supportive system but with space to be improved. Except for external examining, the 
National Student Survey (NSS) is used as another external quality assurance 
mechanism to assure the quality of teaching in the case study university. The section 
below analyzes how the 2005 NSS had affected the work of respondents. 
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Section three: The 2005 National Student Survey (NSS) 
The NSS is a national initiative across all publicly-funded higher education 
institutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It began in 2005 and analyses 
subject and programme level data from final year undergraduates. According to 
HEFCE (2006a), the NSS aims to gather feedback on the quality of students' courses, 
helps inform the choices of future applicants to higher education, and contributes to 
public accountability. Results from the NSS are regarded by the HEFCE as an 
essential element of the revised quality assurance framework for higher education. 
This section first explores how much respondents in the case study university knew 
about this survey and then analyzes whether this survey was believed to have 
affected the work of respondents. 
3.1 Respondents' knowledge of NSS 
The interview data suggests that the majority of academic respondents below the 
level of department/school management knew little about the survey, but the head of 
school/department, and people in charge of undergraduate studies within the faculties, 
and directors of quality assurance at the faculty level were keenly aware of this 
survey. Although there was some feedback to front-line academic staff through the 
system of annual programme review where the results of the NSS were taken into 
account, respondents in general found it very hard to team anything from the survey. 
Academic respondents' lack of knowledge of the NSS was different from the 
expectation of senior manager-academics that departments/schools would take the 
survey seriously. For example, a senior administrator responsible for academic staff 
development in the case study university expressed her shock after learning that a 
department/school within my sample did not take the survey seriously because she 
had sent every department/school a copy of the survey results, including data with 
students' comments. 
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The main reason why the survey was not taken seriously by departments/schools was 
that nearly half of respondents had no interest in the survey because their 
department/school had their own student course evaluation instruments in place 
which were perceived as more closely related to their teaching. For example, a head 
of school confirmed that he only circulated the survey result, but did not discuss it in 
his department because no one showed interest in it: 
I think I circulated the results by email ... and we 
didn't discuss the outcome. I 
just reported and I didn't discuss it with my colleagues. I didn't think they would 
be interested. (laughter) (Respondent 11) 
What respondent 11 implied was that the NSS was not perceived as closely related 
with the courses that individual academics taught although it might be more relevant 
to the institution as a whole. Here, the relevant point is if the university was seen to 
do badly in the survey, it would affect its recruitment. Seven other respondents 
shared a similar view and perceived the NSS as more about how the departments 
organized the tutorial system to give proper development to students and how 
departments organized the provision of feedback. For example, a head of school 
made this view explicit: 
Err,... I don't think it will affect teaching. I think it will affect organization. It 
will improve organization and specifically the issues are around organizations. 
The teaching itself is not a fault. And the content of the course is not an issue. It 
is people turning up on time and students understanding what is happening in 
the timetable, these kinds of organization issues are the main problems. 
(Respondent 13) 
The view that the NSS was mainly for the institutional system suggests that it was 
considered as distant from the real work of individual academic teaching, which as a 
result made academics show little interest in it. Therefore it is hard to tell whether the 
NSS can fulfill its purpose in informing the choices of future applicants to higher 
education or not. 
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3.2 Perceived impact of NSS on work of respondents 
The interview data suggests that the majority of respondents not only had little 
knowledge of the NSS but perceived the impact of the survey on the curriculum and 
their undergraduate classroom teaching practice as limited because they perceived 
the NSS as distant from their individual teaching. Many respondents asserted that the 
survey would not make them take teaching more seriously in future if its methods 
remained flawed because teaching could only be affected by the individual quality of 
academics, the internal standards of the department, student feedback, and peer 
review. 
Although the NSS in general was perceived as having little impact on undergraduate 
classroom teaching practice, five manager-academics argued that the NSS had the 
potential to influence undergraduate classroom teaching practice in the future. One 
argument is that the NSS could encourage universities to request new lecturers to 
take training courses which, as a result, would influence academics' teaching. The 
other argument was that the NSS would make academic respondents become more 
careful with evaluation of their courses to make sure that they did well in their 
evaluations, which as a result would improve respondents' teaching. 
A further analysis of the interview data suggests that most respondents did not think 
the NSS would change the power relations between academics and students. 
However, a couple of respondents argued that the survey had the potential to make 
the relationship between academics and students more formal, particularly in terms 
of the regularity of meetings and consistency of what was delivered in the tutorials. 
3.3 Perceived flawed methods of NSS 
The interview data suggests that the perceived limited impact of the NSS on the work 
of respondents was related to flawed methodology of the survey. The majority of 
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respondents were critical of the way the survey was organized, the way it was run 
and the poor quality of data it collected. Many respondents perceived the sample as 
very small when the survey result was broken down at the programme level. They 
argued that the small sample size made it hard for them to tell whether the result was 
statistically significant or not. For example, a male respondent in a science 
department argued against the low response rate of the survey: 
Generally speaking, ... the survey is not useful, 
(pause) because the response 
rate is ... so 
low, and also, ... one of the problems ... we 
had at the discipline ..., 
so at the macro level, the result of the student survey isn't very useful to its. 
(Respondent 54) 
Another criticism of the NSS was that some questions in the survey were too generic 
to identify problems in the courses. For example, a head of school in a medical 
related course illustrated that the survey questions were inappropriate: 
This survey comes back with really damning criticism. One has to remember 
that the NSS there are a number of problems with it. One thing is the questions 
are not ideal. ... You know you are inviting to answer it, so that is wrong, so 
there is a problem of the survey. Another issue is there is a small percentage of 
class involved in the survey and how accurate is the information survey going to 
bring back. (Respondent 13) 
The perceived flaws in the survey had caused respondents to question the validity of 
the survey results. For example, a respondent in charge of undergraduate studies in 
the faculty of arts expressed doubts about the validity of the NSS: 
... I think (long pause), I think there are a lot of problems with the way the NSS 
was carried out. There are a lot of uncertainties of whether the results are 
reliable, or what they actually mean. In some cases, the result is quite out of 
step with other evidence, so I think if we get the second year result. They are 
basically the same, then we might have a bit more confidence in them and start 
to think about how to respond. (Respondent 5) 
What respondent 5 implied was that respondents were sceptical of the methods of the 
survey, so they did not accept its data as valid. The interview data suggests that 
another reason for many respondents' suspicion of the validity of the NSS was 
because the data from the survey did not always relate to just one department. 
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Sometimes it was for two different departments, which made it difficult for 
respondents to distinguish their department's result from that of another department. 
For example, a deputy head of school in a social science department argued that he 
found it difficult to distinguish the results of two different departments: 
Well, the reason is that ... they didn't distinguish between the two degrees. The 
whole thing is so flawed and it can go to the bin as I am concerned. ... If 1 am 
an economic and politics students, I might think that the feedback in economics 
is just fantastic, but politics isn't so good, but they say taking your programme 
as a whole, I might say: 'well, I will balance it out. 'that would be uninformative, 
so flawed, it would be no use, because all it tells me is students make 
cumbersome judgements between the two departments.... (Respondent 14) 
The above examples suggest that respondents in general were critical of the survey 
which they regarded as flawed. This accounts for why the impact of the NSS on the 
work of academics was perceived as limited. Other than the NSS, the QAA, and the 
external examining system, the professional, statutory and regulatory bodies (PSRBs) 
were studied because the case study university offers some vocationally orientated 
degrees which engage with a wide range of PSRBs to accredit the curriculum. 
Section four: Professional, statutory and regulatory bodies (PSRBs) 
The interview data found that of the seven departments/schools in the research 
sample three vocationally oriented awards existed. For reasons of anonymity, the 
names of these professional bodies are concealed, but their impact on the curriculum 
and on respondents' undergraduate teaching will be analyzed below. 
4.1 Perceived effect of PSRB on curriculum and teaching 
Nearly all the respondents whose courses offered vocationally orientated degrees 
pointed out that professional bodies had a significant influence on their curriculum 
and teaching because these bodies told academics what to teach and how they should 
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assess. In other words, these bodies were perceived as important in providing them 
with knowledge which controlled the curriculum, so academics had to map the 
requirement against the criteria of the relevant PSRB. Many respondents used the 
word `control' to describe the relationship between their degree and the professional 
bodies. For example, a head of school and programme director of a computer course 
illustrated the nature of this control operated by professional bodies: 
(long pause) Well, ... the fact of the British Computer Society, particularly, the 
professional body generally was, before I arrived at the university is being to 
put pressures on some specific topics in the curriculum and these tended to be 
things they saw from the point of view of sort of main use of computers and ... 
they also put pressure on sort of things they would do with and we would call it 
transferable skills and the effect of that .... (Respondent 12) 
Respondent 12 felt that the professional bodies exercised considerable control over 
his degrees. The interview data suggests that although the PSRB was perceived to 
have a significant influence on curriculum and respondents' undergraduate classroom 
teaching practice, there were something that the PSRB respondents disliked about the 
way they operated. 
4.2 Disadvantages of PSRB 
One perceived disadvantage of the professional body was that it duplicated the work 
of respondents in vocationally related degrees. Five respondents shared this view. 
One female lecturer called it a kind of repetition of what they had done: 
Tedious. It duplicated ... a 
lot of the university work, except on different paper 
work... you can't just replicate it twice. You have to ... write in 
different ways, 
because they are d/erent bodies. (Respondent 20) 
In addition to the perceived duplication of respondent's work, three respondents 
perceived some PSRB requirements as out of date. For example, a male professor 
was very critical of his professional body because he regarded some of its 
requirements as unprofessional: 
You are not going to have a job if you are not accredited by (x). ... What they 
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require for the accreditation ... 
is 
... a 
huge amount of effort, plus ... a 
lot of 
time that they have got their own view of the world.... For example, they think 
the database is an important subject because ... say the vast majority of people 
on the panel happened to have a background on that subject ... when they come 
to the department and see there is no data base and say how could we accredit 
the scores... see it is rubbish. You know, every department can't teach every 
course. And you have got to look at teaching whether that provides good 
standards of education. ... 
Not pay attention to your favorite subject that is 
accredited. (pause) That is same thing, when you take people from different 
background and they have certain expectations. ... 
And even they meant to be 
fair, and no one is that fair. (Respondent 39) 
One reason why respondent 39 perceived the requirement of the professional body as 
outdated was because this is a fast developing subject area. As a result, it might be 
difficult for the PSRB in question to include all the changes in its specification. The 
interview data suggests that another perceived disadvantage of the PSRBs among 
two respondents was that sometimes the requirements from the university and those 
from the PSRBs were different, which made respondents become confused about 
what to do. For example, a female lecturer gave an example to illustrate this 
perceived disadvantage: 
Well, I suppose many professional bodies are very strongly influenced ... at the 
moment by what they call the voice of the service user. Here we are not talking 
about students. We are talking about ... clients 
in social services. Children, 
families, disabled people, people from minority groups. And ... they want a 
strong influence on the training. ... and social workers are 
heavily involved, 
which may not be ... the university would 
like. (Pause) it is again, the shift way 
from 
... the theoretical to ... practical 
(respondent 20) 
What respondent 20 implied was that the specification of the professional bodies 
would be influenced by their stakeholders. The specification sometimes might be 
different from what the case study university expected, so the lack of harmonious 
interaction between universities and the professional bodies confused respondents. 
217 
Conclusion 
To sum up, this chapter has described and analyzed how four external quality 
assurance mechanisms were perceived to have affected the work of academics. There 
is some indication that respondents in general held mixed views towards these 
mechanisms. Take the QAA for example, respondents perceived the QAA as an 
unwelcome external interference with their work. Most respondents were suspicious 
of the ability of the QAA to maintain and improve the quality of teaching and the 
curriculum. However, there was another perception among respondents that the QAA 
was important in keeping academics on their toes, which as a result would increase 
their awareness of good teaching because not all such practice was currently good. 
These mixed views suggest that respondents perceived the QAA as important but 
with limitations. 
The interview data further reveals that respondents held different attitudes towards 
these external mechanisms. The majority of respondents perceived external 
examining as important and professional. They preferred external examining to the 
QAA, in spite of the perceived flaws of the external examining system, such as, the 
varied quality of external examiners, and the lack of objectivity of some examiners. 
There were two main reasons for this preference. One was that respondents perceived 
external examining as peer review. The other reason was that external examining did 
not increase the workload of most respondents. 
There is an indication that although many respondents knew about the QAA, the 
impact of the QAA Institutional Audit on their work was perceived as insignificant 
because the retreat of the QAA from Subject Review into Institutional Audit had 
made them adopt a more relaxed attitude. Most respondents, except for the 
manager-academic respondents, did not need to get involved in the audit, and they 
were no longer worried about being chosen in the Institutional Audit, so they showed 
little interest in it. The interview data also suggests that some respondents showed 
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resistance to the Institutional Audit itself. The resistance could be related to the QAA 
abandoning the Subject Review method which was perceived to have significantly 
increased academics' workload. Therefore the QAA changed its audit methods and 
moved from Subject Review to Institutional Audit. However, this case study reveals 
that although Institutional Audit did not increase most respondents' workload as the 
Subject Review did, many respondents felt free to ignore Institutional Audit because 
of their lack of involvement in the audit process. 
An analysis of the interview data suggests that the NSS was the least well accepted 
external quality assurance mechanism among respondents. Many respondents knew 
little of the survey and showed no interest in knowing about it because it was 
perceived to have flawed methods and because there was a perception that the NSS 
had nothing to do with individual academics' teaching and was only for use at the 
institutional level. For example, a negative survey result might affect the university's 
recruitment. In contrast, the professional bodies were perceived as the most 
important external quality assurance mechanism because it prescribed teaching 
content and curriculum where departments/schools had vocationally orientated 
degrees. There is a perception among respondents that the professional body is 
important in controlling their curriculum and their undergraduate teaching. This 
finding suggests that respondents were more likely to feel the impact of the quality 
assurance mechanisms when the mechanisms got involved with their work. 
A further analysis of the interview data suggests that the respondents' position had 
influenced their knowledge of the quality assurance mechanisms. One example is 
that manager-academics knew more of the QAA and the NSS than academic 
respondents. One explanation is that these manager-academics had jobs that might be 
quality assurance related, so they knew more about these mechanisms. Meanwhile, 
there is an indication that manager-academics were more likely to emphasize the 
potential effect of the QAA and the NSS on the work of academics than their 
academic colleagues. The positive attitude of these manager-academics towards the 
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QAA and the NSS suggests that when managers were required to help implement 
these mechanisms, they tended to assure the outsiders that these mechanisms were 
important and useful. 
However, there is little indication that respondents' rank of position had influenced 
their knowledge of the external examining system because respondents in general 
perceived it as peer review, and regarded suggestions made by external examiners as 
professional. This confirms that academics normally regard external examiners as 
subject specialists (Hannan & Silver, 2006), and perceived the external examining 
system as an important feature of UK higher education (Silver, 1995). In general 
respondents' positive perception towards the external quality assurance mechanisms 
depends on whether these mechanisms were perceived as teaching related or not. If 
the mechanism was teaching related, respondents were more likely to perceive it as 
important and useful. Otherwise respondents would perceive the mechanism as 
distant from their work and showed little interest in it and these mechanisms would 
be perceived as having little impact on their work. 
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Chapter 9: Perceived Impact of Internal Quality Assurance Mechanisms on 
Work of Academics 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined how external quality assurance mechanisms 
(EQAMs) were perceived to have affected the work of respondents in the case study 
university. Together with the external mechanisms, the case study university uses a 
range of internal quality assurance mechanisms to assure and to enhance the quality 
and standards of its programmes because one feature of an audit culture is a belief 
that effective regulation is possible and capable of `reaching into the inner motives of 
target organizations' (Power, 1997, p. 54). Auditee organizations, Power argues, 
develop their own internal systems of control. The external audit process 
concentrates on these controls. Similarly, in the case study university, the learning 
and teaching committee oversees quality assurance, but the devolved responsibility 
for assuring and enhancing the quality of teaching and programmes is carried out 
through internal quality assurance mechanisms within the departments/schools and 
faculties. This chapter thus looks at how these mechanisms have affected the work of 
academics. The mechanisms examined include student course evaluation, peer 
observation, annual programe review, and the approval system for new and revised 
programmes and units. The sequence of these mechanisms in this chapter is arranged 
according to their perceived importance to the work of respondents which covers 
undergraduate classroom teaching practice, the development of the curriculum. 
Power relations between academic and students are also considered. 
This chapter first looks at how student course evaluation has changed respondents' 
teaching and curriculum practice, revealing how the evaluation has affected the 
perceived power relations between academics and students. The chapter then 
explores respondents' perception of peer observation, aiming to reveal whether the 
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observation was seen to have improved respondents' undergraduate classroom 
teaching practice. Next, the chapter examines the impact of the annual programme 
review and approval system for new and revised programmes and units both for 
undergraduate classroom teaching practice and the formal curriculum. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with respondents' general perceptions of these internal quality 
assurance mechanisms, suggesting which mechanism was most widely accepted 
among respondents, and the reasons for its popularity. 
Section one: Impact of student course evaluation on teaching 
Student course evaluation in the case study university was normally given at the end 
of each unit and was collected by academics or support staff. There was not one 
single form of evaluation that was used in every department. The seven 
departments/schools in the research sample had slightly different approaches and 
different forms. For example, two departments were particularly interested in having 
numerical data which they analyzed after students gave grades for every aspect of the 
lecturer's performance. They did calculations of the average grade per lecture or per 
unit. In contrast, the other five departments/schools found the numerical data less 
helpful and preferred to collect students' qualitative views about the course. 
1.1 Drivers of student course evaluation 
In spite of the different attitudes held by departments/schools towards student course 
evaluation data, respondents in general agreed that the evaluation was taken seriously 
by their departments/schools and that there were two drivers for this process: quality 
audit and the promotion system for academics. There is a popular view among 
respondents that if the university/school wanted to make money from students, they 
had to design courses that would attract students, especially the international students. 
One perceived important way to attract students was to publish the audit result which 
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could give the public, including potential students, an idea of whether the quality of 
the university they were interested in was good or not. There is an indication that 
respondents in computer course and in medical related courses were more likely to 
emphasize the importance of this `marketisation' of higher education rather than 
respondents from other subject areas, partly because student application in these two 
subjects were relatively higher than the other subjects researched. For example, a 
male teaching fellow in a medical related course emphasized the importance of 
quality audit: 
Err, ... if the students aren't 
happy with the course, ... and they are going to say 
back to other students, the xxx school like each other, wants to get the best 
students onto the course, ... and there is a 
lot of money ... to make on the 
students, so the ... university that tries to play catch up to 
design the courses, ... 
the students are going to be interested in.... and keep them happy with. I think 
there are a lot of students'... input in the design of the courses.... (Respondent 
52) 
Respondent 52 took the needs for students' opinion into consideration with the 
requirement of quality audit. This view was supported by the majority of respondents 
who perceived student course evaluation as an important quality assurance 
mechanism adopted by their departments to demonstrate to anyone external to the 
institution that they had good teaching quality. 
About one third of respondents in different subjects and from different levels of 
seniority argued that the other driver of student course evaluation was that the 
evaluation result would influence academics' promotion to some degree, although the 
promotion is mainly affected by other factors, notably their research performance. 
For example, a director of undergraduate teaching in a social science related 
department said that his department used the evaluation to assess lecturers' 
performance. 
... In this 
department, some new member of staff arrived and give a series of 
lectures which are not well received maybe they have been teaching in different 
countries. What we do is to see the comments and the scores improved over the 
next couple of years. We have got some very good examples of that. Not 
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dumbing down, not sympathetic ... but dumbing down the way the lecture was 
delivered. (Respondent 8) 
Respondent 8 associated student evaluation with academic evaluation. This suggests 
that when the evaluation was perceived to influence academics' promotion, it would 
make respondents feel pressurised in undertaking the evaluation because they had to 
spend a lot more time generating paper work to demonstrate that their teaching was 
good. Therefore respondents felt demoralized and burdened by the evaluation. 
1.2 Perceived effect of student course evaluation on teaching 
Although respondents in general perceived student course evaluation as quality audit 
and related to academic promotion, the majority of them regarded the evaluation as a 
useful practice in improving their undergraduate classroom teaching practice because 
the evaluation provided them with a way of seeing what students liked and what they 
disliked. Most respondents asserted that if the students pointed out that an aspect of 
their teaching was not satisfactory, they would consider whether the student 
perception was valid or not, and then moderate some aspects of their teaching. 
An analysis of the interview data indicates that what respondents found the 
evaluation most useful for was to force them become clearer in what they were trying 
to achieve in the unit and to remind them of their shortcomings. As a result they 
make it clear to the students that what they were delivering would be improved and 
would take the students' needs and interests into consideration in the process. Forty 
out of sixty four respondents in different subject areas asserted that they had changed 
their teaching methods and their teaching content due to student evaluation. What 
these respondents normally did was to look at what they taught last time and then 
made changes to this material. One common example of a change mentioned was 
when a lecturer changed the course textbook which was considered as difficult by 
students. Four respondents in the faculty of social science articulated that they 
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changed their textbooks due to student evaluation. For example, a female lecturer 
made this view explicit: 
I think it is taken quite seriously. The most practical matter, one case that for the 
unit taught, there is indication that textbook was difficult, ... so I quite agreed 
with the comments, so I made a change of the textbook. (Respondent 22) 
Respondent 22 further argued that she not only changed her textbook but also 
changed her way of giving students handouts, for example, she started to give 
students handout far in advance of her lecture: 
That is the same for the lecture notes.... 1 always pass to them three days in 
advance. While... in the past, it would only pass to them ... the 
day before, or 
even the morning, before giving the lecture in the afternoon.... (Respondent 22) 
The interview data reveals that respondents not only gave students handouts in 
advance, but also began to provide students with more handouts which had become a 
common practice among the majority of respondents. There is also evidence that the 
majority of respondents used new technology after the evaluation, such as 
Powerpoint and Blackboard. For example, a respondent in charge of quality 
assurance in the faculty of science illustrated that student course evaluation enabled 
her to use new technology to benefit learning: 
Well, 
... 
I provide a way of much more handout and much more in the way of 
detailed, set of outlines of each class, right at the beginning of the session and 
handing them at the beginning of each session, the use of technology and use of 
Powerpoint and things that totally improves learning. I think Blackboard has 
grown up as a result of student pressure, but I haven't come to use Blackboard. 
(Respondent 9) 
Except for the use of new technology, the majority of respondents said they were 
willing to change their lecture topics to meet the needs of students. For example, a 
female lecturer in a social science department argued that student course evaluation 
changed her way to address topics in class: 
... Sometimes, it (student course evaluation) is really useful, 
for example, 
students might think of the topic that they ... really like to cover in this 
course. ... You teach course work on real politics and ... a 
bunch of students 
say: 'I really think we should cover this topic and ... we haven't covered that'.... 
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Oh, we think: ' That is a good topic and ... we could include that, you know, so 
that kind of thing ... I think is really useful. (Respondent 21) 
The above examples suggest that student course evaluation was perceived as useful 
in improving the ways respondents presented information and the content of lectures. 
This confirms that although not all the respondents took much notice of student 
course evaluation, the evaluation was actually perceived as useful among the 
majority of respondents and the evaluation had affected respondents' teaching to 
some degree. This finding corresponds well with the view of Wilson et al (1997) that 
student course evaluation is a valid, reliable and useful indicator of teaching quality 
because it provides crucial information about the quality of courses. After the 
analysis of the impact of student course evaluation on teaching, the section below 
will analyze respondent's perceptions of whether the evaluation had changed the 
power relationship between academics and students. 
1.3 Impact of evaluation on power relation between academics and students 
The power relations between academics and students was raised and discussed by 
Macfarlane (2004a). He argued that academics possess a considerable degree of 
power over students because of the power of assessment which places academics in a 
unique position to influence the class of degree a student receives and, often in 
consequence, their future career prospects. Similar findings appeared in my case 
study. Two thirds of respondents believed that academics had power over students 
because academics knew more about the subjects, and because academics were in 
charge of the teaching content and the marking. 
However, respondents held various views on whether student course evaluation had 
changed the power relations between academics and students. Nearly two thirds of 
respondents did not think the students' power was strengthened because academics 
still had the power over students in spite of all the evaluation processes, but they 
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pointed out that academics were becoming more responsive to the needs of students 
due to the evaluation, especially in providing more handouts and making changes to 
their units (see section 2.2 of this chapter). In contrast, the other one third of 
respondents argued that the power relations between academics and students would 
change in the future, maybe towards becoming more equal, but the change might 
take a long time. For example, a senior lecturer in a social science department argued 
that the relationship between academics and students was changing but slowly: 
Well, I think it (change of power relationship between academic and students) is 
hard to tell. Over the year, students have more feel about ... what to control 
what happens. They feel that ... they want to get value 
for money. And I think we 
are taking more notice ... of what the students say now than we used to. 
It is just 
a long term trend. ... 
I don 't think it makes individual changes. We used to say: ' 
we know best and we don't need you tell what to do. 'and we are in control.... 
You do what we tell you. Now, it is quite a long way, ... the other way around. 
(Respondent 21) 
A further analysis of the interview data reveals that respondents held different 
attitudes towards this potentially changed power relation. One third of respondents 
perceived it as important in weeding out bad teaching practices. For example, a 
female lecturer in an art department argued that academics would feel obliged to 
improve their teaching due to the pressure of evaluation: 
Err, .., 
for example, 1 have seen ... students complaining 
bitterly 
... year on 
year ... about a certain 
lecturer, who give terrible lectures. And nothing 
happened.... I think in future, they will be able to, say: 'look, something has to 
happen. '... I think their view is less likely to be ignored. (Respondent 56) 
However, the other two thirds of respondents argued that if the power relation 
between academics and students changed in favor of students, it would make 
academics more accountable and would make students more demanding in terms of 
their relationship with lecturers through, among other things, lectures, the content of 
course units, the style of lectures and pastoral care. Nine respondents showed their 
concern that the potentially changed power relationship would increase `spoon 
feeding' to students, which would decrease the quality of education. For example, a 
senior lecturer in the faculty of arts pointed out that academics had to provide more 
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handouts because of the evaluation, which is an example of `spoon feeding', and 
might lead to academics giving higher marks to students: 
... You know, students tend to demand ... lots, lots of handout and reading 
lists ... and so on. (pause) That may ... or may not be ... a good thing.... It does 
mean that ... they tend to become more passive and there is a worry that ... this 
could be a consequence of... sort of questionnaire culture ... and the lecturers 
do more and more ... spoon feeding and get higher marks. ... (Respondent 55) 
Except for the worry about `spoon feeding', there was a fear among eight 
respondents that the potentially changed power relationship would make academics 
become less powerful than the students. A female lecturer gave an example to 
illustrate that students were, in her view, becoming so demanding that she felt treated 
as a mere resource by her students: 
... I got email from my students. ... sometimes even 
five questions in the email. 
Usually, I am not sure about ... content, either ... I actually question which I ... 
syllabus when it is deadline, ... or how should I reference bibliography? And 
these are all in the handout ... and some materials ... provided to the students ... 
in the syllabus as well. Then you will get these kinds of questions ... which 
students can't bother to cross check the syllabus, or to check the website, ... or 
to check the handbook. They use me ... as a short hand ... for 
data. (Respondent 
44) 
1.4 Student course evaluation fatigue 
Except for the fear that student course evaluation would change power relations 
between academics and students, there was a perception that course evaluation 
fatigue had set in among both academics and students. The perceived fatigue was 
caused by two main factors: students did not take the evaluation seriously, and 
academics had difficulty in meeting various needs of students. 
1.4.1 Students not taking evaluation seriously 
Six of the departments/schools in the sample revealed that they normally set a period 
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of time at the end of the class for students to fill in the evaluation forms because if 
the evaluation was sent after the class students would not bother to fill it in and to 
hand it back. One third of respondents affirmed that they found it difficult for 
students to engage in the evaluation process because although some students 
regarded the evaluation as an important opportunity for them to give their opinions, 
many other students did not take the evaluation seriously. Respondents also 
perceived students as unable to produce objective comments when required to fill in 
the evaluation form. For example, a female lecturer in a department of social science 
argued that it was because students spent little time thinking about their comments: 
Err, yes, to some extent. I speak quickly, I suppose, you notice that. It is good 
to ... 
be reminded ... and 1 
have Powerpoint and human information, so ... these 
sort of small comments.., are useful. In terms of standard comments, I don't 
think students are very objective and ... they 
don't usually spend time ... 
commenting on that. ... 
(Respondent 22) 
What respondent 22 suggested was that students did not take the evaluation seriously 
and they were not competent to evaluate teaching. This lack of competence, 
according to Rowley (2003), is because students' assessment will be influenced by 
different variables, such as their ethnic background, gender and age, the size of the 
class, the centrality of the course (compulsory or optional), and the instructor's 
characteristics, (rank, experience, reputation, research skills, gender, minority status, 
and physical appearance). For example, a lecturer who has a more attractive 
personality, regardless of how good they are at teaching, can get better `scores' from 
students. 
1.4.2 Difficulty in meeting the needs of students 
Except for the perception that students did not take the evaluation seriously, fifteen 
respondents expressed their difficulty in meeting student needs because these 
changed every year. It was thus difficult to apply the evaluation result of the previous 
year to the following year's students. The most detailed example to illustrate this 
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difficulty was given by respondent 9 who was responsible for quality assurance in 
the faculty of science. I quote from her at length here to give a flavor of her response: 
What the problem is of course, over the years, I found, for example, the students 
said to me, for example, on one case, said I lectured too much and didn't give 
them enough time for classroom discussion, so the next year, I responded to that 
and had much class discussion. Actually, they said that they didn't want that 
much. So sometimes you find you can't win. (laughter) So you have to try and 
say students have different styles and some got to say what they think about 
things and both learning from the different techniques, now do you say that all 
right, every unit you have a mixtured style. I am a tutor and I have to mix up the 
style which I am doing it. Do I have to do it within every session of every unit? 
So is there time for discussion and the sound lecture? Or do I have some 
sessions that are just lectures and some sessions just discussing that lecture? Or 
do you provide mixture by one tutor who is good at lecturing and one tutor who 
is good at small classroom group? How do you provide that mixed 
opportunities?. (Respondent 9) 
Respondent 9 was unusual among respondents in her response in the face of 
unwelcome change among her students because she found it difficult to cope with the 
variety of student needs. She suggested that some academics became confused and 
anxious under the pressure of student course evaluation which as a result made 
academics perceive the evaluation as a heavy burden imposed upon them and caused 
them fatigue. 
To conclude, student course evaluation was perceived as an important quality 
assurance mechanism in affecting respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching 
practice and power relations between academics and students. The potentially 
changed power relations between academics and students correspond with the 
arguments that student course evaluation is a device to curb the power of academics 
(Morley, 2003), and that student evaluation represents a source of authority that 
changes the balance of power within academic institutions (Moore & Kuol, 2005). 
However, a further analysis of the interview data suggests that although all seven 
departments in the research sample confirmed that student course evaluation was 
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important, its impact in the judging quality of a lecture was perceived as limited. If 
some academics got a lot of negative student comments, the department/school did 
not automatically assume that there was something wrong with their teaching 
because they wanted to take a wider view. Most departments had a system for 
making use of student evaluation data which gave the lecturer an opportunity to 
comment as well. Sometimes, the person with specific responsibility for learning and 
teaching in the department/school would look at the comments made by both 
students and lecturers, and then would come to her/his own judgement, which might 
include recommendations about how teaching might change in the future and about 
how things were organized in the department. This suggests that departments/schools 
would change the course only when they were convinced that students had made a 
valid point, and that student course evaluation was taken seriously but with 
reservation. Moreover all the departments/schools in the research sample not only 
used student course evaluation but also used peer observation to assure and to 
enhance the quality of teaching. How peer observation has affected the work of 
academics will be analyzed below. 
Section two: Impact of peer observation on teaching 
According to the case study university, peer observation is a formative process and a 
learning experience for both those observed and those observing. It aims to create the 
space and opportunity for those being observed and those observing to reflect on 
their teaching. The case study university provided guidelines on peer observation, 
requiring that all departments / schools should operate a system of peer observation 
of teaching, with at least one formative observation of each core member of teaching 
staff, as identified by the Head of Department / School, during any two year period. 
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2.1 Drivers for peer observation 
An analysis of the interview data reveals that there were two main perceived drivers 
for peer observation: quality audit and academics' promotion need. These factors 
were the same as those for student course evaluation. Respondents in general 
regarded peer observation as a quality assurance mechanism driven by quality audit. 
One third of respondents asserted that peer observation was a form of control by the 
audit process, so they showed little interest in it. This finding is similar with that of 
Cockburn (2005) that if academics perceive peer observation as a tool to meet the 
demands of the external quality assurance bodies, academics might regard it as a 
coercive quality assurance instrument designed to hold them to account. 
The view that peer observation was a control mechanism was well illustrated by a 
respondent responsible for quality assurance in the faculty of science. He stated that 
one reason why the case study university adopted peer observation was to pre-empt 
anyone external to the department coming to observe their teaching: 
... 
(Laughter) When we have done it, we probably have not. There was peer 
observation for new member of staff who was on probation, but for doing it for 
everybody, 1 don't think every department has been doing it. The suggestion was 
made to us that if we didn 't start doing it that someone external will come in and 
do it, so it is internal quality assurance and people like see it as part of the 
overall quality assurance package. (Respondent 8) 
What respondent 8 implied was that when academics were subjected to peer 
observation, few of them would like to use it as a means to criticize their colleagues 
or as a means of getting information in the same way as student course evaluation 
where academics felt threatened. One reason for respondents dislike of using peer 
observation to criticize their colleagues, according to Peel (2005), is because 
academics generally do not want to provide negative criticism to undermine their 
colleagues' confidence. 
A further analysis of the interview data reveals that except for quality audit, the othcr 
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important driver for academic respondents taking up peer observation was 
academics' probationary period. Nearly all the respondents agreed that early career 
academics were more frequently peer observed than senior staff. The early career 
academics, who had worked for less than three years and who were in their 
probationary period, were peer observed annually in the case study university. This 
finding suggests that academic staff who have been academics for less than 3 years 
would regard peer observation as an opportunity to reflect on their own teaching 
because they are still on a `learning curve' and need to develop their own teaching 
style (Douglas & Douglas, 2006, p. 8). 
A head of school who had worked over 20 years in a medical related course 
confirmed this view and argued that peer observation worked well for early career 
academics in the case study university: 
... 
It (peer observation) fits very well for young staf, so the young lecturers they 
come in as probationary lectures and they do teaching and learning 
programmes within the university. It works very well for them because they want 
to do it and they want to get the feedback and they want to learn. It doesn ! work 
well on people like me (laughter), because it is very hard to get motivated to 
organize it be done. (Respondent 10) 
What respondent 10 implied was that academics' early career period made peer 
observation a compulsory practice among young staff and that peer observation 
would enable early career academics to learn from their experienced colleagues. 
However, there is an indication that when peer observation was perceived as 
confined to assessing the early career performance of academics, this would affect 
respondents' perception of and attitudes towards peer observation. One example is 
that peer observation was implemented inconsistently at departmental level, which 
will be analyzed in the section below. 
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2.2 Inconsistent implementation of peer observation 
The inconsistent implementation of peer observation was apparent from respondents' 
different understandings of whether such a practice was compulsory or not. The 
policy of the case study university is that peer observation is compulsory, but only 
about two thirds of respondents regarded such a practice as compulsory. The other 
one third of respondents preferred to treat peer observation as a voluntary activity in 
their departments because many of their departmental colleagues had not been peer 
observed recently. The interview data suggests that manager-academics were more 
likely to perceive peer observation as compulsory than their academic colleagues. 
One explanation is that the case study university expected peer observation to be 
compulsory, so manager-academics knew more about this university policy than 
academic respondents. 
Among respondents who perceived peer observation as a compulsory practice, there 
was a view that treating the observation as compulsory had made it hard for the 
department/school to set up a peer observation system because it took up academics' 
time. Academics were thus unwilling to take part in it, unless their department had 
organised it conveniently. Some manager-academics were not supportive in 
addressing peer observation as a compulsory practice because they feared that 
academics would feel forced and obliged and then they would become resistant to 
this practice. This reveals that making peer observation a compulsory practice had 
made respondents perceive it as quality audit regulation. This finding supports the 
argument of Lomas & Nicholls (2005), Lomas & Kinchin (2006), and Shortland 
(2004) that peer observation is a political and cultural drive to raise teaching quality 
via the development and sharing of good practice. The perceived regulation of peer 
observation helps to explain why manager-academics in the case study university 
preferred to use the word `recommendation' in suggesting academics carry out peer 
observation. 
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A further analysis of the interview data suggests that although one third of 
respondents treated peer observation as a voluntary practice, there was also a 
problem in carrying it out because of some academics' ignorance of it. For example, 
a head of school showed his concern of the problems of treating peer observation as a 
voluntary practice: 
... 
As a matter of fact, it (peer observation) is going on for a long time ... on the 
voluntary basis, but it is the sort of one of things, because it is voluntary, it is 
quite a lot of people doing it, sometimes none. There are numerous discussions 
here about whether it should be compulsory. Usually it is the old member of 
staff who opposes the idea that they are compulsory. (laughter) (Respondent 12) 
What respondent 12 suggested was that peer observation as a voluntary practice 
would make some academics perceive it as unimportant, so there was little chance 
academics would take on the observation. This view was widely accepted among the 
other respondents who supported the view that peer observation should become a 
compulsory practice. The view that peer observation should become compulsory 
suggests that peer observation had not been really enforced and had not become a 
popular practice among academics. There is evidence that implementation of peer 
observation at the departmental level was inconsistent. For example, in one 
department, respondents perceived peer observation as a `paper' exercise: 
(laughter) I think there are certain things happened and that is set up as 
departmental policy, ... so 
from that point of view, .. you can say compulsory. 
It 
(peer observation) is just not enforced. For example, if you are to have an 
external review, and documents were produced to say... what procedures are. It 
would be called peer observation, but the number of people engaging that... is 
certainly less complicate than the member of staffs. (Respondent 28) 
Similar views were expressed by respondents from the other two 
schools/departments. These respondents let it be known that peer observation was a 
new practice in their departments/schools and that not many of their colleagues had 
been peer observed. This confirms that peer observation as a quality assurance 
mechanism was not well implemented in these three schools/departments. 
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2.3 Perceived limited impact of peer observation on teaching 
There is evidence that the inconsistent implementation of peer observation had 
affected its impact on respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching practice. 
Nearly half of respondents argued that peer observation had little impact on teaching. 
One perception was that peer observed academics were already pretty good teachers, 
so there was not much the observer could say. This view was only shared by nine 
respondents. In contrast, the most commonly accepted view among half of the 
respondents was that the guidelines for peer observation provided by the case study 
university were bureaucratic and unhelpful because they contained guidance on 
matters that the respondents did not want to talk about. For example, a respondent in 
charge of undergraduate studies in the faculty of social science argued that the 
guideline was too detailed to be used: 
1 don't think it (peer observation) is so practical. .... 1 just think that it is too 
complicated and it is too detailed.... (Respondent 1) 
The complexity of the guideline caused a concern that peer observation would force 
academics to conform to norms which lacked individuality, but retaining 
individuality could be the key to a successful lecture. For example, a head of school 
in a science faculty argued for the importance of this individuality and was critical of 
peer observation guidelines which he regarded as flawed: 
... 
You find what the students find most enjoyable about the lecture is that he is 
enthusiastic about the subject and the ability to cut through the Powerpoint 
materials to determine the most interested part of the materials that we can 
convey. ... That is ... quite 
difficult for peer observer to ... pick tip upon, ... so 
for example, a lot of peer observation forms ... concern with the mechanism 
for 
delivering a lecture. Does ... the 
lecture contain eye contact with the students 
and is she standing still in the middle of the room? They are really stupid things 
you are asked... to comment on. (Respondent 15) 
It is evident that what respondent 15 expected was to get more enthusiasm for his 
subject, but peer observation did not pick up on that kind of thing because the 
observation emphasized more technical aspects of giving a lecture This suggests that 
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when respondents had different expectations of peer observation, it would be hard for 
them to find the observation a useful practice. 
2.4 Perceived improvement of teaching 
Although nearly half of respondents perceived peer observation as having little 
impact on their teaching, the other half of respondents regarded peer observation as a 
useful practice in improving the delivery of a class, providing suggestions on the 
content of lectures, and getting to know different teaching styles. Similar arguments 
are held by Bell (2001), Cockburn (2005), and Fletcher & Orsmond (2004). 
The interview data suggests that one reason why half of respondents argued for the 
importance of peer observation in the case study university was because teaching is 
traditionally a private activity, done behind closed doors. Respondents did not feel 
like talking to people about what they did and how they approached teaching, but 
there might be some important techniques embedded in their teaching practice. When 
peer observation came in, it provided views from the outside which helped to 
develop and to implement new ideas about teaching and to improve teaching practice. 
Sometimes peer observation gave respondents confidence that they had reached 
expected standards within their departments. In general, the perceived improvement 
in the delivery of class among half of respondents mainly took the form of using new 
technology, more engagement with students, and not interrupting students' discussion 
in the seminar, of which use of new technology was the most frequently discussed 
among respondents. For example, a respondent responsible for quality assurance in 
the faculty of science pointed out that some respondents began to use Powerpoint 
after being peer observed: 
... What happens is sometimes, members of staff has changed the way they 
deliver- to switch to a Powerpoint, or they are introduced a new topic and they 
ensure that all is done and to confirm the feedback. That happens quite a lot.... 
(Respondent 8) 
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Except for new technology, increased engagement with students was another 
perceived important improvement caused by peer observation. For example, a female 
lecturer in a medical related course articulated that there was more engagement with 
students due to peer observation: 
I think the sort of feedback they get people they are observing, just 
suggestions... about, perhaps, engage the students a bit more ... and way just 
talking to them got students all after questions, so suggestions like that ... 
I 
think, they find quite useful. Maybe being clear about stuff what is get covered 
in the session, that sort of things, ... 
I think. (Respondent 44) 
The interview data suggests that engagement with students included some other 
minor changes, for example, how to develop a discussion in class. A female lecturer 
in a social science department gave an example on students' discussion in his class: 
One of the things 1 picked up was ... the 
discussion in the seminar is a sort of... 
free flowing and 1 don't ... try to interrupt it... as little as possible. Most of the 
students, you know,... they can manage their discussion, but sometimes some 
students feel like ... you say something ... when their discussion is going on. 
(Respondent 18) 
Together with improvement of the delivery of a class, there was evidence that peer 
observation had helped five respondents in different subject areas to improve the 
content of their lectures. One example was given by a head of school in a faculty of 
science who argued that peer observation helped lecturers to realize which bits of the 
lecture was difficult for students to follow, so lecturers made changes in that aspect. 
The changes in lecturing practice, according to a senior administrator in academic 
staff development, was because peer observation had enriched academics' teaching 
techniques and had provided academics with a chance to learn from their colleagues: 
... The colleagues observing could think that: ' oh, this could be improved if my 
colleagues just did that. Or I can see the students are really engaged in this 
point and this is a better to help them to engage in this subject. Or the observer 
might think, gosh, that is a good technique. I am going to use that in my 
teaching, so I think that is real quality assurance and that does improve things. 
(Respondent 53) 
What respondent 53 implied was that peer observation was important in enabling 
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academics to learn from each other. In spite of the above evidence that peer 
observation was perceived as useful in improving undergraduate classroom teaching 
practice, respondents in general were not particularly interested in being peer 
observed. 
2.5 Academics' reluctance to take up peer observation 
Nearly one third of respondents did not see any value in peer observation and treated 
it as an unnecessary practice. Three different perceptions explained their reluctance 
to take up peer observation: peer observation was interference in teaching; peer 
observation was resource heavy and bureaucratic; and senior staff observing junior 
staff would make the observation an intimidating experience. These perceptions are 
discussed below according to their popularity among respondents. 
The perception that peer observation was an unwelcome attempt to curtail academic 
autonomy in the classroom was accepted by four manager-academics and five 
academic respondents. For example, a senior administrator in academic staff 
development argued that criticism from peer observation would make academics feel 
threatened: 
I think they worried that colleagues might be critical of their teaching and there 
might not be constructive criticism. I think it is a bit threatening, sometimes, you 
know, you have autonomy, maybe they think that colleagues might pinch their 
ideas. ... (Respondent 53) 
What respondent 53 implied was that respondents had been treating teaching as a 
private activity, so they did not expect their teaching to be interfered with by their 
colleagues or by other external forces. As a result, respondents did not expect their 
teaching to be influenced by peer observation because peer observation was 
perceived as interference, which made respondents show reluctance in taking part in 
it. 
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The fact that academics in the case study university were under tremendous pressure 
to do research and teaching, made a lot of respondents perceive peer observation as 
another unwelcome chore for them to do. It was termed as resource heavy by seven 
manager-academics. For example, a respondent in charge of undergraduate studies in 
the faculty of science argued that academics' resistance was caused by their increased 
workload with peer observation as part of the problem: 
I can not look at the mind of the other women and men. ... but I suspect that 
they may feel that they are very busy with many other things, and peer 
observations would take up a few minutes of their times, so it must be an issue 
of workload (Respondent 4) 
The heavy workload caused by peer observation was seen as bureaucratic by 
respondents, so they showed resistance to it. However, there is a contradiction in 
respondents' perception of peer observation as bureaucratic because according to 
Max Weber, bureaucracy is `the means of transforming social actions into rationally 
organized action' (Roth, Cz & Wittich, C., 1968, p. 987). Similarly Watson (2003, p. 8) 
argues that 
bureaucracy is the control and co-ordination of work tasks through a hierarchy of 
appropriately qualified office holders, whose authority derives from their expertise 
and who rationally devise a system of rules and procedures that are calculated to 
provide the most appropriate means of achieving specified ends. 
This suggests that bureaucracy is originally related with hierarchy, a system of 
people or things arranged in a graded order, but in peer observation, there is no 
hierarchy between observers and observees because the observation only involves 
academics observing their peers academics' lectures and then filling in the forms. 
This suggests that respondents perceived bureaucracy differently from Webber and 
Watson. These respondents used bureaucracy/bureaucratic as a derogatory label for 
things they did not want to do. For example, a head of school confirmed this view 
and asserted that he was not surprised that academics showed resistance to peer 
observation because they also showed resistance to other quality assurance 
mechanisms: 
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Sure, my experience is that anything, any other bureaucracy which imposed on 
them (academics) to do and that consumes their time is resisted. It is not 
necessarily peer observation. It may be some other forms of quality assurance, 
whatever it is. Maybe they are required to do some form of internal audit, or 
fulfill in the questionnaire or whatever. Anything takes time is resisted because 
we have a huge amount of work. (Respondent 13) 
Except for the view that peer observation was resource heavy and bureaucratic, there 
was a concern among six respondents that senior staff observing junior staff had 
made the observation an intimidating experience because of the power imbalance 
created by the higher rank of the observer. A respondent in charge of quality 
assurance in the faculty of engineering argued that in order to minimize this problem 
senior and junior staff should observe each other, so they could learn from each 
other: 
... I think it was done in such a way for example, only people in senior positions 
observed people in lower position. That would not be good. ... The head of 
department observing the new member of staff and the new member of staff 
observe the head of department. Not necessarily to learn from what the head of 
department does, but to be critical at what the head of department does because 
new person coming in and you don't have good ideas about teaching, because 
you have been an education receiver for several years, you must come to see 
somebody like me who has been teaching for years..... (Respondent 7) 
To summarize, section 2 suggests that although peer observation was perceived as 
important it has limitations in improving academics' undergraduate classroom 
teaching practice, and that about one third of respondents showed resistance to it. All 
the seven departments/schools in the research sample had realized the limitation of 
peer observation and adopted some other quality assurance mechanisms to improve 
the quality of teaching, one of which is annual programme review. 
Section three: Annual Programme Review (APR) 
In the case study university, all teaching programmes are required to go through 
Annual Programme Review which is carried out by a department gathering feedback 
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on its taught and research programmes from students, departmental staff and external 
examiners every year. Reflections or reports on individual units arc taken into 
account, together with statistical information such as student progression rates and 
proportions of degrees awarded by classification. All these elements are required to 
be discussed at a departmental meeting and a brief summary report written. The 
review report outlines the positive features of the programme(s) and any action to be 
taken on the basis of evaluation. 
3.1 Various attitudes towards APR 
According to the case study university, annual programme review was important and 
compulsory, but the interview data suggests that manager-academics and academic 
respondents held different attitudes towards the review. Manager-academics, 
especially the heads of schools, argued for the importance of the APR in providing 
academics with a framework to think things through. They perceived the review as 
important in affecting both undergraduate classroom teaching practice and wider 
curriculum development. In contrast, nearly half of the academic respondents had 
little knowledge of the review or found it had little effect on their teaching or the 
curriculum. Although these academic respondents felt obliged to conduct the review 
to satisfy the university requirement, they found the review only concerned with 
general departmental issues, without having a direct impact on their undergraduate 
classroom teaching practice. The interview data reveals that one reason for academic 
respondents and manager-academics' holding different attitudes towards the APR 
was that the review was quality audit related, so manager-academics had to prove to 
outsiders that this internal quality assurance mechanism was in place and was 
fulfilling its purposes. Therefore they treated the review more seriously than their 
academic colleagues. 
In spite of the fact that the APR was regarded as important by manager-academics, 
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its implementation varied between departments/schools. One example is that 
respondents, even manager-academics, did not have a consistent view of how long 
the review had been in existence within their departments/schools. Perceptions varied 
between two and nine years. However, according to a senior administrator in 
academic staff development, the APR had existed in the case study university for 
four years. One implication of the perceived different length of time that the APR 
had been in force is that some departments/schools might have been using the review 
long before the case study university required this, whilst some other 
departments/schools had only started to use it more recently. This suggests that the 
APR was not taken seriously in some departments/schools. Three senior manager 
respondents in charge of undergraduate studies in the faculty of science confirmed 
that the APR was not generally taken seriously in their faculties. A full quotation 
from one such respondent makes this point as follows: 
... There are aspects of it 
(Annual Progamme Review) which are perhaps just 
paper pushing. But it encourages an open sort of government and therefore 
colleagues are more conscious I think. There are opportunities to change these 
things, but maybe in department, programme review is just two people in the 
corner and having a cup of coffee, and no one else knows about it. I do not know, 
(laughter) (Respondent 3) 
What respondent 3 suggested was that the APR was not taken seriously and was not 
well implemented at the department/school level. This implies that one reason for 
respondents showing resistance to the APR is because it was perceived as a quality 
assurance mechanism. This confirms the finding in section 2 and section 3 that when 
respondents had to deal with quality assurance mechanisms, they tended to show 
little interest in these jobs because their priority was teaching and research and 
because these respondents already had a heavy workload in the case study university 
(Chapter 6), which as a result made respondents pay little attention to the APR and 
perceive it as a superficial activity and as another chore for them to do. After the 
analysis of respondents' perception of the APR, the section below explores whether 
the APR had had some impact on respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching 
practice and the curriculum. 
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3.2 Impact of APR on teaching and curriculum 
An analysis of the interview data reveals that it was manager-academics who liked to 
argue that the review had affected their undergraduate classroom teaching practice. 
Nearly half of the manger-academics in the sample found the review important in 
drawing comments from the external examiners and in making academics more 
aware of the need of the students. For example, a respondent in charge of quality 
assurance in the faculty of arts argued that the APR would have an affect on 
academics' teaching: 
Well, again, it (annual programme review) will have an impact, because it 
involves looking closely at external evaluation of the programme. It involves 
looking at the student evaluation programme. It involves at staff evaluation 
programme, so if problems are highlighted ... 
by that process, the problem will 
be tackled. And there will be improvement. (Respondent 6) 
A respondent in charge of undergraduate teaching in the faculty of arts shared similar 
views that the APR would affect academics' teaching. He illustrated changes caused 
by the APR, such as topics in class and students' skill development: 
... 1 think it is definitely useful and important. You know, some changes 
have 
come from it. In terms, sometimes thinking about what options the unit should 
be put on in coming years, so thinking about the balance of different topics, how 
we require students to develop particular skills. (Respondent 5) 
Five heads of schools/departments confirmed the view of respondent 5 and argued 
that the APR could regulate what academics did. However, these respondents did not 
reveal which specific aspects of teaching had been changed. What these respondents 
argued for was that the review provided them with a chance to engage more with 
feedback from students and with external examiners, so they would change the 
programme accordingly. However, there is little evidence that individual 
respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching practice had been affected by the 
review. Instead the APR was perceived to have raised nothing new, but was 
repetitious of what respondents had done before. For example, a female professor 
used her personal experience to illustrate that doing the APR was like `jumping 
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through the hoop' because preparing for the review was not much different from 
what she did for the RAE: 
Again, I can only speak from my experience. ... 
I wrote the Annual Programme 
Review for ... PhD programme ... two weeks ago, and 
1 have to say ... that 
I feel 
like... jumping through the hoop .... 
because part was ... the same material 
for the RAE exercises. And now ... 
I am just keeping the paper and .... repeat 
what I say earlier. The main frustration is... that ... 
information is available, but 
it has to keep being provided, ... in the 
different forms, for 
... the multiple 
exercises. I do feel that we are received in different kind of ways and perhaps ... 
they all need to be ... 
lined up and you can just provide information ... once 
(laughter) (Respondent 46) 
What respondent 46 implied was that the APR had little impact on teaching. A 
respondent in charge of quality assurance in the faculty of social science confirmed 
this view and explained that it was because the review was actually a chance for 
academics to sit together to talk about what they had been doing and what they 
should do next. This suggests that the APR was perceived to have limited impact on 
teaching by academic respondents. 
Except for the perceived limited impact of the APR on teaching, the interview data 
reveals that academic respondents and manager-academics held different views about 
how the APR affected the curriculum. The majority of academic respondents did not 
think the review by itself would affect the curriculum because the review was an 
opportunity to see how the different components of the programme related to each 
other, and because the impact of the review was perceived to be quite slow. However, 
these respondents assumed that the process of doing the review would reflect the 
nature of the curriculum and thus gave them ideas for changes. In contrast, nearly 
half of manager-academics argued that the APR had affected their curriculum 
because the review provided them with an open approach to suggest curriculum 
change and to get different ideas from academics, which as a result would change the 
curriculum. For example, a respondent in charge of quality assurance in the faculty 
of social science explained this point: 
Well, as I said, the impact will be providing a more balanced or perhaps 
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coherent set of units within the pathway. (Respondent 9) 
In spite of the above argument that the APR had some effect on the curriculum, very 
few respondents asserted that the APR had produced specific effects. What the 
majority of respondents argued was that the APR provided them with a chance to 
make recommendations to develop their curriculum or for their curriculum review 
committee, which would result in changes. This confirms the view above that the 
impact of the APR on the curriculum was perceived as limited. 
Together with the APR, the case study university uses another quality assurance 
mechanism. This is the approval system for new and revised programmes, to assure 
and enhance their quality. The section below analyzes how this approval system had 
affected respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching practice and curriculum. 
Section four: Approval system for new and revised programmes 
The interview data suggests that all the respondents perceived the approval system as 
compulsory and that all changes to units/programmes and all new programmes have 
to be approved by at least one committee because the university wants to ensure that 
any changes made to units/programmes, or any new units/programmes, are 
academically appropriate and sound; and that sufficient resource can and will be 
made available to ensure their successful delivery. There is an indication that 
respondents' knowledge of the approval system varied with their rank of position. 
Nearly all the manager-academics knew about the approval system. In contrast, two 
thirds of academic respondents had little knowledge of the approval system because 
if a department needed to present a programme within the programme guidelines it 
was more likely that the programme director and the head of school would apply for 
approval, rather than a member of academic staff without such a managerial 
responsibility. 
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4.1 Approval system as bureaucratic scrutiny 
Except for academic respondents' lack of knowledge of the approval system, very 
few respondents regarded the approval system as useful and important. The majority 
of respondents perceived the approval system as bureaucratic scrutiny because 
whenever departments needed to make a minor change, they had to go through a lot 
of paper work. A senior lecturer in a science related department for example showed 
his concern that filling in a lot of forms had made the approval system very 
complicated: 
... I think the system is too complicated. ... 
When we want to change a unit for 
our whole programme, ... we have to fill in ... a 
lot of different forms. Even just 
one minor change of the unit.... The whole system is very complicated and we 
have a lot of trouble... keeping track of the forms. (Respondent 62) 
What respondent 62 implied was that the approval system was bureaucratic, time 
consuming, and a paper exercise. This view was shared and discussed by many other 
academic respondents. There is evidence that what most academic respondents were 
critical of in the approval system was the long period of time needed to get a new 
programme/unit approved. For example, a female professor in a social science 
related department used her experience to demonstrate that the approval system was 
too time consuming: 
Well, it takes ages. It is tedious. It is so ... 
long. I just got a new course through 
last year. It was so long to get through it. ... 
You have to go to... so much 
committee and so much paper work. That discourages from doing it.... I think, it 
is good to have scrutiny, but you have to be careful ... not to 
have so much 
scrutiny. (Respondent 43) 
The interview data indicates that not only academic respondents who got involved 
with the approval system found it time consuming. Many other academic 
respondents who did not have experience of the approval system also argued against 
the lengthy approval system. There are other reasons for respondents' dislike of the 
approval system. One was that the perception of respondents that academics could be 
easily influenced by their colleagues. The other was that academics in general 
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showed resistance to quality assurance mechanisms which included the approval 
system. For example, a female lecturer in a social science department confirmed that 
academics in general treated the approval system as a control mechanism mainly 
designed to satisfy the QAA: 
Well, the unit has to be approved by the faculty.... Again the template for that ... 
is just something that is filled. You know, it is filed away for the QAA. It is not 
anything ... people would actually ... 
look at, when they design their syllabus or 
course. (Respondent 18) 
Aside from the perception that the approval system was time consuming, respondents 
treated the approval committee's use of assessors who were not regarded as 
professional as another sign of bureaucracy. For example, a male lecturer doing 
quality assurance jobs in an art related department argued against the use of 
inappropriate assessors in the approval system: 
It (approval system of new and revised programmes/units) is just a waste of... 
our time because who is the faculty ... can say ... whether or not ... my unit on 
philosophy or physics is any good. They haven 't got any CLUE! 1 teach xxx 
foundations of physics. How can someone from English ... comment ... on my 
unit and the book ... in my 
bibliography is ... the right ones. They just 
looked to 
say ... there are 
6 books on bibliography ... and checked to see that ... it says 
some words ... on what the course will 
do. I would say anything ... and they 
can't tell. If I say something that ... 
I don't understand quantitative 
mechanisms ... 
1 will be a terrible teacher ... of subject and no one in the 
faculty 
... would 
know, so I agree that ... it would 
be good ... 
if it could tell, but 
it can't. (Respondent 58) 
The examples above suggest that academics in general regarded the approval system 
as bureaucratic scrutiny and as a paper trail exercise. How the approval system had 
affected the work of academics will be analyzed below. 
4.2 Setting minimum standards for the curriculum 
The interview data suggests that 14 respondents found the approval system for new 
and revised programmes/units important and useful. Of these 14 respondents, 6 were 
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manager-academics and 8 were academic respondents. These respondents argued for 
the beneficial effect of the approval system. One argument was that the approval 
system provided an external view on the programme. The other argument was that if 
anyone wanted to change the programme, they had to get it approved first. The 
approval process would make academics think carefully about their unit and their 
subject. For example, a head of school of a medical related course argued for the 
usefulness of the approval system in changing the curriculum: 
It is useful, because people will become aware ifyou want to do something new, it 
takes time because of the paper exercise and it has to go through a number of 
committees and so forth. That makes a difference. It is rather the other way 
around. People perceive that somehow they need to make a change in the 
curriculum, to make that change, they have to go through that process, so ... 
probably they have the curriculum changed in mind already. (Respondent 13) 
Although 14 respondents argued for the importance of the approval system, few 
supporters of this system produced specific examples to illustrate how their 
curriculum had been improved. What these respondents emphasized was that the 
approval system in general made sure that their programmes had met a minimum 
quality threshold. In other words, if they had got a good programme, the approval 
system was not going to make it any better, but if they had got a weak programme, 
the approval system might change it from weak to satisfactory. For example, a 
female lecturer in a social science department made this view explicit: 
... Because once the nature of the curriculum was set ..., the approval system 
simply makes sure that ... the course is 
like the unit being proposed ... 
but we 
have a set of open options and ... that 
is not really an issue, but basically what 
people try to do is to make sure that ... it is at appropriate 
level and it is really ... 
the course makes sense and we think the students might be ... and the reading is 
up to date, that sort of ... things, 
but it doesn7 affect the curriculum ... 
like 
quality assurance of particular unit and not the programme as a whole. 
(Respondent 21) 
To conclude, section 5 reveals that the majority of respondents treated the approval 
system as a quality assurance mechanism for them to observe in order to fulfill the 
needs of quality audit, so these respondents perceived the approval system as 
249 
bureaucratic scrutiny. There is little evidence that the approval system had affected 
curriculum and undergraduate classroom teaching practice significantly except that it 
set a minimum standard to ensure that programmes and units met a quality threshold. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described and analyzed how four internal quality assurance 
mechanisms (student course evaluation, peer observation, annual programme review, 
and approval system for new and revised programmes) within the case study 
university were perceived to have affected respondents' undergraduate classroom 
teaching practice, curriculum, and power relations between respondents and students. 
The case study reveals that these four mechanisms were meant to be compulsory, but 
their effects varied by department. One example is that respondents disagreed with 
whether peer observation was compulsory or not. Two thirds of respondents 
perceived the observation as compulsory, but the remaining third regarded it as 
voluntary activity because they were seldom peer observed. This suggests that peer 
observation was implemented inconsistently in schools/departments. This is one 
reason for the perceived limited effect of peer observation on respondents' 
undergraduate classroom teaching practice. Similarly, although student course 
evaluation was perceived to have been taken seriously by each department/school in 
the sample, its impact on respondents' teaching was regarded as limited. It had 
become a common practice for departments/schools to combine the result of student 
course evaluation with peer observation to judge the quality of academics' teaching. 
Moreover annual programme review and the approval system for new and revised 
programmes were perceived as important and compulsory, but there is little evidence 
that these two systems had affected individual respondent's teaching and curriculum 
in a significant way. 
A further analysis of the interview data suggests that respondents held different 
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attitudes towards the four internal quality assurance mechanisms studied. Student 
course evaluation was perceived as the most important and most useful quality 
assurance mechanism in improving respondents' teaching practice. In contrast, the 
programme approval system was perceived as the least important one because it was 
only seen as useful in providing minimum standards to ensure that the quality of the 
programme/unit was good. Moreover, the majority of respondents regarded student 
course evaluation as more useful in improving academics' teaching practice than peer 
observation because the observation was relatively positive, whilst the student 
evaluation commented on respondents' teaching skills more critically. 
Aside from the different attitudes of respondents towards these four internal quality 
assurance mechanisms, respondents generally viewed these mechanisms as quality 
audit related and labelled them as bureaucratic scrutiny in spite of the fact that these 
mechanisms were perceived to have achieved some positive impact on their work. 
For example, student course evaluation was perceived as useful in improving the 
ways respondents presented information and the content of lectures but there was a 
view among respondents that the evaluation was a technical and rational tool to 
subject academics to both internal institutional regulation procedures and external 
scrutiny and judgement. About two thirds of respondents feared that if the perceived 
power relations between academics and students were changed due to the evaluation, 
academics would become more accountable to students and students would become 
more demanding. This suggests that respondents treated student course evaluation as 
important, but was perceived as a tool of quality audit regulation. A similar view 
applies to peer observation. 
The case study also suggests that peer observation was perceived as important in 
improving respondents' undergraduate classroom teaching practice, especially among 
respondents who were in their early academic career, but some respondents showed 
resistance to peer observation and were critical of its bureaucracy. However, there is 
a contradiction between respondents' view of bureaucracy and the original meaning 
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of bureaucracy. According to Weber, bureaucracy refers to the control and 
co-ordination of work tasks through a hierarchy of appropriately qualified office 
holders (Roth, G. & Wittich, C., 1968). This suggests that bureaucracy is related with 
hierarchy, but peer observation does not involve hierarchy because it is intended to 
be an activity between academics who are peers. Therefore the observation is not like 
Institutional Audit where there is hierarchy between the audited institution and the 
QAA, and where the institution and its faculty, department/school are required to 
produce a lot of paper work. Hence, it is Institutional Audit not peer observation that 
should be perceived as `bureaucratic'. The perception of peer observation as 
bureaucratic suggests that respondents tended to use bureaucracy as a label for things 
they did not want to do, and for things that were not perceived as not sufficiently 
closely related to their teaching and research. 
Furthermore, respondents in general were critical of the perceived limitations of the 
internal quality assurance mechanisms studied, such as students' evaluation not being 
objective, peer observation being used mainly for the purpose of academic promotion, 
and the approval system and the annual programme review being time consuming. 
However, in spite of these limitations, respondents still regarded such mechanisms as 
useful and important in improving their work to some degree. Respondents' mixed 
views towards the internal quality assurance mechanisms were similar to the attitudes 
they displayed towards the external mechanisms. 
The case study also suggests that respondents' perception of the internal quality 
assurance mechanisms are influenced by their rank or position. It was 
manager-academics who were more likely to argue for the importance and the 
usefulness of the internal quality assurance mechanisms than academic respondents. 
One reason was that manager-academics in general knew more about these 
mechanisms than academic respondents. Another reason was because 
manager-academics undertook a management role. They were obliged to implement 
these mechanisms and had more knowledge of the impact they had on the work of 
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academics and on the department/schooVfaculty/university than their academic 
colleagues, so the manager academic respondents argued for the importance of these 
mechanisms as a result. 
After an analysis of respondents' perceptions of the four internal quality assurance 
mechanisms and the impact of these mechanisms on their work, the next chapter is 
going to compare respondents' views towards internal quality assurance mechanisms 
and external ones, aiming to find out whether respondents perceived these 
mechanisms differently or not and the reasons for the perceived difference. 
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Chapter 10: The Challenges and Tensions of the Quality Audit Process and 
Professional Authority 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters analysed the perceived impact of external and internal 
quality assurance mechanisms on the work of academics. The intention here is to 
compare respondents' perceptions of the external quality assurance mechanisms with 
perceptions of the internal mechanisms and to assess the extent to which the quality 
audit processes and cultures as a whole is perceived to have affected the work 
product of the respondents. The term `quality audit' in this chapter is used as a social 
science concept. It is not a proxy term for the QAA; instead it refers to an audit 
culture that includes not only the Institutional Audit of the QAA, but also the 
assessment activities of a range of quality assurance mechanisms researched for this 
dissertation, such as, external examining, the 2005 National Student Survey, 
professional, statutory and regulatory bodies, peer observation (See Chapter 2). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, quality audit is a holistic concept that is closely related to 
quality assurance mechanisms because a quality audit claims to have achieved its 
impact on those subjected to it through implementation of these mechanisms (Power, 
1994,1997). This study explores the perceived impact of the quality audit on the 
work of respondents through examining how these mechanisms are believed to have 
affected the work of the respondents of my case study with the aim of revealing 
precisely what respondents liked and what they disliked about the quality audit 
concept. 
In addition, the very existence and growth of an audit culture has become a source of 
debate among academic researchers. For example, Power (1994,1997) regards audit 
as the control of control because the audited organizations develop their own internal 
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system of control and the actual external audit process. In other words, the external 
quality assurance mechanisms concentrate on applying their own controls in the 
organization being audited. In contrast, Shore & Wright (2000) argue that audit is a 
culture of new forms of governance and power, which are designed to engender 
among academic staff, new norms of conduct and professional behaviour that meet 
the needs of the external requirements, for example, the funding council. Both Power 
and Shore & Wright imply that audit is a form of power and control imposed upon 
academics to change the nature of academic work. This chapter explores that 
prospect and whether respondents in the case study university perceived the quality 
audit as a form of power and undue control over their work and whether the process 
of the audit produced among respondents a culture shift to new norms of conduct and 
professional behaviour that met the criteria of the quality audit control. 
Three separate steps were taken to illustrate respondents' perceptions of quality audit. 
Step One compares the perceived impact of external quality assurance mechanisms 
on the work of respondents with the impact of internal mechanisms. That comparison 
worked to reveal that the internal mechanisms were perceived to have more 
significant impact on the work of respondents than the external mechanisms and 
explain the reasons for respondents' preference of the internal mechanisms. Step 
Two analyzes the perception of respondents regarding quality audit processes as a 
whole to illustrate whether respondents perceived the quality audit as power control 
and whether a quality audit engendered among respondents new norms of 
professional behaviour. In the process of the quality audit, the case study university 
established quality assurance systems to affect the individual faculties and 
departments, for example, an Annual Programme Review. The analysis in Step Two 
aims to provide a holistic picture of how respondents perceived the nature of the 
quality audit as well as its impact on their professional effort work. The work of 
these academics included undergraduate classroom teaching practice, curriculum 
content, and an examination of the power relations between academics and students. 
After the analysis of respondents' perceptions of quality audit, the third step explored 
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the reasons for respondents' mixed views toward the quality audit and suggesting that 
there was evidence of a perceived tension between the quality audit and the 
professional authority of respondents. 
Section One: Respondent Preference Regarding Internal Quality Assurance 
Mechanisms 
The interview data indicate that the study respondents, except for very early career 
stage staff, all had a varied experience of an external audit over the last two decades, 
including a Subject Review, and an Institutional Audit of the QAA. These 
respondents held both positive and negative views toward quality assurance 
mechanisms. However, respondents in general regarded internal mechanisms as more 
useful and more important than the external ones. For example, a respondent in 
charge of undergraduate studies in a medical school argued for the supportive and 
regulatory function of the internal quality assurance mechanisms as follows: 
Err, 
... 1 think it has a dual effect. One is supportive. It supports academic staff. It 
does that. But it is also regulatory, ensuring that good practice is done and the bad 
practice is not done. And it is supportive in the sense that it encourages good 
practice. It does both. ... The university 
has regulations about how programmes are 
managed. Internal quality assurance, particularly the faculty quality assurance 
would check that it is happening and that the regulations are being applied, so it is 
like a regulatory one. (Respondent 2) 
What Respondent 2 implied here is that the internal quality assurance mechanism 
was important and useful in ensuring good practices from academics. The interview 
data indicate that two thirds of the respondents perceived that a relatively recent good 
practice (probably resulting from the Subject Review in the 1990s up to the early 
2000s) was increased awareness among academics that they should update their 
teaching units regularly and keep good records of their teaching for themselves and 
others to include reading lists, handouts, and PowerPoint slides. This change was 
considered to have made teaching in the department/school systematic. and 
up-to-date during the quality audit process and suggests that the internal quality 
256 
assurance mechanisms were perceived to have the capacity to change the practice of 
academics at least to some degree. 
In contrast, the majority of respondents implied that they were less affected by and 
cared less about the external quality assurance mechanisms because these 
mechanisms had less of an impact on their work than did the internal mechanisms. 
The different attitudes of respondents toward internal and external quality assurance 
mechanisms suggest that respondents preferred internal mechanisms to external ones 
for any regulation of their work. It is possible that when the QAA moved toward a 
much lighter touch system of audit, with the emphasis on subject- by- subject 
inspection disappearing in favor of an audit of the institution's academic systems and 
standards as a whole, respondents in general showed a greater preference toward the 
internal quality assurance mechanisms. 
1.1 Familiarity of Respondents with Internal Mechanisms 
There are four main reasons for respondents' preference for internal quality 
assurance mechanisms. The most important reason is that the respondents, unless 
they held a management position, were more familiar with the internal mechanisms 
that were institution-specific than mechanisms imposed upon the institution 
externally. For example, respondents knew a lot more about peer observation and 
student course evaluation, two of the internal mechanisms researched (Sec Section 1 
& Section 2 in Chapter 9), than they did about the 2005 National Student Survey 
(NSS), one of the external mechanisms that started in 2005. The majority of 
academic respondents below the level of the department/school head knew little 
about the NSS (See Section 3.1 in Chapter 8). One reason for respondents' 
familiarity with internal mechanisms was the fact that the external mechanisms 
checked the individual work of academics less frequently than did the internal 
mechanisms. 
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The internal mechanisms, particularly the student course evaluations, occur right 
through the year, while the external mechanisms are less frequent. For example, the 
QAA Institutional Audit only happens every five years and visits the institution for 
only a few days. This intensive visit, which on its most recent occasion included 
selected subject audit trails (Discipline Audit Trails), was perceived to have caused 
more stress for the department/school than did the internal quality assurance 
mechanisms. However, very few respondents found this intensive visit to have had 
great impact on their teaching, so respondents showed less interest in the Institutional 
Audit. In other words, because Institutional Audit did not affect respondents very 
particularly in their day-to-day efforts and only affected the overall policies of the 
institution, then the respondents were not as aware of the process and as interested in 
it. 
1.2 Perceived Irrelevance of External Mechanisms to Work of Respondents 
There was a second important reason for respondents' preference for the internal 
mechanisms. They simply did not find the external mechanisms as relevant for their 
work as the internal ones. Except for the Professional, Statutory and Regulatory 
bodies, which control teaching and curriculum content of a professional/vocational 
programme, the 2005 National Student Survey was considered to be distant from the 
work of individual academics. The rest of the external mechanisms only tested 
whether the internal mechanisms within the institution were in place or not, so there 
was a perception among respondents that the external mechanisms could not have 
any direct impact on their work, particularly on their teaching, but merely were 
supposed to reinforce what they did. This perception is identical to the argument of 
Power (1994,1997) that an audit is mainly concerned with the quality assurance 
systems in place so as to maintain the quality of teaching in the context of higher 
education institutions. 
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About two- thirds of the respondents from the case study university argued against 
the relevance of external quality assurance mechanisms on their teaching. For 
example, a Director of Quality Assurance in the Faculty of Arts asserted that these 
external mechanisms were not involved with individual academics' teaching: 
The external quality ... assurance mechanism 
is not supposed to have a direct 
impact on teaching. In theory, they are not testing quality of AAA (name of the case 
study university). What it's testing is 'Does AAA have its own mechanism for 
controlling quality and are these mechanisms working properly? ' (Respondent 6) 
What Respondent 6 implied here is that the external quality assurance mechanism 
had very limited impact on the work of academics because of its minor relevance on 
the work of individual academics. Of the external mechanisms studied, the QAA and 
the NSS were perceived as the least relevant to respondents' teaching. For example, 
the majority of respondents found the QAA had little impact on their teaching 
because its `light touch' audit method was little related to their experience and their 
knowledge of their work (See Section 1.1.2 Chapter 8). 
Together with the view that external mechanisms were largely irrelevant, two- thirds 
of respondents held the view that the external mechanisms only reinforced what they 
already did. For example, a female lecturer in a medical- related course argued that 




I think ... a 
lot of quality assurance, I perceived, is ... showing us that 
perhaps ... we are 
doing things ok ... and in which case, it 
doesn't necessarily 
change it, so for that reason, 1 think, a lot ... would 
be the same, if we didn't have it. 
(Respondent 23) 
Respondent 23 showed doubt about the impact of external quality assurance 
mechanisms on the work of academics. Two- thirds of respondents shared her view 
and argued against the elaborate procedure of external mechanisms. The respondents 
named that procedure as paper trail only and paperwork for the sake of paperwork. 
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They showed strong resistance to this paperwork and argued that it cost them a huge 
amount of time that could otherwise be spent in improving the quality of their 
teaching. Moreover they had the fear that what was recorded on paper might be 
different from what they actually did. This fear suggests that there was danger in the 
audit's focusing on checking paper records because that aspect made two- thirds of 
the respondents perceive the quality audit as only concerned with the paperwork 
instead of the quality of their teaching. 
This difference between respondents' perception of the quality audit and what the 
quality audit intended to achieve can be perceived as an `expectation gap' (Power, 
1994, p. 6). The quality audit now plays a remote assurance role in checking quality 
assurance systems of higher education institutions rather than individual academic 
teaching. The remote quality assurance role is different from what academics expect 
a quality audit to be and is different from what was done in the Subject Review. 
Therefore, when two- thirds of the respondents in the case study university found 
that the quality audit and its external quality assurance mechanisms focused on paper 
record instead of on teaching, the respondents perceived a large gap in expectations. 
As a result they considered the quality audit and its external mechanisms as very 
distant from their work. 
1.3 Respondent Scepticism toward External Mechanisms 
The third reason for respondents' preference for internal quality assurance 
mechanisms was respondent scepticism of the measures undertaken by some of the 
external quality assurance process. The majority of respondents were critical of the 
survey methods of the 2005 NSS, specifically the way the survey was organized, the 
way it was run, and the poor quality of data the survey appeared to have collected. 
Therefore, there was a suspicion among respondents towards the quality of the 
survey results (See Section 3.3 in Chapter 8). Another example of respondent 
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scepticism for the measures taken by some external quality assurance mechanisms 
was that about one- third of respondents (11) in the second phase interviews were 
sceptical of the QAA assessors and did not perceive them as their peers (See Section 
3.1 this chapter). This scepticism made respondents show less interest in the external 
mechanisms than in the internal ones. Their scepticism indicates that respondents had 
doubts regarding some of the audit methods and that there is a clear need for these 
methods to be changed in order to increase academics' confidence in and trust of the 
quality audit processes. 
1.4 Blurred Distinctions between External and Internal Mechanisms 
The fourth reason for respondents' preference for the internal quality assurance 
mechanisms was the distinction between internal and external mechanisms. It was 
rather blurred in some instances. Some external mechanisms were internalized in the 
case study university, but there is little evidence that respondents treated the 
internalized mechanisms as important. An example is the production of programme 
specifications for all teaching programmes. The QAA includes programme 
specification in its codes of practice, which suggests that programme specification is 
an external quality assurance mechanism. However, about half of the respondents 
thought programme specification was an internal mechanism, suggesting that 
programme specification was internalized in the case study university. However, the 
majority of respondents perceived the writing programme specification as artificial 
instead of being a completely true reflection of what the programme was actually 
about (See Section 1.3 Chapter 8). One implication of this finding is that although 
some external quality assurance mechanisms were internalized during the process of 
quality audit, it was still hard for respondents to accept these mechanisms as 
important and useful because they were perceived to have little effect on their actual 
work. 
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The above four reasons for respondents' preference for internal quality assurance 
mechanisms suggest that although external quality assurance mechanisms intend to 
improve the quality of teaching by checking the internal mechanisms or by giving 
graduates views on their experiences with programmes, respondents showed little 
interest in these external mechanisms. There was a gap between respondents' 
expectation of these mechanisms and how these mechanisms actually worked. 
A further study of the interview data reveals that there are three aspects of 
respondents' preference for the internal quality assurance mechanisms. First, 
although respondents were more interested in internal mechanisms, their interest was 
selective; they only treated peer observation and student course evaluation as more 
important and more relevant to their work than the other internal mechanisms. They 
paid less attention to the annual programme review and the approval system for new 
and revised programmes (See Chapter 9). Respondents' priority for certain quality 
assurance mechanisms suggests that there is a need for the case study university to 
make changes in the way some quality assurance mechanisms work, for example, 
peer observation, in order to increase their relevance for the work of academics, 
especially if these mechanisms are to fulfill their aims in maintaining and enhancing 
the quality of teaching. 
A second implication of respondents' preference for the internal mechanisms is that 
the impact of the external mechanisms on their work could be further minimized due 
to respondents' ignorance of the nature of the external mechanisms. For example, 
nearly one-third of respondents took little notice of the external mechanisms, 
particularly the QAA. This ignorance and disinterest created a lack of 
communication between the QAA element of the quality audit process and academics, 
producing a greater barrier to quality audit's making a difference on the work of 
academics. Third, when respondents had little knowledge of the external quality 
assurance mechanisms, the `expectation gap' for the audit (Power, 1994, p. 6) would 
be larger because respondents would more be likely to find the quality audit not 
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achieving what it aimed to achieve. 
Considering that there were variations in respondents' attitudes toward the internal 
and the external quality assurance mechanisms and also considering that these 
mechanisms are indeed closely related with quality audit (See Section 4.1 in Chapter 
3), it is important to analyze how respondents perceived the effect of the quality audit 
as a whole on their work and thereby explore whether the quality audit fully 
achieved its intended aim to improve the quality of teaching in the case study 
university. 
Section Two: Respondents' Perception of the Quality Audit 
A careful study of the literature and an analysis of the interview data gleaned from 
the case study university reveal that the impact of quality audit processes on the work 
of academics varied in different time periods. In the early years of the quality audit 
processes, from HEFCE and QAA, the audit used Subject Review, carried out at the 
subject level, to check the quality of teaching and learning. This Subject Review 
appeared to affect the work of academics significantly. However, the current quality 
audit process, where this case study occurred, was perceived by respondents to have 
made less of an impact on the work of academics because of quality audit methods. 
These methods moved toward a light touch review instead of a subject level 
assessment. However, one feature of the audit, namely its `administrative control' 
(Power, 1994, p. 47) over higher education institutions, remains the same in the 
current quality audit process in spite of these changed methods. This administrative 
control has caused an impression among respondents that there arc power hierarchies 
in place between the QAA and the case study university. 
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2.1 Administrative Control of the Quality Audit 
An analysis of the literature, the interview data, and the official documents, namely 
those of the case study university and the QAA, reveals that external quality audit 
works as an administrative control over higher education institutions. Power (1994, 
p. 19) interprets this aspect as `control of control' because the audited institution 
establishes its own internal quality assurance mechanisms to assure quality of 
teaching, while the external mechanisms checks whether these internal mechanisms 
work properly according to these outside influences. Not only Power but also my 
respondents perceived quality audit as being administrative control over the case 
study university. Respondents perceived this control as meeting the requirement of 
the quality audit, including both Subject Review and Institutional Audit of the QAA 
because many of the internal quality assurance mechanisms within the case study 
university were established during the process of the quality audit, such as peer 
observation, annual programme review, an approval system for new and revised 
programmes and units, and a system of quality assurance affecting both the 
individual faculties and the departments. These internal mechanisms fall under the 
scrutiny of the QAA to ensure the public that these mechanisms are working to 
maintain the quality of teaching. For example, a senior administrator who was 
responsible for academic staff development at the case study university pointed out 
that the set-up of some internal quality assurance mechanisms within the institution, 
such as programme review and the quality assurance team within the faculty, was 
one of the significant impacts of the Subject Review: 
Academic audit originally, and the university had its first visit in 1993. When that 
happened, we had almost no formal quality assurance mechanisms, except external 
examining. And since then we have built up various systems, but they are all based 
around academic practices, being the people who assure the quality ... I think that is very important, because we all have quality assurance in place in interaction 
with students. (Respondent 53) 
The other fourteen respondents, most in management positions, agreed with 
Respondent 53 and articulated that the quality audit encouraged the establishment of 
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internal quality assurance mechanisms. For example, a respondent in charge of 
undergraduate studies in the Faculty of Science suggested that the case study 
university had to make sure that its internal mechanisms were in order to convince 
the QAA that the quality of their teaching was good: 
I think it is now fairly recognized and the central point is that if we do not behave 
sensibly at the institutions, external bodies would make us do things we might not 
want to do, so we'd better try to regulate ourselves within a serious guideline than 
reaching a position that others tell us we must do. (Respondent 4) 
This quote suggests that quality assurance mechanisms are closely tied to the quality 
audit and that the audit uses these mechanisms to regulate the quality of teaching in 
the case study university. This finding corresponds with Power (1994,1997), namely 
that the audit exerts administrative control to make sure that the quality assurance 
mechanisms within the audited university are in place and stay in place to maintain 
the quality of teaching expected by the audit. 
2.2 Perceived Power Relations between the QAA and the University 
Together with the view that the quality audit works as an administrative control over 
the audited institution, there was a perception among respondents that the QAA 
created a power hierarchy that subordinated the case study university to the authority 
of the QAA. There were two main reasons for this perception - the institution's 
compliance with the Institutional Audit and the potential influence of the QAA on the 
reputation of the university. 
English higher education institutions are still undergoing the Institutional Audit. 
Seventy higher education institutions were given their Institutional Audit reports by 
November 2004, and the second round of that audit is currently in progress (QAA, 
2008b). To prepare for the Institutional Audit, the case study university has to 
establish its internal quality assurance mechanisms and produce paperwork to assure 
the QAA that their mechanisms work well enough to maintain the quality of teaching. 
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However, generally speaking, respondents hate the paperwork and perceive it as 
benign irrelevant to their teaching and an additional burden and bureaucracy. Take 
programme specification, for example. Most academic respondents showed little 
interest in the specification, but respondents who were programme directors still had 
to write the specification to meet the audit requirements (See Section 1.3 in Chapter 
9). Respondents perceived the necessity to prepare paperwork and the establishment 
of internal quality assurance mechanisms as being university compliance with the 
requirement of the Institutional Audit and causing a sense among respondents that 
there was a bureaucratic power relation between the QAA and their university. 
Moreover, the QAA makes its Institutional Audit results transparent to the public by 
publishing them on its website. Many respondents were aware that the Institutional 
Audit results could influence the reputation of the university, especially when 
undergraduates are paying higher fees since 2006. Students are now becoming more 
careful about which university they attend. A quarter of the respondents implied that 
if the university/school wanted to make money from students, they had to design 
courses that would attract students, especially international students. One perceived 
way was to get a good Institutional Audit result that could convince the public, 
including potential students, that the quality of the university was high. The 
reputation influence of the QAA, together with the case study university's 
compliance, with the requirements of the Institutional Audit made respondents feel 
that the QAA had considerable power over their university, especially in terms of 
setting up quality assurance mechanisms to meet the requirement of the audit. 
Except for this perceived power relation, there is evidence that the quality audit 
worked as a symbolic regulation over the work of the respondents. In order to 
illustrate the symbolic regulatory role of the quality audit, first it's important to 
analyze the development of quality audit methods to reveal the different methods that 
do appear to have different impacts on the work of academics and also reveal that in 
spite of the perception that the quality audit worked as a symbolic regulation, the 
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audit did have a lasting impact on the work of one- third of the respondents. 
2.3 From Subject Review to Institutional Audit 
Many researchers, such as Morley (2003) and Shore & Wright (2000), argue against 
Subject Review, a type of assessment of all subjects taught in higher education 
institutions in a cycle that started with Teaching Quality Assessment and lasted from 
1993 to 2001 (QAA, 2008a). This review focused on assessment of teaching at 
subject levels. However, the Subject Review was replaced by the Institutional Audit 
which implements a light touch review method (Harvey, 2005), and focuses less on 
direct assessment of academic teaching at the subject level and more on ensuring that 
the quality assurance systems of the institution are working effectively to maintain 
academic standards and quality (See Chapter 2). The first round of the QAA 
Institutional Audit operated from 2002-2003 to 2005-2006 (QAA, 2008b). 
Considering that quality audit is a continuing process but uses different methods, 
such as Subject Review and Institutional Audit, this research first compared the 
perceived impact of Subject Review on the work of academics with the impact of the 
Institutional Audit to find out whether there was a perceived change regarding the 
impact of the audits on the work of academics. Another aim was find out whether the 
current quality audit process was perceived as closely related to the work of 
individual academics and whether the quality audit has changed the way academics 
actually conceptualise themselves. 
2.4 Perceived Impact of the Subject Review 
My case study indicates that the Subject Review was perceived to have had a 
massive impact on the work of academics. A quarter of the respondents (16) who 
experienced Subject Review still recalled it. One perceived impact was making them 
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pay more attention to their programmes and improving their teaching. For example, a 
respondent in charge of a medical school described the dramatic impact of the 
Subject Review that he experienced: 
... 
(Subject Review) It had a very big impact. It made its rethink a large amount of 
what we did with our programmes, particularly the (* * *) programmes.... Because 
we are going to be assessed in a number of different areas, and we had to write the 
self-assessment document, so we had to carefully think about what we did and how 
we did it and how we organized it. We had a whole list of approach that affect 
student learning. And this was going to be externally assessed. It may be just revisit 
and rethink everything we did and it exposed a lot very poor practice, which we 
had to correct before the assessor arrived.... Very very positive, I think. Lots of 
work, very stressful, lot of colleagues didn't like it, but it improves the quality of 
what we do quite substantially, I think.... A very good idea. Personally, I wish we 
still had Subject Review.... (Respondent 2) 
From the words of Respondent 2, one can see that he perceived Subject Review as 
not only important in improving the academics' teaching, but also a cause of the 
heavy workload of academics. Another respondent in charge of undergraduate 
studies in the Faculty of Science also emphasized the importance of Subject Review 
and lamented at the replacement of Subject Review by the Institutional Audit: 
Subject Review I think was very good. ... 
It made people come into your subject 
area to see how you did. I am sorry that it is going. Very sorry to see Subject 
Review go, because I thought it was very good. (Respondent 4) 
It is quite evident that both Respondent 4 and 5 are strong supporters of Subject 
Review because of its significant impact on improving the work of academics. Three 
other respondents shared a similar view on the positive impact of Subject Review. 
All five respondents were in or were used to being in management positions. 
Similarly, the literature suggests that Subject Review did achieve some significant 
positive effects. For instance, increased institutional attention has since been paid 
toward teaching and learning because of the external assessment. There was also an 
increased awareness of the importance and increased practice of good teaching 
(Brennan et al., 1997; Dill, 2001), and there were more active discussions and 
co-operation within academic units and a more clarified responsibility on the part of 
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academics to improve their teaching and student learning. Finally, there was a 
provision for better information being decimated on best practice by academics (Dill, 
2001). My case study also indicated that the tight control of Subject Review 
increased workload among respondents and produced the impression that auditing 
was a form of power control. The Subject Review was compulsory, and academics 
had to undergo the review process and spend time preparing for their review. Eleven 
respondents who experienced Subject Review confirmed that aspect. The control 
view is identical with the argument offered by Shore & Wright (2000) that the audit 
was a form of power control and was closely related to the work of individual 
academics. 
However, respondents in this case study perceived themselves as professionals and 
asserted loyalty to their disciplines. They only accepted the standards and practices 
agreed as good and defensible by professionals in their own discipline community 
(See Section 3.1 this chapter). This loyalty, together with the increased workload 
caused by the Subject Review (Kinman & Jones, 2003) caused academics to resist 
the tight control of Subject Review (Morley, 2003). There was growing resentment in 
the university system toward Subject Review (Kogan & Hanney, 2000). As a result, 
the QAA changed its audit method and began to rely on the Institutional Audit alone. 
It uses a light touch review to reduce the workload of academics (QAA, 2008 b). 
An analysis of the interview data reveals that although the Institutional Audit has 
replaced Subject Review, the Institutional Audit still has had a lasting effect on the 
work of respondents in the case study university. However, it is hard to tell whether 
this effect is passed on by Subject Review or not. There is an indication that the 
quality audit did work as a symbolic regulation of the work of the respondents. 
2.5 Symbolic Regulation of the Quality Audit 
The perceived symbolic regulation of the quality audit is detectable from two main 
269 
evidentiary sources. The first source is that some of the quality assurance 
mechanisms studied were in effect optional, and many respondents found it easy to 
ignore that mechanism. Another example is peer observation. Although the case 
study university expected that academics would pay attention to peer observation and 
would take part in it regularly, peer observation was voluntary procedure in most 
departments/schools. One- third of respondents revealed that many academics in 
their departments had not been peer observed in the past three years, from 2003 to 
2006, (See Section 2.2 Chapter 9). Thus peer observation had little real impact on the 
work of respondents. The optional practice of quality assurance mechanisms did not 
make respondents feel that it was compulsory to take part in a quality audit. As for 
the external examining system, that was established long before the QAA and is still 
a peer- to- peer system (See Section 2.2 Chapter 2). 
Except for the optional nature of certain quality assurance mechanisms, the 
inconsistent implementation of quality assurance mechanisms within the 
department/school, such as annual programme reviews and the 2005 NSS, also 
suggests that quality audit does have a symbolic regulatory role. To be specific, 
nearly half of the respondents had little knowledge of the annual programme review 
(See Section 3.1 in Chapter 9). Similarly, the majority of respondents below the level 
of the department/school head knew little of the 2005 NSS (See Section 3.1 Chapter 
8). The inconsistent implementation of quality assurance mechanisms suggests that 
respondents did not pay much attention to these mechanisms and did not take the 
quality audit seriously. There are other examples as well to suggest that quality audit 
worked as a symbolic regulation of the work of respondents. For example, the 
majority of respondents showed no interest in programme specification and subject 
benchmarking statements. Many ignored these mechanisms. Their ignorance implies 
that the quality audit could not always regulate what respondents did. 
Take peer observation for example. Although it is closely related to teaching, very 
few respondents were willing to take part in the observation process unless their 
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department/school had fixed the observation conveniently for them. Three out of 
seven departments/schools that were studied admitted that peer observation was new 
in their departments/schools, in spite of the fact that it was informally long 
established during the process of Subject Review. Moreover one- third of 
respondents showed a resistance to peer observation because they perceived it as 
driven by the quality audit and used for promotion purposes instead of improving the 
quality of teaching. Respondents' resistance suggests that they did not feel obliged to 
obey the requirements of the quality audit, although on some occasions they would 
adjust slightly to meet its requirements when necessary. 
A further analysis of the interview data suggests that when the quality audit works as 
a symbolic regulation, its impact on the work of respondents' still varied. 
Respondents' attitudes toward the audit varied depending on the length of their years 
working, their position, and their subjects taught. Comparatively speaking, 
respondents in their early career stage appeared to spend less time worrying about the 
audit and had less knowledge of the quality audit than did other respondents. 
However, the majority of respondents in their early career well knew about peer 
observation and student course evaluation and took these two mechanisms seriously. 
They depended on these mechanisms for promotional input. In contrast, most 
respondents in the middle and late stages of their academic careers did not think peer 
observation could ever influence their teaching significantly. 
Management academic respondents in general had more knowledge of the quality 
audit processes and showed a greater positive attitude toward the quality audit than 
did academic respondents. For example, all fifteen academic managers knew about 
the quality audit, and eight broadly accepted the audit and regarded it as an important 
practice. However, only ten of fifty- nine academics found the quality audit useful or 
relevant for their own work. The more supportive attitude of academic managers 
toward the quality audit is due to the fact that these managers make decisions on 
change and are aware that quality audit outcomes could influence the reputation of 
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their institution. They had the responsibility to implement the quality assurance 
mechanisms successfully. 
My respondents came from seven different disciplines, and their response to quality 
audit varied slightly with their disciplines. Respondents from social science- related 
disciplines and philosophical courses were more critical of quality audit, while 
respondents from medical- related courses held slightly more positive attitudes 
toward quality audit. Respondents in medical courses had indeed been regulated by 
professional bodies long before the quality audit, so perhaps they found it easier to 
cope with the requirements of the audit than did the respondents from the other 
disciplines. Respondents had various reactions toward the audit and that variation 
suggests that the quality audit works only as symbolic regulation and respondents 
feel they are free to deal with the audit in different ways. 
2.6 Lasting, but Limited, Impact of the Quality Audit on Academics 
The interview data indicates that although respondents had different responses 
toward the symbolic regulation of quality audit, the audit had a lasting impact on the 
university as an organization, more so than on academic work itself and for two main 
reasons. First, the first round of the QAA Institutional Audit happened shortly after 
Subject Review, so there was the lasting influence of the Subject Review on the work 
of academics during the Institutional Audit process. Secondly, many internal quality 
assurance mechanisms within the university were set up during the Subject Review. 
These mechanisms existed then and were well equipped and developed during the 
Institutional Audit to assure the quality of teaching within the institution. 
However, because of the light touch review methods of the Institutional Audit, the 
impact of the quality audit on the work of academics appeared to decrease when 
compared with that of the Subject Review. For example, a senior administrator 
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interpreted the replacement of Subject Review by an Institutional Audit as both good 
and bad. She expressed her concern that the light touch review by the Institutional 
Audit was less concerned with quality at the subject level: 
... 
On one hand, I can see Subject Review did enable culture change. It has 
enormous impact, but the problem about it was it was enormously bureaucratic.... I 
can't say I believe it should continued, because it was taking away academic time 
from what they are here to do, which is to research and teach... Because now that 
the Subject Review visits have finished, we have really few opportunities to really 
work with academic departments... because for Subject Review, everybody knows 
what they have to do and quite good at it, being prepared for it,... but the audit we 
have is moving further away from looking at quality at subject level. That's ok, 
but 
... actually, in my opinion, there is 
less opportunityfor the institutions to know 
what is exactly happening than we have Subject Review.... (Respondent 53) 
What Respondent 53 implied is that the Subject Review focused on checking the 
teaching at the subject level, so it produced better internal quality processes to 
manage teaching at the university than did the quality audit which adopted light 
touch review methods. An analysis of university documents reveals that there are two 
main activities related to the university assurance procedure in a quality audit: 
Annual programme review and regular visits to departments by faculty-based quality 
assurance teams. Not many respondents found these activities a useful practice to 
their teaching, confirming the view of Respondent 53 that the current quality audit 
process made it more difficult for managers to use the internal quality assurance 
mechanisms within the university. The quality audit still appeared to have limited 
impact on the work of respondents, partly because of the culture change produced by 
the Subject Review, in spite of the light touch review method used for the current 
audit. 
The interview data suggests that one perceived limited effect of the quality audit was 
on curriculum. The majority of respondents who were not in vocationaUprofessional 
programmes did not regard quality audit as important in improving their curricula 
significantly. Another perceived limited effect was on the power relations between 
academics and students. Respondents in general did not think that a quality audit 
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played a vital role in changing this power relation, although student course 
evaluation had made academics more responsive to the needs of students (See 
Chapter 9 Section 1.3). 
In spite of the limited impact of the quality audit, there is evidence that one third of 
respondents adopted positive attitudes toward the quality audit and found it important 
and helpful to their working practice in two major ways: Increasing awareness of 
good teaching and improving undergraduate teaching practice. These positive effects 
suggest that the process of quality audit was perceived in general as useful, although 
with some specific limitations. 
2.6.1 Perceived Increased Awareness of Good Teaching 
One fifth of respondents admitted that they had paid more attention to teaching, 
because the quality audit increased the possibility to reflect upon their teaching, 
made them spend more time thinking about the aims and objectives of their teaching 
and as result improved their teaching practice. For example, a female director of 
quality assurance on a Science faculty argued that the records required by quality 
audit could increase the awareness of good teaching because it helped academics 
reflect on their teaching: 
1 would say that paper trail reflects teaching.... It is the job of the teaching 
committee to make sure that what is delivered is what is described and through 
peer observation, we can check whether that is happening. Through the student 
questionnaires, if there is anything missing and those students say so and we would 
pick it up that way. (Respondent 8) 
What Respondent 8 implied was that the paperwork for the quality audit was 
important, especially the peer observation and student course evaluation because 
academics would make changes accordingly. A further analysis of the interview data 
reveals that another reason for the perceived increased awareness of good teaching 
was that a quality audit kept academics on their toes. For example, a teaching fellow 
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in the Social Science Department articulated that the external check of quality in the 
audit increased academics' awareness to perform well: 
(Long pause) I think most things will be done better ... when they 
(academics) 
know that ... someone is checking. 
(Pause) if you are going to clean the fridge, ... 
for example, when you know that someone is going to check, so you might do it, not 
just flush the dust, ... you 
know someone is checking and marking on it, ... and you 
might loose your job, if you don't do it well, (laughter) then do a better job. 
(Respondent 49) 
What Respondent 49 implied was that academics might increase their awareness of 
performing well when they knew that someone from outside was observing them. 
This conclusion implies that an external check could be useful for academics because 
not all academic teaching was good. The finding differs from the argument by Power 
(1994,1997) that the external check of an audit can be seen as problematic for 
professionals, because the checks for a quality audit can only sometimes increase 
respondents' awareness to perform in a better professional way. 
A male lecturer in an Engineering department in this case study shared the view that 
the quality audit increased awareness of good teaching practice and pointed out that 
quality audit might have made academics feel pressured, but was still a good thing 
because the audit helped increase academics' reflection on teaching, in spite of the 
fact that it did take time for academics to improve their teaching practices: 
Through quality audit, you find out something ... that 
is problem this year, but you 
don't fix it up till next year.... or sometimes it has to wait a couple of years until we 
change the curriculum,... or the programme structure again,... so it is quite slow 
process. And it makes difficult to ... judge 
how good it is, or to... how feel good 
about it, so ... most people still 
feel it is a little bit of pain, but we have learned to 
live with it ... in many ways, and ... overall, 
1 think it is a good thing... in the end, 
because it makes you think harder... about what you do. (Respondent 31) 
The above comments from respondents in this case study suggest that a very slight 
change of culture has occurred among academics because of the quality audit, which 
is a similar finding as the argument of Shore & Wright (2000) that audit produced a 
culture shift. One- fifth of respondents (12) in the first phase interviews were more 
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aware of the quality audit, and it did increase their awareness to teach better. That 
increased awareness is one achievement of the quality audit, and identical with the 
argument of Brennan et al. (1997) and Dill (2001), namely that increased attention 
has been paid to teaching as a result of external audit assessments worldwide, 
especially in regards to the quality of teaching. 
2.6.2 Perceived Improved Teaching Practice 
Except for a perceived increased awareness of good teaching, there was an argument 
among one- third of the respondents (20) that a quality audit helped improve 
undergraduate classroom teaching practice. Quality audit implemented standards for 
teaching, got rid of bad teaching practices, and took student coursework seriously. 
For example, the Head of School in an Arts Department argued that quality audit was 
important in implementing minimum standards for teaching: 
Well, I suppose for many people, the impact will be on matters of ... 
details... so, 
err, if one gets questionnaire response thing, certain part of the courses will be 
more difficult than others that quickly go through and typically staff will take that 
into consideration of the plan for... the course of the next year, so that might be the 
level of detail. At the global level, I think that ... 
it has helped us to make a bit more 
sensitive to teaching quality issues which generally means ... that nobody thinks it 
satisfactory to go and give a completely unprepared lecture that is badly organized 
and so forth. It has implemented the minimum standards for all teaching. 
(Respondent 11) 
Together with the provision of minimum teaching standards, the quality audit was 
perceived as useful in getting rid of bad teaching practices because not all teaching 
was good and some did need to be improved. A female teaching fellow in a Social 
Science Department argued that quality audit encouraged teachers to keep instruction 
material in the case study university up to date: 
I think, without the scrutiny (of audit), ... 1 think people would be ... very.... What 
is the word? I am thinking of,... would be very laid back... about their teaching. 
They would take the programme ... off the shelf and deliver it again. ... 1 an sure 
that a lot of people in this university ... deliver very old material. You know that is 
not up to date. We should try to keep ... all our materials up to date, the current 
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policy, the current practice. ... It is our responsibility ... to keep ourselves up to 
date today. (Respondent 48) 
Respondent 48 implies here that a quality audit stopped some academics from using 
out-of-date teaching materials, so their teaching became more current. Except for 
teaching material, other minor changes came out of the audit process, including the 
use of high technology, improved feedback to students, and improved teaching style. 
A professor in a Social Science Department pointed out that academics began to give 
students more feedback because of the quality audit: 
... I think, most of the quality assurance, ... in principle, the changes we made, ... 
have been good, so there is much more ... written 
feedback to ... students... than 
they would receive in the past. Although it can be quite burdensome, so for example, 
if the students give a presentation, ... you 
know, ten years ago, they give a 
presentation and that is it. Now, we are required to ... provide a written set of 
comment ... on the presentation. .... 
You have to make sure that... these written 
comments are provided and that takes a bit of time.... In the same way. 20 years 
ago, when I was... a student, and I got my essays back, there were a few scribbles 
of comments on the bottom. ... It is much more precise ... checklist and process. 
That can also sometimes be burdensome, but I think, ... in principle, it is a good 
thing. (Respondent 42) 
What Respondent 42 suggested was that although a quality audit could be 
burdensome because of the large amount of paperwork, the audit actually made 
academics perform better, particularly in providing better course comments to 
students. About one- third of respondents shared this view and argued that the quality 
audit made them become more systematic toward student coursework, which then 
improved their teaching. 
The perceived increased awareness of teaching and improved teaching practice 
described by the respondents suggest that although the light touch review of the 
quality audit focuses on checking internal quality assurance mechanisms, and 
although academics did show resistance to some aspects of earlier quality audit 
processes, for example, the Subject Review, some quality assurance mechanisms still 
have had lasting impact on the work of academics. This impact is due to the fact that 
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institutionalized pressure for a quality audit increased the possibility that individual 
academics would reflect on critiques of their teaching and make improvements. The 
perceived changes in teaching and also the awareness of teaching style imply that the 
quality audit has produced a slight culture shift among respondents on how to teach 
well and better. One- third of respondents indeed adopted positive attitudes toward 
the audit and found it to be both important and helpful to their working practice. 
However, that culture shift during the period of the Institutional Audit appears to be 
less massive than the cultural shift produced by the Subject Review. 
Considering the fact that the quality audit was perceived by the respondents to have 
affected their work in both positive and negative ways, this research decided to 
explore whether respondents had actually changed how they conceptualized 
themselves during the audit process. The research also examined the reasons for 
respondents' resistance to the quality audit other than the reasons that the quality 
audit created additional workload for academics. During the analysis of the first 
phase interviews, three terms-- professional, distrust, and bureaucracy-- appeared 
frequently in responses. In order to identify the relationship between quality audit 
and these three terms, second phase interviews were conducted with thirty academics. 
These thirty respondents were gathered by emailing the original sixty- four 
academics from the first phase interviews, but just under half responded. I found that 
the resistance of academics to the quality audit was related to a perceived tension 
between quality audit and the respondents' belief that they were professionals. 
Section Three: Tension between Academics as Professionals and the Nature of a 
Quality Audit 
All thirty respondents in the second phase interviews held the unanimous view that 
they were professionals. A bit more than half (16) argued that a tension existed 
between the nature of a quality audit and their perception that academics were 
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professionals. These respondents held slightly different attitudes toward the quality 
audit in the first phase interviews. To be more specific, fourteen of these sixteen 
argued against the quality audit, while only one supported the audit and only one 
held mild attitudes toward the concept. (See Table 3 below) The tension between the 
nature of the quality audit and academic work seen as a profession was caused by 
three main factors: The time cost of the audit procedure, the bureaucracy of the audit, 
and the audit's distrust of academics. 
In contrast, the other half of these respondents (14) in the second phase interviews 
argued that as long as the audit scrutiny was logical and not too burdensome, they 
did not see any tension between the quality audit and their notion of being 
professionals because they felt that regular review and self-evaluation was part of 
their professional activity, and as professionals they should be accountable to 
students and accountable to the use of public money, for example, their salary. These 
fourteen respondents all also presented positive attitudes toward the quality audit in 
the first phase interviews. Of these respondents, six were manager academics, one 
was a teaching fellow, two were professors, and five were lecturers. (Sec Table 4 
below) 
Table 3: Number of respondents Asserted Tension between Quality Audit (QA) 
and their Professionalism, and number of those held Various Attitudes toward 
the Quality Audit in First Phase Interviews (N=16) 
Respondents' position Opposing QA Mild attitude toward QA Supporting QA 
Academic Manager 4 1 
Lecturer 8 0 0 
Professor 2 0 0 
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Table 4: Position of respondents' Showing Positive Attitude toward Quality 
Audit in First Phase Interviews (N=14) 
Respondent Position Supportive Attitudes toward Quality Audit 
Manager 6 
Teaching Fellow 1 
Professor 2 
Lecturer 5 
3.1 Academic work as a Profession 
Although all thirty respondents to the study perceived themselves as professionals in 
the second phase interviews, their interpretation of being a professional did vary. On 
most occasions, respondents who worked in a subject accredited by a professional 
body normally took being professional to mean being recognized by a professional 
body or being a member of that body. However, the other respondents who worked in 
nonprofessional subjects interpreted academic work as a profession in six ways: 
1. The nature of the job is non manual; 
2. The job has standards and practices agreed as good and defensible by 
professionals in the same discipline community (high level of education and 
qualification/degree, and regular training in proper procedures); 
3. They possess the ability to do their job efficiently and effectively (skills, high 
level expertise in their subject field, and a specialist role); 
4. They conduct themselves with acceptable behavior for the 
promotion/development of their chosen discipline (adherence to standards; 
conscientious workmanship to known standards, enacting the principles 
embodied in the codes of their profession to ensure that one meets the high 
standards expected in their work); 
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5. They work ethically (a matter of attitude: treating students appropriately, 
commitment to standards and rules of the profession, responsibility to students 
and to the development of knowledge); 
6. They have academic freedom (determine their own work practice), have peer 
governance, and have autonomy. 
Most respondents combined more than one of the features above when they 
described themselves as professionals. The most widely accepted features were three: 
Academics possess skills that require a high level of education and high 
qualifications; academics are committed to standards and rules set by their 
subject/discipline fields; and academics have the freedom to determine their own 
work practice with peer governance. The high level of education and high 
qualifications indicates that academic work has a knowledge base that requires a 
lengthy period of education (Wilson, 1979). The commitment to standards and rules 
set by their subject/discipline fields is one of the principles embodied in the codes of 
the profession to ensure that academic professionals meet the high standards 
expected in their work (Freidson, 2001). 
The view that academic work is a profession was not only well supported by my 
respondents, but also by academic researcher, such as, Halsey (1992), Henkel (2000), 
Millet (1967), and Wilson (1979). Wilson (1979) holds to three strong arguments for 
academic work as profession. One is that university is the seedbed of the traditional 
professions, for example, law and medicine. The second argument is that the 
professional ethos for academics has deep roots. The third is that academic work has 
attributes of traditional professions, such as, special expertise, moral integrity, and 
control over who practices the professional. These attributes are raised and discussed 
by Freidson (2001), Johnson (1972), and Larson (1977). 
However, my interview data revealed that one important feature of traditional 
professional work was not in academic (only in respect to teaching) -- providing 
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expert service to clients. Most respondents in the case study university did not 
support the concept of expert service in their work. That concept refers to the 
complex, theoretical, and specialized knowledge that is applied to the problems of 
clients, employers, or customers (Freidson, 2001; Johnson, 1972; Larson, 1977). One 
reason for this view was the difficulty in defining the clients/ customers of academics. 
The majority of respondents in this case study refused to treat students as customers 
because of their perception that higher education was not a product and because they 
knew more about the subject than their students did. This view suggests that although 
respondents perceived their work as a profession, their refusal to treat students as 
clients/ customers made their academic work distinctive and separate from the more 
traditional professions. It needs to be made clear that when this study explored 
academic work as a profession, the research only analyzed it from a teaching aspect 
without consideration of research effort. Whether the notion of expert service can be 
applied to research is a completely different topic and outside the scope of this 
research. 
Except for the notion of expert service, academic work has all the other attributes of 
a profession, such as special expertise, moral integrity, adherence to a code of 
practice, and control over who practices, all discussed by Freidson (2001), Johnson 
(1972), and Larson (1977). For example, academics have control over who practices 
because if one wants to become an academic that person normally needs to achieve a 
high level of post-school education and qualifications/degrees. To achieve this level 
of education, the individual has to apply to university as well as pass all kinds of 
exams. Academics have the right to decide which applicants are admitted to 
university and awarded degrees. In this way academics gain control over who 
practices as academics. 
The adherence to code of practice in the case of academic work can be interpreted as 
a strong commitment to standards and rules set by their subject/disciplinc and a 
category that was the best supported among respondents. This commitment suggests 
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that academic work is a kind of authority within organizations, not only because 
academics manage their own teaching and research and manager academics deal with 
academic work, but also because of their recognition of a standard of conduct that 
governs the exercise of knowledge and skill (Wilson, 1979). There is an indication 
that the majority of respondents only accepted the standards of conduct enacted 
within their own disciplines, not from the outside, for example, from the QAA. The 
respondents asserted that they preferred to be checked and regulated by peers who 
knew their subjects/ disciplines, like external examiners, but not assessors from the 
QAA. They regarded these assessors as non-professionals. For example, a male 
lecturer responsible for quality assurance in an Art Department offered examples to 
illustrate why assessors for the QAA were not professional: 
My opinion is ... they are incapable ... of assessing ... quality of teaching, 
because 
the way the things ... were set up. 
I mean we spend long hours ... writing 
documents 
... and we 
had this room ... 
full of documents and when ... people come 
in, they said. -' Most of them aren't reading documents. ' (Pause) They don' 
necessarily know ... what is 
happening, although ... they 
do sit on some classes. 
(Respondent 55) 
What Respondent 55 implies is that some assessors of the QAA do not take the 
documents prepared by academics seriously. That lack made academics feel that 
their work was not respected. Another reason for the dislike of the QAA assessors 
was that the assessors were not perceived as having solid knowledge of the assessed 
subjects. Ten other respondents shared the view of Respondent 55. This finding 
suggests that respondents tended to treat the QAA assessors and their assessments as 
non-professional because the respondents believed their authority was derived from a 
disciplined- based professionalism, also analyzed by Dearlove (1997). Therefore, 
when the quality audit challenged respondents' assumptions and values about being 
professionals, they felt that the audit challenged their notion of being professionals 
and thus the academics chose to ignore or show resistance to the quality audit. This 
ignorance and resistance confirmed that there was tension between the quality audit 
and academics' notion of being professionals. An analysis of the interview data 
suggests that this perceived tension is caused mainly by the time cost of the audit 
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procedure, the bureaucracy of the audit, and the audit's distrust of academics. Time 
cost of the quality audit appeared to be the strongest reason for the tension. 
3.2 Time cost of Quality Audit Procedures 
Half of the respondents in the second phase interviews argued against the time cost 
of the quality audit procedure. For example, a male lecturer in a Science school 
explained that the priority of academics was research or teaching, and they did not 
want to spend time doing quality audit tasks: 
The only real conflict I see is time - time to ensure that quality audit is satisfied is 
time potentially lost to other professional duties. (Respondent 37) 
What Respondent 37 implied here was that the quality audit was burdensome, and 
the time academics spent in preparing for the audit could be used for research and 
teaching. This viewpoint corresponds with a finding in my first phase interview that 
one reason for respondents' regarding the quality audit as burdensome was that the 
majority of respondents treated quality audit- related job as administrative jobs and 
not their priority (See Chapter 7). 
Another reason why respondents perceived the process of quality audit as time 
consuming was the different perceptions of standards between respondents and the 
quality audit. What a quality audit viewed as good practice might be different from 
the judgment of academics. For example, the quality audit uses an administrative 
measure to judge the quality of teaching and learn of the university, while 
respondents perceived that measure as simply paperwork. A male lecturer in a 
Science faculty explained that the administrative exercise of the quality audit was 
opposed to the professionalism of academics: 
... Quality audit might suggest that we can meet standards with less effort, but a 
sense of professionalism might dictate that we continue to pul a lot of energy into 
producing a 'top end' but inefficient educational product..... Quality audit can 
rapidly become an administrative exercise, i. e. simply a way of formalising on 
paper what is being guided by our own professionalism anyway. It then serves to 
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add to stress and divert energy from activities that are more deserving of our 
highly qualified input.... (Respondent 29) 
What Respondent 29 implied is that although a quality audit uses light touch review 
methods to regulate the quality of teaching, academics did not accept the standards 
set by the audit because they had different ways of interpreting quality of teaching. 
They did not perceive a quality audit as really measuring quality, but more as a 
procedure for academics to fill in forms and a waste of time for academics. Half of 
the respondents in the second phase interviews shared the view of Respondent 29 and 
showed some resentment to the time cost of doing audit paperwork. They held the 
argument that as professionals they would like to control their own work instead of 
being told to do typical boring paper work that did not benefit their teaching and 
research, but only created tension and was conflictive with their notion of 
professionalism. This tension, according to Freidson (2001), is because professionals 
like to use the notion of professionalism as a unique form of occupational control and 
to promote and facilitate their own occupational changes without interference. It 
seems that professionals like to gain control of their work for better practice, instead 
of being told to do paperwork that they view as useless for constructive occupational 
change. 
3.3 Bureaucracy of the Quality Audit 
The second major cause for a perceived tension between the quality audit and 
respondents' professionalism is the alleged bureaucracy of the audit. According to 
Max Weber, bureaucracy originally had a technical and neutral meaning and was `the 
means of transforming social actions into rationally organized action' (Roth, G. & 
Wittich, C., 1968, p. 987). This definition suggests that bureaucracy originally was 
meant to be an efficient system of administration with impersonal recruitment and 
run as a hierarchy, using a set of precisely written rules. 
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3.3.1 Bureaucracy: Perceptions of the Respondents 
These respondents from this university case study perceived bureaucracy differently 
from Max Weber. Many respondents used bureaucracy for pejorative reasons and 
usually related the term to the quality audit. One example is that respondents used 
bureaucracy/bureaucratic as a label for actions/tasks they did not want to do. 
Respondents also associated bureaucracy with administrative support of a 
department/faculty/university; an excess of paperwork; the necessity to conform to 
regulations that simply took up time that would be better spent on teaching and 
research; excessive adherence to rules or standards and less autonomy for those 
involved; and a legalization for academics to formalize rules and bureaucratize ways 
they must deal with students. 
Nearly half of the respondents in the second phase of interviews used 
bureaucracy/bureaucratic interchangeably as a label for tasks they did not want to do, 
such as peer observation, a quality audit, and administrative jobs. Take peer 
observation for example. It is anything but bureaucratic because it does not involve 
hierarchy. However, according to Watson (2003), bureaucracy is originally related to 
hierarchy, a system of people or tasks/actions arranged in a graded order. In other 
words, bureaucracy is 
the control and co-ordination of work tasks through a hierarchy of appropriately 
qualified office holders, whose authority derives from their expertise and who 
rationally devise a system of rules and procedures that are calculated to pro vide 
the most appropriate means of achieving specified ends (Watson, 2003, p. 86). 
There is little evidence that peer observation creates a hierarchy between the 
observer and the observed in the case study university, although when peer 
observation was used for promotion purposes, there was perceived power present 
between the observer and those observed. However, on most occasions, peer 
observation only involves academics observing their peers' lectures and then offering 
suggestions on those as well as filling in the necessary forms, so there is no hierarchy 
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created there. It is a peer- to- peer process, instead of a bureaucratic one. Therefore, 
when respondents perceived peer observation as being bureaucratic, their notion of 
bureaucracy contradicted the original meaning of bureaucracy. Perceiving peer 
observation as a bureaucratic practice implies that respondents perceived 
bureaucracy differently from Weber and Watson and also that these respondents used 
bureaucracy/bureaucratic as a label for what they did not want to do. A head of 
school confirmed this viewpoint and asserted he was not surprised that academics 
showed resistance to peer observation because they showed a similar resistance to 
the other quality assurance mechanisms: 
Sure, my experience is that anything, any other bureaucracy which imposed on 
them (academics) to do and that consumes their time is resisted. It is not 
necessarily peer observation. It may be some other forms of quality assurance, 
whatever it is. Maybe they are required to do some form of internal audit, or fulfill 
in the questionnaire or whatever. Anything takes time is resisted because we have a 
huge amount of work. (Respondent 13) 
What Respondent 13 implied is that academics use the term bureaucracy to resist 
what they do not like, and they referred the term "bureaucracy" to those bureaucrats 
who imposed quality assurance mechanisms and a quality audit. Therefore, the label 
not only applies to peer observation, but also to some administrative jobs. For 
example, an administrator in Engineering made the view explicit: 
When academics talk about 'bureaucracy, they usually mean admin tasks which 
they see as unnecessary, usually imposed by the university or outside bodies rather 
than the department. Quality assurance is a good example. If it involves a lot of 
paperwork, the typical response of academics is to say 'we are spending so much 
time on the paperwork, we don't have enough time to deliver the quality' or 'the 
questions being asked don't measure real quality' or just you don't understand our 
situation'.... (Respondent 7) 
Respondent 7 means here that academics tend to use bureaucracy to refer to 
administrative tasks and paperwork that they have no interest in addressing. Nearly 
half of the respondents in the second phase interviews shared this view and equated 
bureaucracy with their unwanted administrative jobs which involved repetitive work 
and box ticking exercise. One implication of the perceived bureaucracy of the quality 
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audit is that respondents disliked the quality audit and regarded it as a paper exercise. 
This dislike corresponds with the finding in Section 2 of this chapter where only one- 
third of respondents found the quality audit useful and important to their work. The 
other two- thirds of respondents showed doubts about the quality audit and expressed 
resistance to it. 
3.3.2 Different attitudes of Respondents toward Bureaucracy 
Most academic respondents showed a strong resentment toward bureaucracy in their 
work environment. In contrast, nearly half of administrators and academic managers 
in the second phase interviews articulated that bureaucracy was a necessity to 
completing the work of academics, especially when they were working in an age of 
quality audits. Two quotations give a flavor of the respondents' different attitudes 
toward bureaucracy. A female senior lecturer in a Social Science department was 
unusual in her strong resentment of the audit bureaucracy: 
... the QAA... are bureaucrats, ... because each year they change the forms. They 
change it every year because someone has to justify their existence. ... And that 
makes more work for us ... and more time. The university admin does the same.... 
It takes out massive amount of money... from the department and they produce 
nothing for the university. They don? teach. They don't research and they don't do 
anything, but they create endless paperwork, you know, and they do that, I know, in 
part, because of pressure from ... QAA or from whoever outside, but they seen to 
bend backward... and generate ... their own 
bureaucrats to make more paper work, 
so there is bureaucracy ... at all different kind of 
levels (Respondent 45). 
It is noticeable here that Respondent 45 hated the bureaucracy of the quality audit 
and described it as a way to justify the existence of bureaucrats. This resentment 
suggests that the respondents were bored with the long process of a quality audit, so 
they termed tasks related to the quality audit as bureaucratic. However, nearly half of 
academic manager respondents held different views and argued that some academics 
overstated the time they spent in completing documents requested by the quality 
audit. For example, a female senior manager in Social Science studies pointed out 
288 
that not all academics were required to fill out documents related to a quality audit 
because it was normally administrators who dealt with these audit- related tasks and 
even when some academics were required to fill in forms, it did not take them very 
long to finish them: 
Well, ... the minimum document, the unit outline, is actually nothing to 
be honest. It 
is not a big deal. I wouldn't want that to be a big deal... (Respondent 33) 
Respondent 13 did not perceive the bureaucracy of a quality audit as a serious 
problem for her academic colleagues. Her view was shared by five other academic 
manager respondents who confirmed that although not all the academics had audit- 
related jobs, some of their academic colleagues used the word `bureaucracy' as a 
self- defensive mechanism to avoid being asked to do unwanted jobs. For example, a 
male senior manager in an Arts department confirmed that the quality audit was not 
the main cause of bureaucracy; yet academics always labeled things required by 
quality audit as bureaucracy: 
... Bureaucracy is a pejorative term 
for formalised administrative procedures', in 
academic usage, .... 
In some cases, virtually all administration is so 
labelled. 
... Possible examples of things which my colleagues might 
label as 
bureaucracy; Annual Programme Review ...; the process 
for approving new 
optional units, ...; the paperwork surrounding the training and mentoring of new 
staff. In general, it is the 'audit culture, that requires that everything should be 
written down, minuted, and approved by a range of people. (Respondent 17) 
It is evident that Respondent 17 felt some academics exaggerated the bureaucracy of 
the quality audit. This exaggeration suggests that although the bureaucracy of a 
quality audit was perceived as one cause for the tension between the quality audit 
and respondents' notion of professionalism, the interpretation of bureaucracy 
depended on the position of the respondents and also on which side of the fence 
respondents sat. Generally speaking, the respondents who held a more understanding 
attitude toward bureaucracy were those who perceived the quality audit in a positive 
way. For instance, academic manager respondents held a milder attitude toward the 
perceived bureaucracy than did their academic colleagues. 
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In spite of the respondents' different understanding of and different attitudes toward 
bureaucracy, the word "bureaucracy" is still widely used by respondents from the 
case study university. The widespread use of bureaucracy has two implications. One 
is that higher education institutions are not bureaucracy free because in all 
institutions there are mixtures of collegial, academic-based decision-making, and 
bureaucratic/hierarchical work. The `collegial work is not simply a coming together 
of peers, but is itself structured into hierarchical and bureaucratic formats, ' so `a lot 
of decision making process will inevitably become bureaucratized' (Kogan, 1999, p. 
270-271). The other implication is that respondents disliked the quality audit and 
perceived it as a conflict with their professionalism, so they showed ongoing 
resistance to the audit and its bureaucracy. It is important for both the senior 
management teams in universities and the QAA to explore and address the 
problematization of bureaucratic management within the quality audit process, so 
there can be increased understanding of the purpose of the quality audit from 
academics. 
3.4 Distrust of academics by the Quality Audit 
The interview data suggests that the third cause for the perceived tension between 
quality audit and the respondents' notion of professionalism was the distrust of 
quality audit present in academics. About one-third of respondents in the second 
phase interviews articulated that they distrusted the external check of the quality 
audit and that this external check is a sign that quality audit does not trust academics. 
They showed an objection to this external check because as professionals they did 
not like being subjected to any external scrutiny. This objection suggests that these 
respondents believed that as professionals they were competent enough to think 
about and solve problems that fell in their own domain, so trust should be placed on 
their professionalisms, instead of their being checked and assessed by people from 
the outside, i. e., the QAA. 
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The perceived distrust raised by respondents is not new in the literature. Martin Trow 
(1993) was among the first to associate the development of external quality 
assessment with a withdrawal of trust in the academic community. Similarly Eraut 
(1994) lamented that professional bodies use to exist to protect the public from 
unqualified non-professionals, for example, `quack' doctors, but now these 
professional bodies also function to protect the public from the professionals because 
the routines of the professionals are also subjected to scrutiny. What Trow (1993) and 
Eraut (1994) imply is that academics sense a decline of trust in their professional 
conduct and worry that academics are losing their authoritative power because of the 
external check of their professionalism through the quality audit. 
However, the interview data does suggest that not all respondents felt distrusted by 
the quality audit. There was a perception among nearly half of respondents (ten 
academic respondents and four manager academic respondents) in the second phase 
interview that meeting the requirements of the quality audit is a matter of 
accountability, not distrust. These respondents argued that a regular review and 
self-evaluation should become part of academic activity and it was time for 
academics to learn how to prove they were doing their jobs properly. For example, a 
senior lecturer in an Engineering department argued that academics should change 
their biased attitudes toward the quality audit: 
I think it is a case of developing the right attitude, and learning to negotiate. 
Developing the right attitude means you have to stop thinking of quality assurance 
as doing unpleasant paperwork when asked, to try to prove that you are doing your 
job properly. Instead, you have to think about changing your everyday procedures 
so that the quality of what you do gets recorded, in a way you can demonstrate on 
demand, with as little extra effort as possible. (Respondent 9) 
Respondent 9 was understanding of the task involved in the quality audit and 
encouraged academics to adopt a negotiating attitude toward the audit. This 
understanding and cooperative attitude suggests that the quality audit has produced a 
slight culture shift among respondents regarding how to perceive the audit and also 
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how to cooperate with the audit. There was an indication that this culture shift also 
happens in regard to how respondents conceptualize their own professional 
behaviour. For instance, there was increased accountability awareness among them. 
Five academic respondents and four manager academic respondents argued that 
academics should become accountable for their funding and their salaries. A lecturer 
as well as a senior manager in a medical course laughed at the idea that the quality 
audit distrusted academics. He argued strongly that academics should become 
accountable to the public for money because they received funding and were being 
paid to do their work: 
The academic felt distrusted? Good excuses for not doing anything. I am sorry, but 
I have little sympathy with that.... Maybe I shouldn't name it, but what, the MY 
colleges..., which for many years, were purely private universities and recently get 
some money from the government for the students? Little about five years ago, it 
came into the HEFCE and the QAA mechanisms. Therefore they had a Subject 
Review Subject Review stopped, but they just come in so they still went through the 
process. I thought it quite funny, because they were talking to their principal, 
complaining bitterly about this intrusion into looking what they do. And I listened 
to him over dinner complaining bitterly about this and found that simple. Don't 
take their money. (Respondent 2) 
What Respondent 2 argued here was that since the HEFCE provided funding to 
academics and universities, academics should become accountable for the funding. 
This increased accountability awareness, in the words of Walden (1996), stems from 
the demand for higher education institutions to become accountable for their use of 
public resources. The quest for greater accountability to the public penetrates the 
lives of academics in England. Eight other respondents from the case study 
university held a similar view of accountability as Respondent 2. They argued that 
being accountable should become an essential part of academic work. For example, a 
female senior manager in Social Science argued strongly that academics should 
become accountable for public money, at least for their salaries: 
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... We should 
be accountable to somebody, because we are paid the public money. 
This is the basic rule. We can't do whatever we want. We are paid actually not bad 
an amount of public money. We have enormous amount of freedom over our day. 
You know most academics haven't worked at anything for most of their life.... I 
think people who taking their salary but talk in gibberish and never responding to 
students and doing the sort of worst practice. I think you do need some system to 
find these to deal with them.... (Respondent 1) 
It is evident that Respondent 1 showed strong support for academics' becoming 
accountable for public money because of her perception that accountability could 
make academics more responsible to students. Five other academic respondents 
shared her view and argued also for the need of accountability. For example, a female 
lecturer in a Social Science department articulated that although being accountable 
meant that the workload of academics would increase to some degree, doing so 
would keep academics on their toes and prevent them from using the same teaching 
material: 
I think it is a good trend. (long pause) I think, it will ... err, ... I think it is tendency 
to ... keep back on your toes a little bit. ... Academics just 
keep repeating the 
same ... teaching material, ok, I think it will 
keep on their toes a little more. They 
won't be able to be, err, ... lazy is not quite ... the right word, 
but only to work and 
stay on some materials and ... making it interesting and ... not 
being floppy; ... in 
all kinds of ways. (Respondent 19) 
What Respondent 19 suggested then is that being accountable would result in 
academics increasing their awareness of good teaching, and they would produce 
better lectures. This view reveals that there is increased awareness of accountability 
among respondents and a tendency for respondents to perceive being accountable as 
a common practice of their work. The increased awareness of accountability related 
to an increased awareness of good teaching, which could be perceived as changes 
produced by the quality audit. This change suggests that the quality audit has 
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produced a culture shift among half of the respondents in the second phase 
interviews. However this culture shift did not apply to the majority of respondents 
and thus could be understood as only a slight culture change. Moreover this culture 
shift has been undertaken through a long process from the Subject Review 
(1993-2001) to the Institutional Audit. This shift exemplifies how respondents 
perceived their teaching, how they perceived the quality audit, and how they 
perceived accountability. Except for this culture shift, the quality audit has 
challenged some of the respondents' values, for example, their notion of 
professionalism. The academics held a strong belief in professional authority in their 
specific subject/discipline areas. (See Section 3.1 this chapter). As a result, there was 
perceived tension between the quality audit and the respondents' notion of 
professionalism, confirming that when the quality audit works as an external check, 
it is perceived as a challenge to the academics' assumptions and values and has 
produced new norms of conduct and professional behaviour among many academics 
(Shore & Wright, 2000). 
Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed and interpreted how respondents in the case study university 
perceived the impact of the quality audit on their work. It first compared the 
respondents' perception of internal quality assurance mechanisms with that of the 
external mechanism and determined that respondents in general showed a preference 
for the internal mechanisms. These mechanisms were more relevant to their work 
than were the external mechanisms. Then the chapter explored the respondents' 
perception of the quality audit as a whole and revealed that during the audit process, 
the case study university established several new internal quality assurance 
mechanisms to meet the requirements of the audit. Thus the quality audit was 
perceived as administrative control over the university. This administrative control 
issues was raised earlier and discussed by Power (1994,1997). 
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Except for the view that the audit works as administrative control over the university, 
there was a perception among respondents that there was a power hierarchy between 
the QAA and the case study university. The higher education institutions in England 
are still undergoing the Institutional Audit by the QAA. The institutions have no 
choice but to prepare for the audit and produce paperwork to prove that their internal 
quality assurance mechanisms are working well enough to maintain the quality of 
teaching at the institution. Additionally, the result of the QAA Institutional Audit was 
perceived to have influenced the reputation of the case study university. This 
reputation influence, together with the institution's compliance with the requirements 
of the audit, made respondents sense there was an uneven power relation between the 
QAA and the case study university. 
In spite of the perceived power hierarchy between the QAA and the case study 
university, there was a perception among respondents that quality audit processes 
worked as a form of symbolic regulation over their work and the same regulations 
was sometimes also true for the internal quality mechanisms. There are two reasons 
for this perceived symbolic regulation. First, some quality assurance mechanisms 
worked as optional practices in the case study university, for example, peer 
observation. The optional practice made respondents feel that it was not compulsory 
to take part in quality audit. Secondly, there was inconsistent implementation of the 
quality assurance mechanisms within the department/school; for example, nearly half 
of the respondents had little knowledge of the annual programme review process 
taking place in the institution and the majority of academic respondents knew little of 
the 2005 NSS. Such little knowledge of and ignorance of the quality assurance 
mechanisms suggests that respondents did not take the quality audit seriously, and 
the quality audit processes worked as a symbolic type of regulation over the work of 
the respondents. However, the respondents did present different attitudes toward the 
symbolic regulation of the quality audit. About one-third of respondents held 
supportive attitudes toward the quality audit and found the audit both important and 
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helpful to their working practice. The rest either ignored the quality audit or showed 
resistance to it. The various attitudes toward quality audit was related to their length 
of working years, their position, and their subjects. For example, academic manager 
respondents appeared to have more knowledge of the quality audit and paid more 
attention to the audit because they were the people who make decisions change and 
because the audit result could influence the reputation of the institution. 
The case study completed for this research reveals that the whole process of quality 
audit measures is perceived to have achieved a certain amount of impact on the work 
done by academics. However, the effect of the QAA Institutional Audit process upon 
institutions, especially at the academic level appeared to decrease, when compared 
with the effect of the Subject Review, a previous audit method (1993-2001). This 
result is partly because the Institutional Audit adopted a lighter touch review method 
and partly because respondents showed a degree of resistance toward the quality 
audit. However, the quality audit still appeared to have some effect, although limited, 
on the work of academics, including increasing awareness of good teaching among 
respondents, maintaining currency of materials, and helping to improve 
undergraduate classroom teaching practices. 
In spite of the positive changes produced by the quality audit, two-thirds of 
respondents in the first phase interviews ignored or showed resistance to a quality 
audit, partly because of the tension created by that audit with academics' professional 
authority. Respondents showed strong support for their own professionalism in their 
disciplinary domain, but their perception of academic work as a profession was 
different from the notion of traditional professions. Respondents indicated that 
academic work had a lack of expert service or the complex, theoretical, and 
specialized knowledge often applied to problems of clients, employers, or customers. 
It was hard to apply this expert service to the teaching efforts of respondents because 
the majority of academics did not perceive their students as customers or consumers. 
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Half of the respondents in the second phase interviews felt that there was tension 
between the quality audit and the respondents' notion of professionalism. The 
majority of these respondents showed resistance to or ignored the quality audit in the 
first phase interviews (See Table 3). Their perceived tension was caused by the time 
cost of a quality audit, the bureaucracy of a quality audit, and distrust of academics 
by those administering the quality audit. This tension suggests that the quality audit 
has challenged some traditional academic values that focus upon the respondents' 
subject/discipline fields where their professional authority is so strong that they do 
not like being checked and assessed by people from outside their fields. When 
academics were facing the external review process of the quality audit, especially the 
Institutional Audit of the QAA perceived as coming from the outside, the respondents 
constructed and used the discourse of professionalism to maintain and regain control 
of their subject/discipline. 
In contrast, the other half of respondents in the second phase interviews asserted that 
they did not feel the tension between the quality audit and their notion of 
professionalism. They did not feel they were distrusted during the check and 
assessment of the quality audit. Instead they demonstrated an increased awareness of 
accountability. For instance, they regarded the regular review of the quality audit and 
any self-evaluation as part of their professional task. They also felt it important for 
academics to learn to become accountable to funding and salary because doing so 
helped this group of respondents provide better teaching to students. The increased 
awareness of accountability can be perceived as a slight culture change that was 
produced by the quality audit. Moreover, these respondents perceived the quality 
audit as having delivered its claimed benefits of an assured quality of teaching. This 
finding suggests that the culture change by the quality audit was indeed taking place, 
together with a smattering of new norms of conduct and professional behaviour. 
Although a similar culture shift has been taking place since the Subject Review, 
which was revealed and analyzed previously by Shore & Wright (2000), the current 
culture shift is not as dramatic as that alleged to the Subject Review. Some 
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predictions like those by Shore & Wright (2000) have not been realized because of 
the different light review methods and also the resistance of academics toward a 
quality audit. 
The respondents' mixed views, both supportive and resistant, toward the quality audit 
are related to the idea that some respondents still strongly hold traditional values of 
collegiality that relate to academic autonomy and freedom (Dearlove, 1997). Those 
respondents in mid-to late career seemed to cherish the earlier time when a university 
was a self-governing community of scholars, even when their university was imbued 
with hierarchical forms of management, for example, new managerialism, which puts 
high emphasis on explicit management of core and support activities (Deem, 2004). 
The belief in such collegiality enabled respondents to hold on to an authority that 
they related to their professional status, training, experience, and disciplines. Two 
thirds of respondents believed that they should be free to manage their teaching 
without being directed by an outsider, for example, the QAA. These respondents 
defied any external regulation of quality audit and showed resistance to it. As a result, 
the quality audit became a symbolic regulation that controlled the work of 
respondents at the case study university. 
This symbolic regulation by the quality audit raises a question as to whether the 
enormity of any quality audit operation, from the Institutional Audit to the Subject 
Review, has been justified because of its rather limited effect on academics, 
especially when considering that the case study university spent large amounts of 
money and energy to prepare for the audit, only to learn that the apparent impact of 
the quality audit was not obvious. Because this case study indicates that respondents 
indeed supported external examination which is less expensive with fewer resources 
involved, these audits can cause a change in academic work because of good 
citizenship between examiners and academics. Thus it might be a good idea to revise 
the quality audit system into a system where academics can take the lead. In other 
words, it might be beneficial to have external examining leads, instead of QAA leads. 
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Academics might be happier and show more interest in and get more involved with a 
quality audit process led by academics 
Another thought is that it is important for the quality audit and the academic 
community to increase their levels of mutual understanding, in order to establish 
more cooperation in the process of quality audit and thereby achieve improved 
working practice. It is high time that the quality audit rethink its audit methods and 
reduce the perceived time cost of an audit, the perceived distrust of an audit toward 
academics, and the perceived bureaucracy of an audit. In that way, the quality audit 
will not be perceived as interfering with academic professionalism in related subjects 
and disciplines. 
The third thought is that because professions often had to respond to external 
demands for changes in history, which could be political, economic, cultural and 
social (Johnson, 1972), a similar case might occur in the higher education sector if 
the institutions still have to rely heavily on government funding and if academics 
want to continue to have their work accepted as a profession and not merely a 
vocation (Weber, 1918) or a way of life (Hogan, 2003). Therefore, it is important for 
the academic community to learn to negotiate with the quality audit and redefine 
their views of professionalism in terms of their academic underlying commitments 
and purposes. Their professionalism should not only be defined in terms of status and 
self-regulation, but also in terms of values and practices which can benefit society as 
a whole. 
As Nixon & Marks (2001) suggest, it is time for the academics to become a learning 
profession, in order to meet the needs of the community they serve because the 
changed context of the higher education sector, including marketisation and mass 
higher education, has produced a need for academic professionalism to be `based not 
only on their ability to 'profess' their own professional values, but also on their 
capacity to receive and work with the values of others' (Nixon & Ranson, 1997, 
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p. 207), such as parents, students, local and national communities. Therefore 
academics should operate as public intellectuals and their practice should remain 
open to differences, such as, difference of opinion and outlook and difference of 
cultural backgrounds and expectation, because their prime responsibility is to 
students, colleagues and the wider community. 
According to Nixon & Marks (2001), the new professionalism should be both 
oppositional and self-critical, it should not only look beyond its own professional and 
institutional interests but also take a critical look at those interests and at the moral 
and political assumptions that underpin them. From the perspective of quality audit, 
by doing this, both government and the higher education institutions as well as 
academics can gain the best benefits from a quality audit process. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusion of My Thesis 
Introduction 
There are four main purposes for this chapter. First, to draw together my findings and 
explain how they have answered the research questions; secondly, to compare my 
research with previous research on quality audit processes, suggest in what way this 
research does something differently reveals any similarities and differences regarding 
the theoretical points made by Power (1994,1997) and Wright & Shore (2000), and 
present the claims for contribution of my thesis; third, to reflect on the research 
process, the strength and limitations of this research and how I minimized those 
limitations; fourth and finally, to suggest areas for future research arising from what I 
have accomplished here. 
Section 1: Answers to the Research Questions 
My single case study of a research-intensive pre-1992 university in England was 
carried out to answer three research questions, but divided into two phases: January 
2006 - April 2006 and October 2006. The first phase focused on the two research 
questions listed below, while the second phase dealt with the third research question, 
also presented in this section: 
Research Question One: What perceived impact have the external quality assurance 
mechanisms, such as the QAA Institutional Audit, the external examining system, the 
control of professional, statutory and regulatory bodies over some teaching 
programmes and the 2005 National Student Survey (NSS). had on the work of 
academics? 
Research Question Tivo: What perceived impact have the internal quality assurance 
mechanisms within the institution, namely, peer observation, student course 
evaluation, annual programme review and the approval system for new and revised 
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programmes and units, had on the work of academics? 
To address these two research questions, I conducted 64 interviews and a substantial 
document analysis. The first research question, for example, is concerned with the 
perceived impact of external quality assurance mechanisms on the work of 
respondents, so the respondents were asked what they thought of external 
mechanisms as a whole. The respondents held mixed views toward these 
mechanisms because each mechanism had pros and cons and each mechanism was 
perceived to have both a positive and a negative impact on their work. For example, 
the perceived positive impact of external mechanisms was seen to lie in the increased 
awareness of the importance of good teaching, an increased confidence in teaching, a 
different insight into teaching, and keeping respondents in touch with academics 
from different universities. By asking the respondents their general perception of the 
external mechanisms, I developed a more holistic picture of how external quality 
assurance mechanisms actually affected the work of respondents. 
After exploring the respondents' general perception of the external quality assurance 
mechanisms, I examined the impact of individual external mechanism on the work of 
the respondents by asking them what effect they thought the individual mechanisms 
had on their work. This process gave the respondents a chance to discuss the 
individual mechanism in depth and further reflect on the process of quality audits. I 
generated large amounts of data on that question. One finding appeared was that the 
respondents' positive perception toward the individual mechanism depended on 
whether that mechanism was teaching related or not. If the mechanism was teaching 
related, respondents perceived it as important and useful. 
Otherwise, the respondents perceived the mechanism as distant from their work and 
showed little interest in it. For example, the 2005 NSS was the least accepted 
external mechanism, while the role of professional bodies in relation to teaching 
programmes was the best accepted. One reason was the perceived flawed methods of 
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the NSS and the perceived use of the NSS in institutional system use instead of 
teaching. Another reason was that the professional body prescribed and controlled 
teaching and curricula, which made respondents feel it to be compulsory to observe 
its requirement. As for the other two external mechanisms, the majority of 
respondents preferred external examining to the QAA because they regarded external 
examining as a peer review and because external examining did not increase the 
workload of most of respondents as they were not external examiners. 
The perceived general impact of external quality assurance mechanisms and the 
respondents' different attitudes toward the individual mechanisms helped to address 
the first research question on how the external mechanisms affected the work of the 
respondents. That process also allowed me to realize that the respondents' different 
perception of a quality audit was related to their different positions. One example 
was that an academic manager knew more of the QAA and the NSS than academics 
and managers were more likely to emphasize the potential effect of the QAA and the 
NSS on the work effort of academics than did their academic colleagues. One 
explanation for this different perception is that many of these manager academics had 
jobs related to a quality assurance mechanism, so they knew more about these 
mechanisms and tended to assure people, especially outsiders, that these mechanisms 
were both important and useful. The analysis of the relationship between the 
respondents' perceptions and the respondents' position let me understand why the 
respondents had mixed views about the external quality assurance mechanisms, as 
well as allowed me to understand the influence of the external mechanisms on the 
work of the respondents. 
In answering the second research question on how the respondents perceived the 
impact of internal quality assurance mechanisms on their work, similar methods were 
used to those regarding the first research question, and the answers achieved for that 
question (See Chapter 9). After addressing Question Two, I compared the findings to 
Research Question One with that of Research Question Two and found that although 
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respondents held mixed views toward both internal and external quality assurance 
mechanisms, in general they found that the internal mechanisms more useful to their 
work than were the external ones for four reasons. First, the respondents were more 
familiar with the internal mechanisms. Secondly, the external mechanisms were 
perceived as less relevant to their work than were the internal mechanisms. Third, 
respondents were more likely to be sceptical of external mechanisms than internal 
mechanisms because they had doubts on the methods of these mechanisms. Fourth, 
there was a blurred distinction between external and internal mechanisms. Some 
external mechanisms were internalized in the case study university, but there is little 
evidence that respondents treated the internalized mechanisms as important. 
The analysis of respondents' perception of the quality assurance mechanism and the 
comparison of respondents' attitudes toward internal and external quality assurance 
mechanisms not only addressed the two research questions in Phase One but also 
enabled an understanding of the influence of the quality audit on the work of the 
respondents. In order to explore the impact of quality audit further, I conducted a 
Phase Two study by emailing all original 64 respondents. Thirty replied. There was 
one research question included in this Phase Two study: 
Research Question Three: Do academics perceive themselves as professionals? is 
there a perceived tension between the quality audit process and culture and the 
perception that academic work as a profession? 
This question explores whether there is a relationship between the quality audit and 
academics' notion of professionalism because the words "professional" and 
"professionalism" appeared frequently in the responses in the first phase interviews. 
All 30 respondents confirmed that they were professional. Half felt the tension 
between the quality audit and the notion of their professionalism, caused by the time 
cost of the audit, the bureaucracy of the audit, and a general distrust of audits in 
academics. The respondents also interpreted how they perceived bureaucracy and 
professionalism in their work (See Chapter 10). The findings for Research Question 
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Three explain why these respondents held mixed views toward quality audit and why 
there was vocal dissatisfaction about the quality audit among them. During the 
analysis of the data, I explored whether this data proved or disapproved my 
theoretical framework adopted from Power (1994 1997) and Shore & Wright (2000). 
The differences and similarities between my research and their two researches are 
analyzed below. 
Section Two: Comparison to Research by Power (1994,1997) and Shore & 
Wright (2000) 
My research findings differ from those of Power (1994,1997) and Shore & Wright 
(2000) to a certain degree. The most obvious difference is the time period and the 
teaching assessment/review methods. What Power and Shore & Wright mainly 
concentrated on was audit in the 1990s. The audit for the period 1993-2001 used 
Subject Review, a kind of assessment of all subjects taught in higher education 
institutions for a cycle that lasted from 1993 to 2001 (QAA, 2008a). Subject Review 
was perceived as a tight control over the work of academics (Morley, 2003). In 
contrast, my project studies the quality audit that occurred shortly after Subject 
Review. This quality audit process not only involved an Institutional Audit of the 
QAA, but also a variety of quality assurance mechanisms within and upon the 
institution. According to Harvey (2005), Institutional Audit is a light touch review 
method because it focuses less on direct assessment of academic teaching at the 
subject level and more on ensuring that the quality assurance systems of the 
institutions are working effectively to maintain academic standards and quality. 
These different teaching assessment/review methods can greatly influence the impact 
of quality audit on the work of academics. Moreover, my case study university had 
just experienced an Institutional Audit when I started my research in 2005. The time 
span of my research and that of Power (1994,1997) and Shore & Wright (2000) was 
then different. 
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In addition to the different time period and different methods of quality audit, my 
research findings differ further from those of Power (1994,1997) and Shore & 
Wright (2000). It is good first to compare those findings with Power (1994,1997) 
and then with Shore & Wright (2000). 
2.1 Comparison to Power (1994,1997) 
One difference between my research finding and Power's (1994,1997) is the impact 
of quality audit on the work of academics. Power argued that the audit had little 
impact because it focused on paperwork instead of the real teaching of academics. 
Yet one third of the respondents in my case study were supportive of quality audit 
and argued for its importance in improving their work and increasing awareness of 
the importance of good teaching and improved teaching practices. 
Another difference between my research finding and Power's (1994,1997) is that 
Power (1994,1997) perceived auditing as power over the institution, but this 
research indicates that it is not the audit processed per se, but rather the QAA that 
creates power hierarchies and places them on the institution. The QAA has the power 
to influence the reputation of the university because the publication of Institutional 
Audit results on a website can influence potential students in their choices of 
universities, especially when students have to pay top up fees. The case study 
university complied with the requirement of the Institutional Audit and had to use 
large amounts of paperwork to demonstrate to the QAA that its internal quality 
assurance mechanisms worked properly and maintained the quality of teaching and 
learning. The majority of respondents had little interest in this paperwork and 
perceived it as a waste of time, so they regarded this compliance process as a sign 
that the QAA just wished to create a power hierarchy that would control their 
university. 
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Except for the differences indicated between my research and Power's, there are 
many similarities. Both Power (1994,1997) and my research confirm that audit 
works as control over the higher education institutions because the quality assurance 
mechanisms imposed upon the university will check the performance of the quality 
assurance mechanisms within the university. To be specific, my case study university 
complied with the requirements of the quality audit and established its own internal 
quality assurance mechanisms, such as peer observation and student course 
evaluation, to ensure the quality of teaching. The external quality assurance 
mechanisms, for example the QAA, checks whether these internal mechanisms arc in 
place. These two levels of checking suggest that quality audit works as a control of 
the university's control. 
2.2 This Research Compared to the Research of Shore & Wright (2000) 
After comparing my findings with that of Power, it is important to compare this 
research with that of Shore & Wright (2000) because their work was one of my 
theoretical frameworks. According to Shore & Wright, audit shapes a new 
organizational culture and is used as an instrument for new forms of governance and 
power, thus embodying a new rationality and morality and engendering among 
academic staff new norms of conduct and professional behaviour. What they implied 
is that the audit is closely related to the work of individual academics and is designed 
to reduce academic freedom and to change their professional behaviour. 
There was little indication in my respondents of the perceived quality audit as having 
tight control over their work. Instead, the respondents regarded the audit as a 
symbolic regulation. Although most respondents were aware of the existence of the 
quality audit, they felt that the impact of the Institutional Audit and quality assurance 
mechanisms on their work was decreasing when compared with the audit during 
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the period of Subject Review. Moreover, some quality assurance mechanisms worked 
as optional practices and were not visible in the case study university. These included 
peer observation and annual programme review. Such optional and invisible practices 
made respondents feel that it was not compulsory for them to take part in the audit, 
so some chose to ignore it or even show resistance. Secondly, there was an 
inconsistent implementation of quality assurance mechanisms within the 
department/school. For example, the majority of academic respondents knew little 
about the NSS. This ignorance of and resistance to the quality audit, together with the 
inconsistent implementation of quality assurance mechanisms, suggest that the 
quality audit worked more as a symbolic regulation over the work of respondents 
than as a tight control over their work. 
Under this symbolic regulation, about one- third of my respondents found that the 
quality audit was useful for increasing academics' awareness of the importance of 
good teaching, suggesting that the quality audit produced a cultural change of 
teaching among the respondents. This finding confirms the view of Shore & Wright 
that the quality audit produced some new norms of academic conduct. However, the 
culture change revealed by my case study appeared slighter when compared with the 
change found by Shore & Wright (2000). The current culture change is a lasting 
change from the Subject Review, because Subject Review had such a tremendous 
effect on the work of respondents that its influence still existed during the period of 
Institutional Audit. Also, the changed review methods of quality audit affected the 
degree of this change. This audit was perceived as being less related to teaching than 
the Subject Review, so respondents felt relaxed during the process of quality audit 
and found its influence decreased when compared with the influence during the 
Subject Review period. 
The differences between my research findings and that of Power (1994,1997) and 
Shore & Wright (2000) suggest that the quality audit using different review methods 
achieved a different effect on the work of academics in different time periods. Thus, 
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it is important to analyze a quality audit according to its precise time period. Another 
implication of these differences is that there is a danger in the quality audit's 
adopting light touch review methods because that policy made individual academics 
perceive the quality audit as less relevant for their academic work. It is becoming 
easier for UK academics to ignore the quality audit. 
2.3 The Contributions of the Study 
My research aims for an in-depth study of how academics perceived the impact of 
quality audit on their work, analyzing how academics in one research intensive 
university perceive current quality assurance mechanisms and also through 
questioning and addressing the quality audit theories developed by Power (1994, 
1997) and Shore & Wright (2000). The study also reveals and analyses the value 
tensions between academics and quality audit, as well as demonstrating some of the 
differences and similarities between academic work as a profession and the 
traditional concept of a profession. 
My study is important first in that it is much more comprehensive in its coverage of 
internal and external quality mechanisms than any previous UK study. These 
mechanisms studied include those established both before and after the setting up of 
the QAA. This kind of specifically focused research has not been carried out before 
now. Moreover, my research not only focuses on the specific quality audit methods, 
but also on the audit culture and the whole process of the quality audit, including its 
perceived purpose and its effect, so my research provide an in-depth and a more 
comprehensive picture of how academics perceive the impact of the quality audit on 
their work. 
The importance of my research also relates to its timing. There is little research on 
the period between when Subject Review disappeared and the revised 'light touch' 
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Institutional Audit was set up. My research focuses on this interim period and 
especially on that time when the QAA carried out its first round of 'new' Institutional 
Audit after the Subject Review ended. The timing of this study will help the reader 
understand the quality audit as an ongoing process that continues from the Subject 
Review to the Institutional Audit. 
The third important contribution of my research lies in its questioning of and 
addressing the theories of quality audit developed by Power (1994,1997) and Shore 
& Wright (2000) in the following three ways: 
" My research focused on the actual quality audit process and culture shift in the 
higher education sector, unlike Power who applied the audit mainly to the public 
service sector in general. My study reveals that quality audit was not perceived 
by my respondents as impression management in the way that Power argued, but 
rather was perceived as being of positive importance, although with limitations, 
for one-third of the respondents in my case study whilst two thirds saw quality 
audit as being negative or neutral in its effects. This finding suggests that quality 
audit was actually perceived as have both positive and negative impacts on the 
work of academics, instead of being universally regarded as a useless process, as 
indicated by some other previous researchers, for example, Morley (2003) and 
Newton (2002). 
" Although Power (1994,1997) perceived the audit as having/creating 
administrative power over the institution, my research indicates that it is not the 
audit process per se, but instead the QAA that creates and places power 
hierarchies upon the institution because some quality assurance mechanisms, for 
example, peer observation, are peer processes and do not necessarily create a 
power relationship between the reviewer and the revicwcc. These findings allow 
the reader to understand the quality audit in a more comprehensive way, instead 
of treating its various procedures as if they were all the same. 
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" My research considered the quality audit from the perspective of seven different 
academic subjects and disciplines, instead of focusing only on one discipline as 
Shore & Wright (2000) did. My argument about a culture shift of teaching 
produced by quality audit is developed from the findings of Shore & Wright 
(2000), but is different in revealing that not all academics responded to the audit 
passively or with resistance. Some respondents have begun to regard regular 
review and self-evaluation as part of their professional work, a change in attitude 
that demonstrates increased awareness of accountability in some academics. This 
finding can be perceived as evidence of a slight culture change among some 
(even if a minority) of academics. This change could (if found in other 
universities too) have the effect of making academics pay more attention to the 
needs of students and could also contribute to the development of academic 
work as a profession. 
My research also studied and analysed the main sources of dissatisfaction among the 
academics interviewed about quality audit and noted that for my respondents this lies 
in the tension that exists between the process of the quality audit and 
academics' notion of professionalism. This is an aspect that has been seldom been 
discussed in the previous research. The importance of considering this tension is that 
this focus draws attention to both the pros and cons of audit cultures, processes, and 
its related mechanisms, such as: peer observation, student course evaluation, annual 
programme review, Institutional Audit of the QAA, the National Student Survey and 
external examining. 
Addressing this tension could help academics to understand the quality audit as both 
symbolic regulation and something which has a positive impact on their work, even 
if it is somewhat limited. Such understanding could improve the future 
implementation of quality audit at both the national and institutional level. It could 
also help increase mutual understanding between academics and those responsible 
for the quality audit and its procedures. For example, that awareness could help 
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policy makers realize the pitfalls of the quality audit, and increase the chances of 
national policy makers and manager academics within institutions taking the needs of 
academics into account for the purposes of quality audit. My research findings could, 
moreover, result in an improvement of quality assurance mechanisms because 
manager academics could acquire a more precise and immediate understanding of the 
shortcomings of these mechanisms. That understanding gained from this case of one 
university could also help to implement positive and more effective quality assurance 
mechanisms within universities in the future. 
The fifth and final important contribution of my research is that although respondents 
argued that academic work is a profession, academic work is actually different from 
the traditional profession to some degree. The lack of a concept of an expert service 
in teaching, as mentioned by quite a few of my respondents, distinguishes the 
academic profession from more traditional professions. These perceived differences 
could help people to understand not only academic work in the context of the quality 
audit, but also why academics responded differently to quality audit processes. The 
quality audit process was perceived by my respondents to be challenging some of the 
traditional academic values (give example). These values derive from subject fields 
where academic professional authority was so strong that they did not like being 
checked and assessed by people outside their subject areas. When academics were 
facing the external review of a quality audit, respondents constructed and utilized the 
discourse of academic professionalism to fight against the quality audit to maintain 
or regain control of their subject/discipline and their social status within their 
institution and their profession. The other implication of this finding is that it is time 
either to redefine the meaning of the profession to have it include the work of 
academics or to define academic work as a profession but with its own special 
features. 
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Section Three: Reflections on the Research Process 
Of course my research had not only merits, but also limitations. As indicated in the 
methodology chapter, the empirical data of my research was mainly based on 
interviews and public official documents. There are limitations to depending heavily 
on interviews because of their obvious problematic nature. Interviews can only 
capture a snapshot of the overall viewpoints (Kvale, 1996) of the respondents. The 
respondents' perception of the audit might also be confined to only that specific 
period of time of my research. If some changed workload or positions now, they 
might view the audit differently. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that my 
research took place shortly after the first round of Institutional Audit, to reduce any 
potential superficiality of this specific interview data. 
The other problem with interviewing as a method of research is that the responses 
may be based on emotional impact or the perceived purpose of the interviewer (Keats, 
2000). Although this study was careful not to present emotion when asking for the 
respondents' perception of the quality audit and a lot of open- ended questions in 
semi-structured interviews gave all respondents more space to elaborate their views, 
some might have concealed their views in the interviews because of their positions or 
a sensitive relationship between teacher and students. 
In addition to the potentially problematic nature of the interviews, I was also aware 
of the influence of my international student status on the interviews. As a student, I 
have no working experience in the higher education sector in England, so technically 
speaking I am not an insider in terms of the work of the UK audit. This background 
affected my data collection in both positive and negative ways. The disadvantage is 
that I had little knowledge of higher education in UK and my knowledge of 
academics and their work in UK was also limited. I did spend a large amount of time 
studying the context of the quality audit during the first two years of my Ph. D. study. 
Another disadvantage I discerned was that some academics imposed their academic 
313 
power upon me during the interviews. For example, a couple of respondents put off 
or cancelled scheduled interviews for no reason. 
However, being an international student also had some advantages. One was that I 
was detached from the quality audit process, so did not have strong personal feelings, 
either negative or positive, toward the quality audit unlike the academics who 
experienced the audit. Thus, my interpretation of academic views towards the quality 
audit was little influenced by personal experience. Another advantage was that my 
international student status made most of the respondents feel comfortable about 
talking about the nature of the quality audit, allowing me to collect ample data quite 
easily. 
Another limitation of the interview research method was that my sample in one 
department conceivably was slanted because the academics I interviewed were 
designated by the head of school. This process might have influenced the final data. 
Considering that there is that limitation, I was careful with all data collection and 
tried not to place any personal bias onto either quality audit or the work of the 
academics. I adopted an interpretive research paradigm to try and capture my 
interviewees' perceptions through their descriptions and interpretations of their 
experiences with the audit. I then compared those perceptions with official document 
records and afterward provided a set of experiential accounts of the quality audit to 
the respondents for readers to reflect on here. 
Section Four: Further Research 
Although my research interpreted how academics perceive the impact of a quality 
audit and their reasons for dissatisfaction with the audit, these are additional areas for 
further research. It has not been possible within the scope of my research to cover the 
views of the QAA and the HEFCE for how the quality audit affects the work of 
314 
academics. There was a limited time for my Ph. D. study, so my research only 
presents the perception of academics at one university in England without making 
any comparisons with other universities or with the QAA and the HEFCE. However, 
it is worth examining the latter aspect in the future to explore the impact of the 
quality audit from the official point of view. An additional comparison of the official 
views on the quality audit with those of academics will determine further similarities 
and differences. This comparison will help those involved in the quality audit to 
understand it from different perspectives and different sources and provide a holistic 
picture of the quality audit in a complete British context. 
Another possible research study for the future is to compare my findings with 
research into a post-1992 university in England to explore whether academics from 
research - intensive and teaching - intensive universities have different perceptions 
of the quality audit. However, it is important at that time to state the different time 
spans of the two researches since the quality audit uses different review/assessment 
methods during different time period and some review methods are changing in the 
first and second round of the Institutional Audit. For example, the Discipline Audit 
Trails (DATs) is no longer used in the second round of the Institutional Audit. Such 
changed review methods will definitely affect the impact of the quality audit on the 
work of academics. New respondents can easily have a different perception of the 
quality audit. Moreover, in any data analysis, the contexts of two different institution 
types should be taken into account, because their individual quality assurance 
mechanisms may not be the same. If there are differences, it will be important to 
analyze the causes and what possible effects they will have on the current and future 
work of academics. 
A third possible research is to carry out a third round of interviews on the sixty-four 
respondents in this case study to learn their perceptions of the feasibility of 
establishing an academic leaning quality assurance system. It is important to explore 
their perception of academic leaning quality assurance systems to learn what kind of 
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academic leaning systems will both maintain and improve the quality of teaching and 
learning, and how such a system can work to its best advantage for the most students. 
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Appendix 1: Project Introduction 
My name is Ming Cheng. I am a PhD student in Graduate School of Education, 
University of Bristol. My project is about the Perceived Impact of Quality Audit on 
the Work of the Academics. I am interested in exploring how the internal quality 
assurance mechanism at the department level has affected the academic work from 
the perception of the academics. I am also interested in the perceived impact of the 
external quality assurance mechanism on the work of the academic. 
The internal quality assurance mechanism of the department will cover peer 
observation, student evaluation, annual programme review and approval of new and 
revised programme and unit. The External quality assurance mechanism will include 
QAA, External Examining, National Student Survey and Professional and statutory 
body. As to the work of academics, I am going to focus on the undergraduate 
classroom teaching practice, curriculum, workload and academic relationship to 
students. 
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Appendix 2: Academic Consent Form for participating in Research by Ming 
Cheng towards a PhD at the University of Bristol 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research. I am Ming Cheng, a PhD student 
in Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, England. My supervisor is 
Professor Rosemary Deem. 
The purpose of my research is to explore the Perceived Impact of Quality Assurance 
on the Work of Academics. The research is open-ended in nature and it is intended to 
have the potential to benefit any participant. The research procedure involves 
interviewing the academics and some document analysis. I would also like to have 
access to some of your departmental documents, as appropriate. 
It is fully intended that your participation will be treated in confidence, that you are 
completely comfortable with the process and that you are free to withdraw at any 
stage. All data will be kept confidential and any publication of data - for this 
dissertation and subsequent research - will be anonymised. I have informed your 
head of department/school about my research. Beyond this, any further participation 
by you would require your additional consent. 
I do require a written record of your consent, so if you agree to take part in an 
interview in the research as set out above, please sign for it. 




Appendix 3: Interview Questions for Academics (Phase One Interview) 
Personal profile 
Gender; position- years of working at Bristol; type of contract 
Internal quality assurance mechanism of the department 
1. Are you mostly teaching-focused or mostly research focused or a mixture of 
both? How much time do you spent on teaching each week? Do you have 
administrative work for your department? If, yes. What is it? Why did you come 
to do this work? Are you happy with your current workload? If, no. How did 
you balance your work last year? 
2. Do you know how the internal quality assurance mechanism of your 
department works? Are there any recent changes of it? If, yes. What are the 
changes? What has caused the changes? 
3. Does your department have a system of peer observation? If yes. Is it working 
voluntary or compulsory? How has it affected your classroom teaching practice? 
4. Do you think the undergraduate should pay their fees? Have the existing fees 
made any difference to how the academics teach? Will variable fees affect this 
more or will it be the same? 
5. What effects does student course evaluation have on the work of the academics 
in your department? How seriously is it taken? Has the student fees made any 
difference to the importance of student evaluation in the department? 
6. Has Programme Specifications made any difference to your teaching practice? 
How if at all has it affected curriculum? 
7. Has the Annual Programme Review (APR) had any impact on your teaching? 
How about its impact on curriculum? 
8. Does the approval system at department and faculty level for new and revised 
programme and unit have any impact on curriculum in your department? Does it 
have some impact on your teaching? 
9. Are there any other issues about internal quality assurance of teaching that you 
320 
would like to say? 
External quality assurance mechanism 
1. Do you think QAA is a good idea or not? Why? 
2. Do you know the Subject Benchmarking Statement of your discipline? If, ycs. 
Has it had any impact on your work? If, no. (let him read one) Do you think it 
will have some impact on your work? 
3. Is there any joint undergraduate programme in your department? If, yes. How is 
the Subject Benchmarking Statement applied to it? (some department) 
4. Your department had DATs last year. How has it affected the work of the 
academics? (some department) 
5. What is your view of the pros and cons of the external examiner system? How if 
at all does it affect the work of the academics in your department? Have you ever 
been an external examiner? If, yes. What did you make of the experience? Has it 
been useful to you here? 
6. Has your department discussed your results in the 2005 National Student Survey 
for your department? What was the outcome of this? Do you think the Survey is 
going to affect how academics teach? Will it make academics pay more attention 
to teaching and students? Will the Survey make any difference to the curriculum? 
7. Is there any relevant professional or statutory body involved in undergraduate 
programme approval in your department? If, yes. Which one(s)? How has it 
affected the curriculum in your department? (some department) 
8. Are there any other issues about external quality assurance of teaching that you'd 
like to say? 
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Appendix 4: Interview Questions for Head of Department/School (Phase One 
Interview) 
Information to be sought: career as academic etc Annual Programme Review 
Report; who is on the Faculty Quality Assurance Team; self -evaluation document 
for departmental review 
Personal profile 
Gender; years of working at university and elsewhere; ever been QAA assessor 
Internal quality assurance mechanism of the department 
Change as appropriate from QA interviews 
What are your main responsibilities vis a vis teaching in this department? 
1. Would you please let me about your departmental quality assurance mechanism 
and how they work? (Who involved; how organized; what strategies) Are there 
any recent changes in this mechanism? If, yes. What are the changes? What has 
caused the changes? 
What impact has QA had on the teaching in your department? 
2. Does your department have a system of peer observation? If yes, is it voluntary or 
compulsory? What is its impact on the classroom teaching practice in your 
department? 
3. Do you think undergraduate should i ay fees? Have existing fees made any 
difference to how you and your colleagues teach? Do you think variable fees will 
affect this more or will it be the same? 
4. What effects does student course evaluation have on the work of the academics 
in your department? How seriously is it taken? 
5. Has having to write Programme Specifications made any difference to the 
teaching practice of the academics in your department? How if at all has it 
affected curriculum? 
6. Has the Annual Programme Review (APR) had any impact on teaching in your 
department? How about its impact on curriculum? 
7. Does the approval system at department and faculty level for new and revised 
programme and units have any impact on curriculum in your department? 
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8. What do you think of the new system for new programme approval (ie going 
first via FPARC and UPARC not the Faculty Learning and Teaching 
Committees)? Is it an improvement on the old system? 
9. If a staff of your department is not happy with his or her overall workload, is 
there anything you can do to help? 
10. Is there any other issues about internal quality assurance of teaching that you 
would like to raise? 
External quality assurance mechanism 
1. Do you think QAA is a good idea or not? Why? 
2. What changes if any has the 2004 Institutional Audit report and visit had on your 
department? Have you read the report? 
3. Your department just experienced the DATs in 2004. Does it have some impact 
on the work of academics in your department? (some department) 
4.4. Has your subject Benchmarking Statement had any impact on the work of the 
academics here? 
5. How is the Subject Benchmarking Statement applied to any joint undergraduate 
programmes? 
6.6. What is your view of the pros and cons of the external examiner system? 
How if at all does it affect the work of the academics in your department? Have 
you ever been an external examiner and if yes, what did you make of the 
experience? Has it been useful to you here? 
7. Has your department discussed your results in the 2005 National Student Survey 
for your department? What was the outcome of this? Do you think the Survey is 
going to affect how academics teach? Will the NSS make any difference to the 
curriculum? Will it make academics pay more attention to teaching and students? 
8.8. Is there any relevant professional or statutory body involved in undergraduate 
programme approval in your department? If, yes. Which one(s)? How has it 
affected the curriculum in your department? 
9. Are there any other issues about external quality assurance of teaching that you'd 
like to raise? 
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Appendix 5: Interview Questions for Staff Responsible for QA Matters (Phase 
One Interview) 
Information sought: member of the Faculty Quality Assurance Team; self 
-evaluation document for departmental review 
Personal profile 
Gender; position-years of working at university and elsewhere in HE; type of 
contract; ever been a QAA assessor? 
Internal quality assurance mechanism of the department 
1. I understand that you are responsible for the quality assurance matters in your 
department. Would you please tell me about your main responsibilities? How did you 
come to be doing this job? 
2. What other administration, teaching and research are you involved in? Are you 
happy with your current workload? If, no. What are the problems with it? 
3. Do the Faculty's quality assurance mechanisms have much impact on quality 
assurance of teaching in your department? 
4. Are you a member of the Faculty Quality Assurance Team? If so how long have 
you been a member? If no, have you met all the members of the Faculty Quality 
Assurance Team? 
5. Does your department have a system of peer observation? If, yes. Is it working 
voluntarily? How has it affected the classroom teaching practice in your department? 
7. Do you think the undergraduate should pay their fees? Have existing fees made 
any difference to how the academics teach? Will variable fees affect this more or will 
it be the same? 
8. How does student course evaluation work in your department? How has it 
affected the work of the academics? How seriously is it taken? 
9. Has Programme Specifications made any difference to the teaching practice of the 
academics in your department? How if at all has it affected curriculum? 
10. Has the Annual Programme Review (APR) had any impact on teaching in your 
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department? How about its impact on curriculum? 
11. Does the approval system at department and faculty level for new and revised 
programme and units have any impact on curriculum in your department? 
12. What do you think of the new system for new programme approval (ic going 
first via Faculty Planning and Resources Committee (FPARC) and University 
Planning and Resources Committee (UPARC) not the Faculty Learning and 
Teaching Committees)? Is it an improvement on the old system? 
13. Are there any other issues about internal quality assurance of teaching that you 
would like to say? 
External quality assurance mechanism 
10. Do you think QAA a good idea or not? Why? 
11. Has subject Benchmarking Statement of your discipline had any impact on the 
work of the academics here? 
12. Is there joint undergraduate programme in your department? How is the Subject 
Benchmarking Statement applied to it? (some department) 
13. What is your view of the pros and cons of the external examiner system? How 
if at all does it affect the work of the academics in your department? Have you 
ever been an external examiner and if yes, what did you make of the experience? 
Has it been useful to you here? 
14. Has your department discussed your results in the 2005 National Student 
Survey for your department? What was the outcome of this? Do you think the 
Survey is going to affect how academics teach? Will the NSS make any 
difference to the curriculum? Will it make academics pay more attention to 
teaching and students? 
15. Is there any relevant professional or statutory body involved in undergraduate 
programme approval in your department? If, yes. Which one(s)? How has it 
affected the curriculum in your department? (some department) 
16. Are there any other issues about external quality assurance of teaching that I did 
not mention? 
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Appendix 6: Interview Questions for People Responsible for Faculty Quality 
Assurance and Undergraduate Studies (Phase One Interview) 
Personal profile 
Gender; years of working at university and elsewhere; ever been QAA assessor 
Internal quality assurance mechanism of the department 
1. (A) What are your main responsibilities as x x? Are you also an education 
director? If, yes. What are your main responsibilities? 
2. (B) What responsibilities do you have for QA of teaching in your faculty? 
3. How do you guarantee academic standards of undergraduate degrees in your 
faculty? 
4. What impacts has the internal QA had on teaching in your faculty? 
5. Is there peer observation of teaching in your faculty? What impact has it had on 
teaching? 
6. How seriously is the student course evaluation taken in your faculty? How has it 
affected the work of the academics? (teaching; academic relationship to students) 
7. Has having to write Programme Specifications made any difference to the 
teaching practice of the academics in your faculty? How if at all has it affected 
curriculum? 
8. Has the Annual Programme Review (APR) had any impact on teaching in your 
faculty? How about its impact on curriculum? 
9. Does the approval system at department and faculty level for new and revised 
programme and units have any impact on curriculum in your faculty? 
10. What do you think of the new system for new programme approval (ie going 
first via FPARC and UPARC not the Faculty Learning and Teaching Committees)? 
Is it an improvement on the old system? 
11. Are there any other issues about internal quality assurance of teaching that you 
would like to raise? 
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External quality assurance mechanism 
17. What impacts has the external QA had on the teaching in your faculty? 
18. Do you think QAA is a good idea or not? Why? 
19. Has the 2004 Institutional Audit visit had some impacts on your faculty? 
20. Has the subject Benchmarking Statement had any impact on the work of the 
academics in your faculty? 
21. Is the Subject Benchmarking Statement applied to any joint undergraduate 
programmes in your faculty? 
22. What is your view of the pros and cons of the external examiner system? How if 
at all does it affect the work of the academics in your faculty? Have you ever 
been an external examiner and if yes, what did you make of the experience? Has 
it been useful to you here? 
23. Do you know the outcomes of the 2005 National Student Survey for your faculty? 
Do you think the Survey is going to affect how academics teach? Will the NSS 
make any difference to the curriculum? Will it make academics pay more 
attention to teaching and students? 
24. Is there any relevant professional or statutory body involved in undergraduate 
programme approval in your faculty? If, yes. Which one(s)? How has it affected 
the curriculum in your faculty? 
25. Are there any other issues about external quality assurance of teaching that you'd 
like to say? 
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Appendix 7: Interview Questions via Emails (Phase Two Interviews) 
" Do you think you are a professional? If, yes, why? If, no, why? May I know how 
you define professionalism? 
" Is there some conflict between the requirement/procedure of quality audit and 
your perception that you are a professional? If yes, would you please give me 
some examples? 
" Bureaucracy/bureaucratic is a word that appeared frequently in my interview 
data. Would you please let me know how you define bureaucracy? Would you 
please give me some examples? 
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Appendix 8: Chronological History of Higher Education Funding Bodies in UK 
1. The University Grant Committee (UGC) was established on 14 July 1919 and 
dissolved on 21 June 1989. 
2. The Universities Funding Council (UFC) was established on 1 November 1988 
under section 131 of the Education Reform Act 1998. 
3. The Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Councils (PCFC) was established on 1 
November1988 under section 132 of the Education Reform Act 1988. 
4. Both the UFC and the PCFC were dissolved on 31 March 1992 under the 
provision of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992. 
5. The Higher Education Funding Council for Education (HEFCE) was established 
on 6 May 1992 under the section 62 of the Further and Higher Education Act 
1992. The HEFCE assumed its full responsibilities for distributing grants to HEIs 
on 1 April 1993. 
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Appendix 9: Document Sheet on Information about the Interview and the 
Interviewee by Flick (1998, p. 174) 
Date of the interview: 
Place of the interview: 
Duration of the interview: 
Interviewer: 
Identifier for the interviewee: 
Gender of the interviewee: 
Age of the interview: 
Profession of the interviewee: 
Working in this profession since: 
Professional field: 
Raised (countryside/ city) 
Number of children: 
Age of the children: 
Gender of the children: 
Peculiarities of the interview: 
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Appendix 10: Example of data analysis coding 
Respondent 5's Attributes, Knowledge of and Attitudes towards Quality 
Assurance Mechanisms 
1). Respondent 5's attributes of interviewee (Descriptive coding) 
Identifier for the interviewee 5 
Date of the interview 09/03/06 
Place of the interview office 
Duration of the interview 1 hour 28 minutes 
Gender of the interviewee male 
Years being an academic 11 years in case university and 1 year in 
another university 
Position of the interviewee people in charge of faculty undergraduate 
studies 
Rank Reader 
Professional field *** 
Experience of being a QAA assessor No 
2). Respondent's knowledge of quality assurance mechanism 
2.1). Individual interviewee's knowledge of internal quality assurance mechanisms of 
the university 
A. Nothing; B. A little bit; C. Some; D. A lot; E. Very well 
Annual Student Peer Approval 
Programme Course Observation System for 




QAPC D E E E 
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2.2). Individual interviewee's knowledge about external quality assurance 
mechanisms 
A. Nothing; B. A little bit; C. Some; D. A lot; E. Very well 
QAA External Professional 2005 National 
Examining and Statutory Student Survey 
Bodies 
QAPC E E A D 
3). Respondent's attitude towards quality assurance mechanism 
3.1). Academic attitude towards internal quality assurance mechanisms 
A. Very dislike; B. Dislike; C. Neutral; D. Like; E. Like very much 
Annual Student Peer Approval 
Programme Course Observation System for 




QAPC D B B B 
3.2). Respondent's response to external quality assurance mechanisms 
A. Very dislike; B. Dislike; C. Neutral; D. Like; E. Like very much 
QAA External Professional 2005 National 
Examining and Statutory Student Survey 
Bodies 




Appendix 11: Examples of coding and categories 
Coement 1111: Subsubcode: usage 01 
1 
IQA reassuring basic things ok 
Coat 1121: Subsuboode: personal 
experience of IQA: no big issues 
raised 
Comment 1131: Subcode: 
Internal quality assurance no major 
impact on UG teaching 
problems any way, but one of the things the FQAT can do ... 
is to actually give 
internal quality assurance mechanism 
on UG teaching 
('ommeot 1151: Subsubsubcode: QA 
highlighting problems 
Coaosdt 1161: Subsubcode. 
academics returning student feedback 
on time 
Comment (I7j: Subcode: some impeß 
of internal quality assurance 
mechanism on UG teaching 
Cosmett 118: Category: internal 
quality assurance mechanism (IQAM) 
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Interviewer: It is interesting. I hear that the peer observation of teaching vary in the observation a well established pi 
departments of your faculty. Commr. l 11101: Subcode: peer 
observation practice varies From 
Respondent 5: Certainly, in almost every department. ... 
I think there is one 
, {,, R,,, m,,,,, 
Comment 1191: Subcode: peer 
observation a well established practii 
Comment 11101: Subcode: peer 
observation practice varies 1mm 
departments 
Comment X111 1: Category: Internal 
quality assurance mechanism 
Comment 11121: Subsubcode: peer 
observation a regular practice 
Cornmeal 11131: Code: pea 
being done regularly. Comment 11141: Subsubcode: peer 
observation benefits individuals 
Comment 11151: Subcode: peer 
Interviewer: So how has the procedure benefited your faculty? observation a good practice 
Respondent 5: The simple answer is I do not know, because I think the benefit is at Comment 11161: Subcode: peer 
the individual level, so... I can say for myself, I am benefited both from being 
observation is a good practice 
Comment 11171: Subcode: peer 
observed and observing. And I know that various of my colleagues have done, ... 
but 
observation a good practice 
it is something which happens between two people, there isn't a sort of system ... Comment 11181: Subsubcode: peer 
where any sort of practice get more widely spread around. (pause) I think, in some observation takes time to be accepted 
way, it is a shame, because it means that it might be a really, really good thing going 
Comment II191: Subcode: peer 
observation unpopular among 
on, ... 
but it takes a really long time before everyone knows about it. On the other academics 
hand, one of the things many of my colleagues... have always been very concerned Commit 11201: Subsubsubsobeode: 
about with observation, is that it is a sort of peer separate performance evaluation or 
peer review is perfomtance evalt" ýý 
Comment 11211: Subsubsubsubcode: 
judgements on promotion ... or anything 
like that. It is not about a member of staff peer observation doesn't need report 
come to observe ... and write a report which goes to the department. You know, that is Comment 11221: Subsutuubsubcode: 
completely the wrong model, so if you decided there isn't should be a report, if there 
meting report is problematic 
is a report ... that the observation 
has taken place, then anything else will be 
Comment 11231: Subsubsubcode: 
academic confuse peer otservatir--j 
problematic. What that means is that people participate in the process. I know many Comment 11241: Code: pea 
of my colleagues if they were reported and observed, they would be much less happy observation 
to participate at all. Cornmeal 112.51: Subsubsubcode: 
academics don't want to be reported 
Comment 11261: Subsubcode; reasons 
why peer observation not popular 
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Appendix 12: Summary of coding (Respondent 5' s comments on peer 
observation) 
Category: Internal quality assurance mechanism (IQAM) 
Code: peer observation (PO) 
Subcode: characteristics of PO; Development of PO; University guideline of PO; 
department different attitudes to PO; Impact of PO on UG teaching; 
Subsubcode: A well established practice; Vary from departments; A good 
practice; a compulsory practice; Need of improvement; Unpopular among academics; 
(characteristics of PO) / QAA driven; Years of adopting PO in faculty; (development 
of PO)/ Guideline unhelpful; Guideline bureaucratic; Guideline ineffective 
(University guideline of PO)/ Resistance to QAA; Welcome PO; Doubts on PO; 
(Department different attitudes to PO)/Impact depends on individual involved; Little 
impact on good teacher; Personal experience; (Impact of PO on UG teaching) 
Subsubsubcode: A regular practice(a well established practice)/ 
Benefits individual (a good practice); Takes time to be accepted; Academics don't 
want to be reported; Confusion between peer observation and peer review; 
Additional work; Additional bureaucracy; No improvement on teaching (unpopular 
among academics)/ Not much observer can say; Teaching is good (personal 
experience) 
Data analysis: This coding suggests that in this instance peer observation is believed 
to have had little impact on undergraduate teaching, although this interviewee feels 
that peer observation is good practice and that it takes time for peer observation to be 
accepted by the academics; this interviewee feels that the practice of peer 
observation needs improvement. This interviewee points out that peer observation is 
driven by QAA, which is unpopular among academics. It is no wonder that in the 
academics' eyes, peer observation is bureaucratic and meanwhile, it has caused them 
additional work, so there is resistance to peer observation among the academics. This 
interviewee suggests that some academics confuse peer observation with peer review 
by saying that it is a wrong model of peer observation to make academics observed 
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and reported. According to the university guideline, it is only peer review that is 
performance evaluation and promotion related, so it needs not only observation but 
also report. There is a fear among academics that report will cause them problems, so 
some academics are not willing to take part in peer observation. 
Another reason for peer observation having had little impact on undergraduate 
teaching is because it is quite hard for colleagues to criticize each other during the 
observation. One reason is because their teaching is good and the observer doesn't 
have much to say. The other could be that they are colleagues, it could be easier and 
more friendly to say: ' it is jolly good' to the observee than telling the observee that 
his/her teaching needs to be improved. 
Memo: 
This suggests that the implementation of peer observation in the department needs 
improvement, because some academics haven't got a clear idea of what peer 
observation is. It might be that academics haven't got time to read the guidelines of 
PO provided by the university or maybe they don't want to be bothered with reading 
the guidelines. It is tentative to say that the neglecting of regulations could contradict 
academics' claim that they are professionals, because it is professional' responsibility 
to understand certain regulations concerning their work. 
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